


UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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THE HISTORY

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VOL. IV.

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CHAPTER XXIX.

Affairs of the GRECIAN Settlements in SICILY and ITALY; from the ATHENIAN Invasion, to the Settlement of the SYRACUSAN Government under DIONYSIUS and HIPPARINUS.

SECTION I.

Authorities for the Sequel of Grecian History. Sicilian Affairs following the Athenian Invasion. Administration and Legislation of Diocles at Syracuse.

WHSOEVER may engage in the investigation of Grecian history among the original authors, whether writing for others, or only reading for himself, cannot but feel, at the period where we are now arrived, the loss of regular guidance from those cotemporary with the events, citizens of the republics they describe, conversant with the politics and warfare of the time, eyewitnesses, or generally acquainted with eyewitnesses of the facts they relate. After the death of Epameinondas, with which Xenophon's narrative ends, the only account of Grecian affairs, aiming at connection, is that of the Sicilian Diodorus, who lived above three hundred years after, in the time of Augustus

Cæsar. In this long interval, the establishment, first of the Macedonian, and afterward of the Roman empire, had so altered and overwhelmed the former politics of the civilized world, that they were no more to be gathered but from books, in the age of Diodorus, than at this day.

Many valuable works of elder writers were indeed extant, of which a few sentences only, preserved in quotations, are now known to exist. Very interesting portions of Sicilian history were published by men of eminent abilities, whose means of information were not inferior to those of Xenophon and Thucydides, but whose interests and passions, according to remaining report, more tinged their narratives. Diodorus, who had these materials before him, was a scholar of some eloquence, and apparently a well-meaning man; but very ill qualified, either by experience in politics and war, or by communication among statesmen and military men, or by natural acuteness of judgment, to sift the truth from the various falsehood and sophistication in which party-writers would studiously inwrap it. The circumstances of his age also led Diodorus to prejudices. Roman liberty, never assured by a good constitution, was, after many bloody struggles, then just finally crushed by a military despotism, pervading the civilized world. Men of letters, indignant at the event, were compelled to silence about it; yet when none could any longer oppose openly the gigantic tyranny, a kind of masked war was waged against it, in treating sometimes of early Roman, but oftener of Grecian history. This purpose, which may be observed extensive among the writers of both nations, in the first ages of the Roman empire, is conspicuous in Diodorus. Warm in the cause of civil liberty, he has adopted, without discrimination, the party prejudices of those whom he supposed animated in the same way; tho' their principal object has too often been only to promote the interest, or veil the crimes, of a faction. In abridging then, as his extensive plan of universal history required, often he has evidently missed the meaning of political and military writers whom he proposed to follow: but, far worse than this, he has often omitted leading and connecting facts, the most necessary toward a right understanding of following matter. In remark, rarely deserving attention, he is sometimes even puerile. His honesty nevertheless gives him value; and even the contradictions,

traditions, into which, in collecting materials from different authors, he has fallen, tho vexatious and disgusting to a hasty reader, yet while, to a careful observer, they often evince his honesty, they sometimes also show those truths which a more ingenious writer, with the same prejudices, would not have afforded opportunity to discover.

For the deficiencies of Diodorus's generally concise, and frequently broken narrative, Plutarch offers, for detached portions of history, the most copious supply remaining. Plutarch, living about a century and half later than Diodorus, possessed yet probably all the stores of former knowledge undiminished. But while, in Sicily, men versed in civil and military business were induced, by the interest they felt in the wars and revolutions in which they bore a share, to transmit accounts of them to posterity, another description of writers arose and flourished in various parts of Greece. The numerous schools of philosophy had long been the seminaries to prepare youth for high fortune through political or military eminence. They had lately opened means for the acquisition of great wealth, by merely teaching eloquence and politics. Ingenuity, incited by the desire of gain, proceeded then to find new channels, and literature itself was made a trade; a branch of which, perhaps the most profitable, was something very analogous to modern news-writing. The principal difference was that, as the news of the day could not be circulated by writing as by the press, the writer was obliged to take a more extended period; and like our monthly and annual publishers of news, to digest his matter with more care, whence his work became dignified with the title of history. But nothing more invites the curiosity of the many than the private history of eminent persons. Panegyric will have charms for some: but satire of eminent living characters, managed with any dexterity, is always highly alluring to the multitude, and forces the attention even of the calumniated and their friends. Greece then, divided into so many states, jealous each of its separate jurisdiction and peculiar jurisprudence, afforded extraordinary opportunity for safety to libellers; and safety not only against penalties of law, but also against that conviction of falsehood which, by overthrowing reputation, might ruin the author's trade; because, while, in every republic, curiosity was alive to

accounts of persons eminent in any other, means to sift the truth of any account were generally wanting. Writers of what was called the history of the times, thus became very numerous, and men of great talents and acquirements were induced to engage in the business. As then the general licentiousness was excessive, the falsehood, most invensively and wrongfully attributed by some Roman authors to Grecian history without reserve, has been fairly enough charged against those of the ages after Xenophon, who might perhaps be more fitly called news-writers and anecdote-writers than historians.

With such materials abounding before him, Plutarch, in the leisure of the Roman empire, under the benignant government of Trajan, conceived the design of showing the principal characters of Grecian history in advantageous comparison with the most eminent of the Roman. Viewing then with just regret the degraded state of mankind under the existing despotism, and from horrors recently past, notwithstanding the advantageous character and conduct of the reigning prince, foreboding the probability of a renewal of them, his purpose appears to have been to spread, with the fame of his own nation, a spirit of revolution and democracy. It has been, injuriously for him, too extensively held, among modern writers, that he was to be considered as an historian, whose authority might be quoted for matters of fact, with the same confidence as that of Thucydides or Xenophon, or Cæsar or Tacitus. Sometimes indeed he undertakes historical discussion, or relating different reports, leaves judgement on them to his reader. When truth thus appears his object, his matter is valuable for the historian. But generally to do justice to his great work, his *Lives*, it should apparently be considered that, next at least to panegyric of his nation, example, political and moral, was his purpose, and not historical information. Indeed he has in plain terms disavowed the office of historian: he writes *lives*, he says, and not *histories*¹. But to produce striking characters, his constant aim, he appears much to have sought private history. Authorities however for this are rarely to be found of any certainty; and little scrupulous as he has shown himself about transactions the most public, concerning which he often contradicts,

¹ "Οτι γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους. V. Alex. init.

without reserve or apology, not only the highest authorities, but even himself, it can hardly be supposed that he would scrutinize, with great solicitude, the testimonies to private anecdotes, if even sometimes he did not indulge his invention². With the same political principles, and prejudices and purposes as Diodorus, far more ingenious, he has been however, in political and military knowlege, equally deficient. Diodorus, tho a zealot for democracy, or what, having never seen it, he supposed democracy to be, has sometimes described its evils in just and strong colors. Plutarch is still more unequal and uncertain. When led by his subject to exercise his judgement, he could see that civil freedom can be no way secure but through a balance of powers in a state; or possibly he may have followed Cicero's authority in asserting that a combination of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, would make the best government; for at other times we find him an inconsistent and even furious advocate of the pure democratical cause.

Plut. v. Dion.

v. Themist.
& Timol.

The partialities then of these two writers being considered, together with the indifference of one of them to historical truth, when illustration or panegyric was his object, we may generally gather where to trust, and where to doubt them. When they report facts adverse to their known partialities, which happens often from the honesty of Diodorus, and sometimes from the carelessness of Plutarch, credit will of course be given them. But when the tale, conformed to their prejudices, bears appearance of exaggeration, distortion, or invention, whether their own or of others from whom they have gleaned, we must inquire if it accords with the course of history, with well-attested events and well-attested characters; if it is consistent with all that the author himself has related; and more especially if it is in any degree either supported or contradicted by those earlier extant writers, some

² Plutarch's deficiencies, as an historian, can escape none who may have occasion to examine him critically. The notice taken of them by some writers has been mentioned on former occasions. I will add here that of a learned and acute critic, the baron de Sainte Croix. ' Personne n'ignore que les ' vies des hommes illustres sont des tableaux ' peu corrects; ou l'expression est superieure

' a l'ordonnance. Cet historien (Plutarch) ' ne rassemble des faits que pour donner des ' leçons, & ne raconte que pour avoir l'occa- ' sion et le droit de réfléchir. Un pareil ' plan ne peut être que fort nuisible a l'exac- ' titude. Quelle confusion aussi ne trouve- ' t-on pas dans les différens recits de cet ' historien ! Examen critique des historiens d'Alexandre, prem. sect.

of them cotemporary with the transactions, from whom we gain occasional and sometimes large assistance: such assistance must always be of high value.

One more writer, Justin, may require notice here, only because he is commonly quoted with the others. His general abridgement is too scanty and imperfect to be of much use to the historian, and his selection of more detailed matter, to inviven it, is too commonly of extravagant tales, unknown or uncredited by other authors.

Among the deficiencies of historical materials, not least to be regretted, is the failure of means for tracing the causes of the wonderful prosperity of some of the SICILIAN cities; a prosperity so extraordinary, that we might perhaps reasonably deny belief to report of it, the best attested, if monuments yet existing, which have survived, some of them two thousand years, the ruin of those cities, did not afford proof incontestable. And here strikingly appears, what before we have had occasion to observe, how much misfortunes, and crimes, and miseries ingage and force the notice of the cotemporary recorder of events, more than blessings and virtues, and the happiness of nations. The sources of the calamities, for which the Sicilian, even more than most of the other Grecian settlements, were remarkable, are in large proportion opened to us; but to account for their prosperity, more wonderful from the frequency and magnitude of interfering troubles, we are left to conjecture, and even for conjecture sometimes hardly find probable ground.

We have formerly observed the Grecian settlements in Sicily divided into many small republics, and the same consequence resulting as in Greece itself, the inability of each to maintain the independency which was the favorite object of all. Syracuse was generally the leading state of Sicily, as Lacedæmon of Greece. When all the Grecian interest in the island was threatened with subjugation by the imperial democracy of Athens, the government of Syracuse was democratical, and, perhaps as nearly as any ever was, a pure democracy. The necessity for new subordination, arising from the pressure of the Athenian arms, produced some improvement of so licentious a constitution, and

placed Hermocrates son of Hermen, at the head of affairs. But as a keen feeling of great evil, and anxious fear of greater impending, alone brought the sovereign many to that temper which enabled so excellent a man to take the lead, so, immediately as calamity and alarm subsided, others prevailed against him. In vain he opposed the nefarious decree for the death of the Athenian generals, and for the atrocious cruelty which followed to the captive army. The author of that decree was Diocles, already eminent for his favor with the multitude, acquired by turbulent forwardness in asserting their absolute sovereignty, and violent invective against all in power. Success led to farther success, and Diocles quickly overthrew the government established by Hermocrates, which Aristotle has described by the respectable title of polity, and restored that tumultuary government, by which the Syracusan affairs had been administered before the Athenian invasion. Under such circumstances a foreign command would be for Hermocrates a refuge. Accordingly he promoted a decree for the Syracusan state to pay its debt of gratitude to Lacedæmon, by joining in offensive war against Athens; and the armament was in consequence equipped, which we have formerly seen earning honor for its country under his orders in Asia.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 19.

Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 4.

Before Christ
412.
Olympiad
92. 1.

The result however, as we have also formerly seen, was unfortunate for himself. In his absence his adversaries so prevailed in Syracuse, that, within the twelvemonth, he was superseded in his foreign command. Still parties were so balanced that his friends presently procured his restoration. But soon after a more violent effort of party not only deprived him again of his command, but condemned him, and those most attached to him, to banishment. The principal officers of his army were included in the sentence, and numbers of the citizens at home, whether by a positive decree, or by fear of consequences, were also driven from their country.

Ch. 19. s. 3.
of this Hist.

B. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

The power of the party adverse to Hermocrates being thus established, and the deficiencies of the new or restored government being abundantly obvious, Diocles took upon himself the office of legislator. The democratical form was retained as the basis of his constitution. Of his laws one only remains reported, denouncing

Diod. l. 13.
c. 53.

Aristot. Polit. 1. 5. c. 1.

death against any who should enter the place of civil assembly in arms. This law exhibits a striking feature of democracy, and it appears to mark in the legislator a zeal for that form of government, accompanied with a conviction of difficulty and almost impossibility to carry it through in practice. Aristotle evidently considered the change from the constitution of Hermocrates to that of Diocles as a change greatly for the worse; and Diodorus, not a panegyrist of Diocles himself, tho a friend to his party, speaks of the new code as remarkable for nothing so much as the severity with which it was executed. To keep order in a democracy may require more severity than in other forms of government; and there seems ground for believing that the constitution of Diocles was not without ability adapted to the purpose. It is evident that he established some constitutional restraint upon popular extravagance: it appears even that he raised a kind of aristocratical body to great weight in the government; and, how far it was provided for by law, we know not, but he so managed that, in fact, one chief held the supreme executive authority, civil and military, and he was himself that chief.

SECTION II.

Divisions among the Sicilians. Carthaginian Invasion under Hannibal. Sieges of Selinus and Himera. Return of Hermocrates to Sicily.

BUT whatever may have been the merits of the legislation of Diocles, the revolution, which gave occasion for it, produced very unfortunate consequences for the whole Grecian interest in Sicily. Under Hermocrates that interest had been united. When the democratical party prevailed against him in Syracuse, tho the aristocratical would in other cities be shaken, yet it did not equally fall; Syracusan influence could no longer hold all united, and the Grecian cause was broken.

Ch. 48. of this Hist.

A war, it will be remembered, between two little republics at the farther end of the island, led to that scourge of Syracuse and of Sicily the Athenian invasion. The people of Egesta, overborne by the people of Selinus, who obtained assistance from Syracuse, were without resource but in external aid, which was sought and received from Athens. While then the Athenian arms pressed upon the Syracusans

and

and their allies, the Egestans were relieved; but, with the catastrophe of the Athenian forces, followed by the downfall of the influence of Hermocrates, their situation became even more perilous than before; inasmuch as the exasperation of their enemies was increased, the hope of liberality from Syracuse was lessened, and all prospect of a protecting power anywhere among the Grecian states was done away. One glimpse of safety only remained: tho all chance of Grecian protection failed, yet it might be possible to obtain the patronage of a barbarian power; and this was a resource which had not been scrupled sometimes by people of purer Grecian blood than the Egestans, who were a mixed race. The rival city itself, Selinus, tho boasting a population completely Grecian, had been, as we have formerly seen, the ally of Carthage against Syracuse; and it was the resort of an expelled party from Himera, also a Grecian city, to the same barbarian power, that produced the formidable invasion which was repressed by the memorable victory, obtained under the conduct of the illustrious Gelon.

Ch. 5. s. 2.
& Ch. 10.
s. 1. of this
Hist.

Ch. 10. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Since that victory, now above seventy years, the Carthaginian government had made no considerable exertion for the recovery of its dominion in Sicily. The protection of its suffering allies of Egesta seems to have afforded now no unreasonable pretext for interfering again in arms. In the third summer after the conclusion of the fatal expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse, a Carthaginian army arrived, not less powerful, perhaps, than that whose defeat raised Gelon's military fame. The historian Ephorus, following apparently the more extravagant of the accounts which passed into Greece, ventured to state the infantry alone at two hundred thousand; the horse he called four thousand. But Timæus, a Sicilian, likely to have had means of information, without partialities of a kind to induce him to underrate the Carthaginian number, reckoned the whole force little more than one hundred thousand. With this account Xenophon's judgement led him to concur, so far that, in cursory mention of the expedition, he calls the Carthaginian army a hundred thousand men. The commander-in-chief was Hannibal, grandson, according to Diodorus, of Hamilcar, who fell in the battle of Himera. The force brought from Africa was landed at the western extremity of the island, near Lilybæum. Han-

B. C. 410.
Ol. 92. $\frac{2}{3}$.
Dodwell,
chron. Xen.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 54—58.

Xen. Hel.
l. 1. c. 1.
s. 27.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 59.

nibal was presently joined by the Egestans, together with the Sicilian subjects of Carthage, and he proceeded to revenge its allies by marching against Selinus. The port, situated at the mouth of the little river Mazara, yielded to his first assault, and siege was laid to the city.

What Selinus was remains to this day testified by ruins, among the most magnificent of human works existing, tho, two thousand years ago, Strabo described it as a town destroyed, and the place almost a desert. How a people commanding so narrow a territory, without fame for commerce, any more than for politics or war, acquired means to raise such works, we find no information. But we learn that the public wealth, which, to a large amount, whencesoever arising, they certainly possessed, was employed more in public ornament and popular luxury, than in what should have given strength to the state. Temples, baths, processions, and festivals, consumed what should have raised fortifications and maintained military discipline, which might have given security in more moderate enjoynments. Aware of the insufficiency of their own means to resist the might of Carthage, the Selinuntines had implored help from all the Grecian cities of their island; urging, with evident reason, the interest of all to save them from the threatened ruin. But tho their solicitations were kindly received, and the justness of their representations acknowledged, yet the many independent republics feared each to give its single assistance, and to bring them to coöperation was a complex business and slow. Agrigentum and Gela, tho marked by situation for the next attack, waited for Syracuse; and Syracuse waited to collect the force of all the towns in which it had command or influence, as likely all to be little enough for the occasion.

While succour was thus delayed, after a siege of only nine days, the walls of Selinus were forced. The greater part of the men in arms, assembling in the agora, were overpowered, and put to the sword. Amid rapine and every sort of violence, an indiscriminate massacre followed, of both sexes and all ages. On such an occasion, an army composed, after the common method of Carthage, of troops engaged by hire from various barbarous nations, was not to be readily restrained. The humanity of the general however was neither slowly nor ineffectually exerted,

exerted, and yet sixteen thousand persons are said to have been slain. Five thousand men were nevertheless spared as prisoners, and orders for abstaining from all violence toward the multitude of women and children who had sought refuge in the temples, were duly respected. Between two and three thousand, of both sexes, escaped by flight to Agrigentum. Diod. 1. 13. c. 57.

Information of the fate of Selinus struck terror throughout the Grecian cities of Sicily. The Agrigentine and Syracusan governments agreed in the resolution to try negotiation. A mission from them, liberally received by the Carthaginian general, failed however of its object. The subjugation of the island indeed seems to have been Hannibal's purpose; in the prosecution of which, however, his conduct was that of the officer of a great and civilized state, and not of a leader of barbarians. The Carthaginians appear to have been not strangers to the generous policy, which we have seen ordinary among the Persians, for holding a conquered people in subjection. There was a party among the Selinuntines, apparently subsisting from Gelon's age, disposed to friendly connection with Carthage, and averse to those measures, whatever they were, which, with the vengeance of that powerful state, had now superinduced the ruin of their city. Empedion, a principal man of that party, was among those who had fled to Agrigentum. Upon the failure of the mission from that city and Syracuse, his fellow fugitives desired to commit their interests to him. They found themselves then not deceived in their hope of Hannibal's liberality. All were restored to their homes and possessions; required only to pay an annual tribute to Carthage, and forbidden to restore the demolished fortifications of their city. Diod. 1. 13. c. 59.

Among the many Grecian republics in Sicily, claiming independency, it was seldom that some one, either through illiberality of the government, or lawlessness of the people, was not, by some injustice, offending the Sican and Sicel tribes, which still held the center of the island. Generally therefore those unfortunate barbarians preferred a connection with the powerful state of Carthage. The Sicans, who held the western parts, had mostly joined Hannibal on his arrival. His success against Selinus brought the rest, with many of the Sicels, to

solicit that they also might be admitted to alliance. Strengthened with their forces, he proceeded to lay siege to Himera.

The Syracuse held at this time no decisive lead among the Sicilian Greek cities, yet, in the pressure of danger, all looked to it with a disposition to respect its claims to authority as the most powerful state. Diocles, possessing the civil supremacy there, commanded of course the means for adding to it the military; and thus became general-in-chief of the combined forces which marched to relieve Himera. On his arrival he ventured a battle, in which, with some slaughter of the enemy, he was however finally unsuccessful, and forced to seek shelter within the city walls.³ Rumor there met him, that the Carthaginian fleet was gone to Syracuse. In vehement alarm, probably apprehensive of some party movement not less than of the foreign enemy, he resolved to lead his forces home. Fearing however the pursuit of the victorious Carthaginians, if he went by land, he commanded the attendance of the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes, from different cities of the confederacy, which lay in the harbour. In vain the wretched Himeraeans solicited the continuance of that protection which it was the purpose of the allied cities, furnishing the fleet, to afford them. In vain it was urged to him that the bodies of many Syracusans remained on the field of battle unburied. The insufficiency only of the vessels to receive at once his whole force, induced him to leave half of it till the fleet could return. Some of the wives and children of the Himeraeans however were taken aboard. He sailed himself with the first division.

This desertion of the man charged with the supreme care of the Grecian interest in Sicily, seems to have produced that kind of dissolution of military discipline and civil order among the unfortunate Himeraeans which made the defence of the place impossible. On the same night on which Diocles fled in safety by sea, numbers of the Himeraean people engaged in the hazardous attempt to fly by land; and it appears that many succeeded. Nevertheless the remainder de-

³ In this unsuccessful battle, for such it is acknowledged to have been, six thousand Carthaginians were asserted by Timæus to have fallen, and Ephorus did not scruple to say more than twenty thousand. Diod.

l. 13. c. 60. We might excuse some moderate exaggeration in Timæus as a Sicilian, but the extravagance of Ephorus in stating numbers, on this and other occasions, cannot but a little weaken his general credit.

fended the town through the next day. On the following morning, the fleet returning, after having landed Diocles, was already in sight, when the Carthaginian engines had made a breach in the wall sufficient for storming, and assault through it was successful. The same horrors ensued as on the capture of Selinus, only less extensive, as the town was smaller, and the population lessened by flight.

The authority of Hannibal, however, again generously exerted, stopped the slaughter. Too often we find the Greek not less than the Roman writers venting most illiberal invective against the Carthaginians, and especially imputing atrocious cruelty. In loose imputation Diodorus is as vehement as any; but his honesty in narrative, correcting the injustice of his declamation, shows eulogy due where he directs his invective. What he proceeds to relate, however, may be not unfounded. Hannibal, he says, diligently inquired for the spot where his grandfather, Hamilcar, fell in the battle with Gelon; and with solemn ceremony he sacrificed there three thousand prisoners. Exaggeration may be suspected in the number; but the principle, we are well assured, was familiar, not only with the Carthaginians, but with the early Greeks, and something very like it with the Romans even in their highest civilization. Establishing garrisons for the security of the country he had subdued, and of the people who had engaged in alliance with him, Hannibal then returned to Carthage.

It was in these critical circumstances that Hermocrates, furnished by the generous satrap Pharnabazus with money for the express purpose, according to Xenophon, of procuring a naval and military force that might reëstablish him in his country, arrived at Messina, where the government was friendly to him; and it appears probable that intelligence of this had contributed to decide Diocles to his hasty and uncreditable flight from Himera. The name of Hermocrates, alarming to Diocles and his immediate partizans, gave new hope to numbers, before despairing of the Grecian cause in Sicily. Those Himeraeans who had succeeded in the hazardous measure of flying by land, instead of going to Syracuse, whither the fugitives, favored by Diocles with the passage by sea were conveyed, preferred putting themselves under the protection and command of Hermocrates at Messina.

Xen. Hel.
l. i. c. 1.
s. 22.

So far the uncommon virtue of this party leader has been rewarded with uncommon good fortune, that writers of all parties have borne testimony to his merit, and not one has imputed to him an evil action. The troops who served under him in Asia were ready to go all lengths with him against the party in Syracuse which had driven him into banishment; but he declared to them his resolution to use no violence against the existing government of his country, however unjustly he and his adherents might have suffered from it. Not only Xenophon, who esteemed him highly, bears this testimony expressly, but Diodorus, whose prejudices were strong in favor of the opposite party, shows that a resolution so becoming a virtuous statesman of enlarged views, and so singular among Grecian patriots, controlled the measures of Hermocrates. At Messera, favored by its government, he built five triremes, and engaged about a thousand soldiers for pay. About an equal number of fugitive Himereans resolved, without pay, to follow his fortune. He hoped that the meer reputation of this force might have the effect of enabling his numerous friends, in Syracuse, to regain the ascendancy in the general assembly; but, that hope failing, he turned his views another way, still with the same purpose of enabling his friends to prevail against his adversaries, in legal course, through the interest that he might acquire by essential service to his city against its foreign enemies, without violence against itself.

This view was opened to him through his antient interest, among the Grecian cities, among the Sicels, and, in general, throughout the island. Hannibal, in returning with his victorious army to Africa, left the town of Selinus to those of its citizens, with Empedion at their head, who had shown a disposition to the Carthaginian connection. The more eminent and active of the opposite party were in exile; the fortifications in ruin. We have seen it a common policy of the Athenians, for holding conquered places in subjection, to demolish their walls; and such seems on this occasion to have been the policy of the Carthaginians. The need of Carthaginian protection would make those who held Selinus, a faithful, though a weak garrison for Carthage.

On a knowledge of these circumstances Hermocrates formed his plan.

While

While it was yet winter he marched by the less practised inland road, and coming upon the town unexpectedly, entered it unresisted. The exiles were of course restored. No violence appears to have followed to Empedion's party, except that, of course, the powers of government passed into the hands of the friends of Hermocrates. For security against the Carthaginians, fortifications would now be indispensable. But the numbers that could be trusted were unequal to the defence of the wide extent of the old city. A convenient part only therefore was refortified, and thus a strong hold was provided for the friends of the Grecian cause, on the verge of the Carthaginian part of the island.

Hermocrates proceeded then to carry hostility against the general enemies of the Greeks. He plundered successively the Motyene and the Panormitan territories; and the people of each risking action with him separately, he defeated both. After this, no force venturing beyond the protection of walls to oppose him, he plundered and ravaged the whole of the country acknowledging the sovereignty or alliance of Carthage. Laden thus with spoil, he led back his troops highly gratified, both those who engaged gratuitously in adventure with him, and those to whom he was bound for pay, to enjoy themselves for the rest of the winter in Selinus.

It appeared, to the Sicilian people of all descriptions, an interesting phenomenon, that the united Grecian interest, with the powerful Syracuse at its head, should have been unable to prevent the overthrow of two principal Grecian cities by a foreign power, and that, immediately after, an exile from Syracuse should not only recover one of those cities, but carry war successfully through the enemy's country. An impression strongly in favour of Hermocrates followed, throughout the Grecian states and in Syracuse itself. He resolved to improve the impression, especially in Syracuse. Early in spring, he went to Himera, and inquiring diligently for the spot where the Syracusan troops under Diocles had fallen, he caused the bones to be carefully collected. Placing them on carriages splendidly decorated, in funeral style, he conducted them, with a strong escort, to the Syracusan border. With ostentatious respect then for the laws of his country,

avoiding

B. C. 408.
 Ol. 92. 4.
 § 3. 1.
 Dioc. l. 12.
 c. 75.

avoiding to go himself any farther, he committed the procession to others not involved in the decree of banishment.

The arrival of this extraordinary funeral pomp at the gate of Syracuse excited strong feelings in the city. The people assembled. Diocles endeavoured to evince the absurdity of paying honors to relics sent by an unhallowed exile, which might be those, he said, of other exiles, or of any rather than of loyal Syracusans. He could not however overcome the popular sentiment, which was so excited, that not only a public burial was given to the relics, the whole people attending, but Diocles was obliged to abscond. An effort was then made by the friends of Hermocrates to procure a decree for his restoration; but the artful eloquence of the partizans of Diocles prevented. The merit of Hermocrates they did not deny; but a great superiority, even of merit, they affirmed was dangerous in a democracy. If, while an exile, by his single authority and influence, he could raise a force to do more against the Carthaginians than all the Sicilian cities together, what could oppose him in Syracuse, were he once reädmitted there? It was evident that he not only could, but would, and to secure himself, perhaps must, they said, assume the tyranny.

Again thus disappointed, Hermocrates persevered in the resolution to avoid all violence, and withdrew quietly to Selinus. But it is unlikely that his friends in Syracuse, after what had passed, could rest in quiet there. It is unlikely that his opponents would remain satisfied with their civil victory, so hardly gained, and not follow it up with measures against their adversaries, which might secure their tottering power. The friends of Hermocrates therefore urgently claimed that assistance and protection which the force at his command inabled him to give. Their intreaties and remonstrances at length induced him to march three thousand men through the Geloän territory to the Syracusan border. Still however he would not enter the Syracusan territory with any appearance of hostility; but leaving his troops on the frontier, he went, attended by a few friends only, to Syracuse. His friends there had taken care to secure his entrance by the gate of Achradina; but it seems to have been his own resolution still to avoid force, and

trust

trust himself to the assembled people. That he had not miscalculated his interest with the people appears from the mode of opposition used by his adversaries. In defiance of the law of Diocles, an armed body entered the agora, and Hermocrates was killed. Many of his friends fell with him, and the rest saved themselves only by flight or concealment. An assembly of the people, such as might be where an armed force commanded, was then held, and decrees of death or banishment were issued, as the authors of the successful violence directed.

Whether Diocles was personally concerned in these transactions, we have no direct information, nor does any mention occur of him after the death of Hermocrates. We can only on conjecture therefore attribute to this time the remarkable account given of his death by Diodorus, in treating of his legislation. Diocles was leading the Syracusan forces out of the city, says the historian, not mentioning against what enemy, when information was brought him of tumult in the agora, with indications of sedition. In alarm he hastened thither, armed as he was, thoughtless of his own law, by which the penalty of death was decreed against those who should enter the agora with arms. Some one observing to him that he seemed to scorn his own statute, he was so stung with the reproach, that, with an oath averring he would show the force of his law, he drew his sword, and killed himself. This story is such as, with or without ground, his friends would be likely to propagate, if he fell, as seems not improbable, in the tumult which deprived Syracuse and Sicily of the invaluable life of Hermocrates. Diod. l. 13.
c. 33.

Nevertheless, gathering as we best may from the uncertain light afforded by Diodorus, Diocles seems to have been a man of more honest zeal in the cause of democracy than was often found among leading men in the Grecian republics; and thence perhaps the party-writers of the times, whom Diodorus and Plutarch followed, have reported his actions with less warmth of panegyric than those of some others professing the same principles, who, with less real deference to them, promoted more the private interest of their supporters. His political successes however appear to have been more owing to a forward, active, undaunted and indefatigable boldness, than to any great talents,

and as a military commander he was clearly deficient. Very unequal to the lead of the affairs of Syracuse and of Sicily, in the existing crisis, yet of a temper incapable of acting under a superior, his death seems to have been rather a relief than a loss, perhaps even to his own party.

SECTION III.

Second Expedition of Hannibal into Sicily. Prosperity of Agrigentum. Siege of Agrigentum.

By the death of Hermocrates, the fair hope of union among the Sicilian Greek cities, which, with peace within might have given strength against enemies without, was instantly dissipated, and all the advantages which his exertions had gained to the Grecian cause were presently lost. Selinus and Himera fell again under the dominion, or into the interest of Carthage. Report came of new preparations in Africa. Alarm arose everywhere, and nowhere was found a man on whose talents and character there was any public disposition to rely. The Syracusans sent a deputation to Carthage, to deprecate war. Prayers are not commonly efficacious for such a purpose. The Carthaginian government dismissed the deputies with a dubious answer, and the preparations went on. Presently after a multitude from Africa was landed on the Sicilian coast, at a place called, from some springs of hot water, Therma, within the Selinuntine territory, now subject to Carthage, but on the border of the Agrigentine. No hostility was committed, but it was alarming enough to the Greeks, and especially the Agrigentines, to find that this multitude was to establish itself there as a Carthaginian colony*.

Soon however it became manifest that the purpose of the Carthaginian government was not limited to this peaceful way of extending empire. Information arrived of a vast army collecting, in the common

* Probably the Carthaginians had another name for their colony. The Grecian appellation Θέρμα ἰδάρτα, was rather a description,

till the first word came to be, for colloquial convenience, used alone, as a name. We read of another Therma, near Himera.

way of Carthaginian armies, from the various shores to which the Carthaginian commerce extended, of Africa, Spain, Gaul, Italy, the Balearic islands, and perhaps Sardinia and Corsica, tho, of the islanders, the Balearians only were of fame. A large fleet was at the same time prepared, and the whole armament was committed to the orders of Hannibal, who had commanded the late expedition into Sicily. Age and growing infirmities, it is said, induced that general to desire excuse, but he obtained indulgence only so far that his kinsman Imilcon, son of Hanno, was appointed his second in the command. We are however too much without information, equally of the state of politics and parties, as of the interests of individuals at this time at Carthage, to know how to appreciate the little remaining from Diodorus about them. What became notorious to the Greeks was the destination of this great armament for Sicily.¹

Diod. 1. 13.
c. 88.

Among the Grecian cities of that island, political connection was far too defective for any adequate preparations against the threatened storm. Measures of precaution indeed were not totally neglected, but they appear to have been taken under no clear or digested plan. A fleet of observation was sent out, chiefly of Syracusan ships. Off the headland of Eryx it fell in with a Carthaginian fleet of nearly equal force. A battle ensued; the Syracusans were victorious, and took fifteen ships; and yet this event, as a decided beginning of war, seems to have diffused more alarm than encouragement among the Sicilian Greeks.

Ol. 93. $\frac{2}{3}$
B. C. 406.
Diod. 1. 13.
c. 80.

¹ We find this name Imilcon variously written in our copies of Diodorus, where the same person is unquestionably intended. It is first Imilcon, then Imileas, then Amileas, then it becomes again Imileas, and finally resumes the first form Imilcon. Diodorus has probably, in gathering his narrative from different writers, copied the different attempts of Grecian pens to represent one and the same Phœnician name, which the Romans wrote Amilear or Hamilear, differing only in the use or omission of the prefixed aspirate. All these forms

appear to have, for their root, the Hebrew word *Melck*, now in Arabic *Melk*, or *Malk*, signifying King. The name which, from Carthaginian pronuntiation, the Greeks wrote *Ἀμων*, and the Romans Hanno, seems to be the same with that which from Hebrew pronuntiation they wrote *Ἰωάννης*, and Johannes, *John*. Bal, Baal, or Belus, was an added title of dignity, signifying *lord*; so that Hannibal was equivalent to Johannes dominus, *lord John*, and Asdrubal to Esdras dominus, *lord Esdras*.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 81.

Impelled by the pressure of circumstances, the Syracusan government now assumed a lead in the direction of the political and military concerns of the island. This was facilitated by the prevalence of the democratical cause in most of the cities, as in Syracuse, and by a sense of the same pressure in all. Ministers were dispatched to every one, to exhort, says the historian, and incourage the multitude⁶. Embassies were sent also to the Italian states and to Lacedæmon; urging the former as implicated in the danger, the latter as the patron state of the Greek, and especially of the Dorian name. These measures appear to have been, in a general view, what the circumstances required; but the able mind, capable of conciliating adverse interests, arranging and simplifying complex and divided businesses, ingaging confidence, and inciting energy, was wanting, and so the effect was small. Meanwhile the naval victory gained by the Greeks had, according to intelligence, not at all checked the Carthaginian preparations; which were of a magnitude indicating that the purpose could not be merely to support the new colony, and defend the present possessions of Carthage in Sicily, but rather to make the conquest of the whole island sure.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 81.

Numerous circumstances marked Agrigentum as the city likely first to feel the coming storm. Agrigentum was among those phenomena of political prosperity, concerning which we should most desire, and least possess, information. Far more known to historical fame than Selinus, yet the wonderful relics of its ancient magnificence are not needless testimonies to the truth of what history, silent, or little better than silent, about its means of acquiring, has told of its wealth and splendor⁷. The fertility of its soil, and the good management of its oliveyards and vineyards, are mentioned, without being described. More however certainly was wanting; there must have been commerce of some other kind, to draw the concourse of freemen resident in

⁶ Ἐπίειλλον τοὺς παρορμήσαντας τὰ πλεόντα.

⁷ Arduus inde Agragas ostentat maxima longe

Mœnia, magnaminum quondam generator equorum. Virg. Æn. 3. 704.

Agrigentum,

Agrigentum, who were not Agrigentian citizens. If we may trust Diodorus the free inhabitants were two hundred thousand; of whom the citizens were only a tenth part. If the slaves then were only four hundred thousand, the proportion would be lower than in many other Grecian republics; but we are given to believe it was higher than in most. Such then was the public wealth, that the public buildings, not even now wholly destroyed, exceeded all that had to that time been seen in Grecian cities. The pillars of the temple of Jupiter were so vast that a man might stand in the flutings. This was esteemed the most magnificent of the edifices of Agrigentum, tho wanting a roof, which the insuing misfortunes of the city prevented its ever receiving. An artificial lake, without the walls, as a luxury singular in its kind, had particular celebrity. It was six furlongs in circuit and thirty feet deep; fed by aqueducts with perpetual springs; stocked with fish, and aquatic birds, especially swans. While thus it contributed largely to the public banquets, it was for the exercise of swimming, and for the amusement of walking on its banks, a favourite place of public resort. Agrigentum was also remarkable for a kind of building of most important use in great cities, which yet seems to have been little common in Greece. Not however the novelty only, but the magnitude, and excellent construction of its sewers brought fame to the architect Phæax, so that his name became the common Grecian term for a sewer. Diod. l. 13.

While the public wealth of the city was thus advantageously employed, the magnificence of individuals among the citizens furnished anecdotes, not only to incite panegyric in their own day, but to ingage the notice even of those who lived amid all the extravagance of public splendor and private luxury in the last days of the Roman republic and the first of the empire. The hospitality of Gellias was celebrated by poets and historians. His house had numerous apartments, appropriated to the reception of strangers, and servants were employed to inquire for those who were not fortunate enough to bring a recommendation to the magnificent owner. Where hospitality was so extensive, men on military service would not fail of attention. A body of five hundred horse arriving once from Gela, in a violent storm, Gellias not only entertained Diod. l. 11. c. 25.

all,

all, but supplied every man with a change of clothing⁸. This anecdote Diodorus has related on the authority of Timæus, a Sicilian writer nearly cotemporary. Another quoted by him, Polyeletus, had personally profited from the hospitality of Gellias, on being called by military duty to Agrigentum. In a history of his time, which he afterward wrote, he described the extraordinary extent of his magnificent host's cellars, excavated in the rock on which the town was built, and the prodigious quantity of wine stored in them⁹.

Gellias seems to have been unrivalled in the permanent splendor of his establishment; but instances are recorded of extraordinary occasional magnificence in others. Antisthenes, at his daughter's wedding, entertained all the Agrigentine citizens, and invited beside the persons of higher rank from the neighbouring cities. More than eight hundred carriages went in the nuptial procession. The time, as usual, was evening twilight. In the moment of the bride's moving, attended by innumerable torches, at a signal given, all the altars in all the temples, and those, which were numerous, in the streets, fraught with the supper for the multitude, blazed at once, producing a splendor as gratifying as it was uncommon. The return of Exænetus, victor in the chariot-race of the ninety-second Olympiad, six years only before the Carthaginian invasion, was celebrated in a manner showing rather extensive wealth among the Agrigentines than his own magnificence. Of very numerous carriages in the procession, no less than three hundred were drawn by white horses; a color particularly esteemed for parade, and therefore sought at high prices.

There seems indeed to have been, within the narrow bounds of the Agrigentine state, as formerly in Holland, an excess of private wealth, beyond reasonable objects of expenditure; and the indications of it were not of a passing kind, like the Dutch tulip-gardens, but, in the spirit of the Greek passion for lasting fame, calculated to bear testimony for centuries. The public magnificence, guided by that just

Diod. l. 13.
c. 82.

⁸ Tho this may appear to the modern reader a most extravagant verbiage, it was, according to Horace, far below that of Lucullus.

⁹ According to Polyeletus, three hundred cisterns, cut in the rock, were commonly kept full of wine.

taste which was, in this age, national among the Greeks, raised those monuments, of which ruins, sufficient to mark what they once were, yet exist. But architects and statuaries derived also great encouragement from the wealth and taste, and in one remarkable instance, from the capricious fancy of individuals. It became common to raise splendid monuments, in the public burying places, to the memory of favorite brutes; not only horses, which might have acquired a renown, with the reputation of something sacred, by victory in the public games, but birds and various domestic animals. Diod. l. 13. c. 90.

In an independent state, consisting of a vast city, commanding a territory scarcely equal to one of our smallest counties; with a public so wealthy and individuals so extravagant, twenty thousand citizens sovereign over a hundred and eighty thousand free subjects, sovereigns and subjects both having individually under them slaves unnumbered, what was the government, how property was secured, how justice administered, how faction and civil disturbance obviated, we inquire among ancient writers in vain. In the endeavour to gain some idea from analogy, if we look to Athens we find many resembling circumstances, but many characteristic differences also. That Agrigentum however had wise institutions, ably adapted to circumstances, cannot be doubted. The amount of its prosperity may alone prove it to have long enjoyed civil quiet, rare of any duration among Grecian cities. Hence a philosopher-poet of the age, celebrating the splendid hospitality of Gellias, called his house 'the respected resort of strangers, 'which evil had never reached'.

But, in a state where the citizens were so wealthy, and, compared with the whole population, so few; where the distinction between a citizen and a free inhabitant not a citizen, involved, in regard to some important points, a total separation and even opposition of interests; where citizens, and free inhabitants not citizens, were equally served by slaves more numerous than both; how was public defence to be provided for? How were the wealthy citizens to be made soldiers, or those not citizens, or not wealthy, to be trusted with arms? The

¹⁰ *Ξίων ἀιδούοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι.* Emped. ap. Diod. l. 13. c. 83.

expediency, or necessity, for the wealthy to be guardians of their own property, was obvious and generally admitted; and in the pressure of war they might be brave and diligent: but to bear, or to be liable continually to the requisition for bearing, the fatigue and restraint and privations incident to a soldier's duty, they might as well not be rich. Accordingly, on being put to trial, the inconvenience arising to the service from the indulgences which the Agrigentines on military duty would provide for themselves, was such as to make a law necessary specially to restrain it. It was decreed that no soldier, on night duty, should have a bed more furnished than with one mattress, a bolster and pillow, a blanket, and a curtain¹¹. This, says Diodorus, being reckoned the hardest manner of resting to be required of a private soldier on duty, it may be guessed what was the attention to ease, and the refinement of luxury, where not so limited.

Such, as far as may be gathered from accounts remaining, was the internal state of Agrigentum. In regard to external politics the Agrigentines appear to have stood at this time much insulated among the Sicilian Greeks. Their government had maintained close connection with the Syracusan, while Syracuse was under the administration of Hermocrates, and both cities were connected with Lacedæmon. But when Hermocrates was banished, the connection between the Syracusan government and the Lacedæmonian seems nearly to have ceased. At the time of which we are treating, Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian, charged with the care of the Lacedæmonian interests in Sicily, was residing at Gela¹². From the same period the Agrigentine government had no cordial connection with Syracuse; but its connection with Lacedæmon remained unimpaired, and its communication with the

¹¹ Perhaps a mosquito or gauznet.

¹² Diodorus says *καταπαύσας ἐν Σιράκουσαις*, l. 13. c. 93. 'stationed at Gela by the Syracusans.' This he has gained probably from his partial guide Timæus, whom he before quotes for an account of Dexippus, c. 85. Beside the improbability that the Syracusan government, in its circumstances at the time, could direct the residence of the

Lacedæmonian commissioner in Sicily, all that precedes and all that follows, in his own history, combine to show that the fact was otherwise. It is observable that Wesseling, in his Latin translation, has passed by the phrase *ἐν Σιράκουσαις*, which he has nevertheless noticed in a note, and yet has not a word to account for his omission of it in translating.

Lacedæmonian minister in Sicily, uninterrupted. When therefore the Agrigentines found themselves particularly threatened by the preparations at Carthage, they applied to Dexippus, who gave readily his personal services. He accepted a commission for raising a force of mercenaries, for which the Lacedæmonian name would at that time afford great advantage, and with a body of fifteen hundred he passed to Agrigentum. We find, in this age, Italians, under the name of Campanians, commonly adventuring for hire in the Sicilian wars. Eight hundred, who had been in the Carthaginian service, were now engaged by the Agrigentines for their defence against the Carthaginians.

Diod. var.
loc.

The army under Hannibal and Imilcon at length landed on the Sicilian shore, entered the Agrigentine territory unopposed, and incamped near the city. The historian Ephorus did not scruple to report it three hundred thousand men; but the Sicilian Timæus, with more respect for probability, reckoned it only a hundred and twenty thousand. The first measure of the Carthaginian generals, however, was not of hostility: they sent a deputation to the Agrigentine government with the liberal proposition of alliance and society in arms; or, that being unacceptable, peace and neutrality. How far a magnanimous and provident policy, or how far party interest decided the Agrigentines, we have no means to discover, but both the proposals were rejected.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 85.
Ol. 93. $\frac{2}{3}$
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.

Improvement in the art of attacking fortifications was much restrained among the Greeks by the general public poverty of their numerous little states. The Carthaginians were not so limited. A principal species of that artillery, which the Greeks afterward improved, and the Romans perfected, was, according to Diodorus, already familiar with them. Moving wooden towers, and battering-engines were accordingly prepared to force the walls of Agrigentum; but the garrison, in one successful sally, destroyed them all. Measures were immediately taken for replacing them; but a pestilential sickness arising in the besieging army checked exertion and destroyed numbers. Hannibal himself fell under it; but Imilcon nevertheless, as far as the weakened state of his army would allow, continued to press the siege.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 86.

Tho between the Agrigentine government, and those who, since the expulsion of Hermocrates, had ruled Syracuse, there was no cordiality,

Diod. 1.13.
c. 80.

yet the storm which was falling on Agrigentum too nearly threatened Syracuse to be observed with indifference there; nor probably could the Syracusan administration avoid censure among the Syracusan people, if they wholly omitted, in the existing crisis, to support the ancient pretension of their city to be the head and protectress of Sicily. Communication was therefore held with all the Sicilian and Italian cities, which had been accustomed to act in subordination, or were disposed to act in concert, with Syracuse. Auxiliaries came from Messina, and from some of the Italian states. Reinforced by these, the Syracusan army marched under the orders of Daphnæus. The Camarinæan and Geloïan troops arranged themselves under him as he passed their towns. And with a force thus altogether, it is said, of about thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Daphnæus hastened to relieve Agrigentum.

c. 87.

The Carthaginian army was, after all the loss by sickness, if we may trust the historian, still so strong, that, without any interruption of the siege, Imilcon could send a force outnumbering the Greeks to meet them. A battle ensued at the passage of the river Himera, on the border of the Geloïan territory. The Greeks, completely victorious, pursued the Carthaginians to their own camp, through which they fled for refuge within the besieging division's lines. Daphnæus occupied the camp thus deserted by the enemy, and thence commanded communication with the city.

For the deliverance of Agrigentum now, a pause of civil strife only, and some military subordination, seem to have been wanting. But the Agrigentine constitution, adapted to the sunshine in which it had been nurtured, was unfit for a season of storms. The triumphant arrival of the relieving army, under democratical leaders, encouraged the party in opposition to that which actually held the government; and the popular mind, impatient under the evils of the siege, was prepared for irritation. When the flight of the enemy's defeated army was observed from the walls, the exulting multitude was impatient to be led out to share in the honor of victory. Admonition of danger from the superior force of the besieging army, watching opportunities from within its lines, was heard with indignation. Even the authority of Dexippus, supported as it was by his military reputation, with the

added dignity of the Lacedæmonian name, could hardly enable their generals to restrain them. Repressed at length for the occasion, in the first intercourse with the relieving army, this temper, (how far instigated by party art we are uninformed,) broke out again with violence. Corruption was imputed to the generals. Dexippus supporting them, his character was reviled with theirs, and such tumult followed that civil rule and military command failed together. At length, whether from the habit of attending to debate, or through influence of the democratical leaders, who might see opportunity for directing the tempest, the riotous crowd took some regularity of form as a popular assembly. A stranger, Menes, commander of the Camarinæan forces, was the principal speaker. In a violent invective he accused the Agrigentine generals of treachery. In vain they desired to be heard in their defence; clamor overbore their voices; noise presently led to action; four were massacred on the spot, and the fifth was spared, it is said, only in pity of his youth.

After this infuriate act of popular despotism, the multitude were not readily to be brought again to the moderation which their instigators now desired. Elated at the same time with the success of the relieving army against the foreign enemy, and with their own triumph over their unfortunate generals, and jealous of all superiors, they would submit to no restraint. If there were any public stores, they were spent without economy; and what individuals possessed, none ventured with any authority to inquire. Nor does there appear to have been any combination in effort with the relieving army, which, under the orders of Daphnæus, was active and sometimes successful, in harassing the besiegers. Imilcon, nevertheless, within his lines, which the Greeks dared not attack, prosecuted his works regularly and steddily; so that, in the eighth month of the siege, winter being already set in, they were completed.

Diod. I. 13.
c. 88.

OL. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.

Thus, suddenly, want came upon the city, when means of supply by land were stopped. The sea however was yet open, and the Syracusan government did not neglect allies whom, more particularly since the massacre of the generals, they considered as their partizans. A large convoy of provisions was sent; supposed in security under escort of

the Syracusan fleet, because it was understood that the Carthaginian fleet was laid up in the harbours of Motya and Panormus for the winter. But Imileon, watchful of events, had ordered his fleet round. The Greeks, as they approached Agrigentum, were attacked by a superior force: eight of their ships of war were sunk, the rest forced ashore, and the whole convoy was taken.

The besieging army, before suffering from scarcity, was relieved by the prizes made, and the state of the besieged was rendered hopeless¹³. Neither the mercenaries, nor the Italian auxiliaries, together no inconsiderable portion of the military force in the place, appear to have had either share or interest in the massacre of the generals and the revolution ensuing. Of course they reckoned themselves not bound to bear famine for those with whom they were little satisfied, in a cause now become forlorn. Accordingly the Campanians deserted to the Carthaginians, with whom they had formerly served. The Italian Greeks, observing opportunity for retreat yet open, marched to their several homes. Dexippus at the same time withdrew. The retreat of the Italian Greeks is said, and not improbably, to have been concerted with him; but report was farther circulated that he took a bribe of fifteen talents, (about three thousand pounds) from the Carthaginians, for this service. But the circulation of such a report was a mode of party warfare so easy, and, among the Greeks, so ordinary, that the mere circumstance of its circulation cannot intitle it to credit, and other motives for the conduct of Dexippus are obvious. After the assassination of the Agrigentine generals, not only his situation as an individual must have been uneasy, but in just consideration of his public character, it might be necessary for him to quit Agrigentum.

The force however still in the place was equal to the defence of the walls, and more easily to be subsisted and more at the disposal of those who had obtained the lead, for the absence of those who had quitted it. The scarcity however being notoriously such as to threaten

¹³ Tho we may readily believe there was some scarcity in the Carthaginian camp, yet Imileon's fleet, as the land was also to his army, aggerated, for the sea was always open to Diodorus's account of it is evidently exaggerated.

famine, the popular will no longer opposed inquiry about the remaining stock, and it was found insufficient for the support of the remaining numbers for many days. Favorable terms of capitulation, little usual, were unthought of. Flight, however, under cover of a midwinter night, appeared practicable. It was resolved upon by the leading men, and seems to have been ably conducted. Obviating opportunity for public debate, with necessity for their plea, and fear for their instrument, they announced, in the day, that the city must be evacuated that very evening. The desire of saving life, tho with the loss of all besides, operated upon the multitude; and the greater part of the citizens, with their families, those able to bear arms forming a strong escort, arrived in safety at Gela. Some, however, infirm through age or sickness, were unavoidably left behind; and some refused to move; preferring death, according to the historian, from their own or friendly hands, with all the comforts of their former state yet about them, to a precarious life in exile and indigence. Most of these seem to have been of the higher ranks, and of the party of the massacred generals; little hopeful of just measure, had they joined in the emigration, either from the ruling party of their own fellowcitizens or from the democratical republics to which the flight was directed. Possibly indeed participation in the flight was denied to them. The wealthy and worthy Gellias¹⁴ was among those who could not or would not fly. With some friends he repaired to a temple of Minerva, not without hope which might be founded on experience at Selinus and Himera, that its sanctity, or rather the humane consideration of the Carthaginian general for unarmed suppliants, would protect them. Violence however being threatened, possibly from the unruliness of Spanish, Gallic, or Numidian troops, in the first moments of victory, they themselves set fire to the place, and perished with it.

The honesty of Diodorus, amid his prejudices, shows Imilcon as little in any other quality as in cruelty, that barbarian which the illiberality of the Roman writers would represent all the Carthaginians. All valuables, of any considerable bulk or weight, had been necessarily left by the fugitives. Statues and pictures, by the best Grecian artists,

¹⁴ Γελλίαν, τὸν πρῶτοντα πᾶν πολιτῶν πλούτῳ καὶ καλοκαγαθίᾳ. Diod. l. 13. f. 90.

abounded in Agrigentum. The most esteemed of these were selected by Imilcon to adorn Carthage. The town he carefully preserved for winter quarters for his army.

S E C T I O N IV.

Consternation of the Sicilians. Rise of Dionysius. Change of the Administration of Syracuse.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 91.

INTELLIGENCE of the fate of Agrigentum spread terror through the Grecian towns of Sicily. The second of the island having fallen, it was generally apprehended that there could be security nowhere, unless perhaps in the first, and hardly there. Many sent their families and moveable property to Syracuse, and many, for surer safety, to the Grecian towns of Italy. Fear then being more apt to be impatient than wise, there appeared everywhere a disposition to criminate past conduct of public affairs, but nowhere any just measures, or hardly proposals for a better course. The Agrigentine refugees had been removed from Gela to Syracuse; where, amid their wants and dependency, they were vehement in invective against their leaders, for whom they had massacred those under whose guidance they had prospered. Meanwhile the Syracusans were everywhere courted and everywhere unpopular; all concurring in blame of the Syracusan administration, while all, through consciousness of inability to defend themselves, were anxious for Syracusan protection.

Nor was Syracuse itself more united or more satisfied. So were those at the head of affairs aware of their own insufficiency for the existing crisis, that all avoided a leading part in popular debate. They waited the orders of the sovereign people, and the people, unadvised by any in whom there was general confidence, could give none. Nor perhaps should this be considered as marking any great deficiency, either of ability or courage, in the individuals; for in the actual state of parties it would be difficult for them, even with very considerable abilities, to hold that leading influence among the Sicilian cities, that commanding situation with regard to the common politics, without which, to
conduct

conduct the common concerns of the Grecian interest advantageously, must be impossible. Hermocrates was on the point of uniting Sicily, when, by his death, his party lost an influence which their opponents did not gain, and the Grecian interest through the island remained like limbs without a head.

Fortunately the Carthaginians thought it necessary for their mercenary troops, not less than the Greeks usually for their citizens, to rest from warfare during winter. While then, observing the hesitation and indecision of those accustomed to hold the lead, all sober men in the Grecian cities looked forward with much anxiety for the events of the coming spring, a youth of Syracuse, named Dionysius, by the boldness and fluency of his eloquence, drew attention and acquired consideration in the assembly there. Born in the middle rank of citizens, Dionysius had been very well educated¹⁵. At the age of only twenty-two, he had attended Hermocrates on the unfortunate occasion when he lost his life, and had himself been then so severely wounded as to be left on the spot for dead. Possibly this circumstance saved him from the general proscription of the friends of Hermocrates, and consideration for his youth may have assisted toward his complete pardon. In the following year he served in the Syracusan army under Daphnæus against the Carthaginians, and distinguished himself by his activity, courage, and military skill. Among the friends of his earliest youth was Philistus, a youth nearly of his own age¹⁶, of one of the wealthiest families of Syracuse. Philistus was indowed with talents military, political, and literary, but not with powers of eloquence to command a popular assembly. Dionysius,

Diod. l. 13.
c. 92.

c. 91.

¹⁵ Bonis parentibus atque honesto loco natus, etsi id quidem alius alio modo tradidit. Cic. Tusc. l. 5. c. 20. Διονυσίος, πολλοσὶς ὡς Συρακουσίων, καὶ τῷ γένει, καὶ τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Isocr. ep. ad Philipp. p. 350. t. i. ed. Auger. So Oliver Cromwell might be described as πολλοσὶς. Demosthenes, disposed to revile Dionysius, calls him γραμματεὺς. Or, in Leptin. p. 506. ed. Reiske, Diodorus describes him ἐν γραμμα-

τείῳ καὶ τοῦ τυχεύου ἰδιώτου. l. 13. c. 36. It seems equally improbable that his birth was either very high or very low; but that his education was of the best, and his introduction early to the society of the first men of Syracuse, appears unquestionable.

¹⁶ The age of Philistus may be nearly gathered from that of Dionysius, whom he outlived several years.

through his ability for supplying this deficiency, was enabled, at the age of twenty-four, to stand forward almost at once as leader of a party, in opposition to those actually at the head of affairs.

Neither the common practice of the Grecian republics, nor the example of the opponents of Hermocrates, nor the usual temper of his years, would lead Dionysius to moderation in his opposition. He daringly imputed to the Syracusan generals corruption from the enemy; and with advantage, and probably with truth, he turned against them the accusation which they or their party had been wont to urge against

Diod. ut ant. Hermocrates. ‘As for the cause of the many,’ he said, ‘it is but a
 ‘pretence for acquiring power, and they had long abandoned it.
 ‘Power, and the advantages of military and civil eminence, are their
 ‘objects. These attained, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, all are
 ‘equal to them; they will scruple nothing that may promote their
 ‘individual interests.’ Such invective, assisted by the general acknowledgement of necessity for new and improved measures, made an impression on the public mind, which encouraged the young orator to a very bold attempt: ‘Imminent,’ he said, ‘as the ruin is which threatens
 ‘Syracuse and all Sicily, while Sicily is looking to Syracuse for
 ‘preservation, the regular expiration of office and command ought not
 ‘to be waited for. Not a moment longer should the welfare and
 ‘existence of the state be trusted to weak and corrupt hands. If
 ‘Syracuse and Sicily are to be saved, the people must exert their
 ‘unquestioned power, and the present generals must be displaced.
 ‘Their successors then should be chosen, not among those, or the
 ‘friends of those, already tried, and found unable or false; they should
 ‘be known friends of the people, taken from among the people’.

¹⁷ It has been supposed, by some modern writers, that Dionysius, who confessedly began life in the party of Hermocrates, changed sides when he came forward as an Orator, because he professed himself advocate for the power of the many, against the men in administration. But for this there seems no antient authority, nor is the conjecture at all warranted by the circum-

stances known to us. Dionysius, for himself and his partizans together, sought popularity against a party which had risen by popularity; just as with us, in the two first Georges’ days, the Tories, in opposition, asserted Whig principles, while the Whigs, in power, were accused of Tory measures; the parties remaining still the same.

Against

Against this violent proposal the generals and magistrates exclaimed, as not only, in its tenor, seditious, but a direct breach of a positive law. A prosecution was accordingly instituted against Dionysius, and he was condemned to pay the fine which the law imposed for the offence. He was however so supported by his party, that not only the fine was immediately paid for him, but he was encouraged to repeat his invective in the next assembly, and even to renew the offensive motion. His party gained strength: the generals were compelled to yield their situation, and Dionysius, the leading orator of the assembly, was appointed among their successors.

Such is the amount of information, all derived from writers adverse to Dionysius, of a revolution, by which that party in Syracuse was overthrown, which had been powerful enough to drive Hermocrates into banishment, to give a new constitution to the republic, and to hold the government now for five years. In this partial information however is fully implied what honorably distinguishes this among Grecian revolutions, that neither bloodshed attended it, nor expulsions, nor any violence upon the constitution¹⁸. The just, humane, generous, and truly-patriotic spirit of Hermocrates appears to have survived among his friends, and to have influenced all their measures. The next transaction of which we have notice, was a measure of beneficence adapted to strengthen their new power, so as to obviate the necessity for severities so usual among the contests of Grecian faction. Numbers of the party of Hermocrates were yet living in exile. To move their recall in the general assembly, where their opponents had so lately borne the sway, was undertaken by Dionysius. ‘Those unhappy men,’ he said, speaking of it as a known fact, ‘had evinced the sincerity of their patriotism, by refusing very advantageous offers from the Carthaginians. How much then their assistance in the existing crisis

¹⁸ The worst irregularity that the defeated party could impute, was that Dionysius repeatedly incurred the penalty for proposing the removal of the generals before the expiration of their term, and that Philistus had the insolence to declare himself ready to pay it as often as it might be incurred.

That Philistus would be so imprudent seems unlikely enough; and that such a course would produce, as the simple Diodorus affirms, the abandonment of the prosecution by tiring the prosecutors, cannot appear very likely.

‘ was wanted to oppose the danger impending from the enemy of the
 ‘ Grecian name, was too strongly and universally felt to need that he
 ‘ should enlarge upon it. The very fact, that the aid of all the Grecian
 ‘ states around, as far as Italy and Peloponnesus, had been importuned,
 ‘ would alone suffice for proof. It could not therefore but be most
 ‘ impolitic to deny to citizens of approved merit their anxious wish to
 ‘ join in the defence of their country and of the Grecian cause.’ The
 arguments of Dionysius prevailed, and the measure was regularly and
 quietly carried.

If indeed we might believe Diodorus for the character of the recalled exiles, they were worthless vagabonds, the lowest of mankind. But the tenor of his own narrative sufficiently shows that this description, copied from Timæus and others, deeply interested, and therefore violent in opposition to the party of Dionysius, is utterly unjust. Such persons could have been introduced to the rights of Syracusan citizens only to support violences, which are not imputed, or to produce a change in the constitution, which evidently was not made. The popular constitution, and the jurisprudence adapted to such a constitution, by Diocles, after the expulsion of Hermocrates, remained, as far as any accounts tell, unaltered. We cannot but regret the want of the history of Philistus, tho it would probably have its partialities, to confront with these accounts. In collating however all that remains to us, even from the opposite party, we find it satisfactorily shown, that the principal supporters of Dionysius were the principal persons of the party of Hermocrates, and that the exiles restored by him, were all or mostly banished for their attachment to that party, and for some eminence in it¹⁹.

¹⁹ Diodorus himself relates the banishment of the friends of Hermocrates, and we have no account of any other exiles.

SECTION V.

Faction at Gela; Lacedæmonian Authority there superseded by Syracusan. Violence of the Opposition Party in Syracuse. Dionysius and Hipparinus elected Autocrator-Generals of Syracuse.

THE new administration having thus attained some stability, it was among their most pressing duties, and indeed the very pretence and purpose of the change, to look around Sicily, and, using with diligence and prudence the state of parties in the Grecian cities, to form a confederacy under the lead of Syracuse, that might suffice to prevent the further progress of the arms of Carthage. On the Agrigentine, the last conquered territory, bordered the Geloän. At Gela, on retiring from Agrigentum, the Lacedæmonian minister, Dexippus, had resumed his station. But his authority did not suffice to still the storm of faction there. He seems indeed not to have been a man of talents equal to his situation. The mercenary force he commanded, instead of preserving peace, was a principal cause of disturbances. The failure of pay, due from the late Agrigentine government, was the ground of uneasiness and pretence for tumult; while, not only to prevent disorder, but to have that force, if possible, zealous in the Grecian cause, was highly important; for Gela, next in course for attack, could ill hope, with its own strength, to withstand the Carthaginian arms. Dexippus urged to the Geloän government the pressure of circumstances, which required the liquidation of the debt, confessedly just in the demand, tho not precisely due from them. One party among the Geloän people admitted the reasoning; but their opponents persuaded a majority of the short-sighted multitude to disregard the policy, and considering the naked right only, to reject the demand.

The situation of Gela now became most critical. Threatened by a forein foe, of such preponderant power that successful resistance could hardly be hoped from the best united efforts of its people, not only they were divided among themselves, but had, within their walls, a body of mercenaries readier to join the enemy than assist them. In these

OL. 93. 3.
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 93.

distressing circumstances some of the principal men addressed the Syracusan government, as the old and natural head of the Sicilian Greek interest, soliciting its exertion for the preservation of a city so important to the Grecian cause.

Tho unnoticed by the historian, yet it appears probable that the Syracusan government was already prepared for the event. Dionysius was appointed commissioner to assist in settling the affairs of Gela, and a force of two thousand foot, and four hundred horse, was placed under his command for the purpose. On his arrival at Gela an assembly of the people was summoned. Both Dionysius and Dexippus attended, but we have no information how far either interfered, while, apparently in all constitutional form, a number of Geloian citizens were accused, condemned, and executed. The party which had supported Dexippus in his requisition for the arrears due to the mercenaries was thus clearly established in power, and a decree of the people followed, directing that the property of the seditious, who had been executed, should be confiscated for the purpose.

The business of the commissioner of Syracuse, as head of the Grecian interest in Sicily, on such an occasion, would be of great difficulty and delicacy. It was most important to court popularity. If he could obviate violence by soothing, it were well; but he must not directly and openly thwart the popular inclination. He had then another difficulty, to reconcile his authority with that of the Lacedæmonian commissioner, Dexippus, who was sent by his state to assume a superiority over every other stranger, in every republic of the island. In this alone he was unsuccessful. The proud Spartan, vexed apparently at his own experienced inability to carry his own important purpose, so connected with the safety of Gela, and of the whole Grecian interest in Sicily, vexed at his obligation to a Syracusan, whose superiority, however disclaimed, was too unavoidably apparent, but especially vexed at the gratitude demonstrated by his own mercenaries, for justice obtained through the interference of the Syracusan, which he, a Spartan, had insisted upon for them in vain, returned all civilities with coldness, and even with indication of disgust. The Geloian people, or at least the party which obtained the rule in Gela,
1 carried

carried far their demonstrations of satisfaction with the conduct of Dionysius. After having decreed him great honors in their own city, and transmitted to Syracuse testimonies of their approbation, the most unqualified and most flattering, they proceeded to evince their confidence in him, by requesting that he would himself stay among them, to direct the defence of their city against the formidable attack expected. Circumstances in Syracuse would ill allow this; but he assured them of his readiness to return, in the first moment of their danger, and of his hope that it might be with a force sufficient to give them security.

Of the colleagues of Dionysius, remaining vested with the supreme executive power in Syracuse, a majority were not his friends. The failure of extant antient writers to name any of them, tends to indicate that none were of great eminence. Their actions are equally unnoticed, and remain indicated only by what is reported of the conduct of Dionysius on his return. His invectives were vehement, imputing to them at the same time weakness and treachery; and he went so far as to declare that he could no longer hold community of councils and responsibility with them; either they must be removed, or he must resign his situation. In an assembly of the people, held for debate on these important questions, the contest of oratory was so long and so equally maintained, that decision was referred to the morrow. The superiority of the party of Dionysius at length becoming manifest, some of his adherents exclaimed, 'that the dismissal of the other generals ought not to satisfy the people; they should be prosecuted for their misdeeds.' Dionysius himself however and his more intimate friends, holding the principles of liberality and moderation which had always characterized the party of Hermocrates, objected to this: 'Hasty prosecutions,' they said, 'were apt to involve injustice. Nor was the present a season for inquiries which wanted leisure, when an enemy, powerful as the Carthaginians, might be daily expected at their gates. A remedy for existing evils, which experience recommended, was in their power; it was no more than to appoint one efficient general, with full authority; not to be thwarted in his measures for the public good by perverse or corrupt colleagues.'

Ol. 93. $\frac{2}{3}$.
B. C. 406.
Diod. l. 13.
c. 93, 94.

‘colleagues. So it was that their forefathers, under the illustrious ‘Gelon, had defeated the countless host of Carthage at Himera.’

This motion was received with acclamation. Indeed for example of a single person at the head of the Syracusan affairs, civil and military, it were needless to seek back so far as Gelon, had not the popularity and glory of his name invited; for a complete precedent seems afforded in the administration of Diocles. The existing board of generals was abolished; but, whether the authority of others checked the popular extravagance and his ambition, or his own prudence, weighing the objections to his youth and mediocrity of birth, and the advantage to be derived from an associate superior in years and family consideration, he was not raised alone to the first magistracy; Hipparinus, first in rank and property among the Syracusans, was appointed his colleague. To them together the supreme power, civil and military, was committed, with the title of autocrator-generals; a title and power, which we have seen not uncommon among the Grecian republics, and especially in arduous and threatening circumstances²⁰.

The state of parties at Syracuse now appears to have been nearly this. The friends of Hermocrates, some with more, some with less favor toward a youth of five and twenty, who had so extraordinarily risen to the head of them, supported the new government. The party of Diocles, of whom Daphnæus, the late general in chief, was among the most eminent, submitted to it, with minds most hostile. Dionysius

²⁰ Diodorus makes Dionysius sole autocrator-general, under the circumstances of popular election, related in the text, without any mention of Hipparinus. We owe to Plutarch the positive information that Hipparinus was his colleague, without which the mention of their political connection by Aristotle would be less certainly intelligible. The appearance of negative evidence, in the account of Diodorus, will be enough known, by those who may have compared his narrative with those of Thucydides or Xenophon, to be of no weight. Indeed it is little likely that Plutarch, who has so labored his panegyric of

Dion, son of Hipparinus, and his invective against Dionysius, would have reported so close a political connection between his favorite hero's father and the object of his obloquy, unless the authority for it not only was good, but generally known, and not to be discredited. This ray from the biographer, incidentally thrown on a dark, yet interesting portion of Grecian history, is indeed of high value, as it assists our judgment not a little in proceeding among shapes often of uncouth and often of uncertain appearance, in the narrative of the only remaining historian.

had won from them the favor of a large majority of the many, whom Diocles had so successfully courted²¹. It became of course their imputation against the new government, that it was supported only by a worthless or infatuated multitude. Calumny, so ordinary a mode of civil warfare now throughout the republics, would tinge the reports of Sicilian affairs passing to Greece, the exact state and character of which would be little likely to be very well known anywhere. Nor have we means to appreciate the intimation of Aristotle, that Hipparinus was led by the embarrassment of private affairs, produced by extravagance, to associate himself in political situation with Dionysius. Aristot. ut ant.

But the Sicilian historian, honest amid his prejudices, shows, in his narrative of facts, that a generous and mild spirit, becoming the successors of Hermocrates, guided the measures of the new administration. Severity against opponents was avoided. None were even driven to flight. It appears to have been the purpose, on the contrary, by extensive conciliation of friends, to obviate the necessity for violent repression of even the most determined enemies. In the general assembly Dionysius proposed an increase, Diodorus says a duplication, of the ordinary pay to citizens for military service. The measure, gratifying to the many, was readily carried. This indeed was a kind of extensive bribery. But it had many examples among republics wealthy enough to have means for it, and by no statesman perhaps had been carried farther than the great Pericles; nor can we be at all certain whether it was more calculated to produce political evil, or rather, in the existing circumstances, whether it might not be beneficial, and even necessary. Diod. l. 13. c. 95.

Such measures having been taken for quiet within Syracuse, the administration proceeded in those begun for establishing such order throughout the Grecian towns, as might best give them means to oppose the foreign enemy. The Leontine territory was held by a mixed Grecian population, of which the unfortunate refugees from

²¹ Ταχὺ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ ἐνώθασιν, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον μεταβῆναι, Διονύσιος ἀπεδείχθη στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ. c. 94. This foul slur upon democracy, provoked from a zealous partizan of democracy, strengthens the evidence to

the fact, if corroboration indeed could be wanted, that Dionysius now was supported by the great body of the Syracusan citizens, which formerly supported Diocles.

Agrigentum were now perhaps the largest part. It formed a separate republic, under that uncertain kind of subordination to Syracuse, which we have seen so common among the smaller Grecian states. Its affairs requiring the interference of the superintending government, Dionysius marched from Syracuse with an escort, and incamped midway for the night. Before morning²² he was attacked by a force from which he was compelled to fly, and being pursued, he took refuge in the castle of Leontini. Intelligence of his danger quickly reaching Syracuse, a powerful body arrived next day, and his assailants dispersed. The enemies of Dionysius afterward asserted that this nightly attack was a meer fiction. The story altogether is the very counterpart of that of the similar attempt against Peisistratus at Athens, and the result was the same. The Syracusan people believed the assault to have been real, with the purpose of assassination and revolution; and to give security to their commander-in-chief against future attempts, they voted him, in general assembly, a guard for his person, to the amount, it is said, of six hundred men. This mode of security to men in the first situations in the commonwealth, tho affected to be considered, by writers of the opposite party, as marking Dionysius thenceforth decidedly a tyrant, was however neither then new, nor afterward considered, as we shall have occasion very particularly to see, an example unfit to be followed, or involving in any discredit the most zealous assertors of freedom. The late attempt then being considered as proof that the liberality of the new government had gone beyond prudence, and that stronger measures were necessary to obviate the plots of the disaffected, some officers, who had been of the adverse party, were removed from their commands in the Syracusan troops²³, and a body of mercenaries was brought from Gela.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 96.

These measures of precaution being taken, a capital prosecution was instituted against the two principal men of the opposition, Daphnæus

²² Diodorus relates the story of the nightly attack, as if he had found it told so as not quite to suit the purpose of the enemies of Dionysius. Apparently in the desire to improve it, he has made his detail very incoherent and indistinct, and, in

some parts where it is intelligible, very improbable.

²³ Diodorus says, all were removed who were not of known attachment to the ruling party; but in the sequel he shows, as we shall see, that it was not so.

and

and Demarchus. What specific crime was alledged against them, the account coming only from the friends of their party, is not indicated, but, from that partial account, it appears to have been in all constitutional form that they were tried, condemned, and executed. According to the same account, they were the first who suffered for their political conduct after Dionysius came into power; and they suffered now, not in consequence of the revolution, but for measures directed to the overthrow of the new government, already legally and without any violence established.

It was discovered that Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian minister, had taken part in the plot of Daphnæus and Demarchus. That his connection with them was new is evident from his conduct in the Agrigentine war, and it appears to have been unauthorized by his government. The Syracusan government required him immediately to quit Sicily; and this strong measure, far from producing resentment, seems to have led to a renewal of the old connection of Lacedæmon with the party of Hermocrates. The alliance of the Lacedæmonian government with the Syracusan under Dionysius we shall find lasting.

At the early age of four or five and twenty, Dionysius had now shown himself, in eloquence and in political business, the first man of Sicily, and perhaps of the time; and he had given promising hope of those military talents, of which the war impending from Carthage would pressingly want the exertion. To his party he was, no doubt, necessary, as his party was necessary to him. It seems therefore to have been not without the purpose of binding them more closely together, that two weddings, at any rate very creditable to him, were about this time concluded. He himself married Aïcte, daughter of Hermocrates, and he gave his sister to Polyxenus, brother of the widow of that revered patriot.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 96.
Plut. vit.
Dion. init.

CHAPTER XXX.

Affairs of the GREEKS in SICILY and ITALY; from the Settlement of the SYRACUSAN Government, under DIONYSIUS and HIPPARINUS, to the Restoration of the SYRACUSAN Supremacy over the SICILIAN, and its Extension over the ITALIAN, Greek Cities.

SECTION I.

Siege of Gela by the Carthaginians; Evacuation of Gela and Camarina. Atrocious Violence of the Opposition at Syracuse. Peace with Carthage.

B. C. 405.
Ol. 93, 4.

SCARCELY was the government of Syracuse brought to some consistency under the administration of Dionysius and Hipparinus, and a rallying point thus provided for the Grecian interest in Sicily, when the movement of the Carthaginian army from Agrigentum spread alarm throughout the island. Imilcon, if we should believe Diodorus, in quitting Agrigentum, increased the general terror by a measure apparently adapted to that only purpose, and little consistent either with the common policy of the Carthaginians, or with his own previous conduct. He is said to have completely destroyed the city. The direction of his march, not deceiving the apprehension long entertained, was to Gela.

The fortifications of this city were probably sufficient for its defence against any ordinary Grecian power; but its government was aware that they were not equally to be trusted against the force under Imilcon, provided with an artillery far superior to what was common among the Greeks. It had therefore been resolved that the women and children should be sent, for better security, to Syracuse; and as soon as the movement of the Carthaginian army and the direction of its march were ascertained, measures were taken for their removal.

But

But the apprehension of separation from the male part of their families, to be committed to the care of strangers, operated upon the minds of the women so much more forcibly than the fear of sharing their fate, that they resisted with vehemence and even with tumult. Assembling in the agora, clinging about the altars, and urging intreaty with wailing and tears, the feeling excited, and a just aversion to the use of violence, prevailed against a resolution dictated apparently by a just prudence, and they were allowed to remain.

The Syracusans meanwhile had not neglected preparation for the common defence of themselves and the Grecian interest in Sicily; and it appeared that the estimation of their government abroad was not diminished by the revolution of the preceding winter. Auxiliary forces were obtained not only from all the Sicilian, but from several of the Italian Greek cities, and the army which marched under Dionysius to relieve Gela was, according to some writers, fifty thousand strong. We may however, on this occasion, perhaps better believe the enemy of his fame, Timæus, who reported the foot thirty thousand, and the horse one thousand. A fleet of fifty ships of war attended the movements of the army. Diod. l. 13.
c. 109.

Such however was the force under Dionysius, and such the known superiority of the Grecian heavy-armed, that the Carthaginian general with his less regular troops, tho numerous and brave, would not meet them in the field, but, secure within his lines, continued to press the siege. During twenty days, Dionysius, with the patient prudence of a veteran, abstaining from attack, directed his measures to intercept supplies, while he watched opportunities. The temper of a part of his army then compelled him to change his plan. For arms seem to have been denied to no Syracusan citizen: the new administration apparently hoping that, however experience had shown the inconvenience of their first lenity and liberality, the recent execution of the chiefs, Daphnæus and Demarchus, might suffice to deter farther sedition. But the quiet watching of an enemy's motions we have often seen borne by the troops of the Grecian republics with an impatience subversive of discipline, and the chiefs of the opposition were sedulous in using the opportunity for fomenting the ready discontent.

Diod. l. 13.
c. 110.

Dionysius was thus driven to the necessity of quick decision against the enemy, to obviate opportunity for sedition and mutiny among his own people. Having determined then upon the hazardous measure of attacking the superior numbers of the Carthaginians within their lines, his disposition for it seems to have been able. Three assaults were to be made at once by the infantry of the army, and a fourth by the crews of the fleet, while the cavalry was to protect retreat, should it become necessary. But either through mistake, or rather, as the sequel shows probable, through treachery, concert was not duly kept. The Italian Greeks, faithful to their engagement, forced the Carthaginian lines on the side next the sea. Failing however of expected support, they were overpowered and driven out again; more than a thousand were slain, and, but for relief from the fleet, all would have been cut off. A body of Sicilian Greeks, attacking on the land side, was equally overpowered, and, after losing six hundred, compelled to withdraw into the town. The cavalry stood, looking on, till the enemy approached them, and then they also withdrew within the walls²⁴. Dionysius, with the body under his more immediate orders, when all opportunity of advantage was clearly gone, was the last who retired.

Tho his attack was really defeated, yet the state of his own army, rather than any amount of advantage the enemy had gained, made his circumstances now highly critical. Avoiding therefore to notice any misconduct, Dionysius assembled his confidential officers, together with those principal men of Gela, in whose fidelity he trusted, and it was unanimously agreed to be inexpedient to persevere in defending the town. Capitulations, in any degree favorable to a besieged place, were then little known; but it seems to have been held a part of the law of nations, among the Carthaginians, not less than among the Greeks, to grant a truce, upon solicitation from the enemy, for burial of their slain. On this was founded a plan for evacuating the city. In the evening a truce for the next day was applied for, to which

²⁴ Comparing Diodorus's account of the their inaction on the former occasion arose
conduct of the cavalry in the battle and from the same motive as their exertion
after it, there seems no room to doubt but afterward.

Imilcon consented: in the same night the whole Geloän people moved under escort of the army, and, while two thousand light-armed, remaining in the town, deceived the enemy by lighting fires and industriously keeping up the appearance of population, they reached Syracuse unmolested: Dionysius marched to Camarina. Thither at morning dawn the troops left in Gela followed, leaving the unpeopled town to the Carthaginians. Staying only to see Camarina evacuated, which, under terror of the Carthaginians, was done in zealous haste, Dionysius proceeded, with the people under his escort, for Syracuse.

The calamity thus befalling two Grecian cities, which Dionysius was sent to protect, afforded opportunities, industriously used, for exciting discontent in the army. Misery, among both sexes and all ages, abundantly occurring to observation, was attributed to the ambition, or the negligence, or the corruption of Dionysius. There was a set of men among the cavalry, as the historian, friend of their cause, avows, who proposed to assassinate Dionysius on the march; but, tho he avoided any show of precaution, yet the attachment and attention of a large majority of the army deterred the attempt.

It seems to have been his humane care of the unfortunate Camarinæans which afforded opportunity for enormities not to be foreseen or suspected. Disappointed in their purpose against his person, the conspirators hastened to Syracuse, and finding nothing prepared to resist them, went directly to his house, forced their way in, and directed their worse than brutal vengeance against his wife, the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates, to whom calumny itself has left no ill imputed. The insult with which they abused her was so shocking, (historians have avoided the disgusting report of particulars) that, unable to bear the thought of again meeting her husband and friends, according to Plutarch, she destroyed herself: Diodorus only says, that she was destroyed. It is remarkable that such an abominable tale comes to us from the revilers of Dionysius, advocates for his enemies, advocates even for the detestable authors of the horrid atrocity, as friends of liberty and patriots.

When Dionysius was informed of the secession of certain persons from the army, whom he had occasion to suppose unfriendly, he

Diod. l. 13.
c. 111.

c. 112.

Diod. ut ant.
Plut. vit.
Dion.

Plut. vit.
Dion.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 44.

collected instantly a select body, and proceeded to Syracuse, a distance of nearly fifty miles, it is said, without halting. About midnight, arriving at the gate of that quarter of Syracuse called Achradina, he found it shut against him. Hostility was thus enough indicated, but there appeared no sufficient guard to oppose his entrance if he could force the bars. At hand was a large pile of dry reeds, collected for burning lime, and with these he made a fire against the gate, which destroyed it. Meanwhile the infantry of his detachment arriving, he entered the town with a force which, added to that of his friends within, sufficed to overbear what his enemies had been able to collect. The tragedy within his own house however was already complete. The conspirators were endeavouring, in various parts of the extensive city, to gain the people to their party. Information that he had made his way in, spread alarm among them, and they hastened to assemble in the agora. There, after an ineffectual resistance, the greater part of them was put to the sword. Some smaller parties, found in arms in other parts of the town, met the same fate. When opposition ceased, the most eminent and active of the survivors were sought in their own houses, or wherever they might be found, and some were put to death. But, in the tumult unavoidable, and amid passions, so provoked, the bitterest enemies of the successful party (and it is still from their enemies only that we have the account) seem to have found no ground for imputing to them any cruelty or excess of vengeance. It was only then, at length, that they, who had so long had a majority in the general assembly, retaliated, even in a constitutional way, upon such virulent opponents, by procuring a decree of banishment against the more eminent of those who had escaped the swords, which they had so incited to vengeance.

This mad effort of the defeated party, so wild in plan, so abominable in fact, that, if it did not come reported by their decided friends, we might perhaps reasonably withhold our belief of it, seems to have been singularly calculated for putting all Sicily at the mercy of Carthage. Even the talents of Dionysius might have been unable to maintain the Grecian cause, had not a pestilential sickness broken out in the Carthaginian army, so rapidly fatal, that Imilcon

was

was induced to make overtures to the Syracusan government for an accommodation. Dionysius gladly met the proposal; and a treaty of peace was concluded, embracing all the interests of the island. Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera, remained under the Carthaginian dominion; Camarina and Gela were restored to their former possessors, to hold under their own laws and government, but paying a tribute to Carthage, and forbidden to restore their fortifications; the Sicans were to remain under the protection of the Carthaginian government; neither Greeks nor Carthaginians were to controul the Sicels; the Leontines, as well as the Messenians, were to be independent; Syracuse was to remain subject to Dionysius. The last article is expressed evidently in the phrase of faction; the historian's own narrative abundantly showing that Dionysius's power in Syracuse never depended in any degree upon any support from Carthage, but, on the contrary, was always the greatest obstacle to the extension of the Carthaginian dominion in Sicily. For the rest the treaty went to establish nothing but what circumstances had produced. Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera, would of course remain subject to Carthage, because the Greeks were too much divided immediately to reclaim them. The return of the Camarinæans and Geloians to their towns, situate at a distance from the other Carthaginian possessions, could not be prevented without a force constantly employed for the purpose, such that the stipulation for tribute, as the price of their future safety, was a more advantageous bargain for Carthage. The civil strife in Syracuse best secured the independency of Leontini, Messina, and the Sicels ²⁵.

²⁵ One must live among republics, or at least in a free country, to understand the language of party among republicans. Diodorus did not understand it. Formerly the republican Greek political dialect was unintelligible through the far greater part of Europe; best understood in England, and little generally even there. France, in her late revolutions, has done much toward illustration of it.

SECTION II.

Fortification of the Port, and Improvement of the Naval Arsenal at Syracuse. Division of Lands. Extensive Combination against the Administration of Dionysius. Siege of the Citadel of Syracuse. Defeat of the Insurgents. Catastrophe of Entella.

THE deliverance of Sicily being thus, to a degree beyond recent hope, effected, two pressing cares remained for the Syracusan administration. While they were to provide means for resisting future attempts of the foreign enemy, the urgency was still greater for them to secure themselves against the measures of the defeated faction, and obviate the repetition of enormities, which, as the care of civil, social, and moral order, and the peace of their own families and of those of their fellow-citizens, were their duty, it was incumbent upon them to the utmost of their power to prevent. Diodorus, following Timæus and other party-writers, has imputed to Dionysius the formed design to render himself tyrant of his country, from the moment of his appointment to be general; and the actual exercise of monarchical authority and assumption of royal state, from the dismissal of his first colleagues and his elevation to the dignity of general-autocrat; or, at least, from the decree of the people for a guard for his person. This imputation, with every added calumny that party could invent and propagate, suited the purpose of Plutarch, when, wanting the character of a Grecian hero and patriot to compare with the celebrated Marcus Brutus, he selected that of Dion, son of Hipparinus, who became the principal opponent of the family of Dionysius. But hitherto, in the strange mixture of narrative so candid, with invective so illiberal, as those of Diodorus, we do not discover one evil action fixed upon Dionysius, while on the contrary there appears in his conduct, and that of his party, a liberality and clemency, unheard of in contest of faction among the Greeks, since the time of the magnanimous Pericles. It will be still the business of the modern investigator of ancient history

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not to be led by declamation, but to pursue facts and unfold them, so that thence a just estimate may be formed of characters.

The naval force of Syracuse had formerly been very considerable, and to give any security to Sicily against an enemy so powerful by sea as Carthage, a naval force was now absolutely necessary. To this point therefore the administration diligently directed their attention. The great port of Syracuse, even for modern navies, is one of the most commodious in the world. For fleets of the antient construction, the galley kind, drawing little water, and moved by oars, the little harbour, with all its circumstances, especially when the object was defence against an enemy of overbearing power, had singular advantages. Separated from the great harbour by the island, the site of the original city, it might be entered by two passages, but both so narrow that they might be defended by a small force against the greatest, and it was capable of containing sixty of the largest men of war of the age. The island itself had singular advantages for the site of a citadel, to protect the naval arsenal and both the ports.

B. C. 404.
Ol. 94. 1.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 7.

To improve these natural advantages art was diligently and ably employed. In the island a strong citadel was built, provided with whatever might best enable a garrison to sustain a protracted blockade. Barracks, sufficient to lodge a large force, were particularly admired for their porticoes or covered galleries; highly important, in a hot climate, for the health of numbers in confined space. From the citadel, a bridge or dam was thrown across the inner entrance of the little harbour, by which it communicated with the great port. The entrance from the sea was secured by gates, admitting one vessel only at a time; and a wall was carried from one entrance to the other, on the mainland side, so that the vessels in the port were in fact within the garrison. The navy, while measures were thus taken for its security, was itself diligently increased by the building of new ships.

These measures the writers under the Roman empire, to whom we owe all account of them, have mentioned as singularly calculated to rivet the chains of the Syracusans, and sufficient of themselves to mark the tyranny of Dionysius. But we have abundant assurance, from the far better authority of those who lived among the republics,

that the just inference is directly the reverse. At Athens, at Corinth, at Argos, everywhere in Proper Greece, the democratical party always desired to make the state a maritime power, and would, with great expence and labor, connect the city with its port, generally at some distance, by fortifications. The oligarchal party, on the contrary, always, and tyrants, unless the tyrant were a demagogue, endeavoured to withhold their people from maritime affairs, and were highly averse to long walls, as they were commonly called, for connecting the city with its port. At Syracuse therefore, a residence, not in the island in the midst of the seafaring multitude, which was the place appointed for the generals, but rather in Epipolæ, or on the height of Euryclus, would have been their choice. A navy, on its own account, they would have dreaded; but still more, as its expence would necessarily very much lessen their means for maintaining a great land-force, of assured fidelity, which alone could give security to tyrannical power.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 7.

The next measure of Dionysius and his party, was a division of lands among the people. This has been generally a favorite measure of democracy, tho involving the grossest violation of property, and of every principle on which civil freedom can have any secure foundation. Whether property was taken from any, on occasion of the division of lands at Syracuse, is not said: the historian's expression is simply, that much land was given. Confiscated estates perhaps there were, of Daphnæus and Demarchus, who had been executed, and others, slain or banished, in consequence of the sedition through which the unfortunate Arete perished. Probably also there were lands distant from the city, unoccupied, because occupation would have been too insecure, till now, by a better administration, security was provided. This measure took place a little before Critias divided the lands of Attica, under that scheme of atrocious and narrow policy, of which we have seen the overthrow and punishment. Far from any similar project, the party of Dionysius persevered yet in avoiding even that extent of banishment most ordinary in civil contest among the Grecian republics; pursuing still their former purpose of obviating the necessity for extensive severity by the better policy of conciliating friends enough to overbear disaffection, and by creating an extensive interest in support-
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ing the existing government. The lands were given to citizens, to domiciliated strangers, and to manumitted slaves; to citizens evidently of all parties; for even the partial writers, from whom Diodorus drew his materials, appear to have furnished him with no other ground for invective against Dionysius on the occasion, than that his friends obtained the fairest portions. Nevertheless, after having assigned several periods for the beginning of the tyranny, he finishes with this democratical measure of the distribution of lands. Thenceforth, he says, Dionysius was supported only by a mercenary army, but, with his usual honesty, he proceeds immediately to show that it was otherwise, and that the liberality of the Syracusan administration still overstepped its policy.

An interest in the contest between the parties of Hermocrates and Diocles had been extended, as we have seen, widely among the Grecian cities of Sicily. The revived contest in which Dionysius, Hipparinus, and Philistus, were opposed to Daphnæus and Demarchus, had hitherto shown itself almost only in Syracuse. But the party of the latter had meanwhile been neither inactive nor unsuccessful among the other cities of the island. The focus of the strength of the party however seems to have been the city of Rhegium in Italy. It was probably through measures taken there that the neighboring Sicilian city of Messina, where formerly a party so warm in the interest of Hermocrates prevailed, was gained to their cause. Nor was it, apparently, without support from these two states, that the Syracusans, who fled on occasion of the sedition in which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates suffered, had established themselves in the town of Ætna, on the southern side of the vast mountain of that name. Thence they held communication with the neighboring Sicel tribes, and maintained correspondence with those of their party remaining in Syracuse. Diod. l. 14. c. 8.

These measures were so little suspected by the Syracusan government, that when some inroads of the Sicels for plunder produced the resolution to send an army against them, no selection was used in enrolling citizens for the service. Ordinary as it was among the Grecian republics to deny arms to a defeated party, the liberal administration of Syracuse admitted all citizens, without distinction. The

army marched, and, on approaching the Sicel territory, the generals were assassinated. Through previous concert the refugees of Ætna were at hand. Those loyal to the existing government not put to death were completely awed; new generals were elected, and the army turned its march directly back to Syracuse. So well had matters been concerted, or so fortunate was the coincidence, that, just on their arrival, a fleet of eighty triremes from Messena and Rhegium entered the great harbour. The land force, proceeding immediately against Epipolæ, the strongest and most commanding, but least populous quarter of the city, took it with little opposition. The surprize was such that Dionysius, and the principal men of his party, uncertain how far the spirit of disaffection might have been prepared among the large and various population of Tyche and Achradina, withdrew within the strong fortifications of the island, where they were presently blockaded by land and sea²⁶.

Of the population remaining in the three large mainland quarters of Syracuse, a great part, and perhaps the greatest, was unfavorable to the party of the insurgents. Strong and rapid measures were therefore necessary for the completion of that success which their able conduct and good fortune had already carried far. While therefore they prepared to press the siege of the island, they proclaimed rewards for the assassination of Dionysius and the chiefs of his party, with assurances of kind treatment to all others who would desert him. This nefarious mode of warfare however, seems to have been as ineffectual as it deserved to be. On the other hand, what Dionysius and those with him wanted, was time to look about them, and means to communicate with those well disposed toward them. Proposing capitulation, their proposal was

²⁶ Pursuing and arranging, not without difficulty, the facts which Diodorus appears to have honestly recorded, and dismissing his observations, we get a tolerably consistent account of this sudden overthrow of a triumphant administration, which, on a first view of his narrative, is apt to appear utterly unintelligible. In the course of the narrative however we find remarkable proof of the inconsistency, so usual with him, which seems to have arisen from no dis-

honest intention, but from deficiency of judgement in collecting and assorting his materials. He attributes the war against the Sicels to Dionysius, and assigns, as the cause of it, that they coöperated with the Carthaginians; and yet we find him frequently attributing the power of Dionysius in Syracuse to the support of the Carthaginians. The absurdity of the latter imputation is obvious.

attended to, whether with any fair purpose by those whose advocates have avowed their incouragement to assassination, may perhaps not unreasonably be doubted²⁷. The purpose of Dionysius probably was only to gain time. It is said, he asked permission to quit Sicily with his friends²⁸, and it was granted that he should go in safety with persons and effects, as far as five triremes might carry. During the negotiation, opportunities were gained for communication, while, among the besiegers, not a regular army, but a collection of volunteers, relaxation of effort, and remission of watchfulness grew. Meanwhile a body of Campanian horse, to the number of twelve hundred, which had been trained to war in the Carthaginian service, passed to Agyrum, a Sicel town near the Syracusan border, whose chief, Agyris, was friendly to Dionysius. Opportunity being then taken for proceeding by a rapid march to Syracuse, the town was entered by surprize, and the way forced (not without slaughter of some who attempted opposition), clear through into the island, the gate of whose fortification was opened to receive the welcome strangers. Soon after, three hundred foot, ingaged by Dionysius, found means to reach him by sea.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 9.

These reinforcements, especially the cavalry, were important; less as

²⁷ The expression of Diodorus would rather imply that the treaty was concluded; but the sequel of his narrative more clearly implies the contrary.

²⁸ Who were the confidential advisers of Dionysius, and what their characters, might be known, tho what each said, on critical emergencies, would be little likely to come very exactly reported to the public. Thucydides and Xenophon, who had opportunities superior to most men for information, rarely undertake to report any but public orations of their cotemporaries; but writers, Greek and Roman, who lived three, four, or five centuries after, have not scrupled to give words spoken in private, as if they had taken them in writing on the spot. Diodorus attributes to a poet, Heloris, on this distress of Dionysius, what we find, by a much earlier and more authoritative writer, ascribed to

an unnamed person on a later occasion. It was consulted, among the friends of Dionysius, whether safety should not be sought either by flight, or by a composition with the enemy. Heloris, or some other, observed, that ‘a royal station was a noble sepulcher;’ and Dionysius was confirmed in his resolution to maintain his post. It seems likely that the saying originated rather among the enemies than the friends of Dionysius, in conversing on the obstinacy of his defence; that the story, whatever may have been its foundation, was improved in Greece to become such as, in the next age, it was reported by Isocrates; and that, three centuries after, when Diodorus took it up, it had received the farther ornament of a speaker’s name, the poet Heloris, and the siege of the island had been preferred as the fittest season for it.

increase of garrison to the island, than as they would give means to carry war out of it; and especially as the knowledge of the acquisition would afford encouragement to numerous friends yet living in the quarter of the city possessed by the enemy. Some of these began now to venture the expression of sentiments, not of attachment to the party of Dionysius, but of dissatisfaction with the conduct of those who ruled them. The siege of the island, they said, was vain and ruinous. Treaty should be opened again with those who held it, and more liberal terms offered. The spirit of discussion, put in motion, quickly pervaded the people, and contrary opinions were contested with heat. The popular disposition being thus tried, and the strength of parties nearly ascertained, information of the state of things was communicated to the island. Dionysius then led out his forces, in time and circumstances so well chosen, that, with little resistance, he became master of the city. The slaughter on the occasion, says the historian, as candid in relating facts as illiberal in vilifying characters, was not great; for Dionysius rode about forbidding it. More than seven thousand thus escaped unhurt to Ætna.

After this rapid and great success, it was among the first cares of Dionysius to have all the slain, without distinction of friends and enemies, buried with due funeral pomp, as fellowcitizens. The piety of this act was what Grecian minds would be very generally ready to acknowledge: its generosity, uncommon, as we have had too much occasion to see, could not but be striking, and its policy is obvious. Singularly adapted to soothe Grecian prejudices, and not less wanted perhaps to soften the vindictive spirit of the party friendly to him than to allay the apprehensions of their adversaries, it was a most advantageous preparative for conciliation, enabling him to extend to the living the generosity which had been shown to the dead. All the fugitives were invited to return to Syracuse, with assurance of pardon. Most of those who had families and possessions, accepted the offered boon; and none, says the historian, found occasion to repent of their confidence in the faith of their opponents. Nevertheless some in the bitterness of party spirit, and some in the spirit of adventure, adverse to settlement under a regular government, rejected it, and replied to the

the arguments of those commissioned to press their acceptance of it, with indecent insult. ‘The favor,’ they said, ‘which Dionysius had shown to their slain comrades, in granting them burial, was precisely that which they desired he should receive; and they prayed the gods it might be soon.’ Whether this passed exactly as related, or, not without some improvement, became a popular story, its circulation tends to mark the temper of those with whom Dionysius had to deal, and from whom almost alone any account of him has reached posterity. Yet even from those who cherished such a story, we learn that he had magnanimity enough still not to shut the door of mercy against the scorers: on the contrary he continued, not indeed directly, but obliquely, to invite their repentance²⁹.

Matters being composed, the Campanian cavalry were to be dismissed; and they left Syracuse well satisfied with the reward they received. Accustomed however to adventure, and probably to waste, they seem to have had no mind to return home to subsist on their scanty savings. Possibly therefore hoping to be received again into Carthaginian pay, they returned toward the Carthaginian settlements at the western end of Sicily. On their way they were received, as friends, into quarters in the Sicel town of Entella. Whether then quarrel arising with the unfortunate people, or the simple desire of possessing what belonged to others, instigated, they slew all the men, took the women for their wives, divided the slaves and other booty, and settled themselves in the place. Diod. l. 14.
c. 9.

²⁹ We have no intimation from Diodorus that he ever followed Philistus, or any writer friendly to Dionysius. Nevertheless his narrative, throughout his Sicilian history, from the Athenian invasion to the death of Timoleon, is so at variance with his remarks, whether he eulogizes, or whether he detracts, that they can hardly have been collected from the same sources. The narrative has evidently been taken, for the most part, tho from a party-writer, yet from one of con-

siderable candor; but the remarks seem to have been drawn from a declaimer, intent only on good stories and strong expressions, and regardless of foundation for his invective. The declaimer, nevertheless, has probably been eloquent, and his work in esteem for that merit; and thence probably, for it is difficult to account for it otherwise, the obloquy of Dionysius, in the works of Cicero, Seneca, and other Latin writers.

SECTION III.

Ministers from Lacedæmon and Corinth at Syracuse. Sedition at Syracuse. Measures for the Security and Prosperity of Syracuse. Refugees expelled from Ætna.

B. C. 404. It was in the same year in which these great and rapid turns of
 Ol. 94. 1. fortune in the contest of parties occurred in Sicily, that in Greece the Peloponnesian war was concluded by the surrender of Athens to the Lacedæmonian arms. The Lacedæmonian government then extended its interference, with the purpose of extending command or influence to every member of the Greek nation. Aristus was sent as its minister to Syracuse. The assumption of authority, such as Lacedæmon, exercised among the smaller Grecian states, was not there attempted; no title of harmost was assumed: the business of Aristus seems to have been precisely that of a modern foreign minister, to cultivate a good understanding with Dionysius and his party, which was the party of old connected with Lacedæmon, and to which a good understanding now with the Lacedæmonian government, the proud head of the Greek nation, could not but be flattering and advantageous.

Ch. 21. s. 3.
 & ch. 24. s. 2.
 of this Hist.

But, in the moment when all those republics which had formerly been adverse to Lacedæmon were brought under its supremacy, a disposition to enmity and resistance began, as we have observed in its proper place, to grow among those which had formerly been most attached to it, and especially in Corinth. That respect which the people of Syracuse had always a disposition to pay to Corinth, as their parent city, we have also formerly had occasion to notice. In Corinth then, under all the existing circumstances, some jealousy of the interference of Lacedæmon at Syracuse could not fail; and in Syracuse the party adverse to that which was connected with Lacedæmon would of course become the Corinthian party. Accordingly, in the year following that in which the Peloponnesian war was concluded, we find Nicoteles, a Corinthian, residing in Syracuse, apparently not without some public character. He engaged deeply in the politics of
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B. C. 403.
 Ol. 94. 2.
 Diod. l. 14.
 c. 10.

the city, and he endeavored to gain Aristus to the party in opposition to the existing government. Aristus thus obtained information of sedition, which he communicated to those in administration, and, whatever privilege Nicoteles might claim, whether as a minister, or simply a Corinthian citizen, he was condemned to death and executed.

Hitherto a scrupulous respect for all the forms of a free constitution, according even to the accounts of the most adverse writers, and a lenity singular among Grecian governments, had marked the administration of Dionysius. After such repeated experience of the inefficacy of a generous forbearance to conciliate the disaffected, or induce them to rest, measures more coercive were judged indispensable; but still the extensive executions, and even the extensive banishments, so ordinary among the Grecian republics, were avoided. To obviate necessity for these it was resolved to disarm the disaffected. For this strong measure the season of harvest was chosen. It was usual for the great mass of the population then to leave the city, and live, for the time, in the fields. In some of the southern parts of Europe the harvest management is nearly the same at this day. Farm-houses, as in England, are not seen; even villages are rare. In a good soil and favoring climate few hands do the business of a very imperfect, and yet not unproductive husbandry, till harvest. Then the towns pour forth their inhabitants; the corn is cut, and the grain, immediately trodden out by cattle in the field, is alone brought in. This opportunity then being taken, a general search³⁰ for arms was made through the city, and all found were carried to the public armory, to be given out in future for use only under the direction of the government.

It was so usual, among the Greeks, for every party in a state to assume exclusively the title of **THE PEOPLE**, and to stigmatize as tyranny everything adverse to their own power, that, without adverting to these circumstances, no just estimate can be formed of the value of such expressions as those with which Diodorus and Plutarch would charac-

³⁰ Diodorus says that all the Syracusans were deprived of arms; but he soon afterwards shows that it was not so.

terize the administration of Dionysius. Looking to the facts related by them, and especially by Diodorus, the systems of law and of magistracy, established by Diocles, appear to have remained little if at all altered; nor is any essential difference marked between the power of Dionysius in Syracuse and that which Pericles held so long in Athens. One material change indeed had been growing among the Grecian republics, but not at all peculiar to Syracuse, or the government of Dionysius, the employment of mercenary troops, instead of trusting military service to citizens only. This change was indeed threatening enough to the freedom of all Greece; and yet advantages attended it, wherever the government was liberally administered, so satisfactory to individuals on the score of present ease, that danger in distant and uncertain prospect was disregarded. A force of mercenaries at the disposal of the administration of a republic, enabled them to avoid pressing upon their friends for military duty, and it enabled them also to be lenient to their foes. For where parties were nearly balanced in a republic, the government could hardly go on. Those who held the administration must be watchful, as if a foreign enemy was within their walls, and thence the frequent resort to those extensive banishments which we have seen so ordinary. But if a mercenary force was maintained, always ready at the orders of government, the adverse might be deterred from moving, tho' the friendly citizens rested. In consonance then to the practice of all the republics, the mercenary troops in the Syracusan service were increased, and perhaps not unnecessarily, for the purpose of resisting the attack threatened from Carthage. The power of the ruling party would of course, by the same measure, be rendered more secure, and the double purpose was further promoted by the addition of a second wall to the fortifications of the citadel.

The attention of the government meanwhile was directed, and it seems to have been urgently required, toward those most implacable enemies, the refugees in Ætna; formidable apparently not by their own numbers, but by their connection with Messina and Rhegium, and by their situation overhanging the Syracusan territory. They had, however, ill measured their means altogether, when they added
contumely

contumely to scorn of their adversary's clemency. Their fortress was besieged and taken. What befel themselves the historian, their friend, has not said, and we may thence safely conclude that it was no way uncreditable to Dionysius. From the sequel it appears probable that, upon surrendering the place, they were allowed to withdraw, and that they were mostly the same persons who will recur to historical notice as Syracusan refugees, settled in Rhegium. Diod. l. 14. c. 14.

SECTION IV.

Farther Extension of the Authority of Syracuse in Sicily. War of Rhegium and Messina against Syracuse. Establishment of the Syracusan Empire among the Sicilian and Italian Cities.

THE distinction of the Dorian and Ionian branches of the Greek nation, as we have formerly seen, was maintained in Sicily; and in Sicily, as in Greece, a superintending power, to lead in war, to arbitrate in peace, among so many little independent governments of one people, was found, with whatever inconveniences and dangers attended, to be often necessary. Accordingly, the Dorian cities, Camarina excepted, were generally ready to concede the supremacy to Syracuse, as the most powerful of the Dorian name; but the Ionian, called also commonly Chalcidian, as having originated mostly from Chalcis in Eubœa, were generally jealous of this, and often adverse to it. None, however, of the Ionian cities was eminent enough to pretend itself to any supremacy; whence, for the common defence of the Grecian interest against an enemy powerful as Carthage, if circumstances appeared at all threatening, and the Syracusan government at the time was of a character to command respect and confidence, they were readier to acquiesce. Circumstances afforded leisure now for the Syracusan government to attend to this point, with which domestic troubles had hitherto greatly interfered.

Of the Ionian cities Leontini was nearest to Syracuse, bordering on its territory. The government favored the Syracusan opposition and the refugees, but there was an opposing party friendly to the Syracusan administration. Dionysius led an army to the Leontine border, in the P. C. 403.
Ol. 94. 2.
Diod. l. 14.

hope that his appearance only would suffice to enable the friendly to acquire the superiority in the popular assembly. Being however disappointed, he proceeded to the Sicel town of Enna, where a strong party was adverse to Acimnestus, whom Diodorus calls tyrant of Enna, and through their disputes he became master of the place. He put the popular party in possession of the government, and delivered the tyrant to their mercy, and then, to their great surprize, led his army away without requiring a contribution, which they concluded to have been, as usual with the Greeks, the principal object of his expedition.

The temper of the writers from whom Diodorus drew the materials of his Sicilian history, for he seems to have had little original opinion, may be gathered from his observations on these transactions. The merit of the conduct of Dionysius, in deposing a tyrant, restoring a free government, and forbearing to use the power in his hands for taking, after the common practice of the Greeks, his own reward, he could not but acknowlege; yet he denies all merit to the man; because, he says, his conduct was founded on no regard for justice, but merely on a view to future advantage, from the credit to be acquired, and the confidence that would accrue. It is obvious that virtuous motive might on the same pretence be denied to all the virtuous deeds of men; nor should it escape observation, that deposing a tyrant to establish a popular government could hardly be a tyrant's policy, but rather marks the popular leader of a popular government.

This liberality, likely to extend the reputation and influence of Syracuse, appears immediately to have produced its just reward. Dionysius proposed terms to the town of Erbita. Archonidas, its chief, opposed the reception of them, but they were grateful to a majority of the people. Archonidas migrated with those particularly attached to him, and founded a new state at Alesa, which, from him, took the name of Archonidium. The terms proposed by Dionysius were then acceded to by the Erbitæans, and they were numbered among the allies of Syracuse³¹.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 15, 16.

³¹ Diodorus says that Dionysius made peace with the Erbitæans, after an unsuccessful attempt against them; but in a few sentences after he shows that Dionysius's purpose was fully answered, as related in the text.

Catana and Naxos, the two principal cities in Sicily of the Ionian name, were the next objects of the Syracusan general. He succeeded in negotiation with both, Diodorus says, through corruption of their generals. Here first we find reported of him measures of rigor which might give some countenance to the invective, with which his fame has been sullied. The adverse party of the Catanæan and Naxian people were sold to slavery. The town of Naxos was destroyed, and its territory given to the neighboring Sicels. In Catana a colony of Campanians was established; the town and territory probably being given them as payment for military service, to hold under the supremacy of Syracuse. The historian has omitted to say what became of that party among the Catanians and Naxians who had supported their generals in acceding to the Syracusan terms, but it may apparently be gathered from what he proceeds to relate of the Leontines. The reputation and the power accruing to Dionysius from his late successes, and his liberal conduct amid them, seem to have enabled the friendly in Leontini to gain proselytes to their party, so as to obtain a majority in the general assembly. The policy of Dionysius then was the same which we have seen formerly practised by Gelon. He abolished the Leontine government, and admitted the people to the rights of citizens of Syracuse. Excessive virulence of faction, which appears to have been the common ground of this policy, may have produced the circumstances concealed by the historian, or rather perhaps by those from whom he drew, which occasioned the rigorous treatment of the adverse Catanians and Naxians. In a small city, with contending parties of nearly equal strength, no man could sleep secure. The removal of the whole population to such a town as Syracuse, would remove in a great degree the objects contended for, and a powerful superintending government might repress the ebullitions of ordinary virulence. But Grecian history will give readily to conceive a spirit of party so violent, and provocations so immoderate, that nothing less than separating the parties completely could prevent fatal consequences; and the general spirit of the policy of Dionysius, as appears even in the accounts of writers so adverse to his fame as those from whom

whom alone we have report of it, would not lead him to useless severities ³².

B. C. 402.
Ol. 91. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 18.

To the same adverse pens also we owe all account of the unexampled prosperity which Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, about this time attained; a prosperity which, even in their account, sufficiently marks that his administration must have been, not only able, but liberal, beneficent, and such as altogether clearly infused a general confidence, both among those living under it, and among foreign states. Nothing, indeed, among the deficiencies of Sicilian history seems so much to be regretted as the failure of information of the measures that produced this prosperity; which, in the loss of memorials from the party friendly to Dionysius, might have remained wholly hidden from us, but for the evils following from the revived ambition of Carthage. In relating the effects of that ambition, and the resistance to it, some display of the power and resources of Syracuse was unavoidable. It was generally believed, among the Sicilian Greeks, that a pestilential sickness, desolating Africa, had occasioned the delay of attack upon them, long ago threatened. The Syracusans, already enjoying a prosperity which was the envy of surrounding people, were aware that, as they had most to lose, so it behoved them to exert themselves most in guarding against the impending evil. Powerful as they were among Grecian states, their inferiority to the force of Carthage was such that defensive war must obviously be their business, and even the means of maintaining a siege should be among their first cares. Pressed by these considerations, they very generally looked to Dionysius as the only man who had shown himself qualified, by his talents and energy, to direct public measures in such threatening circumstances. Accordingly the authority of general-autocrator, which had been committed to him for the purpose of quelling sedition

³² Diodorus speaks of the selling of the Catamans and Naxians, as if the whole or both people were sold; but, as we have already had frequent occasion to observe, the people, in the language of party-writers, whom he

followed, was a title only for those of their own party. That it was so on this occasion the historian himself shows, for he mentions the friends of the generals, who were Catamans and Naxians of the opposite party.

at home, and giving peace to Syracuse against Grecian enemies, was now continued to him for the purpose of providing defence against the formidable foreign foe. At what time he lost his colleague Hipparinus we find no mention; but this we gather with certainty, that his friendly connection with the family of Hipparinus remained uninterrupted, and that, within his party, there was no schism.

The works that were executed, under his direction, at the expence of the Syracusan commonwealth, were of a magnitude before unknown among Grecian states. Provision had been made, as we have already seen, for the security of the island, with its port, naval arsenal, and citadel, the last resource in misfortune. It remained to give safety to the population occupying the three large quarters of the town on the mainland, which experience had shown to be very insecure. Dionysius had observed that the craggy hill of Epipolæ, overhanging the town on the northern side, might either give the greatest advantage to a besieging army, or most effectually prevent a complete blockade. Toward the country its height was hardly accessible. Its less precipitous parts wanted fortification, and security for its communication with the rest of the town was an important point. The best military architects of the age, wherever to be found among Grecian states, were engaged to design the plan and direct the execution. Sixty thousand Syracusan citizens, if Diodorus might be credited for the number, gave their voluntary labor to the business of building only, while another multitude wrought the stone, and attended six thousand yoke of oxen employed in drawing it. Dionysius, laying aside the severity of manner and tone of dignity which, in the office of general he usually assumed, was indefatigable in the difficult task of directing just arrangement, and preserving regularity in the distribution of work among such numbers; present wherever difficulty occurred, careful to provide ready relief for the tired, and bearing, together with his friends and associates in the administration, every hardship, whether of fatigue or weather, incident to the business of ordinary overseers. Such zeal altogether was excited for the accomplishment of the work, that many of the laborers would not cease with daylight, but continued their toil through

through a part of the night. Thus in twenty days a wall of squared stones, sufficiently lofty, and of thickness to defy battering-engines, with towers at short intervals, was carried the length of thirty stadia (between three and four English miles) and then the city was supposed impregnable. If there is here some exaggeration of the hands and of the dispatch, the testimony however to the ability, and still more to the popularity of Dionysius is liable to no suspicion³³.

B. C. 401. The quiet of Syracuse and of Sicily was now so far established, that,
Ol. 94. 1. for the year following that of the fortification of Epipolæ, distinguished by the expedition of the younger Cyrus against his brother the king of Persia, we find no transaction within the island recorded; and for the year after again, only a work of peace and prosperity, the founding of a town by Dionysius, at the foot of mount Ætna, which, from a temple of some previous fame there, was called Adranum. That prosperity, which afterward became remarkable among the Sicilian Greek cities in general, already thus overflowing in Syracuse, seems to have been.

³³The fortifying of Epipolæ having been not only popular, but a work effected only through an uncommon amount of popularity, it is obvious that the previous fortifying of the island could not have been the result of tyranny, or any indication of it. Diodorus has had no purpose of deception, or he would have reversed the order of his story; for had he related that Dionysius, having acquired an undeserved popularity, first led the people to approve and promote zealously the fortifying of Epipolæ, and then, throwing off the mask, had fortified the island to secure the tyranny, it would have been so far not inconsistent; but the incongruity of the contrary course is such, that it seems to be accounted for only by the probable supposition, that Diodorus followed one writer for one transaction and another writer for the other.

Rollin has been exceedingly puzzled by the utter discordance of numerous facts,

reported by Diodorus and Plutarch, with the invective against Dionysius, in which those writers abound. To make his own narrative consistent, it was necessary to chuse between them, or it would be impossible not to contradict the character he has given of the tyrant by report of his actions. Whether tragical effect then allured, or he was in any degree biassed by a disposition to decry monarchy, which long ago began to infect men of letters in France, he has adopted all the invective and omitted most of the good actions reported of Dionysius; but he could not omit all without leaving his narrative offensively bare, so that he has not at last avoided great inconsistency. Indeed, in this part of his work we no longer see the faithful and even judicious historian, which he has shown himself in his account of the earlier times of the republics.

in this season of leisure, extending itself, with the popularity and consequent power of Dionysius, tho in progress, as commonly happens, it escaped the notice of historians. The extent of his power, and of his popularity, to which he owed his power, is marked by Diodorus in the title which he attributes to him where he reports the extraordinary works which confessedly his popularity in Syracuse inabled him to accomplish there. He calls him not simply tyrant of Syracuse, but tyrant of the Sicilian Greeks ³⁴.

Nevertheless those violent partizans of the administration of Diocles and Daphnæus, now in exile, whom no invitation could conciliate, no generosity soften, had been, with the merit, at least, of courage, zeal, and activity, not wholly unsuccessful in exciting enemies to the now flourishing government of Syracuse. The ruling party in Rhegium, one of the most powerful of the Italian Greek towns, appears always to have favored their cause. The Rhegians were a mixed people, Dorian and Ionian; and, as by their Dorian blood they esteemed themselves allied to the Syracusans, so by their Ionian, derived from Chalcidians of Eubœa, they held as kinsmen the expelled Naxians and Catanians. Common misfortune then uniting the Dorian exiles from Syracuse, and the Ionian from Naxus and Catana, their joint influence decided the Rhegian people to assert their common cause against the existing Syracusan government, and especially against Dionysius, as a tyrant, whose growing power it behoved them, for their own security, to check before it became irresistible. In the neighbouring city of Messena a large majority were satisfied with the Syracusan alliance; but some men who held leading situations undertook, through what appears to have been really a conspiracy, to bring their state to connection with Rhegium against Syracuse.

Ch. 5. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Matters being concerted, the Rhegian army crossed the strait into Sicily, to the amount, according to Diodorus, of six thousand foot

³⁴ Ὁ τῶν Σικελιωτῶν τύραννος. Diod. l. 14. c. 18. The Greeks distinguished between Σικελιώτης and Σικελός, the former meaning always a Greek, and the latter the old Sicel inhabitants of the island, who were not Greeks; a distinction in which the Latin language failed. Diodorus seems to have

given titles as he found them in the works from which he gathered, where they would vary according to the author's party. His most common description of Dionysius is 'tyrant of the Syracusans,' but sometimes he substitutes the title of dynast, Συρακυσίων δυνάστης. l. 14. c. 103. & 107.

and six hundred horse, a fleet of fifty triremes attending. The Messenian leaders, aware of the unpopularity of war with Syracuse, and fearing, even now, to propose it in the general assembly, ventured, with the authority of office alone, to order the people under arms. The order was obeyed; about four thousand foot and four hundred horse marched, and thirty triremes joined the Rhegian fleet.

On the march, however, before they reached the Messenian border, opportunity occurring for communication, the dissatisfaction generally felt at the arbitrary conduct of their generals and magistrates was made known from one to another, and at length the army assumed to itself to be the popular assembly, whose authority the generals and magistrates had taken upon themselves to supersede. Laomedon, the principal speaker on the occasion, urged so impressively both the illegality of the order for their assembling and marching, and the inexpediency of the proposed war, that the resolution was taken to refuse obedience to the generals, and to return home. The measure was executed as soon as resolved upon. The Rhegian chiefs, disappointed thus of their expected support, no longer hoped to prevail against the power of Syracuse, and ministers from both cities were sent to treat of accommodation. Dionysius, following still a wise and liberal policy, readily forgave, and persuaded the Syracusan people to forgive, the injurious conduct of the Rhegian Many and the Messenian Few. The historian's silence implies that no severity was insisted on, even against the refugees, those inveterate enemies who excited the mischief. His whole account of the treaty is comprized in three words of large expression, 'Peace was made.' The result appears to have been that the influence of the Syracusan government, under the administration of Dionysius, or, in the phrase which has been commonly used to express a similar influence of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments, the Syracusan empire, was extended very generally over the Grecian towns of Italy; and thence Dionysius, in his capacity of autocrator-general of Syracuse, has been called sometimes tyrant, and sometimes king, of Sicily and Italy.

CHAPTER XXXI.

Affairs of the SICILIAN and ITALIAN GREEK Cities, from the Establishment of the SYRACUSAN Empire to the Death of DIONYSIUS.

SECTION I.

Motives and Preparations for War with Carthage. Marriage of Dionysius with the Daughter of Xenetus of Locri. Injurious Treatment of the Carthaginian Subjects in the Grecian Towns. Successful beginning of the War.

THE whole Grecian interest in Sicily being thus placed in circumstances of tranquility and prosperity, each city holding its separate popular government under the superintendancy of the Syracusan administration, and the confederacy strengthened by extension to the Italian cities, alarm nevertheless remained and was increasing from the power and the policy, the liberal and seducing policy, of Carthage. For tho it appears that the advantages were great, and among the Greeks uncommon, which the administration of Dionysius provided for the Sicilian towns within the Grecian line, yet numbers of Greeks were induced by greater advantages, or more flattering hopes, offering in the towns under the Carthaginian dominion, to establish themselves there. It is interesting to find from a prejudiced adversary, for such Diodorus was, to the Carthaginians as well as to Dionysius, this substantial and unsuspecting testimony to the liberality and good faith of a great people, whose fair fame, not probably exempt from real stain, has however suffered singularly from invidious and base detraction.

B. C. 400.
Ol. 95. 1.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.

Had the history of Philistus remained to us, we should probably have gained information of other circumstances which induced or impelled Dionysius to disturb the tranquility, to check the prosperity, and to risk the utter overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by

beginning war with Carthage. In the want of this there might appear some wildness of unjustifiable ambition in the measure, if the omission of Diodorus, and all other writers, to impute any blame to him on the occasion, did not carry with it strong implication that they had nowhere found any imputed, and that none was imputable.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.

c. 44.

Carthage, according to Diodorus, was still weak, from the pestilence which had widely desolated Africa; and there was, throughout the Sicilian Greek towns, a strong disposition to ingage in the war, with a desire that Syracuse should take the lead in it, and that Dionysius, who was universally popular, should command the forces. Thus, in the avowal of his enemies, there appears to have been enough to invite ambition. But there was probably farther cause. The power of Carthage, growing abroad by policy, even during its weakness at home, could not but hold out encouragement to ambition for those who obtained the direction of it. Meanwhile the Greek cities, the more they flourished, were, under popular government, the more difficult to be kept in order. If then popular discontent grew, as the historian's account indicates, at the migrations to the Carthaginian towns, war might have followed from the indiscretion of some one state, which must in the end have involved all, or left the Grecian interest weakened by the loss of one or more members, which would have indangered all.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 41.

But whatever were the aggregate considerations, Dionysius resolved to use the concurring opportunities of the weakened state of Carthage and his own popularity in Sicily, with the general disposition of the Sicilian Greeks toward the measure, for attacking rather than await attack. He did not however involve his country in a measure of so much hazard, without the most careful circumspection, and the most diligent exertion of his own uncommon abilities in preparation. From all parts of Sicily, Italy, Greece, and even from the Carthaginian dominions, were invited men of science to devise and direct, and artizans to execute, whatever might give superiority to the Syracusan armies and fleets. All the porticoes or public galleries, all the gymnasias or places of exercise, and even the vestibules and opisthodomies of the temples were filled with such men and their works. Two great improvements in the antient art of war, one for the land service and

one

one for the sea, according to Diodorus, had hence their origin. That artillery which afterward so much promoted the victories of the Roman armies, machinery for shooting darts and stones of size far beyond the strength of man's arm to throw, (Diodorus calls it the catapeltic) was now either invented, or first perfected, so as to be valuable for practice. Dionysius is said himself to have devised the last great improvement of the antient marine. Holding to the principle of the trieris or trireme, hitherto the most powerful vessel of war, against which no other could stand in contest, by an improved application of it, he added still two benches of oars on each side of the galley. Thenceforward the trireme could no longer resist the impulse, superior both by weight and swiftness, of the penteris or quinquereme. Timber was brought from Ætna, whose sides, at this day nearly bare, then abounded with pine; and from Italy, a country yet affording in plenty the finest oak, of which France, partly owing to greater population, partly to its colder winters, requiring larger supply of fuel, has been long exhausted. Syracuse possessed a hundred and ten ships of war. These were put under repair, and the construction of two hundred more, some of the superior rate, was at once undertaken. Already a hundred and fifty receptacles, for securing the ships of the republic from injuries of weather, a sort of larger boathouses, were among the conveniencies of the naval arsenal. To make the increased strength of the navy lasting, a hundred and fifty of superior construction, and mostly capable each of containing two ships, were now added. Syracusan citizens were appointed to make half the complement of this great fleet; the other half it was proposed to supply by mercenaries.

While these things, under favor of a most extraordinary zeal among the Syracusan people, were proceeding rapidly, Dionysius directed his view diligently to all the Greek towns of Sicily and Italy, and was generally successful in cultivating their friendship³⁵. His greatest anxiety,

³⁵ Diodorus, in his account of preparation for war with Carthage, drops many strong expressions, showing the popularity of Dionysius in Syracuse and throughout the Greek towns of Sicily, and the general

zeal to act under his orders: 'Απείλησιν σπειρόντων τιλέσαι τὸ τιταγμένον — πολλὰ μὲν ἱρίαι ἰγίνετο — τοσαύτη σπύουδῃ τοῖς πλήθεσιν ἐνπεπλώκει, l. 14. c. 18. Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὰ συνίσταται

B. C. 398.
Ol. 95. 3.

anxiety, as his greatest difficulty, was to secure the fidelity of Messena and Rhegium to the common cause of the Greeks; having great reason to suspect that the party in those towns, connected with the Syracusan refugees, would not scruple to join the Carthaginians³⁶. He succeeded with the Messenians by giving them a considerable tract of land (from whom acquired the historian hath not said) as an addition to their territory. No similar opportunity being open for cultivating popularity among the Rhegians, he proposed to form a connection of interest with them in a very different way.

Ch. 26. s. 2.
of this Hist.

We have already had occasion to notice that republican jealousy which restrained social communication among the Greeks, and, especially by the interdiction of marriage between those of different republics, insulated the people of each, and made all more than is common between great nations, even of different languages, foreigners to each other. Such illiberal jealousy, and every prejudice tending to produce it, could not but operate to the hindrance of the political union necessary to maintain a nation in independency, and especially necessary now to support the Grecian interest in Sicily against the threatening superiority of Carthage. It seems to have been with a view to prepare for a union of the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities, that Dionysius proposed to set an example for diffusing family connections among them. Whether the Olynthians, in their yet infant confederacy, gave the example, or whether they owed it to Dionysius, is a question involved in the same obscurity with many much more important, which occur to reasonable curiosity, about both the Olynthian and Syracusan

συνέβαινεν γινώσκειν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, c. 41. Συγκαταίνοις ἑαδὲ τοῖς Συρακούσις, c. 45. Ταῖς κατὰ τὴν νῆσον πόλεις φιλανδρώπως προσεφέριτο, τὴν ἰσίουσαν, αὐτῶν ἰκκαλίμινος, c. 44. Συναγματοῦ γὰρ αὐτῷ προβίμης ἁπάντες, c. 47. These sentiments, if they were his own, or these expressions, whenever borrowed, are evidently of a different source from the obloquy with which he abounds against Dionysius. It seems as if he had quite forgotten his foregoing assertion that the Syracusans showed themselves ready to bear anything rather than obey the tyrant.

³⁶ We cannot but give credit to Diodorus for so honestly confessing that his favorite party was guilty of that very crime which he so repeatedly and so inconsistently imputes to Dionysius. The confession is explicit enough: Τοὺς δὲ Πηγίους τε καὶ Μεσσηνίους ὁρῶν ἰκκίην δίσταμι ἔχουσας συνδύαγμαίης, ἐλαβῆτο μὴ ποτε τῶν Καρχηδονίων διαδάνῳ εἰς Σικελίαν, ἐκινῶν πρόσθωλται. Ἄ δὲ λίαν ἀγωνίῳ ὁ Διονύσιος, τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις ἰδῶκε πολλὴν τῆς ὁμοῦ χάραν, ἰδίους αἰτοὺς κατασκευάζων ταῖς ἐνέργειαις. Diod. l. 14. c. 44.

governments. Nearly twenty years however before that war which produced the overthrow of the Olynthian confederacy, and gave occasion to all the information remaining to us concerning it, Dionysius made a formal application to the Rhegian people for permission for himself to marry the daughter of a Rhegian citizen. Without having observed how unusual the thing was among the Greeks, it might appear to us equally strange that such application should have been necessary, and that it should have met, as we are assured it did, with a denial. But tho it was in Rhegium that he particularly desired to cultivate an interest, yet he might promote his general purpose by taking a wife from any of the principal Italian Greek cities. Applying therefore at Locri, he found more liberality. Nevertheless there, equally as at Rhegium, the people were to be assembled, and their decree was to authorize the permission. This being obtained, Xenetus, the most illustrious of the Locrians, readily betrothed his daughter, Doris, to Dionysius. While all the writers from whom we have mention of these remarkable transactions call Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse, every circumstance in their report indicates a studied deference to popular government.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 44. & 107.
Strab. l. 6.
p. 258.
Plut. vit.
Dion.

Dionysius also married Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, the most illustrious, wealthy, and powerful of the Syracusans, his colleague in the high office of captain-general. The story seems to have been some ages after popular, that he married both these ladies on the same day; but tho adopted both by Diodorus and Plutarch, whose prejudices it suited, it appears highly improbable. The marriage with the daughter of his colleague, the first man of Syracuse in family dignity, if no prejudices were shocked, if offence of no kind were given by peculiar circumstances attending it, would of course carry those advantages which one in the situation of Dionysius would seek. The extension of nuptial connection, to other cities also, tho against the general habits and prejudices of the Greeks of his own day, was but a revival of what was enough known to have been the practice of their forefathers of the heroic ages; and a great and liberal policy is obvious in it, such as, according to all accounts, would be likely to be the policy of Dionysius. The writers who report this bigamy mention no
violence

violence attending it, no offence taken at it. On the contrary, we learn from them that the families of both the ladies continued to be always upon good terms with Dionysius; that by one match he actually strengthened his interest in Syracuse, and by the other in Italy. We learn from them also that children followed immediately his marriage with the Locrian lady, and, not till after some years, another family came by the daughter of Hipparinus. It seems then altogether every way probable that Doris, the mother of the younger Dionysius, was dead before the nuptials took place with Aristomache, mother of the younger Hipparinus; and that the story of the bigamy originated, from something perhaps at first loosely said, in the violence of the party heat which we shall see, some years after the death of the elder Dionysius, afflicted Syracuse, and through Syracuse, all the Grecian interest in Sicily³⁷.

Another imputation against Dionysius seems better founded, being in some degree confirmed by the venerable Athenian rhetorician his cotemporary, Isocrates. Like Themistocles, a love of splendor was the weakness of his great mind. Probably however this has been exaggerated; tho the gilt galley which is said to have brought one bride from Locri, and the chariot with four white horses, which conducted the other from the house of her own family in Syracuse, imply nothing that will appear to the modern reader either very invidious or very extraordinary. We might therefore excuse the writers, who dwell on these matters, their omission of all information about the sources of private income which could supply the magnificence, if they would have given us some account of the public revenue which afforded means for the vast preparations, naval and military, at the same time made, and encouragement to undertake the various expences of the arduous war to insue. But on this interesting subject also the information remaining is unfortunately defective. Such as it is, it may be best reserved for future notice.

³⁷ Should it be reckoned that a supposition howsoever supported by probabilities, ought not to be maintained against the positive assertions of Diodorus and Plutarch, with whatever improbabilities em-

barrassed, unless some warrant of antient authority can be found, I would refer to Cornelius Nepos, whose account of Dionysius appears clearly to involve a virtual contradiction of the bigamy.

According

According to the explicit declaration of Diodorus himself, Dionysius was, at this time, in no shape or degree tyrant, in the antient, any more than in the modern sense of the word. The guard for his person, formerly decreed by the people, was evidently but a temporary resource, usual among the Grecian democracies, and which the necessity of the moment justified. As general of the republic, now without a guard, and without any pomp, he superintended the business of the fortifications, the dockyards, and the armories, conversing familiarly with the artizans, receiving those of superior merit at his table, inciting thus a zeal and diligence of which even his enemies spoke with wonder, commanding general respect through meer superiority of character, and establishing a popularity such as Grecian history nowhere else exhibits, not even in the great Pericles. In circumstances thus favorable, preparations being sufficiently forward, by virtue of his office he summoned the people to assemble, and proposed war with Carthage: 'It was a war,' he said, 'not of ambition, but truly of self-defence, to which the critically advantageous opportunities of the moment invited. For that ambitious republic was yet weak through the ravages of the pestilence, and its command over the conquered Grecian cities, loosely held, might, by a vigorous effort, be snatched from it. But its purposes of conquest, necessarily intermitted, were not abandoned, and the means of opposing them, which the present moment offered, if now neglected, might never recur.' The Syracusan people, predisposed to the sentiments of their general, assented with zeal, and the decree for war was voted³⁸.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 18. 41. 45.

B. C. 398.
Ol. 95. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 45.

On

³⁸ Συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακουσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, κ. τ. ε. c. 41.

The incongruity into which Diodorus has here been led, apparently in collecting narrative of fact from one writer and invective against Dionysius from others, is often curious, and not least so here. After declaring that the government of Syracuse, under Dionysius, was perfectly mild and highly popular, ἀπερίθροτο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυρανίδος, καὶ, μεταβάλλομενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν, φιλανθρωπότερον ἔρχετο τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, — ταχὺ συγκατά-

τους ἔλαβε τοὺς Συρακουσίους, c. 45; that the general zeal to obey his directions and gratify his wishes was extraordinary, c. 18; that the mildness of government was extended to all, without distinction of party; that all the citizens were armed; that Dionysius avoided to use the authority of his office for engaging mercenary troops, till the moment when they were wanted against the foreign enemy; and, finally, that the great object of all his preparations was war with Carthage; after all this the historian proceeds

On the dismissal of the assembly then, after having thus exercised their sovereign authority in legal form, the ill-thinking many, feeling their power above law, with heated minds, would exercise it in their own way. Many Carthaginian traders, residing in Syracuse, had large property in their warehouses, and many Carthaginian vessels, richly laden, were in the harbour. Warehouses were forced, vessels were boarded, and Carthaginian property, wherever found, was the prey of unprincipled rapacity. This violence of the Syracusans was as a signal for the other Grecian towns of Sicily; and in many places the people, not confining themselves to robbery, treated the persons of the Carthaginian traders and residents with wanton and extreme cruelty. It was not indeed the proper sovereign that did this; for then

ceeds to tell us, that Dionysius owed his power in Syracuse to his army of mercenaries and the support of Carthage; that the Syracusans acceded to the proposal made by him for war with Carthage, because they hated the Carthaginians for supporting him, and because they hoped that, as Dionysius allowed them arms, the chance of war would furnish opportunity for recovering their liberty.

The inconsistencies of Diodorus, where the thread of history depends upon his narrative, are often very vexatiously perplexing, and, in his general business of abridging, he rarely avoids some confusion, but still more, whenever he undertakes to compound, a mass of incongruity is apt to result. Nevertheless as in copying he seems always to have been faithful, not only he shows often plainly what a more artful writer, with his prejudices, would have concealed, but sometimes he furnishes a thread's end, discoverable on careful examination, to help toward some unravelling of his incongruities. Such a thread's end appears in his observation, that the Syracusans hoped, with the possession of arms, to find, among the chances of war, opportunity for recovering their liberty: Ἡλπίζον ἐαυτοὺς, κερεινσαιτας ἐπλαν, ἰαν ἡ τύχη

δω καὶ ὁν, ἀνιλάφειδαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Applied to the Syracusans generally, there is no guessing what this can mean in any connection with what has proceeded: it is as incongruous as the notion that Dionysius depended upon Carthage for his power in Syracuse, while he was taking measures for war with Carthage, and that he would quarrel with his supporters to give opportunity for resistance to his dominion. But if we take the term Syracusans to mean only the relics of that party in Syracuse which had been so obstinately and bitterly opposing him, who, in the way of party, would call themselves eminently the Syracusans, and if we take the term liberty to mean, as it so generally did, the power and prevalence of the party, then the observation will be found probably just; and the inference will be that numbers of the adverse party were yet living in Syracuse, and that all were trusted with arms. Combining it then with what precedes, we gather, that while all joined in pretending union in political sentiment with the majority of their fellow-citizens, and satisfaction with the government administered by Dionysius, the gall of party remained in their minds, and they were still always ready for sedition.

only

only the people, in a regular democracy, were properly sovereign, when they were assembled according to law, and voted according to law; but it was so large a portion of those in whom the sovereign power was, without limitation by the constitution, vested, that restraint upon them was impossible. Diodorus, who, with the too-commonly illiberal spirit of both Greek and Roman patriotism, seems rather to have approved the villainy, allows Dionysius credit for a share in it no farther than that he took no effectual measures of prevention.

This gross violation of the law of nations and of common honesty did not immediately lead to actual war. Probably some negotiation followed, and some apology was made by the government for the lawless violence of the populace, tho Diodorus says no more than that Dionysius considered of sending ministers to Carthage. In the next spring a herald was sent formally to announce to the Carthaginian government the decree of the Syracusan people for war; proposing, as the only condition on which it might be avoided, the renuntiation of all claim over Grecian towns in Sicily. This minister, notwithstanding the atrocious conduct of the Greeks, was received by the Carthaginian government as became the government of a civilized and great people. He was allowed to deliver the writing he bore to the executive magistrates, who regularly communicated the contents to the senate and the popular assembly. Deliberation was held on the contents: the proposal was rejected, and the herald was dismissed.

B. C. 397.
Ol. 95. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 47.

On the return of the herald to Syracuse, regular war began. The forces of all the Greek cities, of the eastern part of the island, were assembled under Dionysius, as commander-in-chief, and marched by the southern coast; a fleet of two hundred ships of war and five hundred store-vessels attending. The measure had been prepared for by well-conducted negotiation among the towns over which the authority or influence of Carthage had been extended, so that all were prepared to concur in the Grecian cause. The strength of Camarina, Gela, and Agrigentum, joined Dionysius as he passed; that of Himera crossed the island to meet him. Even Selinus was gained, and the Sicels seem to have contributed largely to swell his numbers, which are said to have amounted to eighty thousand foot, with more than

c. 47.

c. 53.

three thousand horse. The purpose was evidently no less than to drive out the Carthaginians, and make Sicily completely a Grecian island. At the approach of so formidable a force, no succour appearing at hand, all the Sican tribes hastened to make submission, and the town of Eryx surrendered on the first summons. Motya, however, prepared for firm resistance. This town, singularly well built, strong by situation on a small island, connected with the main by a causeway six furlongs in length, was the principal residence of the wealthy traders of Carthage in Sicily. Dionysius, having disposed everything for the siege, left the prosecution of it, with a sufficient landforce, to his brother Leptines, commander-in-chief of the fleet, while, with the main body of his army, he marched to collect plunder; which, to his own day, from those of Homer, had continued to be generally not less a measure of necessity for maintaining an invading army, than of policy for distressing the enemy. Having overrun, without resistance, the territories of Ancyraë, Solus, Egesta, Panormus, and Entella, he returned to press the siege of Motya.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 47.

It appears that Dionysius had not less well chosen his time than well arranged his measures. Carthage was not yet prepared to meet his extraordinary exertions. But Imilcon, again appointed commander-in-chief for the Sicilian war, showed no small degree of spirit and ability in the conduct of an inferior force against him. Instead of pressing to the point attacked, while he could give no effectual relief, he sent ten ships to surprize the harbour of Syracuse itself, while the fleet was absent, and the bold attempt succeeded. Much shipping was destroyed, and the assailing squadron withdrew little injured. Probably he hoped for greater effect from his success. But Dionysius was too well assured of the people at home, too well prepared with his plans abroad, and altogether too firm to his purpose to be diverted from it, as Diocles had formerly been from the relief of Himera. Imilcon then, having collected a hundred ships, resolved to attempt the relief of Motya. But for this also management and surprize were necessary; he could not yet face the Grecian fleet at sea. But he found opportunity to fall upon a detached division of it at anchor, of which he destroyed a part, and disabled most of the rest. Seizing then the favoring moment,

c. 49.

moment, he boldly pushed into the harbour, where, according to the usual way of the antients, the rest of the galleys of war were hauled upon the beach. All the ability of Dionysius was wanted, so complete was the surprize, to repel this well-conducted attack upon a very superior fleet, within ready reach of support, from a powerful landforce. His resource, instead of risking to launch his galleys, and get his crews aboard amid the tumult of action, was to bring his landforce, supported by his new engine the catapult, down to the shore ; and under cover of these to drag his vessels to the other side of the causeway, where his crews might be collected and naval action prepared for, in some leisure. His engine is said to have been of great service, by the execution it did, and still more by the alarm of the enemy at a power so new to them. Imilcon, disappointed in his daring attack by the effect of this new implement of war, and by the mode of retreat adopted by Dionysius, and justly judging it imprudent to wait till so superior a naval force could be brought round against him, withdrew, and returned to Africa.

The Motyenes, thus left to their own strength, defended the place through the summer. Toward winter, through the improved art of Dionysius, seconded by abundant force, it was carried by assault. c. 53. The cruelty of the Sicilian Greeks then spared neither age nor sex. By the confession of their fellowcountryman and panegyrist Diodorus, it was enormous. Dionysius exerted himself to restrain it, but every attempt to interfere, directly by authority, proved vain. Nevertheless, not abandoning his humane purpose, he sent heralds around, proclaiming to the troops, that the plunder of the town, from which their rage for blood had hitherto diverted their attention, was theirs, and at the same time directing the wretched suppliants and fugitives to the temples which the Greeks were most likely to respect. Thus a miserable remnant of the Motyenes was saved from slaughter, but only to be sold to slavery. Some Greeks, found bearing arms for the Carthaginians, were crucified.

Dionysius seems to have had little credit with his fellowcountrymen for his humanity toward their enemies, but his liberality and judgement

ment in rewarding merit, wherever it had been conspicuous in his own army, were acknowledged. Having arranged other matters, he trusted the care of Motya to a garrison composed mostly of Sicels, but under a Syracusan commander. A hundred and twenty ships of war were left under the orders of his brother Leptines, with a landforce for the blockade of Entella and Egesta. With the rest of the army and fleet he returned home for the winter.

SECTION II.

Great Preparations of Carthage. Campaign in Sicily. Destruction of Messina.

IF Dionysius, in beginning the war under no more pressure of immediate necessity than Diodorus has stated, may appear to have miscalculated the resources of Carthage, we ought not perhaps therefore to think lightly of his abilities or foresight. Political arithmetic then had not the grounds which the circumstances of modern Europe afford, and even in modern Europe events have often baffled all previous calculation. In the spring following the taking of Motya, the Carthaginian government had collected a force greater than was probably supposed within their means. Diodorus has been desirous of credit for the report, which made the troops for the Sicilian war three hundred thousand foot and four thousand horse; tho he confesses that the cotemporary Sicilian writer, Timæus, reckoned the army which passed from Africa only one hundred thousand, strengthened however afterward by thirty thousand Sicilians. Imilcon, still the commander, was raised on the occasion to a dignity familiar to the Carthaginian constitution, which the Greeks often expressed by their term which corresponds with our title of King³⁹.

While this great armament was yet preparing, Dionysius opened the campaign by marching again to the western end of the island, and

³⁹ Isocrates says, that in Carthage, as in Lacedæmon, the civil government was oligarchal, the military kingly. Nicodes, p. 118, t. i.

repeating or extending plunder and waste of the territories yet holding for Carthage. The Halicyæans obviated the evil by offers of submission, which were accepted. The collection of booty having been carried as far as conveniently might be, he sat down before Egesta, of which it was much his object to become master. But the garrison was determined, and the operations of the siege were greatly checked by a well-conducted sally, in which fire was so spread about the station of the cavalry of the besieging army, that most of the horses perished by the flames⁴⁰.

Meanwhile the passage of the Carthaginians to Sicily had difficulties peculiar to the antient naval system. The ships of war and the ships of burden, from the wide difference in their construction, were ill qualified to keep company. The former, long ships, as they were called, all row-gallies, could go any way at pleasure in a calm; but a wind the most direct in their course, unless very moderate, was formidable. On the contrary the latter, round ships, as the Greeks termed them, in form approaching our vessels for ocean navigation, wanted wind, and could bear it. Imilcon sailed with a favoring breeze, suiting both his long ships and his round ships, and it was the more necessary for them to hold company on account of the extreme deficiency of burthen of the long ships, which denied room for almost the smallest quantity of stores. But the wind shortly increased, so that the ships of war could no longer safely keep their course. The fleet therefore separated. The ships of war, bending eastward, ranged the African shore; which, with shelter from the blast, gave them also smooth water. The ships of burden, meanwhile, profited from the gale to cross the deep. But, to reach the Carthaginian harbours of Sicily, all on the northern coast, they must pass Motya, now the station of the Grecian fleet; and in the want of the compass it was hazardous not to assure themselves of their course by sight of the western promontory, before they turned eastward for Panormus, their

⁴⁰ Τῶν δ' ἱππέων οἱ πλεῖστοι ταῖς σκηναῖς συγκατεκάλυπτον. Rhodoman has ventured to render ἱππέων, by the word *equorum*. Westling has ill altered this by substituting *equitum*. The difficulty of saving horses from fire surrounding them is well known; and it seems little doubtful but the copy of the original, and not the translation, wanted correction.

appointed port. To see they must of course risk being seen, and Dionysius, watchful, at all points, obtained intelligence that they were approaching, unprotected by ships of war. Leptines, with a ready squadron, hastened to intercept them. Had the weather fallen calm, he might probably have given an important check to the Carthaginian expedition. Adverse as the roughness of the sea was to his operations, he sunk some of the ships by the stroke of the beak, but the greater part sailed from him with ease. On the first abatement of the wind, Imilcon followed with a force too great for the Greeks to meet, and he joined his transports and storeships in the harbour of Panormus.

The very fame of the arrival of such a force made a great change in Sicily. The fidelity of the Sicans to their new ingagement with the Syracusans was at once shaken; the Halicyæans hastened to atone for their recent defection by demonstration of zeal to renew their connection with Carthage. These advantages having thus accrued without effort, Imilcon directed his first measures to the recovery of Motya, critically situated for communication with the African shore, or, in an enemy's hands, to prevent communication between that shore and all the Carthaginian possessions in Sicily. Dionysius was still pressing the siege of Egesta. Imilcon passing almost in sight of that place, in marching to Motya, gave him no disturbance. Hasty decision by battle was not necessary to either general, as commonly among the little republics of Greece; and Imilcon, not less than Dionysius, seems to have been aware of a superior mode of warfare.

But the very superior force of the Carthaginians, by sea and by land, while the people of the western end of Sicily, always disposed to a preference of the Carthaginian to the Grecian connection, wanted only such encouragement to declare it, at once reduced Dionysius to great difficulties. He could not relieve Motya without a battle, in a country now to a great extent hostile, against a force which he could not prudently attack. The reduction of Egesta, if he might hope for it, would no longer answer his former views. The Sicans having universally declared for the Carthaginians, some of the Sicel tribes would be likely to join the rising power, and, in all the Grecian towns, the party adverse to the existing administration, a party which, as we have
seen,

seen, in some places held communication with the Carthaginians, would be moving. Under these and probably still other considerations, Dionysius resolved to raise the siege of Egesta; and leaving Motya to its fate, in whose garrison of Sicels perhaps he had no perfect confidence, to direct his more immediate care to the eastern parts of the island. Motya then soon yielded to the Carthaginian arms; nor is any retaliation for the cruelties exercised there by the Greeks, imputed by the Greek historians.

Free communication with Carthage being thus restored, Imilcon resolved to proceed, as immediately as conveniently might be, against Syracuse itself, whose fall would involve that of all the rest of Sicily. The situation of the Carthaginian possessions led him to take the road of the northern coast, on which they extended near half the length of the island. His vast fleet attended the motions of his army. The submission of Himera, offered on his approach, was favorably received. Cephaledion, Solus, and some other small places, were little capable of resistance. All the northern coast of the island fell to him almost without a blow, and the Messenians at its extremity, debated whether to follow the example of Himera. After warm contest, the resolution to resist prevailed.

This resolution however seems to have been founded on no just consideration of means. Long ill-governed, and distracted by party, Messena was very deficiently fortified. On the western side indeed, by which the Carthaginians approached, the mountain-ridge of Peloris formed a very advantageous rampart, leaving only one practicable pass, another Thermopylæ, against the sea. That pass was occupied, but to little purpose; for Imilcon, halting his army, sent his fleet forward, which entered the harbour of Messena unopposed. The previous removal of families and effects fortunately had made the defence of the town of less importance. In the vain attempt a few only of the remaining garrison fell. The greater part escaped by flight to the neighboring mountain-fastnesses. Above two hundred, whose retreat by land was intercepted, threw themselves into the sea, with the purpose of swimming to the Italian shore. About fifty succeeded; the rest were drowned.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 58.

The superiority of the Carthaginians being thus substantially demonstrated, the Sicels hastened to follow the example, already set not only by the Sicans but by so many even of the Greeks, to make terms for themselves; the Assarine tribe alone holding faithfully their engagements with the Syracusans. Three-fourths of the island might now be considered as subdued. The possession of the harbour of Messena gave great opportunity for intercepting succour to the remaining Greek possessions, not only from Italy, but, according to the ordinary course of Grecian navigation, also from Peloponnesus. The means of Syracuse for defence were thus so narrowed, that its fall seemed nearly assured.

Ch. 18. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Dionysius meanwhile had been diligent in arranging the means yet remaining in his power. The policy of Pericles, in the Peloponnesian war, voluntarily to abandon the country, and confine all measures of defence to the walls of Syracuse, could not be his policy. However the walls might resist assault, the superiority of the Carthaginian fleet, excluding supplies by sea, would make such resistance finally ineffectual. But the Syracusan territory, larger than that of most of the states of Proper Greece, was not open, like many of them, and without refuge for its people but within the walls of the capital: it abounded with castles for the protection of its fields; each capable of strong resistance, with a very small garrison, against great numbers using the ancient manner of attack. These he supplied largely with provisions. The Syracusan territory, including the subject lands of Leontini, Catana, and Naxos, was also advantageously bounded for defence. Dionysius therefore gave his particular attention to the northern border, where the mountain of Ætna divided it from the Messenian, whence attack was expected. He carefully strengthened the citadel of Leontini, as a central post, and made it a magazine whence other places might be supplied. He persuaded the Campanians, whom he had established in Catana, a place ill-fortified, and, as a post, less important, to remove to the town of Ætna, lately the strong hold of the Syracusan exiles. He was not equally fortunate in maintaining his influence with the Sicels, to whom he had given the town of Naxos, critically situated near the point where the northern root of the great mountain meets the sea. For, as Imilcon's power was alarming,

so his liberality was alluring; and, at his invitation they broke faith with Dionysius, and, moving from Naxos, a place of little strength, they fortified for themselves a post on the neighboring height of Taurus. Hence originated the town afterward called Tauromenium, now Taormina. To obviate then, as far as might be, the evils of this defection, Dionysius took his own station at Naxos, with an army said to have been of thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; and the fleet, of a hundred and eighty ships of war, attended to coöperate with him.

Imilcon, pursuing his purpose against Syracuse, moved his fleet and army at the same time from Messina southward. But, before he reached the Naxian territory, an eruption happened from Ætna, and the fiery matter pouring toward the sea, completely stopped the march of his troops. He was thus reduced to the necessity of parting company with his fleet, to make a long circuit round the mountain's base, whose complete circumference is estimated one hundred miles. Diod. l. 14.
c. 59.

In choice of dangers, an opportunity was thus offered to Dionysius, beyond his hope, tho yet little affording any fair prospect of success. He nevertheless resolved to take the advantage, such as it might be, for engaging the enemy's very superior fleet during the army's absence. Leptines, commanding, led the charge with a courage that earned the eulogy of those bitterest of enemies, party-enemies; but the unfortunate result gave ground for blaming his conduct. He was defeated, with the loss, it is said, of no less than a hundred ships, and two thousand men. Catana was immediately occupied by the conquerors, and made their naval station, whence, more conveniently than from the greater distance of Messina, operations might be carried on against Syracuse. Messina, whether to punish any ill-faith of the people, and hold out an example of terror, or with what other view we little gather from remaining accounts, was, with singular accuracy of destruction, according to Diodorus, levelled with the ground⁴¹. c. 60.
c. 58.

⁴¹ In the narrative of Diodorus occurs frequently what may indicate that, after gathering indiscriminately from different authors, telling the same story, often with different views and different prejudices, he never revised his work. He says Imilcon was anxious to take Messina for the singular convenience of its port and its situation for

SECTION III.

Siege of Syracuse. Retreat of the Carthaginians.

Diod. l. 11.
c. 61.

IN addition now to contention with a force very superior by land, and completely victorious by sea, all the difficulties incident to federal armies, voluntary service, and popular governments, pressed upon Dionysius. A part of those under him, dreading the waste of their lands and the certain evils and incalculable dangers of a siege, were earnest for trying the fortune of the field against Imilcon's very superior numbers. But Dionysius, considering the hazard that would hang over Syracuse from the enemy's fleet, even while a victory might be gaining by the army, and the certainty of its fall, should the event of a battle be less than victory, resolved to risk all the inconveniencies of withdrawing within those fortifications which, with so much expence and labor, he had made, in common opinion, and he hoped well-founded opinion, impregnable. The result probably he in some degree foresaw. Immediately his command over a considerable part of his army ceased. Some hastened to their several cities: some threw themselves into the forts of the Syracusan territory, for the better chance, which they hoped for there, of means to chuse their farther measures, than if they went to Syracuse, where they expected immediate blockade. He prudently avoided to attempt any violence upon their inclinations. Confident in the attachment of sufficient numbers, through their own clear interest, for the garrison of the city, he had taken hostages only from the Campanians who held Ætna, a select body of whose best soldiers he also required to march with him to reinforce the garrison of Syracuse.

purposes of importance to his views; and then proceeds to tell that, as soon as he was master of it, he would not let one stone stand upon another, lest it might be of future use to the Greeks. It is more likely that this destruction took place after, than

before possession was taken of Catana: and it seems very unlikely that Imilcon then apprehended that Greeks or others could make any use of Messena which he should disapprove.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile the general conduct of Imilcon was not that of a merciless barbarian, but of a mild and politic conqueror. Having made the circuit of Ætna with his whole army, on arriving near the town of the name, he sent proposal of very liberal terms to the Campanians in garrison there, and referred them to their fellowcountrymen settled in Entella for testimony to the good faith of the Carthaginian government, and the advantages enjoyed under its protection. The Campanians, well-disposed to accept his offers, were restrained by consideration for their hostages in the hands of the Syracusans.

Avoiding to waste time on small objects, Imilcon left the Campanians in their strong hold, pursued his march to Syracuse, and incamped with his numerous army about two miles from the city. His fleet, entering the great harbour unresisted, seemed to fill its ample space. He had hopes that Dionysius might be rash enough, or that the people's impatience would force him, to come out and venture a battle. But the Syracusans appear to have been, under the administration of Dionysius, not subject to passionate counsels, as when the Athenians first invaded their country. The patience of a people under reverses is indeed the best test of the popularity of a government. Not even the actual ravage of their territory, which Imilcon gave up for plunder to his army during thirty days, overcame their prudent forbearance. The siege was then regularly formed, and, before long, the division of Achradina was taken by assault.

We want the history of Philistus to do justice to the conduct of Dionysius in these arduous circumstances; but even in the account of Diodorus we see much foundation for that eulogy of it by the great Scipio Africanus, which Polybius has reported. Early in the pressure of his affairs, under the overbearing force of the Carthaginian armament, he had sent his kinsman Polyxenus through the Italian Greek cities, and on to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to solicit assistance; urging them, for their own sake, to exertion for preventing the threatened overthrow of the Grecian interest in Sicily by a barbarian power. Polyxenus succeeded so far only as to collect about thirty triremes from different states, but with the advantage of a Lacedæmonian of rank, Pharacidas, for the commander; and he was fortunate enough

to avoid opposition from the Carthaginian fleet, while he conducted them into the small harbour.

The Achradina was lost, the fortifications of the other parts of the city seemed capable of resisting the combined force and art of the besiegers, so that famine was the evil principally to be guarded against. This was a point of so much importance, and at the same time of so much difficulty, as to induce Dionysius to leave the charge of the city to others, while he went himself with Leptines to bring in a convoy. In their absence, a vessel, laden with corn for the enemy, being observed approaching without any ready protection, five triremes pushed out from the little harbour, and took possession of her; but before they could recover their port with their prize, they were attacked by a superior force. Further assistance however hastening to them, while none was equally ready for the enemy, they were finally victorious, and brought in their prize in triumph⁴².

Under the privations, hardships, and alarms inseparable from a siege, uneasiness among the people, such as produced a temporary disgrace for the great Pericles in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, tho Athens was not actually besieged, could not fail to press upon Dionysius. His adversaries endeavoured, in his absence, to profit from the late naval success for party purposes: 'The pretence, they said, 'that his talents were necessary for the republic's service, ' was now demonstrated to be unfounded. His permanence in the ' office of general-autocrat was not only unconstitutional, but evidently disadvantageous to the conduct of public affairs, and injurious ' to better men.' The same opportunity of his absence was taken to

⁴² Such are the probable circumstances in the wild account of Diodorus, which has evidently been gathered from some most unreasonable party-writer and paneg of the Greeks. Tho a considerable part of the half-ruined fleet of Syracuse, in its best state very unequal to the Carthaginian, was absent with Dionysius and Leptines, yet the small remainder, according to Diodorus, not only took the Carthaginian admiral's ship, and destroyed or took twenty-four more,

but, unsatisfied with this reasonable good success, they went into the great harbour, and provoked the vast fleet there to battle; and, so were the Carthaginians astonished at the heroism of which they had just been witnesses, that they feared to stir; and all this heroism was owing to the absence of Dionysius. We shall see presently the testimony of the same author to what his presence could do.

excite dissatisfaction and alarm at the employment of some gold taken from the temples for the public exigencies. ‘How could the divine favor,’ it was asked, ‘be expected for the republic’s arms, under the conduct of an impious man, notoriously guilty of sacrilege? The force of united Sicily flying from an enemy; Motya, Himera, Messina, taken; the Sican and Sicel alliances lost; the fleet defeated; Syracuse itself besieged, all these clearly indicated the indignation of the gods against the individual commander, while the victory just obtained, under others, by so small a force against so vast an armament, satisfactorily proved their kind disposition to the commonwealth, if separated from the individual.’ Pericles, we have seen, gave his sanction to the application of the gold of the statue of Minerva to public purposes, and had the good fortune to escape, probably not the invective of faction at the time, yet all censure from posterity. Dionysius, not fortunate enough to find equal candor in posterity, was happy however, it appears, in a popularity which enabled him to overbear the invective of the day. On his return, learning what had passed, he summoned, in virtue of his office of general, the people to assembly. In addressing them, he liberally praised those who, in his absence, had restored the oppressed glory of their country’s arms. He commended all for their patience under the unavoidable evils of the siege; a patience which had saved the city, and of which the advantage would soon be better seen; for he had already knowledge of circumstances, and a view to measures, which, he was confident, would shortly give them complete relief.

Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 13.
Ch. 14. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Cic. de nat.
Deor. l. 15.
n. 83, 84.

The reply made to him by a leader of the inimical party, Theodorus, reported by the Sicilian historian, marks very satisfactorily the state of the Syracusan government at the time; showing completely that, far indeed from being tyranny, in the hands of Dionysius, it was on the contrary a popular government, open to all the licence of Athens in the age of Pericles. Theodorus did not fear to use the most illiberal invective, or to make the most hostile propositions, against the general-autocrat: he called him the wickedest of citizens, the bitterest of tyrants, the most cowardly of generals; and, in conclusion, moved for his banishment, and that of his principal supporters. The popularity

popularity of Dionysius, it appears, enabled him to consider foul words against him as vain breath. His revenge, and the whole consequence of the transaction, is reported by Diodorus himself thus: 'After this, Dionysius made himself familiar with the people in easy and obliging conversation, and some he honored with presents, and some he invited to his table⁴³.'

Diod. l. 14.
c. 65.

Meanwhile Imilcon, master of Achradina, found the skill of his engineers unavailing against the strength of the other quarters of the city, and the vigilance of its defenders. Dionysius, harassed him with frequent and often successful sallies, and the fortifying of Epipolæ had made a complete blockade difficult, if, for his numbers, it was not impossible. Nevertheless the introduction of provisions, sufficient for the numerous population within, could hardly be effected by land, while a superior army was watchful without. To prevent supply by sea, was what principally required the attention of the besieging army. The same views therefore led Imilcon to fix his camp and fortify posts on the unwholesome ground along the bank of the Anapus and the shore of the great harbour, which had directed Nicias to the same measure seventeen years before. The same calamity followed; an epidemical sickness, produced by the alternacy of the suffocating mid-day heat and chilling nightly damps⁴⁴; but its violence far exceeded

⁴³ Diodorus has reported Theodorus's speech at some length, and it is an ingenious and wellwritten piece of party-oratory. But the story altogether is among the most inconsistent of the many inconsistent ones of that historian. The tyrant himself, as he always calls Dionysius, summoned the assembly, in which such licence might be used, and such propositions made. If the people was sovereign, and Dionysius constitutional general, this was in course; but a tyrant who could, as Diodorus often says, tho' he is continually showing it was otherwise, command all by his mercenaries, would surely have done no such thing. Theodorus then, amid abundant invective against his conduct could call Dionysius *πολιτὴν μὲν ποικιλοτάτον, τίξαντι δὲ πικροτάτον, ἐμπατορὶ δὲ πάλιν ἀγωνίσαντι*, and proceed to

propose his banishment and that of all his principal associates in the administration. Dionysius could overbear this through the fear in which his mercenaries held an armed and high-spirited people, irritated by the pressure of the war, and at the same time flushed with recent success, and yet he no way revenged himself against this virulent opponent and his supporters but by the opposite kind of conduct related in the text: *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, φιλαυθάτοις λόγοις χρησάμενος, καθήματα τῷ πλοῦτι, καὶ τινας μὲν δωρεαῖς ἔτιμα, τινας δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ συστία παρελαβεῖν*, Diod. l. 14, c. 70.

⁴⁴ *Πρῶτον μὲν, πρὶν ἢ λιν ἀνατίλλαι, διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἀέρας μετὰ ἰθάτην, φρικτὴ κατῆχε τὰ σωματά, κατὰ δὲ τὴν μεσημβρίαν ἡ θερμοκρασία ἐπιπύει*, c. 70.

what

what the Athenians had experienced. The historian describes it beginning generally with a catarrh and a swelling of the throat. An eruptive fever followed, often attended with dysentery. The agony was extreme, and the patient commonly died on the fifth or sixth day. The supposed malignity of the disorder soon deterred both attendance upon the sick and burial of the dead; for either of which the general's orders, among hired troops of various nations, might, in such circumstances, be difficult to enforce. The putrifying corpses thus, tainting the air, not a little enhanced the evil, and the mortality was very great. Diod. l. 14.
c. 70.
c. 71.

Perhaps Dionysius foresaw this calamity, or possibly had intelligence that it was already begun, when he ventured to promise the Syracusans speedy relief from the siege. Informed however now how the besieging army was weakened, and what discontent and despondency pervaded the part yet healthy, he formed a plan of complex attack, that seems worthy to have been described by Xenophon or Thucydides, and, even in the account of Diodorus, marks in no small degree the able commander. The fleet, now amounting to only eighty ships of war (we may gather how little competent it could have been to brave the unimpaired strength of the Carthaginian fleet in the absence of Dionysius) was committed to Leptines conjointly with the Lacedæmonian Pharacidas. Dionysius took himself the command of the landforce. A dark night was chosen. He marched out by the gate farthest from the Carthaginian camp, and, dividing his forces by the way, his infantry reached the enemy's lines about daybreak, nearly at the same time in two important points, considerably distant from each other. The surprize was complete, and the cavalry keeping the Carthaginians in check in the intermediate space, the attack was successful in both places. Coöperation had been so well concerted, that, in the critical moment when unexpected assault, on the land side, had engaged all the attention of the enemy, the fleet, from the little harbour, had already entered the great harbour, and, raising the shout of battle, attacked the Carthaginian fleet in its station. c. 72.

Success in this point being the great object of Dionysius, he had taken upon himself the direction of that division of the army which c. 73.

was more immediately to coöperate with the fleet. While then Leptines and Pharacidas were effectually assailing many of the ships at anchor with the stroke of the beak, his troops set fire to a division of forty, hauled on the shore. In vain a Carthaginian force, ample to have defended that division, was quickly assembled, and exerted itself to extinguish the flames; for the conflagration, favored by the wind, spread to the ships at anchor, and a large part of the fleet was destroyed. The success, at the same time, against the debilitated landforce, sufficed to incourage Dionysius, instead of withdrawing again within the city walls, to incamp overagainst the enemy, near Olympieium.

Such altogether were the effects of this well-concerted action, that the Carthaginian general's hope to take Syracuse was gone, and it became a pressing consideration how to avoid, for himself and those under him, the calamitous fate of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes. His fleet was no longer sufficient to convey his landforce, nor could it any longer command the sea, but must make its way either by flight or by doubtful contest. To reach the Carthaginian settlements by land, there was choice between a mountainous way through the wild country of the Sicels and Sicans, and a circuitous way by either coast; the shortest of considerable length, the easiest of various difficulty, and both of abundant hazard. Under all these considerations, Imilcon resolved to propose treaty. Dionysius gladly listened to him; but the Corinthian party in Syracuse, now the principal party in opposition, stimulating the ready propensity of the popular mind to pass from despondency to presumption, made negotiation difficult. Nevertheless a treaty was concluded, in pursuance of which Imilcon paid three hundred talents, (about sixty thousand pounds sterling) for permission for his armament to withdraw, engaging to quit intirely the Grecian part of Sicily. The conditions appear such as prudence should have rejoiced in. But the leaders of opposition inciting, such became the fury of the multitude to destroy the Carthaginians, as they had formerly destroyed the Athenians, that Dionysius was unable to provide for the exact performance. Fortunately the fleet remaining to Imilcon sufficed to carry all the Africans,

Africans, the first objects of Syracusan vengeance⁴⁵. Imilcon, cautiously concealing, as far as might be, the intended time of his departure, embarked by night; and yet the inflamed Syracusans, watchful of his motions, without any regular authority, launched some triremes, pursued him, and damaged some of his vessels. In the same night the Sicels and Sicans profited from their knowledge of the country to outstrip or elude pursuit. But a large remainder of the army was at a loss which way to fly. The Spaniards declared firmly their determination not to quit their arms while they had life; but they were willing, they said, with their arms, to serve the Syracusans. This proposal was accepted, and they were taken into Syracusan pay. The various other troops surrendered themselves to Dionysius; who, tho unable wholly to restrain the usually greater licentiousness of the Grecian marine, had kept order in his army; and, as nothing is said farther of their fate, it was probably, for the character of the times, not severe⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ The historian's account proves that the Africans were the principal objects of vengeance, tho the party-writers, guides of his faith, have led him to insinuate the contrary.

⁴⁶ The treaty with Imilcon was an event apparently considered by the enemies of Dionysius as affording very favorable opportunities, which they did not fail to use against him. Diodorus, following the writers of the party, says, that Dionysius received a bribe of three hundred talents from Imilcon; and has undertaken to know what Dionysius answered to the proposal, privately made, and when and how the money was conveyed; but he has totally omitted to say where he got information so little probably authenticated. A remark which follows, strengthens the indication, which the story bears within itself, of having been a party fabrication. Dionysius, says the historian, desired to prevent the complete overthrow of the Carthaginian power in Sicily, that the Syracusans, in continual fear of it, might not have leisure to recover their liberty. It appears meanwhile, from his own honest

narrative of facts, that licentiousness was the great enemy to freedom in Syracuse; that the regular government, even under the administration of Dionysius, was not always strong enough to prevent great disorder; that the mob was the real tyrant of Syracuse, and Dionysius the steddiest enemy of Carthage. Nevertheless it seems likely that the outline of the story may have been true, tho with a shadowing and coloring wholly false. That Imilcon would desire to treat rather with one able man, like Dionysius, at the head of affairs, than with the wild assembly of the Syracusan people, is perfectly probable; and that he would propose to pay for quiet retreat is not impossible. But that the treaty was public, and that Dionysius communicated with the general assembly of the Syracusan people and their allies, before anything was concluded, Diodorus has himself clearly shown; for he says, 'Dionysius informed Imilcon ' that the Syracusans and their allies would ' not consent to permission for the quiet retreat of the whole army, but for the Carthaginian

SECTION IV.

Difficulties of the Syracusan Administration. Mercenaries settled in Leontini. Peloponnesian Messenians settled in Sicily. Messina restored. War of Rhegium with Syracuse. Defeat of Dionysius at Tauromenium.

B. C. 396. WHEN Syracuse, and the Grecian interest throughout Sicily were thus fortunately delivered from subjugation or extermination, at one time seeming their only alternative, no small difficulties remained for those at the head of the government. The first and most pressing business was to satisfy and discharge the large body of mercenary troops, whose valor and discipline had contributed greatly to the happy result. Diodorus states their number at ten thousand. Many of them were Grecian citizens from the mother-country, and a Lacedæmonian, Aristoteles, commanded them. There is perhaps no one point for which we should more desire and less can gather information, than the revenue, which enabled the Syracusan government, under Dionysius, to do more than the Athenian under Pericles, when Athens commanded tribute from every island of the Ægean, and almost every town of its surrounding shores; and the want of such information is the more to be regretted, because strong presumption of the merit of the financial management arises from the failure of censure of it, among writers eager to seize every pretence for calumniating Dionysius. The mercenaries would of course rate their services high, in some proportion to the final success; and they might also have some view to their own strength in forming the computation. Aristoteles, with apparently somewhat of that arrogance which we have seen common at this time among

Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.

‘thaginian citizens it would be allowed,’ c. 75. This sentence of his own, suffices to show that all he has said of the tyranny of Dionysius, and the slavery of the Syracusans under his administration, has been no-

thing more than the party-language of the day, which he has adopted. If we want farther evidence, we find it in his account of the lawless pursuit of the Carthaginian fleet, which Dionysius could not prevent.

Lacedæmonians

Lacedæmonians in forein command, encouraged them in extravagant pretensions, and menaced the Syracusan administration. Dionysius checked the mischief by the bold measure of sending away Aristoteles to Lacedæmon, to account for his conduct. The mercenaries at first showed some indignation, and threatened violence. But it was much to have deprived them of a Lacedæmonian leader. There remained none equally supported by the reputation of the government whence he derived his authority, nor any who could fill the large void by his personal reputation. Dionysius therefore soon found means not only to pacify but to conciliate them. The town of Leontini, with its rich territory, wanting inhabitants and cultivators, was given them for a settlement. Thus much and no more the historian tells us. But it is obvious that such a present could be little advantageous for military men, without the addition of means to use it; slaves and cattle must have been given, or money which might purchase them⁴⁷.

This difficult and hazardous business however being successfully adjusted, the Syracusan administration had leisure to direct their attention to external concerns, which, for the security both of Syracuse itself, and of the general welfare of the Grecian interest in Sicily, pressingly required it. A great change in the state of politics everywhere had insued from the Carthaginian invasion. In those towns of the northern coast, which yielded to the Carthaginians, the party most adverse to Syracuse would of course be most favored by the conquerors. In the more populous and powerful cities of the southern shore, the extreme suffering and expected ruin of Syracuse

⁴⁷ Diodorus says, that, after disbanding these mercenaries, to the amount of ten thousand, Dionysius immediately engaged others, in sufficient number to hold the Syracusan people in unwilling subjection to himself as their tyrant. But, having told us before that the whole Syracusan people were armed, he should have informed us how Dionysius held his authority when the mercenaries were mutinous, and what gave him means to send their powerful commander out of the island. It is evident that the practice of arms and discipline, which

he had introduced among the Syracusan citizens, together with his sure popularity, alone could give security to them or him against such a force as that said to have been under the command of Aristoteles, and that, when that force was disbanded, it was impossible for him to raise such another without the approbation of the armed Syracusan people. But writers of the day would call their freest armed fellowcitizens, of an adverse party, mercenaries; and this would suffice for Diodorus.

would give great advantage to the same party. When, on the retreat of the Carthaginians, Syracuse, without any change of administration, was restored to a condition to aspire again to the lead of the Grecian interest, this party was not insulated in every town, but connected through all. It seems however to have been least proportionally strong in the cities of the southern coast. Of these therefore, on account of the weakness of the party, and of those on the northern coast, on account of the inferiority of the cities, none could pretend to a general supremacy. But Rhegium in Italy, which, not having suffered, had perhaps profited from the Carthaginian expedition, became the head of the interest adverse to the Syracusan supremacy.

Under this consideration, among others, it was a great object for the Syracusan government to restore Messena; a work of charity which, had any common charity for one another prevailed among the Grecian cities, or any just consideration of the opposition of Grecian to barbarian interest, could not but have had also the advantage of popularity. But the Messenian people, as we have seen, were themselves much divided in politics, and a large part was inimical to Syracuse, and closely connected with Rhegium. The Syracusan administration then, adhering still to their liberal principle of avoiding the extensive proscriptions, so common among the Grecian republics, would nevertheless, in restoring the Messenians generally, provide for the preponderance of their friends. On the recent conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, six hundred families of descendants of the antient Peloponnesian Messenians had been expelled, by the Lacedæmonians, from their settlements at Naupactus and in Zacynthus. These unfortunate wanderers Dionysius collected, and established them, as a valuable accession of population and strength, in the Sicilian Messena.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.

Had the Rhegians alone objected to this charitable measure, some reasonable ground for their jealousy of it would be obvious. But the efficacious persecutors of the miserable vagabond Messenians were still the Lacedæmonians, at this time lords of Greece. They objected to the establishment of only six hundred homeless families, in a place so distant from them, because its port was of uncommon excellence,

and because, for the sake of their antient country, an influence might attach to them which, it was apprehended, they would use against the interest of Lacedæmon. Dionysius conceded so far to the wishes of the Lacedæmonians, his powerful and steady allies, as to remove those Messenians from Messena. But he gave them a territory to themselves, on the northern coast of Sicily, overagainst the Liparean islands, where they founded a new city, which, with some reference apparently to some antient tradition concerning their original Peloponnesian country, they called Tyndaris, or Tyndarium.

Adversity, it appears, had not depressed, but, on the contrary, stimulated the vigor of mind, while it chastened the manners, of these unfortunate people. With superior military knowlege and practice, gained in long service with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, they appear to have brought a spirit of civil order and a habit of regular administration, far above what was common in the Sicilian Greek cities. The advantages of that order, which made at the same time their strength and their happiness, inabled them to increase their strength by extending the same happiness to others. They were not afraid to admit numbers, who desired association, to the rights of citizens of Tyndarium, and shortly they had more than five thousand able to bear arms. But, with this military force, possibly their justice toward their Sicel neighbours, whom they called barbarians, may not have equalled their liberality and punctuality among Greeks. They made frequent inroads upon the Sicel lands, and they took the Sicel towns of Smeneum and Morgantium. With some of the Sicel tribes, however, they made treaties and kept faith. Euna, one of the principal towns of the Sicel nation, was put under their dominion by a party among its people, induced by the joint consideration of their general fair conduct, and of aversion to their own actual rulers. The Greek towns of Cephaledion and Solus, which had yielded to Imilcon, and perhaps were still governed by a party in the Carthaginian interest, passed to them in the same way. This account of the Messenians of Tyndarium, not unworthy at any rate of place in a history of the Grecian republics, becomes the more valuable from the extreme deficiency of remaining information concerning the
other

other measures, by which Dionysius proceeded to restore empire to Syracuse, and prosperity among the Grecian towns of Sicily. The year next after the retreat of the Carthaginians appears to have been employed, without material interruption from forein or domestic enemies, in preparing that prosperity. In the year following we find his influence extended as far as Agrigentum.

B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. $\frac{1}{2}$.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 78.
B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 87.

But the restoration of Messena, notwithstanding the removal of the Peloponnesians, gave great uneasiness in Rhegium. The return of the people to repossess their lands and rebuild their town, was not a matter of avowed dissatisfaction: the Rhegian government might hope to establish its own authority over its weak neighbour, and thus profit from his future convalescence, as well as his past misfortune. But the measures taken, under the patronage of Syracuse, to make Messena flourishing, and especially the restoration of its fortifications, gave them great offence. Nor was this a sentiment of party only: it was popular among the Rhegians. Often, indeed, we find difficulty to decide how far blame should attach to the appearance of envy and narrow spirit among people so uneasily situated as the Greeks in their little republics. Messena had often been a troublesome neighbour to Rhegium; sometimes a dangerous rival. The great superiority of its port gave it advantages which its proximity made annoying; and altogether its fall could not but be relieving to the Rhegian people, and its restoration alarming. The liberality therefore of the government of Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, not only far above that of the Rhegian, but superior to what we have seen ordinary in the Athenian and Lacedæmonian, in promoting the refortification of a city possessing the second port of the island, if indeed their own was the first, cannot but earn our esteem.

The leaders of the party in Rhegium then, finding incouragement in the state of things around, resolved to use the spirit of resentment toward Syracuse for ingaging their people in measures, not immediately of avowed hostility, but which could scarcely fail to bring on war. It was probably expected, that the might of Carthage would not long acquiesce under its late heavy disappointment; or perhaps it was known that preparations were already making for revenging it.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile the arms of Syracuse were engaged in a little but troublesome war, in which they had been baffled beyond all expectation. The Sicels who had received the fair settlement of Naxos from the bounty of the Syracusan government, and then, deserting to the Carthaginians, had seized the strong and commanding post of Tauromenium, refused still, after the retreat of Imileon, to quit that post. Probably they were not without encouragement both from the Carthaginian officers in Sicily and from the Rhegian government. The Rhegians, however, resolved to profit from the circumstances, and professing the purpose of rivalling the Syracusan government in generosity and charity, they assembled the dispersed Catanians and Naxians, whom Dionysius had expelled, and established them at Mylæ, on the western verge of the Messenian territory, in a situation to intercept the communication of Messina with the new colony of Tyndarium. This measure being executed without opposition, and the Sicels resisting still successfully in Tauromenium, the Rhegians judged the season favorable for proceeding to open and offensive war, in which they invited, by proclamation, all banished Syracusans to join them. To demonstrate then how much they meant to make common cause with the Syracusans adverse to the existing government of their own city, they elected a Syracusan, Heloris, distinguished for the vehemence of his animosity against that government, to command their forces. Without loss of time they crossed the strait, with all the strength they could raise, and laid siege to the yet incompletely fortified Messina.

But Dionysius, notwithstanding the trouble which the Sicels gave, did not neglect to send assistance to the Messenians. The besieged, thus reinforced, attacked the besiegers, and put them completely to rout. Marching then to Mylæ, and offering at once liberal terms to the new settlers, who were yet ill-prepared to resist them, they recovered the place. Thus the ill-concerted hostilities of the Rhegians only served to extend and confirm the influence of Syracuse in all that part of Sicily next the strait.

Nevertheless the obstinate defence of the Sicels in Tauromenium disappointed, and in some degree distressed, the Syracusan government. It had been expected that men bred in the warm temperature

Ch. 20. s. 4.
& ch. 31. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 88.

of the Sicilian plains would be unable to persevere long through the winter season, ill-provided as they were, in a station occupied in haste on a bleak mountain summit. Midwinter however came, and no disposition to surrender appeared. Dionysius then, to relieve his troops from the pressure of a winter campaign, resolved himself to lead an attempt to surprize and storm the place. He chose a dark tempestuous night, with snow falling. The first outwork on the hill-side was carried; but such was the change of atmosphere in ascending, and so violent the storm, that, in proceeding up the steep, not only his people suffered, but his own eyes received lasting injury from the chilling assault of the driving sleet. Nevertheless he persevered in his purpose, till, leading an attack upon the enemy, he received a blow which felled him. His armour turned the weapon, so that the wound was itself unimportant, but he narrowly escaped being made prisoner. Compelled then to retreat, under the complicated disadvantages of craggy ways, snow lying, storm beating, and an enemy occupying commanding eminences, more than six hundred men were lost, and the rest, for easier flight, mostly abandoned their arms. Himself saved only his cuirass. Report of this discomfiture, spread with exaggeration, excited everywhere the hopes and the industry of the party adverse to the Syracusan administration; and in Agrigentum that industry was so successful that a revolution was effected⁴⁸.

⁴⁸ In our copies of Diodorus Messina is added; but we find, in the sequel of his narrative, strong reason to believe that the name has been corrupted in transcription; for, in the repeated mention of Messina,

soon following, we find it always indicated that the government was in the hands of the party friends to Dionysius, and nowhere that any change had taken place.

SECTION V.

War renewed by Carthage against Syracuse. Insubordination in the Syracusan Army. Able Conduct of Dionysius; and Peace with Carthage. Reduction of the Sicels of Tauromenium. Settlement of Mercenaries.

SINCE the retreat of Imilcon from Syracuse, the energy of the Carthaginians in Sicily had been checked by troubles in Africa. But Magon, to whom the chief command was left, appears to have been well qualified for his difficult situation. Humane and liberal, as well as politic, (for to so much even Diodorus, vehement generally in undistinguishing invective against the Carthaginians, gives testimony) Magon preserved the attachment of the greater part of the Sicels. Enabled, with their assistance, to raise a sufficient army, he marched into the Messenian territory, ravaged it, and withdrew with the booty. Dionysius, having collected the Syracusan forces, followed him into the territory of the Abacene Sicels, where a battle ensued, in which the Greeks were completely victorious. Present security being thus given to the allies of Syracuse in Sicily, Dionysius sailed with a hundred ships against the Rhegians, his implacable enemies. Failing in an attempt upon the city, he however enriched his armament with the plunder of the territory, collected without resistance. Wants on both sides then produced a truce for a year, and Dionysius returned to Syracuse⁴⁹.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 90.

B. C. 393.
Ol. 96. 4.

In the next spring, the Carthaginian government sent such large reinforcement to Magon, as to put the Grecian interest in Sicily again in danger. But Dionysius had ably profited from the delay of this

B. C. 392.
Ol. 96. 1.

⁴⁹ It is little among the inconsistencies of honest Diodorus that he accuses Dionysius of connection with the Carthaginians, while he shows it to have been really the great object of his politics to oppose the Carthaginians, and that to him in truth was owing that Sicily was not subdued by the Cartha-

ginians. In the sequel we find him imputing war with the Carthaginians to the ambition of Dionysius. That the Rhegians, the irreconcilable enemies of Dionysius, had connection with the Carthaginians, is fully implied in his narrative.

measure for preparing obstacles to its success. In giving liberal assistance toward the restoration of the Grecian towns, which had suffered in the invasion under Imilcon, he had so extended the influence of Syracuse, that the Grecian interest was now more united than ever before, perhaps, since the time of Gelon; and, not confining the liberality of his policy to those of the Grecian name, he had succeeded against the ability and liberality of Magon in conciliating the greater part of the Sicels.

Against this policy, now with more powerful means, Magon directed his first measures. Instead of making his way toward Syracuse, as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly, by the line of Grecian towns on either coast, he proposed first to gain to his interest or under his authority the whole midland country, whence he might chuse how he would direct operations against any of the Grecian settlements around. The allurements of his promises, assisted by the fear of his power, succeeded with most of the western Sicels, but he was not equally successful with the eastern. He resolved therefore to carry his arms against Agyris, chief of Agyrium, the principal potentate of the eastern hills, whom he found immoveable in his engagements with Dionysius.

B. C. 592.
Ol. 27. 4.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 95, 96.

The Syracusan general hastened to support so steddy an ally, in whose uprightness he had so much confidence that he did not fear to trust himself, with a very few attendants, within his garrison, for the purpose of concerting measures⁵⁰. It was resolved between them to avoid a battle, and direct all their operations to cutting off the enemy's supplies. In both purposes they succeeded, and Magon was reduced to distress. But the same difficulties which had often pressed upon Hermocrates when in the same office, still bore upon Dionysius; the

⁵⁰ Diodorus describes Agyris as a tyrant, who amassed wealth by the murder of the richest men of his little dominion. Probably he had authority for this from writers of the opposite party, and he makes, in some degree, that the imputation is slanderous, and at the same time abates its venom, by showing the confidence of such a person as

Dionysius in the integrity of Agyris, and the zeal of his own people in his service. If these facts were true, the color given to them in the report of partizans of Agyris would be, that disturbers of the public peace were justly executed, and their property justly confiscated.

soverein people in arms would not always obey their general. The apparent want of energy in his conduct, the real wisdom of which they could not see, afforded opportunity for the adverse party to excite and spread discontent. The outcry became extensive against this tedious and inglorious warfare; 'they would be led to battle,' they said, 'and 'conquer and go home.' Dionysius firmly refusing to yield to their rash requisition, a large body actually seceded, and returned to Syracuse. Dionysius, avoiding all violence against the mutineers, employed his diligence to encourage the sound remainder, to increase its real strength, as far as circumstances would allow, and, to obviate as far as might be, the evils of deficiency by keeping up appearances, which might assist to hold the enemy in check. He armed a number of slaves, according to Diodorus, those of the seceders, promising them the rank of citizens as the reward of good conduct. The measure very completely answered his purpose. Magon, fearing to force an action on disadvantageous ground, and unable to procure supplies for his army, sent proposals for peace; and thus Dionysius, without any effusion of blood, obtained the effect of victory. A treaty was concluded, by which it was stipulated that Carthage should interfere no more among the Sicels, and for the rest things remained nearly as before the war⁵¹.

The immediate danger from the foreign enemy being thus obviated, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, and seems to have been not less suc-

⁵¹ Ἦσαν δὲ συνδόναι τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παραπλήσια τοῖς περὶ τὴν Συρακούσας; διὰ δὲ ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι. Those from whom Diodorus took this account, if they used the phrase ὑπὸ Διονύσιον τετάχθαι, can have meant no other subjection of the Sicels to Dionysius than such as that of the Corninians and other allies to Lacolemon, the head of their confederacy. With regard to former treaties, to which the first member of the sentence may refer, two have been already noticed; one with Hannibal, after the taking of Gela and Camarina, and the other with Imaleon, previous to his retreat from Syracuse. The former, according to Diodorus, left the

Sicels to the Grecian alliance; of the other he has not given the terms.

Diodorus calls the seceders from the army at Agrigium *the Syracusans*, as if they were all the Syracusans of the army. If so, the success of Dionysius against the Carthaginians would have been indeed extraordinary. But, in the mean time, if Dionysius was the hated tyrant, as Diodorus seems to have been persuaded to believe, what prevented a revolution in Syracuse he has totally omitted to show. It is evident that a large majority of the Syracusans supported Dionysius, and the historian has used the language of the minority.

cessful in repressing the movements of faction, without violence and without severity. He not only avoided all harsh measures against those who had so irregularly withdrawn from the army at Agyrium, but, according to Diodorus, he restored them their slaves; how consistently with his promises to those unfortunate men is not said by the historian, who nevertheless has not imputed to him the blame of a breach of engagement. The quiet of Syracuse, however, appears to have been completely preserved, so that the government having leisure to direct all its energy against Tauromenium, the Sicels there, deprived of assistance and hope from Carthage, were reduced before the end of the same summer. A grant of the place, with the surrounding lands, rewarded the service of the mercenaries in the Syracusan army, who seem well to have earned it by the share which their courage, discipline, and fidelity, had contributed to the successes of the war.

SECTION VI.

Peace throughout Sicily. Confederacy of the Lucanians against the Italian Greeks. Ill-constituted Confederacy of the Italian Greeks. War of Thurium with the Lucanians. Thurium gained to the Syracusan Confederacy. War of Rhegium and Crotona with Syracuse. Generosity of Dionysius. Siege of Rhegium.

- B. C. 391. DURING the year following the treaty of Agyrium and the taking of
O. 97. 1. Tauromenium, the quiet of Syracuse and of the Grecian interest throughout Sicily, under the administration of Dionysius, seems to have denied materials to the historian of wars and troubles. In the next
- B. C. 390. year, affairs in Italy called the attention of the Syracusan government.
O. 97. 1. The Greek settlements, both in Italy and Sicily, had been, as we have formerly seen, by forcible intrusion upon the former inhabitants. These, in Sicily, surrounded by foreign establishments, Greek or Carthaginian, had been reduced to an impotence from which they had no means to emerge. But in Italy they had larger range: and while every Greek city, in captious jealousy, even of fellowcountrymen, insulating its political existence, would be an independent state, the Lucanians, robbed of their coast, and confined to their mountains,

but improved in policy by the necessities of their circumstances, and in military art by practice against the intruders, had instituted a confederacy such that no single Grecian city of Italy was any longer able to contend with them.

Polybius attributes the first example of confederate government among the Grecian republics, not such as that of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, where one was supreme and the others subordinate, but confederacy upon equal terms, to the Achæians of Peloponnesus. In imitation of these, and borrowing their laws of union, he says, the Crotoniats, Sybarites, and Caulonians of Italy formed a confederacy, and for the place of their assembly dedicated a piece of ground with a temple to Homorian Jupiter, the Jupiter of those who lived within one common boundary. Whether the historian speaks of the antient Sybaris, destroyed by the Crotoniats, or of a remnant of its people of a faction friendly to the Crotoniats, and settled elsewhere under their protection, is not clear; but from Diodorus it appears that afterward other confederacies were instituted, of the most powerful of which Rhegium was a principal member. Here, however, we find nothing of the wisdom of the Achæian constitutions. Widely and variously as the governments of the Grecian republics differed, they seem to have had this almost universally in common, that, in time of war, the commander-in-chief was first-magistrate. Among the Italian republics then, a very extraordinary responsibility was imposed upon those military first-magistrates: if any republic of the confederacy was attacked by the Lucanians, the generals of all the others were to answer with their lives for the omission, or even delay, of assistance. The strange confusion of powers, here indicated, is perhaps less to be attributed to deficient penetration or deficient judgment in the leading men than to the inherent and irremediable inconveniencies of the Greek republican system.

Rhegium we have seen always vehemently adverse to Dionysius. The Grecian confederacy in Italy next in power was that of which Locri was the head, and there Dionysius had always maintained friendly connection. Among these circumstances arose causes, not explained to us, which induced Dionysius to lead an armament against Rhegium.

Polyb. l. 2.
p. 126.

Rhegium. He debarked and plundered the territory, but a storm so injured his fleet as to disable him for besieging the town. The expedition nevertheless was not fruitless. Withdrawing to Messena, he entered into negotiation with the Lucanians, who, it appears, were not altogether averse to friendly connection with Greeks, and an alliance resulted.

Diod. l. 13.
4. 101.

2. 102.

It was about the time of this transaction that the Lucanians invaded and ravaged a part of the Thurian territory, perhaps esteeming the whole properly their own. Thurium was a member of the Rhegian confederacy, but, being able to take the field, it is said, with fourteen thousand foot and a thousand horse, the people, impatient for revenge, would pursue the Lucanians without waiting for their allies. Entering the Lucanian country, they took a fastness, where they found considerable booty. Not however thus satisfied, but rather incited, they resolved to proceed to the enemy's principal hold among the mountains, where they expected great plunder. Entering incautiously a narrow valley, they were at once opposed in front, and attacked in flank from every height that commanded the way. More than ten thousand are said to have been killed, either on the spot, or in their flight, which was directed toward the coast. The remainder reaching advantageous ground near the sea, were encouraged to vigorous resistance by the sight of a fleet at hand, supposed to be of their Rhegian friends. A small number, by a bold effort, gaining the shore, swam aboard, but, to their utter consternation, found it the Syracusan fleet, under the command of Leptines. That gallant officer, however, presently calmed their fears. Not only he received them with kindness, but immediately interposed his friendly offices with the Lucanians, in favor of their comrades, who were yet defending themselves, but without hope of sustaining the contest much longer. The Lucanians consented to their redemption as prisoners, at a mina a head, and Leptines generously engaging for the payment, the Lucanians were satisfied, and the prisoners were set at liberty. The opportunity thus afforded by a very extraordinary and most unexpected emergency, to extend the credit and influence of the Syracusan government, Leptines, with equal readiness of ability and liberality, seems to have profited from

from to the utmost. Mediating between the Lucanians and the Thurians, he established peace between them⁵². Thurium thus was gained to the Syracusan alliance; but Rhegium not the less persevered in enmity, in which it was seconded by Crotona, the most populous and powerful of the Italian Greek cities⁵³. D. 4. l. 11. c. 103.

Of the state and views of parties in those cities, and how party-connection extended thence through the Grecian cities of Sicily, some idea may be gathered from the circumstance that the governments of Rhegium and Crotona concurred in appointing to the chief command of their united forces, not one of their own citizens, not an Italian Greek, not even one whom former success could recommend, but the Syracusan Heloris, who had already been defeated in the attempt against Messena, and whose merit seems, in the account of Diodorus, to have consisted wholly in the vehemence of his animosity against the existing administration of Syracuse. But the specific objects of the Rhegian and Crotoniat governments the defective narrative of Diodorus does not unfold. It is however evident that the friends of Syracuse in Italy were threatened, when, in the spring of the year following the defeat of the Thurians by the Lucanians, Dionysius led a powerful armament for their protection. Stopping at Messena, he detached his brother Thearides to the Liparean islands in quest of a Rhegian squadron of ten ships, which were all taken, with their crews. Passing with his army then into Italy, he laid siege to Caulonia, a town on the coast, between Locri and Scyllacium. Heloris marched to its relief with superior B. C. 389. Cl. 37. 3. Diod. l. 14. c. 103, 104, 105.

⁵² Diodorus says Dionysius was so dissatisfied with his brother for this liberal and truly politic conduct, that he removed him from the command of the fleet, which was committed to another brother, Thearides. It was the desire of Dionysius, he adds, for the purpose of holding the Italian Greeks at his devotion, to have unceasing enmity between them and the Lucanians. But all this is sufficiently contradicted by the sequel of his own narrative. We shall find Dionysius presently following up the every way

excellent policy of Leptines, and we shall see Leptines again in high command under his brother. That the fleet, or a division of it, was committed to another brother, as we shall see it was, for a particular expedition, is no proof of any quarrel with Leptines.

⁵³ Rhegium was in the territory called by the Roman writers Brutium or Bruttium. Diodorus extends the Lucanian name over that country, tho, in the sequel of his history, (l. 16. c. 15.) he relates the origin of the name Bruttium.

numbers. Dionysius, well provided with intelligence, attacked him on the way, with such circumstances of advantage that Heloris was killed, and his army put to flight. A large body gained an eminence where it could not easily be forced. Dionysius disposed his troops in blockade around, and so rested. The Rhegians and Crotoniats, destitute of both food and water, sent next day to treat for their surrender. Dionysius required that it should be unconditional. At this they hesitated; but toward evening, worn with hunger, and still more with thirst, they submitted themselves to his mercy. Being commanded to march in regular order down the hill, their numbers were ascertained, as they passed, to be more than ten thousand. When all were assembled at the bottom, Dionysius addressed them, and to their surprize scarcely less than to their joy, told them ‘that he should neither detain them prisoners nor require ransom; they were all free.’

Diod. l. 14.
c. 105.

This generosity, so superior to anything heard of in his own, or reported of any former age, procured him at the time the credit its just due. Thanks the most cordial and panegyric the most sincere were profusely poured; and golden crowns, often given, as it became popular to remark, to other conquerors by those for whom they conquered, were presented to Dionysius, with grateful hearts, by the conquered themselves. His generosity to individuals he proceeded to follow up by liberality to their several cities, granting favorable terms of peace, without an attempt to press upon their independency. But this humane and magnanimous policy, so much above the common temper of his age, is not all that we have to admire on this occasion in Dionysius. We want information how he found means to exert virtues which perhaps others in eminent stations possessed, unable equally to show them. We have seen Athenian generals cruelly called to account by the sovereign people for very inferior generosity, and we have seen the Syracusans perhaps exceeding the Athenians in illiberality, and even Hermocrates unable to lead them to a better temper⁵⁴.

The

⁵⁴ Diodorus, tho often before candidly reporting the generous, humane, and popular conduct of Dionysius, while he was calling him a cruel and detested tyrant, seems nevertheless

The generosity of Dionysius seems to have subdued the enmity of all the Italian Greeks, except the Rhegians. Closely connected with the Syracusan exiles, they persevered in hostility till threatened with a siege. Aware then, as the historian their partizan confesses for them, that, should they persevere farther, and finally be overcome, no pretence to ask for mercy would remain, they resolved to endeavour to use what opportunity might yet be open. Even now they did not hope that a proposal for negotiation upon any equal terms could claim attention. They addressed therefore an humble petition to Dionysius, invoking his humanity, and leaving the conditions for him to name. He required all their ships, with three hundred talents, (about sixty thousand pounds) for the expences of the war, and a hundred hostages.

Dionysius staid the winter in Italy, to make the various arrangements likely to be wanting toward the permanence of civil order and political union among so many independent cities, with two parties in every one, each holding communication through all. He removed the people of the two small towns of Caulonia and Hipponium to Syracuse, and gave their territory to the Locrians. We have observed many similar instances of removals, and we have yet no more than ground for some conjecture about the general policy of them. No severity has on this occasion been intended to the people removed, for they received not only the rights of Syracusan citizens, but the privilege of exemption from taxes for five years; a privilege of which, not less than of the policy of the removal, we should desire an explanation, which the antient writers have not given.

But the measures of Dionysius for insuring the peaceful conduct of the Rhegians, apparently did not suffice. Diodorus, copying his traducers, says that he made peace with them only with a view to break

less here astonished at what he had to report, and laboring for expression that might obviate the appearance of gross inconsistency, while he honestly related facts, without retracting his opinion of character, which they so directly contradict: *Καὶ πάντων αὐτοῦ ἐπικρατούντων τὸ Σικελιώδες, κ. τ. ε.* c. 105. Al-

ways before giving Dionysius the title of tyrant, he has avoided it here, and concludes the account with coldly remarking, that 'this was esteemed altogether the finest action of Dionysius's life.' Indeed I believe a parallel to it is not to be found among all Plutarch's worthies.

it, when, through the possession of their ships and hostages, he could make war on them more advantageously. But all the facts, which he proceeds honestly to report, continue to mark good faith and liberality in Dionysius, and to throw every suspicion of ill faith on those who led the Rhégians. Diacorus avows that against compact they refused a market for the Syracusan troops, while the peace was yet unbroken; and, on the contrary, Dionysius, when he resolved upon renewing hostilities against them, not only showed himself anxious that his measures should appear just and dignified in the public eye²⁵, but gave a new instance of uncommon generosity, in restoring to them all their hostages.

B. C. 385.
Ol. 98. 1.

The Rhégians meanwhile had so provided themselves that they seem not to have been without ground for some reasonable confidence of being able to resist successfully the siege of their town, which was presently formed. In one of their many vigorous sallies, Dionysius was so severely wounded in the groin with a spear, that his recovery was slow, and for some time doubtful. His perseverance however was firm; and about the eleventh month provisions began to fail in the place. A bushel of wheat had been sold for five mines, (about fifteen guineas) and was now no longer to be bought. The horses and all domestic animals were consumed. The despair, nevertheless, arising from consciousness of having forfeited all claim to mercy, still incited to resistance, while leather was sodden for food, and all herbage within the place failing, men would occasionally venture out, at the risk of their lives, to snatch the grass and weeds on the outer foot of the walls. This however was no sooner observed than the besiegers destroyed the resource by turning cattle under the walls at night. Thus at length worn out, the besieged surrendered to the mercy of the conqueror. In number more than six thousand, they were sent prisoners to Syracuse; but not, as former prisoners, condemned to perish by slow torments in the stonequarries, all were allowed to redeem themselves at the price of a mina (scarcely three guineas) each. Those unable to raise so small a sum, little able of course to find an honest live-

²⁵ Εξήτει, πέρυσι: ἔλλογον, δι' ἧς οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τὴν ἰδίαν δόξαι λαλῆκαίαι τὰς συνθήκας.

lihood in freedom, where hire for labor was rare, were sold to slavery⁵⁶. Phyton, who commanded during the siege, was alone reserved for a severer fate. If Diodorus might be believed, he was put to death under the immediate direction of Dionysius, with circumstances of cruelty, not only the most illiberal, but the most impolitic; for it was such that his own soldiers were shocked at it. What cruelty may not have been retorted, on such an occasion, by a democratical army or a democratical assembly of the people, the tenor of Grecian history, and especially of Syracusan history, will make difficult for satisfactory conjecture; but the tenor of the conduct of Dionysius, and the result of his conduct, as reported by, unfortunately for his fame, his only remaining historian, show it very improbable that any cruelty, but especially such impolitic cruelty, could be fairly imputed to him⁵⁷.

⁵⁶ We find mention of the sale of the Rhegians, by Aristotle, with the addition that it was against his word given, *Aristot. Œcon.* l. 2. p. 688, t. 3. ed. Paris. That such report might pass to Greece from the enemies of Dionysius is quite likely, but the Sicilian historian's account appears ample refutation of it.

⁵⁷ It is remarkable enough, in the account of Diodorus, that the first instance of cruelty in Dionysius, which, in following the writers adverse to him, he has been able to specify, is the destruction of the vegetables under the townwall of Rhegium; and the manner in which that historian has noticed the fact, especially if we observe what has preceded and what follows, is truly curious: 'So far,' he says, 'was Dionysius from pitying those whose sufferings drove them to such resources, that he sent cattle to consume their last remaining relief. Thus, overborne by distress, they surrendered themselves and their city to the tyrant's mercy.' He proceeds then, with simple honesty, to show that the tyrant had mercy, which not only the Syracusan but the Athenian democracy too often wanted, as he had before shown how little

those with whom the tyrant had to deal often deserved mercy. For this honesty we cannot but give him credit, even while we recollect that he has related the horrid treatment of the daughter of Hierocrates without expressing any disapprobation, and the massacre of the Carthaginians of both sexes and all ages in Motya as matter of glory.

When after the death of Dionysius, it became the object of a powerful and at length triumphant party to vilify his fame, excessive animosity against the Rhegians was ascribed to him, and attributed to a very puerile cause. When he applied to the Rhegian people for leave to take a wife among them, it is said, he received for answer, in pursuance of a vote of their assembly, that he might have their hangman's daughter. The story perhaps is as little creditable to the Rhegian people as to Dionysius; but beside its inherent improbability, the omission of all notice of it by Diodorus in its proper place, and the insertion of it afterward, seems to mark that he had not found it in any regular history, but among some popular anecdotes only. Nevertheless it may have been not wholly groundless.

A pax-

SECTION VII.

Peace throughout the Grecian Settlements of Sicily and Italy. Piracy of the Tuscans repressed. Invasion of Sicily and Italy by the Carthaginians. Treaty with Carthage.

- B. C. 385. By the reduction of Rhegium, the power of the party which banished
 Olynth. Hermocrates and murdered his daughter was suppressed⁵⁸, and the
 result was peace, internal and external, for all the Grecian cities of
 Sicily and Italy. It was about the same time that the treaty of Antalcidas gave a short and imperfect repose to Greece⁵⁹. Prosperity attended the better tranquility of the Italian and Sicilian cities. Even Rhegium, however the historian's account of its capture may appear to imply its desolation, flourished, as we learn from the sequel of his narrative, under the administration of that party among its citizens which was friendly to Dionysius. The extensive popularity of the Syracusan administration meanwhile is evinced by the effects which it produced. Formerly the advantages of living under the Carthaginian government was alluring even to Greeks. Now, on the contrary, even old allies and subjects of Carthage showed a preference for the Grecian connection, and some actually entered into negotiation for engaging in it.
- Diod. l. 15. c. 6.
 Ch. 23. s. 7.
 of this Hist.
- Diod. l. 16. c. 16.
- l. 15. c. 15.

A passionate speech of a violent partyman, in the assembly or out of the assembly, at the time or long after, reported from mouth to mouth, may have been gradually, and yet perhaps rapidly, improved into the story which has been transmitted to us. The real object of the Rhegian war appears in the result, fairly enough, tho defectively, reported by Diodorus.

⁵⁸ The murder of the daughter was the immediate act of only a few, but the manner in which it is mentioned by the writers friendly to the party, too strongly marks a

general concurrence of that party in the disposition and principles which led to it.

⁵⁹ Diodorus places the peace of Antalcidas and the taking of Rhegium in the same year. Dodwell, in his Xenophontean chronology, ascribes the negotiation of Antalcidas at the Persian court to the year to which Diodorus gives the taking of Rhegium, and the establishment of the peace in Greece to the following year. Diodorus adds to the remarkable events of this year the sack of Rome by the Gauls.

How

How far Dionysius was honest or how far politic in the encouragement which he is said to have given to this disposition among the allies of Carthage, which would scarcely fail to superinduce a new rupture with that preponderant power, the very defective account of Diodorus will not enable us to judge. But as it was scarcely possible but rupture with that power, whatever caution were used to avoid it, would sooner or later come, Syracuse and the whole Grecian interest of Sicily and Italy seem to have owed much to the ability, the diligence, the provident circumspection, with which he sought and used every opportunity for providing means of effectual resistance. Among these the most important by far was that which also most contributed to the prosperity and happiness of the Greeks among themselves, namely, the concord produced and maintained among all their establishments throughout Sicily and Italy, which brought that high eulogy remaining to us from the contemporary Athenian, the patriotic Isocrates, contained in the proposal of Dionysius as an example for Philip king of Macedonia to follow for the benefit of Greece. After this, what appear most prominent, in remaining accounts, are his measures for raising the Sicilian navy to a force unknown before among the Greeks. To promote this he had established a colony at Lissus, on the Italian shore, where naval stores abounded. He cultivated alliance with the Illyrians of the opposite shore of the Adriatic, whose country was fruitful in similar productions, and he extended still the Syracusan interest, on that continent, by coöperating in the restoration of Alcetas, the expelled prince of the Molossians.

Isoc. or. ad
Philip.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 13.

Meanwhile the relics of the party of Diocles, active still in slander, when impotent for other exercise of enmity, endeavoured to excite alarm by representing it as the purpose of Dionysius to gain access c. 13. for a large army which he would send from Sicily to plunder the temple of Delphi. The simple historian, who believed this absurd calumny, proceeds fairly to show what the real purpose was, by relating what was really done, and what afterward followed, marking the just policy which directed the measures. The advantages derived from the colony of Lissus, gave means for building two hundred shiphouses, around the Syracusan harbour, and ships to occupy them, while the colonies

colonies and connections in Italy, and on the opposite shores of Epirus and Illyria, commanded the communication with Greece; which, in any case of pressure from Carthage, provided the temple of Delphi were respected, and public faith maintained with the principal Grecian republics, might be of incalculable advantage.

Ch. 10. s. 2.
of the Hist.

I. 15. c. 14.

Prod. et sup.

A. 1. 1.

Geon. I. 2.

We have had occasion formerly to observe that the Tusicans were principal pirates of the western parts of the Mediterranean. As the trade of Syracuse increased, their depredations becoming more annoying, Dionysius undertook himself an expedition to suppress them. He was successful, and, after the ordinary manner of antient war, much booty was taken. In the course of the expedition a temple, of some fame for its wealth, was plundered by his troops. Hence occasion was taken, by the enemies of his fame, to spread report in Sicily and in Greece, that the sacrilegious robbery, meditated against Apollo at Delphi, had been actually executed against the rich temple of Leucothea in Tuscany. That the man who had united under his command the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, repressed the might of Carthage, made Syracuse the first city of the Grecian name, and prepared the way for the very uncommon political tranquility which we shall see follow, would leave to others the care of his great interests at home, for the little, uncreditable, and perhaps impolitic purpose of plundering a temple on the Tuscan shore, seems too little probable to need refutation⁶⁰. The pillage, which we may believe to have been sacrilegiously taken by a licentious part of his army, his command over the sound, we are told, enabled him to make them surrender; but whether his farther

⁶⁰ The passage, coming from such a reviewer of Dionysius, who had just before stated robbery and sacrilege as the only purpose of the colonization on the Adriatic shore, is, in its own language, very remarkable:

Ὅτις ὁ Διονύσιος ἀπεικὼν ἀπεραυτὸς εἰς τὴν Ἀδριατικὴν πολλὰς περιεποιήσας, ἰδὼν δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀπεικὴν. Ἐκ ταύτης οὖν ἐπεμύνη Διονύσιος, σφραγὴν ἔχουσαν, κατεσκεύασε, καὶ τὴν ἀπεικὴν, τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ αὐτὸς περιεποιήσας τὴν ἀπεικὴν ἀπεμύνη, ὥστε τὴν πόλιν γινώσκειν

τὸν περὶ τὴν ῥήγινον τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλιν, κατεσκεύασε δὲ καὶ γυνάκισια μεγάλα παρὰ τὴν Ἀσιατικὴν ποταμὸν, διὼν τε καὶ κατεσκεύασε, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα συντεταγμένα πρὸς ἀξίαν πόλιν καὶ δεξάν.

It is sometimes the unfortunate fancy of learned men to show their talents by maintaining absurdities: the very learned Cellarius would have it that this description relates to Iassus, a new colony in a wild country. Wesseling has well observed that Syracuse alone can be, and most clearly is, intended.

disposal

disposal of it was honorable or otherwise, remaining accounts will hardly warrant any judgement⁶¹.

In the scarcely avoidable clashing of the Grecian and Carthaginian interests in Sicily, a new rupture with Carthage was now impending. Diodorus attributes this to the encouragement given, by the Syracusan government, for the allies and subjects of Carthage in Sicily to desert the Carthaginian for the Grecian connection; which implies that the Syracusan government bore at least the character of mildness and beneficence. A requisition was made by Carthage, with which the Syracusans refused to comply, and war was declared. Magon, who had succeeded Imilcon in that high rank which the Greeks described by the title of king, took the command of a very large force, with which Sicily and Italy were at the same time invaded. Dionysius provided effectual resistance in both countries. He himself opposed Magon in Sicily, and, the armies coming to a general action at Cabala, he gained a complete victory. Magon was one of ten thousand said to have been killed; and five thousand are reported to have been made prisoners. Nevertheless the power of Carthage enabled the son of Magon, in the same summer, according to the historian, to revenge his father's death. He met the Greeks at Cronium, and directing his great effort against the wing commanded by Leptines, brother of Dionysius, he overpowered it, and Leptines himself fell. Dionysius, unable either to protect the defeated part of his army, or to oppose effectual resistance to the conquerors, retreated, and the Carthaginians giving no quarter, the Sicilian slain are said to have been fourteen thousand. The loss of Leptines, whose great and good qualities seem to have been universally acknowledged, would alone have been heavy to the Grecian cause in Sicily, and especially to Dionysius, in whose confidence none equalled him, unless perhaps Philistus. It seems however probable that the battle was very obstinately fought, and that the loss of the conquerors also was great; for, instead of pursuing success, the Carthaginian general withdrew to Panormus, and sent proposals of peace. These Dionysius readily met, and a treaty was soon

B. C. 383.
Ol. 99. 2.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 15.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 16, 17.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 6, 17.

⁶¹ Farther notice of the passage of Aristotle, mentioning this sacrilege, will be found in a note shortly to follow.

concluded. If we may trust Diodorus for the terms, Selinus, and that part of the Agrigentine territory which lay westward of the river Halycus, were yielded to Carthage: the Grecian interest was confirmed where else it had before extended; but a thousand talents (about two hundred thousand pounds) were paid to the Carthaginians for the expences of the war.

SECTION VIII.

Peace of Sixteen Years. Syracuse enlarged and embellished. Syracusan Revenue. Literature encouraged. Assistance from Syracuse to Lacedæmon against Thebes. War renewed between Syracuse and Carthage. Truce. Death of Dionysius.

THO the historian's account of what led to this treaty of peace is very defective, yet his report of the terms, as an outline, carries the appearance of being reasonable and correct, and we derive from him testimony of very high value for what followed. The Grecian cities of Sicily and Italy, united under the superintending administration of Syracuse, enjoyed, during the long period of sixteen years, such quiet, that a perfect void in the military and political history of those countries issues: for their prosperity only we find them noticed by antient writers. The circumstances are unparalleled in Grecian history, and, for the tranquility alone, had we no evidence of the prosperity, might be esteemed a phenomenon of the rarest, and most worthy of admiration. In the loss of all accounts from the party friendly to Dionysius, we owe to the method only of Diodorus, arranging his narrative in the way of annals, the unsuspecting information that a period so fortunate, and of such a length, existed. Without this sort of negative history, the allusions to such a golden age, found among other writers, and especially the cotemporary Athenian Isocrates, would have appeared inexplicable.

But able, active, and intrepid as Dionysius, according to all accounts, was in war, it is yet not lightly indicated that he had a stronger
3
inclination

inclination for the arts of peace. Among all the troubles of his preceding administration we find him executing great works for the improvement of the town of Syracuse. But hitherto the principal object necessarily was to give it strength: now he could attend to its embellishment. Flourishing in peace, it acquired that extent which vestiges even at this day show, and that population which made it the wonder of those and of aftertimes. Under the direction of Dionysius temples were built, and whatever else, in the historian's expression, for convenience or for splendor became the greatness of the city, was done. Nor did the wide circuit of the walls suffice for the public edifices: magnificent places of exercise, of the kind called by the Greeks gymnasia, were raised without it, on the bank of the Anapus. In extent altogether of buildings, in extent of fortifications, in population, in number of ships of war, and in every convenience of ports and naval arsenals, Syracuse, under the administration of Dionysius, was unequalled throughout the countries occupied by the Greeks. Diod. l. 15.
c. 13.

The revenue, through which such mighty things were done, in peace and war, by a state of very narrow empire, is much an object of curiosity, for which remaining means of gratification are very scanty. Xenophon's treatise on the Athenian revenue, whence best a general idea of the financial systems of the republics may be gathered, has been formerly noticed. The little work on public revenue, remaining from Aristotle, not a treatise, but rather notes for a treatise, principally of expedients used in emergencies by many different governments, contains some of Dionysius of Syracuse. Of the ordinary revenue of the Syracusan state unfortunately no mention is made. When public purposes required money, beyond what the ordinary revenue supplied, recourse, it appears, was had to the general assembly. Thus it is fully indicated that the government, under Dionysius, was democratical⁶². We have already seen largely, in the history of Athens, and the sequel

Ch. 51. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Aristot. Œ-
con. l. 2.

⁶² Διονύσιος Συρακούσιος, βουλευμένος χρήματα ὅσκις ἐπορῶν δι' ἀργυρίου, νόμισμα ἰκοφ: κασιτέρου, συναγαγεῖν, ἐκκλησίαις ποταῖς, ἰφθαι — Τρι-
της δὲ κασιτέρου πολλὰ, ἥδη, ὅτι διοίσαιτο
χρημάτων. Ἐκκλησίαι δὲ συναγαγόν, ἰφθαι —
Ὅσκις ἐπορῶν δι' ἀργυρίου, νόμισμα ἰκοφ: κασιτέρου
καὶ συναγαγόν ἐκκλησίαι, πολλὰ τοῦ νεοκομίου
νομίσματος ἐπετίπει: ὅς δ' ἰφθίσαντο. Aristot.
Œcon. l. 2. p. 688, t. 3. ed. Paris.

will yet largely show, how difficult was the task of the minister of a democracy, when public exigencies required that money should be raised from the people; how hardly consent could be obtained for any burden upon the people at large; what heartburnings arose in consequence between the rich and the poor; what evasions were practised by some of the wealthy; what frequent and violent oppression fell upon others. With this we have seen also another inconvenience; how rarely the secrecy could be preserved, in communication with friendly states, or in purposes against the hostile, which, for any reasonable hope of success, was often indispensable. The measures reported by Aristotle of Dionysius, as worthy the notice of future politicians, are all of a tendency to obviate these inherent evils of democracy, without trenching upon democracy itself.

A poll-tax appears to have been a common expedient of the Syracusan government in emergencies. This concurs with other circumstances to mark that, tho the form was democratical, the higher orders had considerable weight in the Syracusan government; for a poll-tax is comparatively light on the rich, and heavy on the poor; but it brings money immediately, and in amount nearly certain. Dionysius therefore wanting, apparently for the Carthaginian war⁶³, some command of such a resource for emergencies, had recourse to an artifice. Assembling the people, he told them that opportunity offered of most important advantage for the state, no less than to gain a considerable city to the Syracusan confederacy, if the treasury might be sufficiently supplied for the purpose; and he accordingly desired a contribution of two staters (perhaps two pounds sterling) from every citizen. His arguments and his character prevailed: the decree for the contribution passed, and the money was paid. A few days after, assembling the people again, he told them that adverse circumstances, not to be foreseen, had defeated the project, but every contributor should immediately have his money returned; and this was done punctually. None could tell what had been really in view; but the consequence was a

⁶³ Τρεῖς μίλλων ναυπηγήσειν μέλλων, is the want assigned by Aristotle.

general confidence in Dionysius⁶⁴, such that, in following emergencies, without disclosing the secrets of administration, a poll-tax could always be obtained.

But, in a republic, to obtain from the wealthy their reasonable share, without resorting to the violences practised at Athens, artifice seems to have been necessary. At a time therefore when money was much wanted for public purposes, Dionysius declared, in the general assembly, that he had seen the goddess Ceres, who required that the women should deposit all their jewels and golden ornaments in her temple. The women of his family, he said, had already obeyed the divine behest, and those who failed would assuredly incur the goddess's anger. General obedience to the injunction being thus obtained, he made a solemn sacrifice, at the conclusion of which he declared that the goddess had kindly consented to lend the dedicated valuables for the use of the republic. The ground thus gained then he proceeded to use as foundation for a permanent tax, in its kind certainly the least possibly oppressive, inacting that women, who would wear costly ornaments, should pay to the goddess a sum equal to their value.

Free gifts also, as at Athens, were in use at Syracuse. But it was the misfortune of this mode of taxation, especially in a government less arbitrary than the Athenian, that while real patriots paid, the disaffected avoided payment. Free gifts being proposed, many, of supposed wealth, pleaded poverty. Dionysius gave out that he also was poor, but he would nevertheless find means to contribute to the support of the commonwealth. Accordingly directing the most valuable of his moveable effects to be put to auction, the pretenders to poverty were found to be among the purchasers. It was then ordered that the price paid should go to the public treasury, and the goods back to Dionysius's house⁶⁵.

In

⁶⁴ *Ἀνεκτήσατο τοὺς πολίτας*. A stronger phrase, to express general popularity, the Greek language itself would hardly furnish.

⁶⁵ It is obvious that such a measure, as applicable generally to the citizens, if at all practicable, could not be within the policy

of the man to whom public confidence was so great an object, and so successfully attained, as is indicated in the preceding example. But used against a disaffected or disingenuous few only, it would obtain ready confirmation from the decrees of a majority

In a time when a real scarcity of money prevented the necessary exertions of government, he proposed a coinage of pewter, to pass at the value of silver. Much argument was necessary to prevail upon the assembly to ratify this measure: the people, says Aristotle, chose rather to have silver than pewter; but nevertheless Dionysius at length obtained the decree he desired. Perhaps in no other way, that the circumstances of the age admitted, could he equally have attained, for the Syracusan state, the modern advantage of paper-money. If, on another occasion, to pay a public debt, he used the more exceptionable method of requiring the current coin to be taken at twice its former value, it should be considered what the difficulties of administration must have been in the pressure of a Carthaginian war.

A tax on cattle, which of course would excite uneasiness among the landowners, appears, in the philosopher's account, to have carried more impolicy than any of the others. Several successive regulations became necessary to obviate great inconveniencies, and even to make it productive; but, in the end, it should seem that Dionysius succeeded. Such a tax, levied in the way of tithe, and bearing the name, seems to have been, ordinarily among the Greeks, imposed only on conquered countries⁶⁶. Possibly this tax, however regularly laid by a decree of the general assembly, and however necessary toward

in the general assembly. So it may be observed also of a measure of military discipline, afterward reported by Aristotle of Dionysius, on occasion of the plunder of a temple in Tuscany, by his troops, already noticed in the text. He commanded that every man should deliver up one half of what he had so irregularly taken. The plunderers, hoping, from the terms of the order, that they should not only escape punishment, but be allowed to retain the other half, with more or less exactness obeyed the requisition. But Dionysius, having thus gained a considerable amount of the information he wanted, then issued a second order for the other half to be brought in. For the

writer's purpose, in a collection of notes, it sufficed to mention the soldiers or sailors generally. But such a measure, calling a whole armament to account, would evidently have been impracticable. Of course therefore the words must be taken as applying only to a dissolute part of an armament whose general good discipline and good disposition alone could give means for carrying such a measure into execution against any part.

⁶⁶ Aristotle reckons this tax in that class which he distinguishes by the title of *ὀικονομία στρατικῇ*, of which is *ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν Βεσηκμάτων, ἐπικαρπία καὶ ΔΕΚΑΓΗ καλούμενη*.

preserving

preserving all the lands of the Sicilian Greeks from such an impost under the arbitrary order of a Carthaginian general, may have contributed largely to extend the title of tyrant, as a common addition to the name of Dionysius.

Among the reports which passed to Greece from the adverse party, it was said that distress only, arising from waste of private fortune, induced Hipparinus to connect his political interest with that of Dionysius. It is not improbable that the pride of Hipparinus may have been hurt at finding it expedient, whether from private or political necessities, to become in a manner dependent upon the abilities and popularity of one so inferior in years and in family importance. Nevertheless, the silence of the adverse historian, and the still more adverse biographer, not lightly implies that no discord between the autocrator-generals interrupted public business. The marriage of Dionysius with the daughter of Hipparinus, unless his consent to that also should be attributed to private necessities, which other accounts, especially Plutarch's, tend to contradict, would mark rather private esteem, as well as political concord. When Hipparinus died we do not learn; but it seems likely to have been before his son Dion was of an age to warrant any pretension immediately to offer himself for popular choice, to succeed to the first civil and military office of the republic. Former precedents were rather in favor of one than two together in that high situation; those especially of Gelon and Hieron formerly, and lately of Diocles and Daphnæus. Dionysius, however, after the death of Hipparinus, remained without a colleague in the supreme magistracy. If in this invidious situation he had cause to fear the interfering pretensions of any, Dion apparently would be the foremost object of his jealousy. Nevertheless that he remained the friend of the family of Hipparinus, that he was kind to Dion, that, whatever may have been the derangement of the father's affairs, the son inherited and enjoyed a very large patrimony, and was put forward, by the surviving general-autocrator, in civil and in military office, is allowed by the most adverse writers and denied by none.

Aristot. Pol.
l. 5. p. 526.
ed. Paris.

Dionysius

Dionysius had a strong propensity to literature, and the busiest life commonly affords portions of leisure, in which an active mind will still be employed, and the change of employment serves for relaxation and rest. He delighted particularly in poetry, and was himself a poet. The weakness of his character seems to have been, like that of the great Themistocles, vanity and ostentatiousness. Like his predecessor in command, Hieron, he would send his chariots to the Olympian games. If we might believe Strabo, the power of his arms by sea and land so commanded the Adriatic sea and its shores, that he had his principal breeding stud in the Venetian territory. But this, in itself improbable enough, is rendered more so by what the geographer also relates, that Ancona was a colony of Syracusans who withdrew from his tyranny; unless indeed they withdrew with his consent. But Ancona, like Lissus, on the same coast, was settled under the protection of the Syracusan government.

But he is said to have been most anxious to shine as a poet; and probably his poetical talents were considerable; for Isocrates mentions that a tragedy of his composition won the prize in the great field of contention for poetical fame, the theater of Athens. At Olympia he was less fortunate, having apparently sent both his verses and his horses thither in untoward season, when politics would be likely to interfere with the decision on poetical merit; for those who then held the Eleian government, and swayed the Eleian people, were, with the greatest part of Peloponnesus, highly hostile to Lacedæmon, then in close alliance with Syracuse. If beside literary fame, and the simple glory of a victor in the games, he had a political purpose, which is probable, he was not in that either successful; for an invective against him, composed by Lysias, the celebrated rhetorician, and pronounced before the meeting, falling in more with the political sentiments of the majority, he was abused as a tyrant, and his poetry was reviled.

Fond however of the conversation of lettered men, he gathered about him all the principal literary characters of the time; who were drawn perhaps less by his munificence than by the superior quiet and security of the residence of Syracuse in that troubled age. A most improbable

Strab. l. 5.
p. 212.

p. 241.

s. 7. of this
chap.

Isocr. paneg.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 74.

improbable story is told of his treatment of Plato, who was among the visitors he most honored. In consequence of offence puerilely taken, it is said he caused the philosopher to be exposed in the common slave-market, and actually sold. But the accounts of the same writers show that the society of literary men remained in Syracuse, and about Dionysius; and that, as far as the influence of his administration extended in Italy as well as in Sicily, the towns were seats of learning, more, with exception for Athens only, than any others of the Greek nation. The tale, indeed, involves its own contradiction; proceeding to say that Plato was redeemed by a subscription of philosophers residing in the Sicilian and Italian cities; of course under the protection of that superintending government, by the chief administrator of which it is pretended the injurious violence was committed ⁶⁷.

It is for these sixteen years of settled peace and prosperity, which

⁶⁷ The story of the sale of Plato, as given by Diodorus, has such confirmation as it may derive from the letters attributed to Plato himself, and printed with his dialogues. Those letters seem to have been acknowledged by Plutarch, and thence probably have obtained credit among the modern learned. Barthelemi has admitted them implicitly, note, p. 548. 13 ed. 8vo. Their authenticity, so supported, it cannot but be hazardous to question; and yet, the character of spuriousness they exhibit, being to my mind convincing, I should be wanting in the duty I have undertaken, if I attributed any authority to them, and perhaps if I wholly declined saying why I refuse it. Not however to enter into long argument, it should seem, that to Diodorus, tho he tells the same story of the sale of Plato, they were either unknown, or known to be spurious: for they tell of three voyages made by Plato to Sicily, and Diodorus believed in only one. But the very inanity of those letters seems enough to mark them for supposititious. Considering the person pretended writing, the persons addressed,

the subjects of the letters, and the circumstances of the times, it is surely impossible to read them without the utmost disappointment. Is it imaginable that such letters could have been written by Plato, not containing one syllable of information that might not have been written as well four hundred years after, by any sophist the most ignorant, not only of the private affairs of the individuals concerned, but of the public circumstances of Sicily and Greece in their time? Between the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch, to arrain arbitrary power directly, we know was necessarily to be avoided; but oblique attack, a kind of velitatio, under the mask of Grecian story, was much in vogue. The letters then are in consonance with Plutarch's purpose, in his life of Dion, and with Barthelemi's, in his *Anacharsis*. But the whole story of the sale of Plato, and his redemption by the philosophers, unmentioned by the cotemporaries Xenophon, Aristotle, or Demosthenes, and virtually contradicted by Isocrates, seems too absurd almost to deserve even the notice that has here been taken of it.

the malice of disappointed fiction seems to have resented more than actual injury, that we especially want the history of Philistus. Of political and military occurrences within Sicily or Italy, during the term, no information remains. In Greece the pause of arms, produced by the peace of Antalcidas, immediately preceded it. That pause of hardly three years, tho there was not settled peace throughout the republics, was, for that country of troubles, an uncommon period of quiet. Soon after the settlement of the peace of Sicily, it was partially interrupted by the war which Lacedæmon carried against Olynthus; and presently all was embroiled again, through the seizure of the citadel of Thebes by the Lacedæmonians, producing, in a long series of complicated hostilities, the fatal consequences, which we have seen, to Lacedæmon itself.

Sicily and the Grecian settlements in Italy, had already enjoyed six years of tranquility, when the Lacedæmonians, pressed by the united arms of Thebes and Athens, and fearful of the preponderance of the Athenian navy, and the extension of the Athenian influence among the islands of the western sea, applied to Syracuse for assistance to prevent them; urging not only the claim of an allied power, but the clear interest of the Sicilian Greeks as requiring it. Ten ships were accordingly sent to reinforce the Lacedæmonian fleet at Corcyra, nine of which were intercepted, immediately on reaching the island, by the able Athenian commander Iphicrates. Soon after this the Athenians renounced the Theban alliance, and ingaged in confederacy with Lacedæmon against Thebes. Then Syracuse also seems to have become the ally of Athens. Dionysius was so received into favor by the Athenian people, tho we are uninformed on what precise occasion, that the privileges of an Athenian citizen were given to himself and all his posterity. Of any farther auxiliary force, sent from Syracuse, no notice occurs till about eight years after, in the heavy pressure upon Lacedæmon, after the fatal battle of Leuctra, and its sequel, the invasion of Laconia, when Epaminondas a second time entered Peloponnesus, with the assembled strength of the Theban confederacy. Faithful then to its antient ally in distress, the Syracusan government sent twenty triremes and a body of foot and horse; the

B. C. 375.
Ol. 100. 4.

Ch. 26. s. 8.
of this Hist.

Ep. Philipp.
ad Athen. ap.
Demosth.

B. C. 368.
Ol. 93. 4.
Ch. 27. s. 4.
of this Hist.

foot

foot Spaniards and Gauls, possibly those which had been received into the Syracusan service on the retreat of the Carthaginian besieging army; the horse probably native Syracusans, who compensated the smallness of their number by their activity and the superiority of their discipline.

About two years after, when Greece was in that confusion of war and politics which preceded the embassy of Pelopidas to the Persian court, war broke out again between the Sicilians and Carthaginians. Diodorus and Plutarch impute the calamity to the ambition of Dionysius; careless of reconciling this with their imputations against him of dependency upon Carthage. Diodorus however acknowledges the pretence at least of a just cause, in the incursions from Carthaginian settlements upon Grecian lands; and Plutarch proceeds to assert, what cannot but be considered as involving eulogy of the Syracusan administration, that the Grecian forces, which it could now assemble and carry into action, amounted to a hundred thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and five hundred ships of war. Diodorus states the armament, which actually moved under the orders of Dionysius, to have consisted of thirty thousand foot, three thousand horse, and three hundred ships of war, which may perhaps be no great exaggeration. Selinus, Eryx, and even Entella, which had formerly baffled his efforts, now yielded to him. In an attempt upon Lilybæum he failed; and the stormy season then approaching, its dangers for the antient vessels of war induced him to remand the greater part of his fleet to Syracuse. The Carthaginians, in an unexpected attack upon the squadron left in the port of Eryx, took several ships. In the course of the winter negotiation was opened, which produced a truce; soon after which Dionysius was seized with a disorder, of which he died.

B. C. 366.
Ol. 103.².

Diod. l. 15.
c. 73.
Plut. v. Dion.
p. 693.

APPENDIX TO THE THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER.

Of the Character of the elder Dionysius, and of his Government.

THO it has been carefully endeavored, in the three last chapters, to give the fairest account, that could be elicited from antient memorials, of an interesting portion of the Grecian republics, during an interesting period, yet it may not be wholly unnecessary, both toward establishing the faith of the foregoing, and clearing the way for the coming narrative, to take some farther notice of obscurities left, and extravagancies warranted by writers of high authority, through which this part of history has been singularly clouded and disguised. We have already seen much, and in the sequel much more will appear, of the origin of those odious pictures of Dionysius which have been transmitted, incidentally however only, and without historical connection, by most respectable antient authors. It must be observed, and occasion will occur to repeat the remark, that, even under the republics, while history was scanty, and books altogether rare, the numerous philosophers, and even the greatest, wanting a statement of facts, for ground, or for illustration of an argument, took ordinarily any popular report, without care of its authenticity. When books afterward multiplied, the despotism, first of the successors of Alexander, and then much more that of the Roman empire, stopping the political career which was before open, the busy-minded, educated for that career under the philosophers, turned their talents and their ingenuity to idle disputation. Stories invented by party malignity, offering the highest-colored pictures, seem, without regard for their origin, generally to have been preferred; and, for this merit, those disseminated by the enemies of Dionysius appear to have earned singular favor. Even Cicero, we find, gave into this practice of the philosophers, with whom he was fond of associating himself, and example of it remains from him not a little remarkable. Philistus, the friend, the assistant in peace and war, and the historian of Dionysius, is mentioned, in his didactic and critical works, as

Cic. de Orat.
l. 2. c. 13.
De Clar. or.
c. 85.
De Divin.
l. 1. c. 20.

among the first historical writers; not only admirable for his style and manner, but worthy of confidence for his ability, diligence, and means of acquaintance with the facts he related⁶⁸. Nevertheless, when, among his philosophical questions, he wanted an example of a horrid tyrant, setting aside Philistus, he gives, from the opposite party-writers, with all the deformity of their coloring, the odious pictures that his immediate purpose required. He does not indeed profess to write history; he merely draws example, such as he found to his immediate purpose among historical writers, and not without acknowledgement that different representations existed. These stories, thus related by Cicero, afford very satisfactory evidence that they were in his time extant, in works of literary merit enough to have fame, but none that he gave them credit against the contrary testimonies also extant.

Plutarch's account however must certainly be otherwise considered. Not professing to write connected history, he professes nevertheless to extract from it the lives of eminent men, and represent their characters fairly. Of the public conduct of Dionysius, how he acquired his power, how he administered the complex affairs of a state or confederacy composed of all the Sicilian and Italian Greek cities, how he managed its revenue, how he combined and directed its force, so as to excite the admiration of the great Scipio Africanus at his success in the wars with Carthage, and to draw confession, even from Plutarch of the singularly flourishing state of Syracuse under him, Plutarch appears to have thought himself not at all bound to show. But he has entered into the private life, the domestic affairs and the closet conversations of this extraordinary tyrant, which he has undertaken to know, without at all saying how they became known. The man whom Scipio professed to admire as one of the greatest men, not only of his own but of any age, who, in the testimony of Cicero, governed Syracuse eight-and-thirty years, who, having defended his country in

Polyb. l. 15.
p. 721.

Cic. Tusc.
l. 5. c. 20

⁶⁸ Syracusius Philistus, qui, cum Dionysii tyranni familiarissimus esset, otium suum consumpsit in historia scribenda, maximeque Thucydidem est, sicut mihi videtur, imitatus, Cic. de Orat. l. 2. c. 13. Philistum, doc-

tum hominem et diligentem, et aequalem temporum illorum. De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. Catonem cum Philisto et Thucydide comparares? — quos enim Græcis quisquam imitari potest. De Clar. or. c. 85.

arms against the most formidable power then upon earth, maintained it in a peace and tranquility unknown elsewhere among the Greeks, and provided so that this happy period should extend far beyond his own life, this man Plutarch represents as a compound of the foulest vices and basest weaknesses. ‘So suspicious,’ he says, ‘and fearful of all men, was the first Dionysius, that he would not allow scissars to be used about his head, but his hair was kept in form with a burning coal. No person, not his brother, not his son, was allowed to come into his presence, without first stripping himself before the guard, for assurance against secreted weapons. His brother Leptines, for taking a spear from an attending guardsman, to point out the situation of places in a country which was the subject of conversation, incurred his heavy displeasure, and the guardsman was put to death for parting with the spear. Marsyas, whom he had raised to a high military command, relating that he had dreamed of having killed Dionysius, was executed for the evil disposition so indicated.’

Aristot. Pol.
l. 5. c. 5.

To refute such tales it is hardly necessary to refer to the account of Diodorus, confirmed by Aristotle, of the popularity by which Dionysius acquired his power, and of his free and confidential communication with all ranks of people when in full possession of it: the poet’s reason, formerly noticed, might suffice against the philosopher’s extravagancies, ‘Is it not absurd to aim at sovereignty without friends and without popularity?’ What little circumstances may have assisted invention for such tales, it were waste of time to inquire. One only, reported by Cicero, for its intrinsic merit, through which it has acquired a just celebrity, may deserve notice, that of the feast of Damocles. If, in conversation at table, Dionysius only said, ‘Could you, Damocles, enjoy the most delicious feast, in the most engaging company, with a sword suspended over your head by a single horse-hair?’ the foundation would be abundant for the ingenious story which has been transmitted to posterity.

Sophocl. Œd.
tyr. v. 350.

Cor. Nep. de
regibus.

From the earlier and more impartial Roman biographer, we have not a life, but a character of Dionysius, which may deserve to be reported, as nearly as may be in his own words—‘Dionysius,’ he says, ‘was among the princes known to history most eminent for the glory of their actions;

‘actions; a brave soldier, an able general, and what, is rarely found in a tyrant, above the temptations of lust, luxury, avarice, and every other vice, except the thirst of sovereign power, which led him to cruelty. In his constant purpose of strengthening his authority, he spared the life of none whom he suspected of plotting against him. Nevertheless the tyranny which he acquired by his virtue and bravery, he retained with extraordinary felicity; and, dying at the age of more than sixty years, he left behind him a flourishing kingdom.’

Here we find a man described, who might defend Sicily against Carthage, and gain the admiration of a great Roman. Yet it seems due to the character of Dionysius to observe, that, in the whole detail of the Sicilian historian, often imputing cruelty in general terms, and showing clemency, liberality, and generosity in specific instances, no instance of cruelty is specified, but in the very doubtful case of Phyton, general of the Rhegians, where exaggeration is evident. If then we add the total failure of all notice of the cruelty of Dionysius by the very eminent cotemporary writers, by whom we find him mentioned, Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Aristotle, and to this negative testimony join that which is rather positive, so strongly implied in the recommendation of his example by Isocrates for the common benefit of Greece, the inference seems but reasonable that the tales of that excavation among the quarries of Syracuse, still called the ear of Dionysius, and all those which Cicero, and Plutarch, and Seneca, and philosophical fablers of later ages have reported, of the singularly tyrannical character of his government, however become popular and almost proverbial, have originated only in the malice of party-spirit.

Epist. ad
Philipp.

It is obvious that there would be always, among the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, a party desirous of propagating opinions of Dionysius, such as Plutarch has transmitted, and that party we shall see becoming the ruling party; but how the disposition passed, as in a certain degree evidently it did, to Athens, and extensively over Greece, is not so obvious. There remains, however, from a most respectable cotemporary writer, what will not only throw light on this subject, but assist toward

a just

Ch. 26. s. 1,
2, 3, of this
Hist.

Ep. Philipp.
ap. Demosth.
p. 161. ed.
Reiske.
Isocr. Ni-
cocl. p. 118.
t. 1.
Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.
p. 360. t. 1.
p. 350.

a just general view of the politics of the age, and a just estimation of the accounts transmitted by later authors. The discourse of Isocrates, known by the name of the Panegyric Oration, really a political pamphlet, was written when the conduct of the Lacedæmonians in the punishment of Mantinea, in the seizure of the citadel of Thebes, and in the wars, which presently followed, with Phlius and Olynthus, excited just indignation and alarm among thinking men throughout Greece; and hence it was an object of general patriotism to excite opposition to their ambitious views and oppressive measures. Syracuse, the antient ally of Lacedæmon, continued to be such while Dionysius directed its government; and, of course, throughout the extensive party among the Grecian republics adverse to Lacedæmon, there would be some fellowfeeling with the party in Italy and Sicily adverse to Dionysius. Of this temper Isocrates endeavored to avail himself in that oration. Among a labored collection of reproaches against Lacedæmon, deduced from earliest history, he asserts it to have been through the cordial coöperation of the Lacedæmonian government that Dionysius made himself tyrant of Sicily. But when the Theban democracy, after having successfully resisted oppression, aspired to a tyrannical command over other states, friendly connection being then formed between Athens and Lacedæmon, Dionysius, already the ally of Lacedæmon, apparently became also the ally of Athens; for the freedom of the city, as already mentioned, was given to him for himself and all his posterity. Then an Athenian might eulogize Dionysius, tho a tyrant. ‘He found the rest of Sicily,’ says a cotemporary rhetorician, ‘desolated, and Syracuse severely pressed by war. Every danger he met and averted, and made Syracuse the greatest of Grecian cities⁶⁹.’ Isocrates did not scruple to avow correspondence with Dionysius, ‘when he held the ‘tyranny⁷⁰;’ and must surely have depended, not merely upon his own opinion, but upon some extensive estimation of the beneficial conduct of the tyrant, when he ventured to propose it among examples to be followed for the common good of Greece. Nevertheless, wherever

⁶⁹ The tract called Nicocles, transmitted among the works of Isocrates, if it should not carry the authority of his name, seems, however, intitled to that of his age.

⁷⁰ Διούσιον τὸν τυραννίδα κτησάμενον.

the Theban interest prevailed, the name of Dionysius, as the friend of Lacedæmon, would be still unpopular, and all the prejudices and all the calumnies of the party adverse to him, in Sicily and Italy, would find ready reception.

It might be much an object to know what that government really was, evidently superier, at least in point of administration, to anything common with the Greeks, which, among so many cities, habituated each to its separate republican independency, and much habituated to political contest and sedition, could maintain concord during sixteen years, and still hold all so ready and zealous to coöperate in war, as to form a sufficient balance to the power, and an effectual check to the ambition of Carthage. In Proper Greece, since the Trojan times at least, such union had not been seen, nor had any influence been able to collect and direct such a force as that which inabled the Sicilian Greeks to withstand the Carthaginian invasion. Should Plutarch be believed, a mercenary army held the Sicilian Greeks in absolute subjection. But how a mercenary army could be maintained, sufficient at the same time to hold the Greeks in subjection and to defend them against the Carthaginians, was, in his plan of history, needless to explain. The less artful Sicilian compiler Diodorus, however, sufficiently shows that the fact was otherwise. The citizens in arms, and especially the Syracusans, it is evident from his account, formed the great body of the armies that opposed the forein enemy. Indeed the very amount of the military force of Syracuse, stated by Plutarch himself, may be esteemed no small degree of evidence that the citizens must have borne arms. Mercenaries were beside entertained, as they were by the Athenian and almost every other principal republic of the age. But, as we have had occasion often to observe, among the Greeks a naval force was always held highly adverse to the security of either oligarchy, or tyrannical monarchy. When Critias proposed to make himself lord of Athens he renounced maritime power. Among all the maritime republics it was the constant object of the democratical party to hold the city connected with the fleet; of the oligarchal to keep them separate. The Lacedæmonian government, often compelled to mix in maritime war, and even to take a lead in it,

never persevered in any effort for raising a Lacedæmonian navy; and among the reasons for this, gathering from what we see common in Grecian politics, probably not the lowest was that they saw danger in it to their oligarchy. But Dionysius evidently lived in no fear of what Thucydides calls the nautic multitude; a description of men far different from the British seaman, whose home is on the ocean: the Greek seaman, if he ought to be called so, fed and slept ashore, and went aboard almost only for action. But in the midst of that generally troublesome multitude, in the island, which separated the two harbours of Syracuse, Dionysius chose his residence. At one time we have seen a part of that multitude breaking loose from just authority, to act as in the impulse of the moment they thought the good of their country required: at another time we have seen a part of the Syracusan people in the land-service more directly and more perseveringly disobeying the commander-in-chief. But as far as Dionysius ruled, legally, or with authority more than legal, it seems to have been always through the support of the great body of Syracusan citizens, who composed the fleets and armies of the republic. In Syracuse he assembled a vast population, removing thither the people of other towns of Sicily and of Italy. To govern by a force of mercenaries, he should rather have divided them. For keeping order in the mixed multitude, the mercenaries might sometimes be useful; and to relieve the friendly party in restraining the adverse, they would probably be sometimes employed; but not to hold in subjection that party, by which Dionysius acquired, and without which he could not maintain his power. For it appears on numerous occasions, that not only all the forms of republican government were constantly maintained, but that the exercise of sovereign authority by the general assembly gave continual opportunity for opposition to the administration of Dionysius.

The whole executive government however, with powers not likely to have been very accurately defined, was apparently directed by the general-autocrat. He was regularly accountable to the assembly of the people; but that assembly must have been a most unwieldy body, little fit to execute the powers, either of legislation, or of controul over an executive government, extending over numerous cities, holding
each

each its separate legislative power. One man therefore, at the same time first civil magistrate and commander-in-chief of army and navy, for all those cities, popular and politic, the greatest general, and the greatest orator of his age, in such a government would and must hold the effectual exercise of absolute power ; and thus Dionysius seems to have been not untruly called, in the original sense of the term, Tyrant of Syracuse and of Sicily and Italy.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Affairs of the GRECIAN Settlements of SICILY and ITALY,
from the Death of the first DIONYSIUS to the Restoration
of the second DIONYSIUS.

SECTION I.

*Election of the second Dionysius to the Dignity of General-Autocrator.
Peace of Eleven Years. Parties in Opposition under Dion and
Heracleides. Banishment of Dion and Heracleides.*

THE discussion of the character of the elder Dionysius and of his government, longer perhaps and more particular than would generally become historical composition, seemed warranted and even required by the importance of the portion of history, and by the obscurity and contradictions in which that portion of history hath been inwrapped; nor may it be less necessary toward exhibiting in just light an important sequel.

On the death of a man who had presided over the government so many years, with uncommon ability, and perhaps yet more uncommon success, it was matter of most serious consideration for all the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, but especially the Syracusans, and most especially those who had been his principal supporters, how and by whom the administration should be in future directed. To preserve peace and union, and means for common exertion against a threatening common enemy, among so many portions of the little empire, long habituated to discord within each and among all, it seems to have been extensively felt that one chief, with some permanence of power, was necessary, and that, for such a chief, eminence of birth was an important qualification. With these views the family of the late general-autocrator would stand among the foremost for public notice.

Dionysius

Dionysius had left by Doris, daughter of Xenetus of Locri, a son also named Dionysius, already advanced in manhood, and by Aristomache, daughter of Hipparinus, his late colleague in the office of general-autocrator, two sons, Hipparinus and Narsæus, yet under age. But the elder Hipparinus had also left a son, Dion; and the family of Hipparinus was the first, or among the first of Syracuse. Dion then was some years older than the younger Dionysius; with considerable talents, cultivated under the first philosophers of the age, and especially Plato; he had the farther advantage, derived from his late brother-in-law's favor, of having been versed in high employments military and civil, and to these he added that of possessing the largest patrimonial fortune of the Sicilian Greeks. Thus eminent, he aspired to the first eminence, and, before the death of the elder Dionysius, he had begun by secret practices to prepare the way for stepping into his place.

Diod.
Plut. v. Dion.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

The younger Dionysius was not his equal, either in ability or in ambition. But Dion had made himself obnoxious by a morose and haughty temper. Dionysius was more popular among the many by his father's popularity, and more agreeable to the principal men for his pleasanter manners. Philistus especially supported him⁷⁴. But the important election was to be made, as in a democracy, by the voice of the sovereign people. The general assembly was convened. Young Dionysius, addressing the multitude, solicited that goodwill, which he said he hoped, little as he had yet had opportunity to earn it, would attach to him for his father's merits, and pass to him as an inheritance. Of any opposition, on the occasion, we have no account.

B. C. 364.
Ol. 187. 4.
Diod. l. 15.
c. 74.

The silence of the adverse writers concerning transactions in Sicily, during eleven years after the accession of the younger Dionysius to

⁷⁴ The story told by Plutarch of Dionysius having given the tyranny of Syracuse and Sicily by a testamentary devise, is so little consonant with what was either usual among the Greeks, or likely to have happened in his particular circumstances, that the clear testimony of Diodorus to a more probable and ordinary course of things, is hardly necessary to its refutation. Plutarch's idea seems to have been drawn from

Roman times, or Greek, after the conquest of the Persian empire. For the age of Dionysius, he should still have attended to the tragic poet's information of what tyranny was, and how to be acquired, with which the account of Diodorus perfectly accords. The phrase *πρῶτον τὰ πλεονεκτησάμενα*, but indeed the whole account of Diodorus, show that not only the form, but the reality of popular sovereignty remained.

the supreme power in Syracuse, forms no small eulogy of his administration, and reflects very great credit on that of his predecessor, who had established the advantageous order of things, which gave means for such a phenomenon in Grecian history. While the mild temper of the government provoked no enemies, the naval and military force, ready at its command, deterred aggression. Respected abroad, and cherished at home, the only murmurs, noticed even by the adverse writers, were of restless spirits, who reprobated that want of energy, as they called it, which allowed the Carthaginians to hold their Sicilian possessions; while sober men could not but consider the maintenance of peace with that preponderant power, unsullied by any degrading concession, as indicating political conduct the most beneficial and praiseworthy. In the uncommon peace thus enjoyed, the Sicilian towns, and especially Syracuse, flourished beyond example; and the benefits appear to have been in no small degree extended to the Italian cities, which acquiesced under the superintending authority of the younger, as before of the elder Dionysius. The many self-governed cities, thus united under one executive administration, in the manner nearly of the Athenian confederacy under Pericles, formed a state altogether the most powerful at that time existing in Europe⁷¹. The peace of Sicily appears to have remained wholly undisturbed. In Italy hostilities occurred only with the Lucanians. The Syracusan government undertook the conduct of the war, and Dionysius has the credit of having commanded in some successful actions, which brought the enemy to submission. The moderation and generosity which restrained ambition and rapacity, and gave easy terms to the conquered, were taken, by the ill-affected, as ground, apparently in the scarcity of other ground, for invective against the administration. Except in this little war, the growth of piracy, in the Adriatic, alone gave occasion for any use of arms. That evil was repressed by the Syracusan fleets; and to prevent more effectually the renewal of maritime depredations in those seas, two towns were founded, in places commodious for naval stations, on the coast of Apulia.

⁷¹ Μείλιτη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπῃ δυνασιῶν ἀρχῇ, Diod. l. 16. c. 5. Τυρανίδι πασῶν ἐπιφανισατάτη καὶ μείλιτη, Plut. v. Timol. p. 242.

SECT. I. YOUNGER DIONYSIUS GENERAL-AUTOCRATOR.

The advantages however of the administration of the younger Dionysius appear to have been little owing to his own character, but much to the able men who had been his father's friends and assistants, and especially the venerable Philistus. If Dionysius had himself talents for business, he had little disposition to use them. He seems indeed to have had all his father's passion for literature, but with an excessive propensity, which, if his father ever had, his great mind overbore it⁷³, for pleasure and dissipation. That he had some quickness of judgement as well as of wit, much good humor, and a temper not easily ruffled, appears from anecdotes of his later life, preserved with a purpose very wide of flattery. Easiness and generosity are also marked in him in the course of the narrative of Diodorus, and remain attested even by his cotemporary enemy Timæus. But his dissipation, and especially his drunkenness, made him contemptible.

Arist. Polit.
l. 5. c. 10.

With such a character at the head of a government, whether tyranny, aristocracy, or democracy (tho the government of Syracuse seems clearly to have been compounded of the three, with the addition, from the Sicilian and Italian cities, of a large portion of what has been called federalism) it may well be wondered that quiet could be maintained so long, but not that troubles should at length arise. Philistus, who seems chiefly to have directed things, would be sometimes ill-supported, and always envied. Two principal men opposed him, Dion and Heracleides. The former, maternal uncle of Dionysius, was, in character, the reverse of his nephew, ambitious, active, austere, singularly austere, and haughty. He had some popular virtues; and, for the sake of power he cultivated popularity; but his political principles were aristocratical, and his temper, perhaps yet more than his political principles, were adverse to the acquisition of any extensive and dangerous popularity. Heracleides was more of the courtier. With much ambition, much courage, much activity, he had a temper that could accommodate itself to acquire the favor equally of prince and people. Through the favor of the general-autocrator, he was next in military command under him: through the favor of the people he was the most dangerous man in Syracuse to his government.

Plut. v. Dion.

⁷³ Minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus. Corn. Nep. de reg.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

Of Heraclides we have very little account; and of Dion, in some respects, too little, in other, more than enough; for much from Plutarch is evidently fable. Nevertheless, by comparing Plutarch with the honest tho prejudiced Diodorus, and both, as means offer, with other writers, we are enabled in a great degree to appreciate what is related by all. It seems probable that the elder Dionysius had taken measures for securing to his son the succession to the high rank which himself held, by the favor both of the principal men and of the multitude. We owe to the Roman biographer, less a party-writer than either Diodorus or Plutarch, the information that Dion, even before his brother-in-law's death, ingaged in secret measures for supplanting his nephew. Tho this was discovered, yet the easy liberality of the younger Dionysius forgave it, and Dion was not only still admitted to his society and counsels, but was among the most respected and favored in both. It was at the instance of Dion, it is said, that Plato was invited to revisit Syracuse, and assist in improving the laws and constitution. However doubtful the accounts of Plato's voyages to Sicily, and of the circumstances of his residence there, yet this may deserve notice concerning them: if they are true, it follows that the government of Syracuse remained in a great degree popular under each Dionysius; for the very purpose for which the philosopher is said to have been invited was to arrange a free government. But if the accounts are fictitious, they show that the author of a fiction which has obtained so much credit, either was aware that the government of Syracuse was free, or considered it as general opinion, which, to make his fiction popular, it would be necessary to respect.

It is likely nevertheless that Dion had reason to be dissatisfied with his nephew's conduct, as it tended to weaken and expose to ruin the well-combined system of government, under which Sicily had so long flourished; and it is likely that his haughty and austere manner in remonstrance might make his counsels daily less acceptable to the general-autocrator. Philistus then injoying the greatest favor with the first magistrate, and Heraclides with the people, Dion with much uneasiness found himself in an inferior situation, where he reckoned he ought to have held the first. Thus disappointed and soured, he was
led

led to a line of conduct which nothing could justify: he engaged in secret correspondence with the governor of the Carthaginian settlements in Sicily. Some of his letters were intercepted and delivered to Dionysius. From these it was discovered that, while formal communication was carried on by the Carthaginian governor with the Syracusan administration, as a blind, secret negotiation was going forward with Dion. Of the tenor of this negotiation ancient writers have omitted to inform us, but that the purpose was the advancement of Dion's power in Syracuse, to the overthrow of that of Dionysius and his immediate friends, is clearly implied. Dionysius, before aware, as the Roman biographer says, that Dion excelled him in talents, and was gaining upon him in popularity, now saw that it was no longer possible for both to live in Sicily.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 963.

Plut. & Corn.
Nep. v. Dion.
Diod. l. 16.

We have heretofore observed it to have been too much the way of writers of the ages of Diodorus and Plutarch, deficient in their accounts of public affairs, to relate secret transactions and private conversation, the most unlikely to become known, with as much confidence as if they had been present at them. Plutarch has undertaken to say what passed between Dion and Philistus concerning the intercepted letters, and he has reported, in still more detail, a conversation between Dion and Dionysius on the same occasion. What might be known, and concurrent testimonies speak to it, is that Dion was detected in a conspiracy for overthrowing the existing administration of Syracuse, and establishing himself in the chief authority; that he was in consequence banished, and that Heracleides was banished about the same time. It seems probable that the sentence against both was given, with all constitutional formality, by a decree of the people; the interest of the administration, directed more by the able and active Philistus than by the dissipated general-autocrat, overbearing the divided causes of the leaders of opposing parties.

Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.
Diod. l. 16.
Corn. Nep. & Plut. v. Dion.
Justin. B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. $\frac{2}{3}$.

The generosity of Dionysius, on this occasion, remains authenticated by the unsuspecting testimony of a cotemporary historian of the adverse party. To soften the fate of his uncle, as far as might be consistently with his own safety, he ordered a trireme for his accommodation, to carry him to Greece, and Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse, was the

Timæus, ap. Plut. v. Dion. p. 963, 964, 965.

place he chose for his residence. Thither his large income was regularly remitted to him, and he is said to have lived in a style of princely splendor, new in Peloponnesus. Meanwhile his wife and children, remaining in Syracuse, were taken by Dionysius into his own house, and treated with the kindness and respect becoming such near relations.

SECTION II.

Measures of Dion for War against Dionysius. New Settlement of Naxus under Andromachus. Return of Dion to Sicily in Arms. Return of Heracleides in Arms. Dionysius besieged in the Citadel. Death of Philistus.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 967.

THE gratitude of Dion, even according to his panegyrist, did not at all correspond with the liberal generosity of Dionysius. Proposing to use the means, which he owed to it, for raising troops to make war against his benefactor, it is said he consulted Plato on the subject, whose scholar and friend it was his boast to have been. Plato strongly dissuaded, but Dion nevertheless persevered. At this time more than a thousand Sicilian exiles were living in Greece. It seems probable that the greater number, or perhaps all, were a relic of the party in the several cities of the island, which we have seen so virulent and inflexible in animosity against the elder Dionysius. Scarcely thirty could be engaged to follow Dion, who had been so many years a principal person of the opposite party. Many of them seem to have been of those expelled from Naxus; and these, holding together under an eminent man of their own city, Andromachus, whose wealth inabled, as his talents qualified him, to be a chief in adventure, drew many others with them. The colony established in the Naxian territory, after the expulsion of the rebellious Sicels, seems, in the neglect of the Syracusan government, distracted through the dissipated character of the general-autocrator, to have been at this time in decay. Andromachus, using a favorable opportunity, and well seconded by the zeal of his followers, possessed himself of the height of Taurus, where the Sicels so long resisted the elder Dionysius; and, from that commanding situation,

situation, he vindicated for his followers in a great degree the possession and enjoymēt of the whole Naxian territory. His circumstances made the lofty fastness preferable to the otherwise far more convenient situation of the old town of Naxos below it, and under his able direction, his settlement, retaining the name of Tauromenium, quickly became a flourishing republic. Timæus, whose Sicilian history, now unfortunately known only by the quotations of other writers, has already occurred for notice, was a son of the founder of the republic of Tauromenium.

Meanwhile both Dion and Heracleides had been levying forces in Peloponnesus, for the purpose of reëstablishing themselves in Syracuse; and as the deranged state of the government there had afforded encouragement and opportunity for Andromachus, so his success would afford encouragement and promote opportunity for the Syracusan exiles. Intelligence of their preparations, and of the actual seizure of Tauromenium by Andromachus, alarmed the Syracusan administration. The direct passage from Peloponnesus across the Ionian sea to Sicily, was rarely ventured by the antient ships of war: they commonly, as we have had occasion formerly to observe, ranged the coast of Epirus, till opposite the Iapygian promontory, and then proceeded by the Italian headlands to the Sicilian shore. The occupation of Tauromenium, if its occupiers were in concert, as might reasonably be apprehended, with Dion and Heracleides, would give facility to invasion on that side, and perhaps might afford opportunity also to detach some of the Italian cities from the Syracusan alliance. The danger appeared so threatening, that Dionysius and Philistus went together to Italy to provide against it.

Meanwhile Dion, far less successful than Heracleides in ingaging Sicilian refugees, yet having collected some mercenary troops, and holding intelligence in Sicily, resolved upon a measure which has been celebrated for its novelty and boldness. The direct passage, very hazardous for the antient ships of war, was far from being equally so for the ships of burthen. Dion therefore embarked his troops in merchant-vessels, and steered to the south of Sicily; but, avoiding the Grecian towns, he held on his course to Africa, forced thither, as his

B. C. 358.
Ol. 105. 3.

Plut. vit.
Dion.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 9.
Plut. v. Dion.

friends gave out, by the wind. Thence however he proceeded, not to any Grecian settlement, but to Minoa, a Carthaginian garrison in the Agrigentine territory. There he was received as a friend by the Carthaginian governor, who gave him important assistance for the prosecution of his purpose. Dion hastened his march, with his small force, toward Syracuse, and the Carthaginian governor meanwhile managed for him the conveyance of arms, which he had brought to distribute among his partizans in the island. The friendship of Carthage moreover would procure him the friendly aid of all the Sicans, and probably some of the Sicels, and perhaps even some of the Greeks; for few of the Grecian towns, especially of the west of the island, were without a Carthaginian party⁷³. But everywhere all who were adverse to the ruling party, and all who apprehended that the administration of Dionysius was tottering, would be half prepared to join him. In a proclamation adapted to the general temper, or to the temper of a large part of the Sicilian Greeks, Dion declared that his purpose was to give liberty to all; and before he reached Syracuse, he had collected an army, it is said, of twenty thousand men.

Probable as it is that with all the advantage which Dionysius had, in the able advice of Philistus, there would be considerable errors in his administration, it is remarkable enough that none regarding public measures, are specified by the adverse historians. They pry into his house and his family for accusation against him. When Dion's purpose of bringing war against his country was ascertained by open preparation, in revenge for his ingratitude and perfidy, they say, Dionysius compelled his sister, Dion's wife, to repudiate her husband and take another. The credit due to such an account from an adverse faction, whether for the manner and circumstances, or for the fact itself, is very difficult to estimate. But the administration, in the absence of Dionysius and Philistus, remained certainly in hands either weak or faithless.

⁷³ It seems probable that if the history of Philistus had remained to us, we should have seen that the Carthaginian connection was the popular topic, urged by the party of Dionysius, that pressed most against Dion; and it seems to have been to coun-

terwork this that the accusation was retorted, evidently enough without foundation, and yet ingeniously enough to have perhaps some effect upon the popular mind at the time, against the elder Dionysius.

Dion became master of the city without a blow, the island only excepted. The numerous population, some part always disposed to Dion, a greater part indisposed to the existing administration, and expecting the desired arrival of Heracleides, some swayed by the alarm of the moment, and some by the incouragement, all flocked out to meet, and earn the favor or allay the resentment of the rising power. Dion, in a sort of royal, or as it would be called by an adverse party, tyrannical state, conspicuous for his fine armour, and surrounded by a body-guard of foreigners, addressed the obsequious multitude, and recommended the immediate election of commanders, fit, he said, in the style commonly used for alluring the multitude, to lead them to the overthrow of tyranny and the establishment of freedom. The choice, under the existing circumstances, could not be dubious; universal acclamation raised Dion and his brother Megacles to the high office of autocrator-generals, and a body-guard was allowed them, as appertenant to that dignity. No symptom of opposition appearing, they led the way, in a kind of triumph, through Achradina to the agora. Sacrifices, thanksgivings, festivals, whatever might incourage among the people the hope and imagination of great advantages in the revolution, followed; and while the informed and serious looked with anxious apprehension to the future, the thoughtless multitude enjoyed for the moment a real happiness, for which they paid Dion with the grossest flattery, equalling him with the gods.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 10.

Plut. vit.
Dion.

Plut. vit.
Dion, p. 972.
E.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 11.

But that government which had made Syracuse the greatest city of the Greek nation, the capital of the flourishing settlements of Sicily and Italy, and had been able to maintain it so many years in so uncommon a tranquility, tho thus violently interrupted, and put in imminent danger, was not so to be in a moment overthrown and annihilated. Dionysius and Philistus, returning not till seven days after Dion had been in possession of the city, found themselves nevertheless, by the command of the strong fortress of the island, by the attachment of the fleet, and by an interest yet among those who had submitted to Dion, in circumstances to propose an accommodation by which civil war might have been avoided. But Dion, haughty and unbending, for so much even his panegyrists allow, would accede to

no equal terms, and yet feared the unpopularity likely to be incurred by the refusal of them. To obviate this, his partizans imputed insincerity to their adversaries in proposing negotiation. Arms then being resorted to, and Dion, while his troops were roughly handled, being himself severely wounded, his partizans reproached Dionysius for breach of faith, as if a treaty had been going forward or even concluded. Nevertheless Dionysius again invited negotiations, which Dion persevered in avoiding, while he diligently prosecuted works for blockading the fortress. Composition, even his encomiasts avow, was not his purpose; he would compel Dionysius either to surrender at discretion or quit Sicily.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 12.
c. 13.

The rapidity and the amount of Dion's first success had brought unexpected credit to his cause; but when the extent of his design became more manifest, and men had leisure to reflect a little upon the probable and even necessary consequences, of a revolution, his progress was presently checked, and it appeared that an adverse party, or even more than one adverse party remained, capable of contending with him for superiority. The fleet continued faithful to the old government, and Philistus, passing again to Italy, where also its interest was yet good, he procured from Rhegium alone, flourishing under the party established in power by the elder Dionysius, five hundred horse. He did not fear then to return to Syracuse by land; and, Leontini having declared for Dion, he made a vigorous assault upon it. He was repelled, but he proceeded without any check to his march, and joined Dionysius in the citadel.

c. 16.

Meanwhile in the city things had taken a new face. Dion had quickly ceased to be the god who could command the minds of all men. Already symptoms of dissatisfaction had appeared among the multitude when Heracleides arrived from Peloponnesus, and was received with extensive satisfaction. He pretended the same zeal with Dion for what they called the popular cause, against Dionysius; but with little disposition to coalesce with Dion, and none to act under his orders. He had found among the Sicilian exiles, and in the Peloponnesian states, a favor which Dion could not obtain. He brought a force with him considerably greater; and the popularity of his

his character seems to have produced shortly some desertion in the Syracusan fleet, which Dion had vainly tempted. Nor was Heracleides supported only by the multitude. Those of higher rank, either disgusted with the haughty manner, or fearing the imperious temper of Dion, concurred in the policy of supporting a rival. Dion was compelled to concede, so far that, the command in chief of the landforce remaining to him, Heracleides was appointed, by a popular decree, to the independent command of the fleet. Dion had assumed a guard for his person, and a similar guard was, by a vote of the people, allowed to Heracleides. Jointly they seem to have been deficient in nothing that might give them, equally at least with either Dionysius, a claim to the title of tyrants of Syracuse.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.
Plut. v. Dion.
p. 972.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

Heracleides soon collected a fleet such that he could offer battle, and he gained a decisive victory. The veteran Philistus, who commanded against him, fell. Plutarch has related his fate as reported by Timonides, an associate in arms of Dion, to his friend the philosopher Speusippus in Italy. According to his account, Philistus was made prisoner in the ship in which, now in his eightieth year, he had bravely fought. Neither his age, nor the courage which at that age he had demonstrated, nor the universally-acknowledged merit of fidelity to principle and steddiness in friendship through so long and active a life, moved any spark of generosity in his illiberal victors, the friends of the reporter. Stript naked, his body, shrunk and shrivelled with years, while his mind remained so vigorous, was exhibited to the derision of the thoughtless multitude, and, not till they were sated with the abominable joke, he was deliberately put to death. Boys were then encouraged to drag the corpse about the city, and the odious scene was concluded by tumbling it, denied the rites of burial, into the stonequarries. It marks a strong stain in the character of the times, perhaps even more than of the man, that such a person as Timæus, son of the respectable chief of Naxos, giving a similar account of this base revenge, testified a malignant satisfaction in it, which has drawn censure even from Plutarch. The historian Ephorus, also a cotemporary, seems to have been unwilling to allow that Philistus, whose character he admired, and whose fate he lamented, would submit to be taken alive. Diodorus, apparently

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 975, 976.

Plut. *ibid.*

Diod. l. 16.
c. 16.

apparently following his account, says that Philistus, seeing resistance useless, and escape impossible, to avoid the indignities expected from such rancorous enemies, destroyed himself. Concerning the scandalous insults to the dead body, avowed as matter of triumph by the victorious party, all have agreed. The superiority of character of the venerable sufferer seems to have been hardly less generally acknowledged. The cause indeed, in which his talents were exerted, would of course bring on him reprobation from its opponents; yet his high merit with the party with which through a long life he acted, has been admitted by all⁷⁴. The loss therefore of his history of Sicilian affairs, which Cicero esteemed highly, for style and manner, as well as for the matter, will be esteemed among the greatest that we have suffered from the barbarism of the middle ages⁷⁵.

SECTION III.

Declining Popularity of Dion; advancing Influence of Heracleides. Retreat of Dion from Syracuse. Ill-Success of Heracleides. Recall of Dion, and Failure again of Popularity. Interference of the Lacedæmonians. Surrender of the Citadel to Dion.

By the defeat of the fleet, and the loss of the man who, equally for politics and war, was his ablest and most faithful adviser, Dionysius was reduced to a situation of extreme peril and difficulty. Immediately he again tried negotiation; founding perhaps some hope in the knowledge of dissention among his enemies. Dion, pressed by the popularity of Heracleides, was now disposed to moderation toward Dionysius. Claiming to be the deliverer of Syracuse, he had demanded public pay for more than three thousand mercenaries engaged in his service; but, thwarted by the influence of Heracleides, he could not obtain the

⁷⁴ Πλείστας μὲν καὶ μεγίστας χρείας παροσχέμενος τοῖς τυράννοις, πιστοτατος δὲ τῶν φίλων τοῖς δυνάσταις γεγονώς, Diod. l. 16. c. 16.

⁷⁵ Philistum, doctum hominem & dili-

gentem. De Divin. l. 1. c. 20. Catonem cum Philisto & Thucydide comparares?—Quos enim ne e Græcis quisquam imitari potest. De Clar. or. c. 85.

necessary

necessary sanction of a popular vote. His situation, in consequence, pledged as he was to the troops, became highly distressing. In this state of things Dionysius offered a sum equal to five months pay for the mercenaries, and to surrender the island and citadel upon condition of being allowed to pass to Italy, and enjoy there, under security of the Syracusan government, the revenue of his lands in Sicily. Dion exerted his influence to have the proposal accepted; but, in the debate on the question in the general assembly, free vent was given to the harshest invective against him and his foreign troops, to which the people so listened that he was unable to carry his proposal. The tricks to which democratical government is peculiarly liable, were, if his panegyrist may be trusted, resorted to for bringing farther discredit upon him. A man named Sosis, in the course of a bitter harangue, accused him of aiming at the tyranny. The next day the same man came bloody into the agora, asserting that he had been wounded by Dion's foreign soldiers, and hardly escaped assassination. Freedom of speech, he said, and all freedom would shortly be banished from Syracuse, if such crimes went unpunished. Inquiry being immediately instituted, the falsehood of the story was fully proved, and Sosis, in due course of law, was condemned to death for the attempted imposture, and executed. Whether, however, we suppose Sosis false, or Plutarch prejudiced or misguided, the story assists to mark the state of Syracuse at the time. Its happy days were gone by; and the time was come for citizens to be liable to insult and violence from foreign troops, and for the sovereign assembly to be misled by impostors.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 16.
Plut. v. Dion.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 972.

But the popular suspicion of Dion, and dislike of his foreign troops, did not die with Sosis. While he was in vain endeavouring to obtain an allowance from the public that might enable him to discharge his engagements, a measure was proposed, which might straiten his private means. Citizens, it was said in the general assembly, who had deserved well and were in want, should be provided with the necessary, before foreign mercenaries were rewarded. A division of lands was accordingly decreed, how far to the injury of legal property, and how far to the particular injury of Dion, who seems to have been the greatest landed proprietor among the Syracusans, we have no information. A measure

followed, however, which deprived Dion of all official authority: it was decreed that there should be a new election of generals, and that instead of one, or two, there should be no less than twenty-five. Heracleides was chosen of this numerous board, but Dion was omitted.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 17.
Plut. ut ant.

Dion's situation was now highly critical. Fortunately for him, while the favor of the Syracusan citizens so failed, the conduct of his adversaries but rendered it the more necessary for his mercenary army to make common cause with him. Confident in the superiority which discipline and practice in war would give to their small number over the Syracusan multitude, habituated to a relaxed military system in an uncommon length of peace, they proposed to right themselves and their commander by force. But Dion would not, with a band of foreigners, begin hostilities against his country, whose deliverer it had been his boast to be. He persuaded his little army to abstain from violence, and march under his orders to Leontini, where he could insure it a favorable reception. Probably Heracleides was unable to keep equal order among the Syracusans; taught by himself to believe that they had a right to exercise sovereign authority under no rule but their fancy. Under no regular command accordingly they pursued Dion; and treating with scorn his admonition to forbear violence, they made it necessary for his troops to chastize their injurious aggression. He interfered, with politic humanity, to check the slaughter, while they directed their precipitate flight to Syracuse, and he pursued his march to Leontini.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 17.

The dissention among those who claimed to be assertors of the liberties of Syracuse, had afforded some relief to Dionysius and his friends in the island. The blockade indeed was continued, so that a failure of provisions threatened; but notwithstanding the enemy's decided naval superiority since the battle in which Philistus fell, opportunity was found for Dionysius himself to go, in quest of supplies, to Italy, where his interest was yet good. The command of the garrison meanwhile was committed to his son Apollocrates; and its numbers and fidelity, with the natural and artificial strength of the place, sufficed to make assault vain. Want however became pressing,

and a negotiation for its surrender, was going forward, when a convoy from Locri came in sight. The Syracusans launched and manned their triremes, and proceeded against it as to a sure prey. But Nypsius, a man of approved valor and talent, who commanded it, conducted the contest so ably, against a very superior force, that, tho he lost four triremes, he carried in his whole convoy.

Heracleides is said to have been supported by a considerable number of principal men⁷⁵, but all accounts indicate that the power which enabled him at the same time to contend with Dionysius and drive Dion from Syracuse, was acquired principally by excessive indulgence and flattery to the multitude. The people, in consequence, became utterly unruly; they would consider the destruction or capture of four triremes, in the late action, as a victory important enough to be celebrated by a public festival; and their generals, whether accommodating themselves to the popular fancy, or following their own inclination, are said to have joined in the dissolution of moral order and military discipline, so as to have disabled themselves by inebriety. Nypsius, watchful, and supplied with intelligence, sallying in a critical moment with his whole garrison, became master of the two quarters of the city adjoining to the harbour⁷⁶.

Diod. i. 16.
c. 13, 19.
Plut. v. Dion,
p. 974, 5, 6.

The friends of Dion who had remained in Syracuse, encouraged by this misfortune to the government of Heracleides, now ventured again, in conversation and in debate, to push the interest of their party through that of its chief. It was become evident, they said, that there was but one man capable of averting from Syracuse the horror of returning under the odious tyranny of Dionysius. Another indeed in his circumstances might think only of revenge for the gross ill-usage he had received; but Dion's magnanimity and patriotism, it need not be doubted, would forgive the offence of the Syracusan people, and receive them as repentant children. The defect of the policy of Heracleides,

⁷⁵ Neque is minus valebat apud optimates, quorum consensu præerat classi. Corn. Nep. v. Dion.

⁷⁶ Plutarch, who commonly paints with a broad brush, regardless of nice distinctions, and often indulges in a very indiscriminate use of hard names and foul language, calls

Nypsius's troops altogether barbarians. But Diodorus's narrative, and the tenor even of Plutarch's account, marks them to have been mostly Sicilian and Italian Greeks; tho possibly, with the Locrian troops, there may have been some Lucanians, and possibly a few Gauls or Spaniards.

just before experienced in prosperity, now equally showed itself in adversity. He was obliged to concur in an invitation, in the name of the people, for Dion to return to Syracuse. There could indeed be no reasonable doubt of Dion's readiness to grant the request, which was, with the restoration of his property, to raise him again to the first situation in the commonwealth⁷⁷. To obtain such advantages his proud mind did not disdain a compromise with Heracleides. The board of twenty-five generals was dissolved of course; Dion was elected general-autocrator with Heracleides, as the elder Dionysius had formerly been with Hipparinus, and it was settled that the landforce should be under Dion's orders, and that Heracleides, still the popular character, especially with the seamen, should have the independent command of the fleet. Dion immediately proceeded to use the well-disciplined troops which had returned with him against Dionysius, and with such effect that Nypsius was soon compelled to abandon his conquest, and withdraw again within the island⁷⁸.

The zeal of Dion's friends, on his return, but still more on this success, broke out in gross extravagancies. They paid him divine honors; Diodorus says as a hero, or demigod: Plutarch, to whom, under the Roman empire, the absurd profaneness was familiar, says they called him a god. Such extravagance could not but maintain and increase jealousy among the friends of Heracleides. It was indeed an ill-fated city whose internal peace depended upon the

⁷⁷ Plutarch describes much good acting on the occasion, with considerable stage effect, but the story is not fit for serious history.

⁷⁸ Plutarch pretends that Dion's return was opposed by Heracleides, who was made prisoner by him, and owed life and liberty to his generosity. His own account of transactions, confused and sometimes contradictory as it is, however shows this very little likely; and from Diodorus and Nepos it appears clearly untrue. But without such improvement of the genuine accounts of Dion's life, Plutarch would have wanted ground for some fine declamation, which

he has introduced, on clemency and magnanimity. Yet however admirable such declamation may be, to found it on the demolition of the truth and even probability of history, is a practice surely not without inconvenience; and the invective which we find against Heracleides, as a popular leader on one hand, and against either Dionysius, as tyrants, on the other, is so marked with malignity, and, as not only Diodorus and Nepos, but more respectable writers also, Isocrates and Polybius, show, so unsupported by fact, that even the moral tendency altogether of the tale seems at best very questionable.

agreement of rival chiefs, supported by parties old in mutual animosity. Dion was still bent upon that scheme of an improved constitution, said to have been concerted with Plato. For whatever cause this was disapproved by the first Dionysius, under whom it seems to have been conceived, or by the second, to whom Dion, according to his panegyrist, would allow no rest for his urgency to carry it into execution, it was not a plan for increasing, but for checking the popular power. After his master, Plato, Dion called democracy not a government, but a market for governors, or, if a cant phrase, the only apposite one our language affords might be allowed, a jobmarket. But the power, and of course the safety of Heracleides and his principal supporters, depended upon their influence among the great body of the people. Any check therefore upon the authority of the general assembly, they were led by the most pressing interest to oppose. Dion, supported by his mercenary army, resisted the execution of the decree which had actually passed, for the partition of lands and distribution of houses. Perhaps his end was just and patriotic, but his measure appears to have been violent and tyrannical. He could not conceal his dissatisfaction with the appointment of Heracleides to the independent command of the fleet. A phrase of Homer, much noticed in antient and in modern times, was frequently in his mouth, which Pope has well, tho strongly, turned, 'That worst of tyrants, an usurping crowd;' and this, with the comment which ingenious opponents could add, did him great injury in popular estimation.

With two parties, thus only not at open war within the city, and a third, against which both carried arms, in the citadel, Syracuse could not be the flourishing and commanding state which it had been under either Dionysius; and yet among the Sicilian cities Syracuse was still powerful. Among all those cities there was yet a relic of the party of Dionysius. This being what had always been the Lacedæmonian party, seems, in its existing distress, to have engaged the attention of the Lacedæmonian government, to which it had been accustomed to afford assistance. Pharax, a Lacedæmonian, as we learn from Plutarch (in our copies of Diodorus, there occurs here an intermission of all notice of Sicilian affairs for near four years) charged with the interests of his government

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 981. D.

Plut. ibid.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 979. C.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 979. E.

government in Sicily, was in the Agrigentine territory with some troops under his command. This was considered by the Syracusan government as highly threatening to their interest. Plutarch, commonly careless of coherency, and here more than commonly defective and confused, assigns no cause for their alarm, but proceeds to relate that, ceasing to press the siege of the island, they sent the greatest part of their force, the army under Dion, the fleet under Heracleides, to oppose Pharax. Between such rivals however as Dion and Heracleides, just coöperation was little to be expected. Dion, compelled by the impatience of his licentious army to fight at disadvantage, was defeated. Heracleides, presently after, without communicating his purpose to the commander of the landforce, sailed eastward. Dion, apprehending he was gone for Syracuse, in extreme jealousy so hastened thither with his cavalry, that, tho it was night before he moved, he arrived, by a march of eighty miles, at the third hour of the next day.

This appears to have been esteemed by Dion's partizans a very meritorious exploit. Whether it was on any fair ground to be justified, we are without means to judge, but it was clearly a great party stroke, for Heracleides, and his principal friends, were excluded from the city. Nevertheless it was far from placing Dion and his party in any easy circumstances there; deprived of all coöperation from the fleet, which remained strongly attached to Heracleides. But the fleet felt the want of the city, not less than the city of the fleet. The inducements to accommodation being mutual, and a Lacedæmonian, Gæsylyus, becoming mediator, a reconciliation, for the present, between the rival chiefs, was effected.

What was the policy of the Lacedæmonian government at this time, in regard to Sicilian affairs, or what the views of either Pharax or Gæsylyus, its officers and ministers, does not appear. No consequences of the victory obtained by Pharax against Dion are mentioned. The conduct of Gæsylyus however shows that the old connection of Lacedæmon with the party of Dionysius no longer subsisted, and that, on the contrary its weight was rather given to the opposite scale. Pressed then by sea and land, with former friends become adverse, and means no longer occurring to avert threatened famine, Apollocrates negotiated
with

with Dion in preference to Heracleides for a capitulation. Surrendering then the island and citadel, he was allowed to withdraw with his followers to his father in Italy.

SECTION IV.

Power of Dion. Measures for reforming the Constitution. Assassination of Heracleides. Tyranny and Assassination of Dion.

THE reconciliation of Dion and Heracleides having been produced merely by political necessity, their contest for superiority began again when the necessity ceased. Dion represented to the people that the expence of the fleet, which pressed heavily upon them, might now be spared. The fleet was laid up, and its commander reduced to a private station, while Dion remained general-autocrator, without any other in a situation to balance his authority ⁷⁹.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 939. A.

Dion was now, as far as may be gathered from antient writers, not less than either Dionysius had been, king or tyrant of Syracuse, differing principally in the want of that popularity through which the first Dionysius had executed such great things, in peace and in war, at home and abroad, and extended the supremacy of Syracuse over the whole Grecian interest in Sicily and in Italy, to the great advantage of all; a popularity which, passing as a kind of inheritance to his son, and adhering to him even under great deficiencies of conduct, maintained him so long, and long so peacefully, in his high situation. Plutarch, amid the most extravagant panegyric of Dion, has avowed, in plain terms, that the Syracusans hated him ⁸⁰. Dion was aware of his own

V. Dion.
p. 975. A.

⁷⁹ In Plutarch's account, the reduction of the fleet is stated first, and the surrender of the island afterward; but he is always careless of any other order in his narrative than what may set a particular fact in a striking point of view. He wanted to pass at once from the surrender of the island to a display of Dion's greatness and glory, and for this advantage he would dispense with any explanation to his reader on what

ground his hero could pretend to the people, or even with a view to his own interest, desire them to believe that the fleet was no longer wanted, while the close blockade of the island was so great an object for all, and without the fleet impossible.

⁸⁰ Ἐμισοῦν τὸν Δίωνα, p. 975. A. On other occasions Plutarch is generally a preacher of democratical doctrine, but here, to revenge his hero, he is severe upon democracy.

unpopularity,

V. Dion.
p. 980. F.

unpopularity, and yet he could persevere in, what can only be well done through the highest popularity, a reformation of the constitution. So bent he was upon his project, that seeing his party weak, he endeavoured to strengthen himself by foreign aid. He sought assistance from Corinth, where the title of parent-city might soften the prejudice that would attach against any other foreign power.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

What may have been really the merit or demerit of his plan, we have no information. It may however be not unreasonable to believe that a man, as he was, of acknowledged talents, who had studied under one of the greatest philosophers, and acted many years under one of the greatest politicians of his own or any age, would, in altering, considerably improve a constitution, such as was then the Syracusan; which, through interested flattery and indulgence to the multitude, seems to have been sunk to a state not better than that in which we saw it on the first rise of Hermocrates, at the time of the Athenian invasion. But in carrying his plan into execution, he was evidently indiscreet; highly indiscreet and highly arbitrary. He seems clearly not to have profited from that admonition of the tragic poet, to which we have already more than once adverted. When alarm and indignation at his conduct were manifested among the people, instead of endeavouring to appease he would overbear. Heracleides, reduced as he was to a private situation, found means to profit from Dion's indiscretion, so as to be still formidable by his popularity, which increased as Dion's waned. Whatever the general-autocrat proposed in the assembly was thwarted by the favorite of the people. Dion's proud spirit could ill brook this revived opposition from a fallen rival, and his philosophy was weak against the alluring proposal, to still the annoyance by the base crime of assassination. Heracleides was murdered in his own house, by persons commissioned by Dion for the purpose.

Ibid.
Plut. v. Dion.
p. 981. D.

This atrocious deed, as even Plutarch has been fair enough to acknowledge, excited great and general indignation in Syracuse. Yet in the existing lawlessness, unless it should be rather called the existing tyranny, no judicial inquiry seems to have followed. Dion, known as he was for the murderer, proposed to allay the popular anger by a show of respect for the dead body. It was buried with great pomp under his direction,

direction, himself attending. But his panegyrist, to whom we owe this curious particular, has been true enough to a better morality to avow, that conscience of the wickedness imbittered all Dion's following days⁸².

It has been apparently in tenderness for his hero's reputation that Plutarch has omitted all account of transactions in Syracuse, from the death of Heracleides to the completion of the tragedy by the death of Dion; a short but interesting period, reported succinctly by the more impartial Roman biographer thus: 'No man any longer now thought himself safe in Syracuse, when Dion, after the removal of his opponent, in a still more arbitrary manner than before, seized and divided among his soldiers the property of any whom he supposed his adversaries. Nevertheless, with all the confiscations, the expences of this arbitrary government so exceeded the income, that he was driven to press upon the purses of his friends; and thus dissatisfaction was extended among the wealthy and powerful.' Information, much to be desired, fails us, what was become of the revenue, with which the first Dionysius had done such mighty things. 'But Dion,' continues the biographer, 'irritated more than admonished by the appearance of ill humor among all ranks, inveighed most impatiently against the unsteadiness of men, now thwarting his best purposes, who a little before were promising him every support, and equalling him with the gods. Such reproaches gained him no party; and, when the dissatisfaction of the most powerful men became generally known, while the discontent of the military was made public by petulant clamors for pay long in arrear, the body of the people freely vented their sentiments, calling Dion a tyrant, no longer to be borne.'

Plutarch, desirous of softening the tyrannical character of his hero,

⁸² Barthelemi, in his learned romance of Anacharsis, has taken up Dion as a favorite hero, and even outstripped Plutarch in extravagance of panegyric, concealing many of the disadvantageous truths which Plutarch has revealed. Thus far, were romance only his purpose and not history, he might be excused. But he admits the consent of

Dion to the assassination of Heracleides for the purpose of justifying it. His unfortunate nephew has probably seen and felt enough not to be so fond of those principles, which the uncle, and his great patron the duke of Choiseuil, contributed to spread in France.

Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.
Plut. v. Dion.
p. 982.

which he knew not how intirely to conceal, says that, mistrusting and scorning his fellowcitizens, he sent for Corinthians to be his associates in council and in authority⁸¹. The reality and the character of his tyranny are, even thus, largely shown. Yet the association of Dorians, in the government of a Dorian state, would be less generally offensive than the admission of Ionians; and a Corinthian, as of the mother-city of Syracuse, would be more acceptable than any other Dorian. But from Plutarch equally as from Nepos, we learn that Dion's most confidential assistant, in civil and in military business, was Callippus, an Athenian. His popularity was so completely gone, and his mistrust of his fellow-citizens such, that he employed this man as a spy among them, to discover and report their sentiments and their purposes. To inable a foreigner, and one so known to have been in his confidence, to execute effectually such an office, a plan of dissimulation was agreed upon between them: Callippus was to pretend concurrence with those most dissatisfied with Dion, who was equally to profess dissatisfaction with him. But, in the course of this employment, Callippus seems to have found that, if he remained faithful to Dion, he must probably fall with him, whereas by betraying him, he might rise on his ruin. Daring, cunning, and unprincipled (if we may trust the panegyrists of Dion, from whom alone report of his character and actions hath reached us) he resolved upon the latter. Example for assassination, a crime to which the Syracusans were perhaps before but too prone, had been given by Dion himself. A plot was formed against him, and there seems to have been a very large number of persons so far engaged as to give it their approbation. Rumor of it got abroad, and reached Dion's family. Confiding in his supposed friend, or at a loss for another in whom he might confide, he would himself take no measures of prevention: but his wife and sister, it is said, communicated their suspicions to Callippus; nor would be be satisfied with his assurances of fidelity, till he had sworn it before them in the temple of Proserpine, with every ceremony supposed to give fairest sanction to an oath, covered with the goddess's purple robe, and bearing a flaming torch in his hand.

⁸¹ Μισαπέμπεται δ' ἄν Κερύβει συμβουλῶν καὶ συνάρχωνας, ἀπαξίῳ τοὺς πολίτας. Plut. v. 1. m. p. 981. C.

But as Callippus was already too far advanced to retreat with any safety, the discovery that he was suspected served but as admonition to hasten the execution of the plot. A day of public festivity was chosen, when the people would be collected where, it was known, Dion would avoid attending. For security against commotion, commanding points in the city were occupied, by troops in the confidence of the conspirators, and a trireme was prepared in the harbour for ready flight, if it should become desirable. Matters being thus arranged, some Zacynthian soldiers went, without arms, to Dion's house, and pretending an errand to speak with him, on business of the mercenary troops, pushed into the room where he was, and immediately shut the door. His very guards, according to Nepos, had they had any disposition to it, might easily have saved him; for the tumult was heard, while Dion for some time resisted his unarmed assailants; but none moved to his relief. The business of murder was at length completed with a sword, which Lycon, a Syracusan, handed to the foreign assassins, through a window. Thus, with his life, ended the administration of Dion, about four years after his return from Peloponnesus, and about the fifty-fifth of his age; a man whose eulogy among ancient writers has far exceeded what any remaining account of his actions will justify.

B. C. 352.
Ol. 106. $\frac{3}{4}$.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 31.
Corn. Nep.
v. Dion.

SECTION V.

The Athenian Callippus General-Autocrator of Syracuse. Hipparinus General-Autocrator. Ill-Condition of the Grecian Cities of Sicily. Quiet of the Italian Cities. Restoration of Dionysius in Syracuse. Death of the Widows of Dion and of the elder Dionysius.

STILL as we proceed with Sicilian history, much as we feel the want of such guidance as that of Thucydides or Xenophon, nevertheless, for facts of a public nature, we find accounts, tho' ill connected, and often defective, yet consistent and probable, with little important variation from one another. Secret history, in which the writers on Sicilian affairs are more ample, of course should be received with caution, and their panegyric and their invective those who seek truth will equally disregard.

disregard. The Syracusan constitution is very little known to us, as it existed under either Dionysius, or Dion, but the character of the administration, under each, may be in a great degree gathered from the circumstances of the death of each, and what immediately followed. Dionysius, as we have seen, died in peace, at a mature age, surrounded by his friends, respected by his enemies, leaving his family flourishing, and his country by far the most flourishing of Grecian states. The first following public measure was to assemble the people, and commit to them the choice of a first magistrate. The accounts come only from the enemies of the family, and yet no violence upon the public voice is pretended: the general favor, which had attached so many years to the father, passed as an inheritance to the son; so that a youth, of uncertain merit, was, for the father's sake, raised to the first situation in the commonwealth, and with circumstances so advantageous as to retain it peaceably, notwithstanding great disadvantages of character and conduct, during eleven years. When, on the contrary, Dion, after having held the administration four years, was cut off by sedition, the circumstances of the state were far from flourishing; empire gone, revenue gone, population diminished, faction raging. Instead then of an assembly of citizens, an army of mercenaries decided the succession to the first magistracy; and Callippus, a foreiner of Ionian race, an Athenian, of character stained with imputation of the murder of Dion, ruled with sovereign power during thirteen months⁸⁴. Callippus was, no doubt, a man of talents, which he is said to have improved in the school of Plato; and what was his real guilt, seems ill ascertained. The family of Dion continued under his government to live in Syracuse, and apparently might have lived secure, had they avoided plots against it. But the relics of the party moving sedition, they, as implicated in the measures for disturbing the existing order of things, were compelled to fly to Leontini.

Athen. l. 11.
c. 15. p. 250.
vel 508.

B. C. 351.
Ol. 106. 4.

That interest then which Dion, during four years at the head of affairs in Syracuse, had failed to acquire, the family of Dionysius yet retained. Hipparinus, son of the elder Dionysius by Aristomache,

⁸⁴ Λαμπρός ἦν καὶ κατ' ἤχην τὰς Σираκούσας. Plut. v. Dion. p. 983. Ἦλξε μῆνας τρισκάνδεκα. Diocl. l. 16. c. 51.

sister of Dion, arriving in a critical moment when Callippus was absent on some expedition, a revolution was effected in his favor, and he held the chief power two years. Callippus, driven to wander with his mercenaries in quest of new fortune, after an unsuccessful attempt upon Messena, made himself master of Rhegium, but soon perished there by assassination.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 36.
Plut. v. Dion.
p. 983.

Of the government of Hipparinus in Syracuse, we learn no more than that it was neither flourishing nor lasting. Nor was it succeeded by a government either flourishing or lasting. Syracuse, so long the superintending state, being too much distracted to hold its superintendency, lawlessness and confusion pervaded the Sicilian Greek cities. During five or six years of this confusion, we are without history of Sicilian affairs. At length, in the third year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, answering to the three hundred and forty-fourth before the Christian Era, eight years after the death of Dion, we find the state of Sicily, the result of his celebrated expedition for its deliverance, described by his panegyrist, Plutarch, thus: 'Syracuse, under no settled government, but, among many competitors for the sovereignty, passing continually from tyrant to tyrant, became, through excess of misery, almost a desert. Of the rest of Grecian Sicily, through unceasing hostilities, part was absolutely depopulated and waste. The population of almost every town, which had a remaining population, was contaminated by a mixture of barbarians and mercenary soldiers, who, for want of regular pay, were driven to any venture for subsistence.' In the coloring of this picture, Plutarch has had in view to prepare his readers for panegyric of a new hero; and yet that it is little if at all overcharged, appears from other accounts, and from the result, which seems not ill summed up in these words of Diodorus: 'The Syracusans, divided into factions, and compelled to submit to many, and great, and various tyrannies, at length came to the resolution of sending to their mother-city, Corinth, for a general, who might command respect from all parties, and repress the overweening ambition of individuals.'

B. C. 344.
Ol. 108. $\frac{2}{3}$.
Plut. v. Tim.
init.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 65.

While Syracuse and most of the Grecian part of Sicily were in this wretched situation, the Italian towns seem to have remained nearly in

the state of regular government and prosperity in which the elder Dionysius left them. We hear of neither tyrants nor civil war among them, except in the occupation of Rhegium by Callippus, nor of any popular discontent. There, on his expulsion from Syracuse, the younger Dionysius had found an advantageous asylum. Locri, his mother's native city, was mostly his residence. Little disposed to activity, and little troubled by ambition, he would perhaps there have passed the remainder of his days in as much ease as was commonly enjoyed under Grecian governments, if the importunity of friends and partizans, suffering under the actual state of things in Sicily, and expecting only increased oppression from any new prevalence of the Corinthian party, had not again brought him into action. It was not, however, on any light ground that he engaged in a new expedition to Syracuse. His party there was so strong, and things had been so prepared, that Nesaüs, who had acquired the lead in the government, was obliged to retire before him. He was again elected general-autocrator; and probably became, in consequence of the confusion of all the regular powers of government in the course of the long troubles, a much more absolute sovereign, tho within a much narrowed dominion, than when he first succeeded his father.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Affairs of the GRECIAN Settlements in SICILY and ITALY,
from the Restoration of the younger DIONYSIUS to the
Death of TIMOLEON.

SECTION I.

Expedition of the Carthaginians into Sicily under Hanno. Grecian Cities in Sicily under the Government of single Chiefs. Application for Interference of Corinth in the Affairs of Sicily. Circumstances of Corinth. Timoleon appointed to manage the Corinthian Interest in Sicily.

FORTUNATELY for the Grecian interest in Sicily, the Carthaginian government, whether prevented by domestic troubles, or engaged by greater views elsewhere, made no use of the opportunities which the weakness necessarily incident to an administration of a man of the character of the younger Dionysius, and the distractions which followed the expedition of Dion, for prosecuting by arms any views of ambition there. Its policy, meanwhile, or at least the conduct of its officers, was liberal and able. The attachment even of the Grecian towns in the western parts was conciliated; and it appears, from Diodorus, that those towns shared little in the ruin, which Plutarch has represented as so universally sweeping over the island. Since the decay of the great naval force which the first Dionysius raised, the Carthaginians had held complete command of the sea; and this, in the divided state of the Greeks, produced by Dion's expedition, would be perhaps more advantageous to a commercial people than any extension of territorial command. The first warlike measures of the Carthaginian government were professed, and apparently intended, not against the Greeks, but merely to repress the rapine of the Campanians, who had, with such faithless violence, settled themselves

Diod. l. 16.
c. 67.

Plut. v. Timol. init.

themselves in Entella, and, in their settlement, retained, to the annoyance of their peaceful neighbours, their habit of war, and appetite for plunder.

Among the Grecian cities unconnected with Carthage, there seems at this time to have been regularity of government, and security for individuals, only where some one powerful man could hold sovereign sway. With his own party that powerful man had the title of governor, prince, or potentate⁸⁵: by an opposite party he would of course be called tyrant. His power indeed could be little defined by law; he must necessarily act according to emergencies; and the character of his administration would be decided by his own character, and his sense of his own interest. His situation altogether nearly resembled that of the feudal barons of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Of those who thus held sovereign sway in the Sicilian Greek cities, Dionysius perhaps was the most powerful: for tho Syracuse was lamentably fallen, and in Syracuse itself his authority, tho little regularly limited, was ill-settled, yet his interest in Italy gave him weight. Next, and perhaps for power within Sicily hardly second, were Ictes of Leontini, and Andromachus of Tauromenium. Andromachus stood as head of that party, throughout the Sicilian and Italian cities, which had always been adverse to the family of Dionysius; and by his success at Tauromenium he had acquired the consideration of restorer, or, in the antient phrase, second founder of the interest of that party in Sicily.

Ictes had been a confidential friend of Dion, on whose death, accompanied by the mercenary force which had served under him, and those citizens who desired to avoid the new power in Syracuse, he had withdrawn to Leontini. That place had always been, more than any other in Sicily, well disposed to Dion. Thither therefore his widow, and his sister, widow of the elder Dionysius, had retired from the government of Callippus. At first they were treated with apparent tenderness and respect; but, after no long time, they were embarked for Peloponnesus, under pretence of placing them in better security, and, under orders, it is said, from Ictes, murdered in the passage. It

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 983.

Plut. v. Dion.
p. 983. &
v. Timol.
p. 252.

⁸⁵ "Ἀρχὴν, δυνάστην.

is among infelicities likely to attend haughty and morose tempers, like Dion's, to fail in the choice of friends. But tho this tale of horror comes from Plutarch, the panegyrist of Dion, it seems liable to some reasonable doubt. The manner of the murder the biographer mentions to have been variously reported. If then Ictes directed it, he did not intend it should be known that he directed it; and how it came to be known we are not informed. What temptation even would lead Ictes to the crime does not appear. That the unfortunate women perished in the passage, was probably of public notoriety. If they perished by accident, party calumny may have gathered opportunity from it to asperse Ictes. But they may have been destroyed by the pirates who infested those seas; or, in the opportunity among the Greek republics for the worst criminals to escape, the crew, to whose charge they were committed, may have been tempted to murder them for the small riches they might carry. In the want of means to ascertain the fact, if such tales of secret crimes want both authentication and probability, they can rarely deserve regard in history; and accordingly many such, even some of celebrity, have been passed unnoticed here.

But tho this shocking tale, related by the philosophical biographer, the panegyrist of Dion, is of very doubtful appearance, yet the character of Ictes seems not to have been altogether creditable to Dion's choice of him as a friend. When the return of Dionysius to Syracuse made the residence of the more violent of those in opposition to him unsafe or uneasy there, the most violent chiefly resorted to Leontini. Men of quieter and more respectable character generally, and especially those of higher rank, preferred the refuge of Tauromenium, under the government of Andromachus. Other chiefs held an independent, or almost independent authority in many of the smaller towns. Dionysius, Ictes, and Andromachus stood as chiefs of three principal parties, each in a state of war with both the others, and with such a spirit of animosity pervading all, so inflamed and maintained by opposition of interest, that composition between them was hardly possible.

Plut. v. Timol. init.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 68.

In circumstances so distressing for all who held property, or desired settled life, among the Grecian possessions in Sicily, the rumor of preparation at Carthage for a new expedition, tho the Campanians of Entella, who had given sufficient occasion for it, were alone its avowed object, excited great and reasonable alarm. Union, under the lead of any man, or any city of Sicily, appearing beyond hope, it was proposed, among the refugees in Tauromenium, to solicit the interference of Corinth, the mother-city of Syracuse and of a large proportion of the Dorian Greeks of Sicily, as what alone could be of authority to bring the adverse spirits to the coalition necessary for the safety of all. Precedents of such a measure were numerous. It was generally, among the Greeks, held reputable, and pleasing to the gods, for colonies, on important occasions, to desire a leader from the mother-country. The Syracusans themselves, no longer ago than the Athenian war, had admitted Corinthians to chief commands in their forces. From Tauromenium therefore communication being managed in Syracuse and other towns, numbers were found to approve the proposal⁸⁶.

Ch. 28, s. 3.
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 65. Plut.
v. Timol.

But Corinth itself was at this time distracted by contest of factions. To resist aggression from Argos, the government had been driven to the resource, which we have seen it formerly using, of employing an army of those adventurers, or, they might perhaps be called, traders, in military business, commonly distinguished, after the Latin phrase, by the name of mercenaries. Under the able and spirited conduct of Timophanes, of one of the most illustrious families of Corinth, success rather beyond hope had attended the Corinthian arms. His popularity, before extensive, was thus greatly increased, and with his power, accruing from command of the mercenaries, gave him great means for purposes of ambition. What the real merit

⁸⁶ Both Diodorus and Plutarch mention this measure as the act of the Syracusans. They do not however say it was, and it cannot be supposed, a regular act of the Syracusan people, under the newly restored administration of Dionysius. But every party of Syracusans, every knot of Syra-

cusans, in and out of Syracuse, would call themselves, and be called by their friends, the Syracusans. It is, in the sequel, specified by Diodorus, that the communication with Corinth was conducted by the refugees in Tauromenium.

of the contest of parties was, accounts remaining not only are too defective, but too contradictory, to enable us now satisfactorily to gather. The historian's expressions however imply that the party through which Timophanes was formidable, was the democratical. What we learn with certainty is that the contention in Corinth was at this time, as we have seen it formerly, in the authentic account of Xenophon, violent; and that the party in which Timophanes had been bred, considered him as not only betraying their cause, which alone they would allow to be the cause of their country, but, by the combined powers of popularity, and his influence over a standing army, aiming at sovereign command, or, in the Grecian phrase, the tyranny, of Corinth⁸⁷.

Timoleon, younger brother of Timophanes, disapproved his conduct and purposes. Failing in remonstrance and dissuasion, and seeing the constitutional powers, or the powers of his party, unequal to contest with the extensive popularity of Timophanes, he engaged in conspiracy against him. Whether better means really became desperate, or the familiarity of the age with assassination so lessened its horror that it was adopted merely as the readiest and surest, assassination was resolved upon. For the manner of the crime, as would be likely for a fact of the kind, accounts differ, agreeing about the result. Diodorus says that Timoleon killed his brother with his own hand, publicly, in the agora. For a different account Plutarch has quoted three authors, Timæus, Iphorus, and Theopompus, all cotemporary with the event. According to them Timoleon introduced the assassins into his brother's house, under pretence of desiring a friendly conference; but, tho he considered the murder as a patriotic duty, yet he yielded so far to nature as to turn his back while the deed was done. The Roman biographer, contrary to both these accounts, relates that Timoleon acted indeed in concert with the assassins, but was not present at the

Corn. Nep.
v. Timol.

⁸⁷ The phrases *πομπόλατος ἔχων μεβέλειδῶ*, & *κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν πύρειν, ἐν πρισπιώμενος* *ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ* &c. Diod. l. 16. c. 65. clearly indicate a man raising himself by popular favor. Aristotle, in cursory mention of Timophanes, attributes his acquisition of the tyranny to his command of mercenaries. Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 6.

assassination, being employed elsewhere in preventing opposition to their purpose⁸⁸.

Corinth was still in the ferment which this atrocious act produced, when the Syracusan deputies arrived⁸⁹. One party was extolling Timoleon as a virtuous tyrannicide, whose magnanimous patriotism was above all praise: the other execrated his deed as a parricidal murder, for which the laws of gods and men demanded expiation by his just punishment. The petition of the Syracusans afforded opportunity for a compromise, in which, with a wisdom and temper, oftener found perhaps in Corinth than in other Grecian cities, both parties agreed. Timoleon's birth and rank were eminent; his great talents had been proved in politics and in war; and, according to one party, he had shown himself peculiarly fit for the honorable office of delivering Sicily, by the very act which, according to the other, made him unfit to live in his own country. His friends and his enemies therefore concurred in his appointment; with the condition, according to Diodorus, required by the latter, that, provided his conduct in Sicily corresponded with

⁸⁸ Plutarch, in his usual way, has undertaken to describe the dark scene in Timophanes's apartment, as if it had been acted before him. The difference of writers about this assassination, the circumstances of which, as it was gloried in by the perpetrators, and their whole party, were as likely to be ascertained as those of such deeds commonly can be, may add to the lessons already gained in the course of the history, to be cautious of giving credit to the pretence of exact reports of any of them.

⁸⁹ This is the account of Diodorus, who seems always to have meant to be accurate, especially in dates. Plutarch, on the contrary, ever straining to make the best story, unsolicitous about the consistency or connection of history, reports that Timoleon had been living twenty years in solitude and repentance, when he was called upon to undertake the deliverance of Sicily from tyrants.

But tho we find Diodorus often detected by the learned and sagacious Dodwell in confounding the chronology of a year or two, yet, for these times, when historians and annalists abounded, he would hardly err, concerning so public a fact, so widely as twenty years. If Diodorus however could want support against Plutarch, we gain for him what is pretty satisfactory from the omission of all mention of these remarkable matters by Xenophon. According to Dodwell's exposition of Xenophon's chronology, it was in the twentieth year before the mission of the Sicilian Greeks to Corinth, that the Corinthians, with the approbation of the Lacedæmonian government, made their separate peace with Thebes. Xenophon's history is continued some years after, and has not a word about Timophanes or Timoleon, or any circumstances of Corinthian affairs suited to their story.

his

his pretensions to political virtue, he should be forgiven the offence to the laws of the city and to humanity; but otherwise, if ever he returned to Syracuse, he should suffer the just punishment for parricide. Plutarch has censured it as a weakness in Timoleon, the only weakness of his great mind, that he felt contrition for his brother's murder. The Roman biographer has less affected a philosophy like that of the modern French; and relating apparently nothing without authority from elder writers, he says the persevering refusal of Timoleon's mother to see him after the fact, and her invective and imprecations against him, of which he was informed, made a most severe impression on his mind. Thus he was prepared for such a proposal as that from the Sicilians; which he seems to have rejoiced in, however offering a field only for almost hopeless adventure among abounding dangers and difficulties, having formed his resolution never to return to Corinth.

SECTION II.

Expedition of Timoleon to Sicily. Opposition of Greeks and Carthaginians to the Interference of Corinth in Sicily. First and second Campains of Timoleon. Final Retreat of Dionysius.

THE fulsomeness of panegyric, which we find among the later Grecian writers, especially Plutarch, is perhaps not less injurious to a great character than the malevolence of invective, which abounded among those of the age we are engaged with, and which Plutarch, for the advantage apparently of contrast in his pictures, frequently adopted. It may be not less disadvantageous to Timoleon's fame among sober inquirers, that we know him only from writers ever straining for eulogy, than to that of the elder Dionysius, that all detailed accounts of him come from his traducers. Timoleon's history altogether bears the character more of the tale of a hero of the times of the Seven before Thebes, than of the authentic narrative of the actions of a cotemporary of Xenophon, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Nevertheless, involving a very interesting portion of the history of the Grecian republics, curiosity cannot but be awake to it; and, in the circumstances of Timoleon and
of

of Sicily, the real character of adventures, sentiments, and conduct, might have some tinge of the romantic. On careful examination, moreover, we find generally those principal matters of fact which might be of some public notoriety, not unsatisfactorily unfolded.

To the outfit of Timoleon's adventurous expedition, the Corinthian government would contribute little or nothing beyond the credit of its name; and what could reach Corinth, from Sicilians friendly to the cause, was probably very small. His own credit would assist, and possibly his private fortune. But the force with which he left the Grecian shores, including three triremes furnished by the Corinthian colonies of Lencædia and Coreyra, with which he sailed, professing the purpose of delivering the Sicilian cities from tyranny, and avenging the Grecian cause against the Carthaginians, consisted of only ten ships of war and seven hundred soldiers. In failure of transport ships, he put his landforce into four of his triremes; an inconvenience which disabled them for naval action, so that his effective fighting ships were only six⁹⁰.

B. C. 342.
 (ii. 408. 4.
 12. 1. 10.
 c. 10.
 Tim. v. 11.
 mol. p. 239.

To infuse then into his little armament an inspiration it was likely to want, he had recourse to that superstition of which, we find, the ablest commanders of Greece and Rome most availed themselves. The priestesses of Ceres and Proserpine in Corinth gave him their valuable assistance, in a declaration that those goddesses appearing to them in their dreams, had given assurance that they would accompany Timoleon to that great and fruitful island which was peculiarly sacred to them. Timoleon hence took occasion to consecrate his best ship to the goddesses, and call it by their name. A meteor, more brilliant and lasting than common, was seen in the sky during his voyage. He termed it a lamp, held out by the gods to guide him; and the story

⁹⁰ Diodorus alone has given the detail of Timoleon's land force. Plutarch agrees with him in stating it at ten triremes. Wesseling has supposed that Aristotle, in his epistle to Alexander, on rhetoric, has had Timoleon's fleet in view, which he says that the Corinthians sent him triremes to Syracuse against the Carthaginians. Appa-

rently the learned commentator has not sufficiently followed up the historian's narrative, as he would have said, I think, that Aristotle has rather referred to the fleet stated by him to have been afterwards sent by the Corinthian government, as he shall see in the sequel, for the immediate purpose of opposing the Carthaginians.

afterward

afterward passed, that this celestial lamp directed his course across the Ionian Sea and up the Tarentine Gulph, to his proposed port, Metapontum. Probably he desired to pass unseen from the land, and for this advantage must give up that, so important for antient navigation, and especially for the antient ships of war, of seeing and being near the land; whence encouragement from confidence in divine protection might be more wanted for his people.

Intelligence reaching Leontini of the negotiation put forward from Taormenium, and of preparation at Corinth for interfering with arms in the affairs of Sicily, Iectes, who had interest with one party among the Corinthians, sent ministers to counterwork the measure. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army under Hanno had crossed from Africa, and begun operations with the siege of Entella. Conquest, such as Hannibal and Imilcon formerly sought, seems not to have been the purpose of Hanno's expedition: yet, in securing the Carthaginian command or influence, to extend thence would probably be in his view. Iectes held friendly connection with Carthage, which we have seen not uncommon among the Sicilian Greeks. The interference of the Corinthians in Sicily, highly obnoxious to Iectes, was likely to be an object of jealousy to the Carthaginian government. In consequence therefore of concert between Iectes and Hanno, a Carthaginian squadron was sent to watch the movements from Peloponnesus. It seems however not to have been Hanno's purpose to provoke hostilities. A single trireme, sent to Metapontum, met Timoleon there. The Carthaginian remonstrated against the purpose of the Corinthians to interfere with an armed force in the affairs of Sicily, where they had no possessions. Timoleon, little regarding argument, resolved to use the opportunity yet left open, by the moderation of the Carthaginian commander, for reaching a friendly Sicilian port, and listened to proceed on his way. Nevertheless an invitation from Rhegium, to assist in putting the government of that city into the hands of the party friendly to him, appeared of too much importance to be neglected. He went thither, and the object was gained: but he had not time to sail again before a Carthaginian squadron, of twice his force, entered the harbour. The conduct of the Carthaginian commander was that of one instructed to promote peace and respect the rights of others.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 66.
Plut. v. Timol.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 67.

c. 66.

c. 68.

No way using the power in his hands, he went ashore to meet the Rhegian people in assembly, and argue, in their constitutional method, the matters in question between his own government and the various parties of the Greeks. This respect, from a Carthaginian commander, for Grecian laws and customs, Timoleon regarded only as it afforded opportunity to profit from disingenuous artifice. As soon as the debates had begun to engage all attention, nine of his ships proceeded to sea; and then, slipping away himself unobserved, he followed in the remaining one. The Carthaginian, indignant as soon as the deceit was made known to him, hastened in pursuit; but night was already advancing, and Timoleon reached Tauromenium without obstruction. Andromachus, and the Syracusan refugees, the first promoters of his expedition, greeted his arrival.

B. C. 343. It seems to have been late in the summer for beginning military
Ol. 108. 4. enterprise; but things had been singularly prepared, by war between those against whom Timoleon meant to direct his arms. Ictes had besieged Dionysius in Syracuse, but making no progress, withdrew. Dionysius pursued. Ictes, turning, defeated him, entered the city with his flying troops, and became master of all except the island. Against the extraordinary strength of that fortress he would not waste his exertions, but he proceeded to besiege Adranum, the colony of the elder Dionysius, now holding connection with the refugees in Tauromenium.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 68.
Plat. v. Timol. p. 241.

Information of these circumstances decided the measures of Timoleon. Marching to relieve the Adranites, he attacked Ictes, with such well-planned surprize, that, with very inferior force, he put him presently to flight. In the instant of victory then he decided his next measure. Proceeding immediately for Syracuse, he marched with such speed, it is said, as to outstrip the flying enemy; and arriving wholly unexpected, he became master of the two quarters which he first approached, Tychë and Epipolæ. The strong separate fortifications of Neapolis and Achradina made farther attempt unavailing; but he retained what he had acquired; and thus the unfortunate city was divided between three powers at war with each other.

Winter now put that stop, which was usual among the Greeks, to farther military operations. The season of leisure for arms seems
however

however to have been diligently and ably employed in negotiation. The numerous garrisons of small fortresses, scattered over the Syracusan territory, began, in the existing circumstances, to despair of the cause of Dionysius, to which they were attached. They were vehemently averse to Icetes, and little inclined to Andromachus; but to a general from the parent-city Corinth, unversed in Sicilian quarrels, if he might be able to protect them, they had no particular objection. Timoleon was ready with fair promises, and most of them made terms with him.

This success prepared matters for a greater acquisition. The chief of Catana, Mamercus, bears, among antient writers, the title of tyrant. But Timoleon, we find, never disdained friendly connection with a tyrant, if it might be useful; and Mamercus, beside that he was a brave and able soldier, with a well-trained little army under his orders, was, in the biographer's phrase, powerfully wealthy⁹¹. The accession therefore of this chief to the Corinthian interest was altogether considered as a highly fortunate event⁹².

But in the following spring, while Syracuse was yet divided between the three contending parties, Dionysius holding the island, Icetes Achradina and Neapolis, and Timoleon Tychæ and Epipolæ, a Carthaginian fleet, under Hanno, entered the harbour, and landed an army, stated at fifty thousand men. It was expected that Hanno would have the coöperation of Icetes, and their united strength seemed far too great for either of their opponents to withstand. Energy indeed, for whatever it might effect, was not wanting to the Corinthian party; and Mamercus, and the Syracusans of the country garrisons, showed all zeal in their new engagements. The party in Corinth, which supported Timoleon, had been also prospering, or report of his first successes had extended his interest there; for in the existing crisis nine Corinthian triremes, filled with soldiers, arrived to act under his orders. Still he was, in extreme anxiety, looking round for opportunities of attack and means of defence, when he was relieved by the sudden and unaccountable retreat of the Carthaginian armament. Whether news from Carthage, or

Diod. l. 16.
c. 69.
Plut. v. Timol. p. 241.

B. C. 342.
Ol. 709. 4.

Aristot. ep. ad Alex. de Rhet. c. 9.
Diod. l. 16. c. 69.

Aristot. ut sup.
Diod. ut sup.

⁹¹ Πολιμετῆς ἀνὴρ, καὶ χρήμασιν ἑρρωμένος. Plut. v. Timol. p. 241.

⁹² Ἀνέλιπτον εὐτυχίαν. Plut. v. Timol. p. 242.

intrigue ably managed by Timoleon, or dissatisfaction with Icetes (which following circumstances indicate as probable) or what else may have influenced Hanno, historians have not undertaken to say. The Greeks, on all sides, observed the departing fleet with astonishment, and Timoleon's troops, from expressions of growing despondency, passed to joyful scoffing and ridicule.

This inexplicable conduct of the Carthaginian general produced advantages for Timoleon, which might not have accrued had no Carthaginian force appeared at Syracuse. The Messenians, who had refused any intimacy of connection with Icetes, and nevertheless had formed alliance with the Carthaginians, now, conceiving themselves deserted, listened to proposals from Timoleon, and joined that which appeared the prospering cause. Icetes, pressed by an enemy on each side, hopeless of assistance from Carthage, and fearing blockade from the increased and still growing strength of Timoleon, abandoned Syracuse with his adherents, no small portion of the remaining population of the city, and withdrew to Leontini.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 72.

Meanwhile Dionysius, no longer, as formerly, possessing a fleet commanding the sea, but shut within his island fortress, had been losing interest in Italy, while, with apparently ill-planned and ill-conducted effort, he was endeavoring to serve his friends, and recover his property and influence, in Sicily. Ease and pleasure, according to all but the most evidently malignant reports, far more than power and pomp, were the objects of his prevailing passions. A knowledge of his disposition, as well as of his circumstances, seems to have been the foundation of a negotiation, into which Timoleon entered with him in the course of the winter after the departure of Icetes. Corinth itself was proposed for the place of his retreat. The Corinthian state had obligations both to his father and to himself. Some among the principal citizens were likely to be well affected toward him; and that city, whose graver society had engaged the preference of Xenophon's elderhood, might still more, by its gaieties, invite the yet vigorous age of Dionysius. In the following spring the island and its citadel were surrendered to Timoleon; two thousand mercenaries of its garrison engaged in service under

Corn. Nep.
v. Timol.

B. C. 341.
Ol. 109. $\frac{1}{2}$.
Diod. l. 16.

under him; and Dionysius, with his immediate friends, passed to Corinth⁹¹.

Plut. & Corn.
Nep. v. Ti-
mol.

SECTION III.

Desolation of Syracuse. Difficulty of Timoleon to reward his conquering Troops. Provocation to Carthage. New Invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians. Mutiny in Timoleon's Army. Battle of the Crimesus. New Measures of the Carthaginians. Measures of Timoleon. Peace with Carthage.

SYRACUSE, thus brought completely under the authority of Timoleon, was still, in buildings, the largest city of the Greek nation, but, in population, compared with its extent of buildings, it appeared a desert. With this great unpeopled town, and what territory he could vindicate with it, at his disposal, it was incumbent on Timoleon to reward the services of his now large force of mercenary troops, and to provide for those Syracusans of the Corinthian party, who did not prefer a residence under the approved good government of Andromachus in Tauromenium. To this then, if to any period, would apply Plutarch's description of desolation in Syracuse; such that the cavalry actually grazed in the agora, while the grooms indulgently slept upon the luxuriant swarth. The biographer and the Sicilian historian in concurrence ascribe to this period Timoleon's legislation for the Syracusans. But at this time, by their concurrent account also, beyond the troops to whom he issued his orders as a military commander, there were few for whom to

V. Timol.
p. 246, 247.

⁹¹ However, in collating Diodorus with Thucydides or Xenophon, we may be disgusted with his deficiencies, yet, compared with the wildness of Plutarch, we find reason often to be gratified with his sobriety, clearness, and consistency. From Diodorus we have a coherent account of the transactions of two summers and two winters after the arrival of Timoleon in Sicily, before he became master of the citadel of Syracuse, which he says was managed by capitulation with Dionysius, without mentioning any

assault upon it. Plutarch, a hundred and fifty years after Diodorus, and near five hundred after Dionysius, without either vouching any authority or impeaching any, boldly says that Timoleon, within fifty days after his arrival in Sicily, took the citadel of Syracuse by assault, with Dionysius in it. Timoleon's first success, after his victory at Adranum, against a part of the vast city held by Ictes, without approaching the island, held by Dionysius, seems to have served as foundation for this romance.

legislate. His employment for the winter seems to have been the assignment of deserted houses and lands to his followers; to his mercenaries instead of pay, which he had not to give, and to the Syracusans of the Corinthian party in proportion to their zeal in the cause. With this, some civil arrangement would be necessary, and it seems every way probable that he adapted it ably to the circumstances.

But it was beyond his ability to convert at once soldiers by trade, and men habituated to revolutions, into sober citizens. Good houses for the winter would of course be gratifying; but the lands he gave were little valuable without slaves and cattle to cultivate them. With spring therefore it became necessary for him again to seek war. Nor was this difficult to find; for between his followers and those whose lands and houses they had seized, tho there might be cessation of hostilities, peace could not easily be established. He therefore led his restless people first against Icetes in Leontini; but finding little hope of ready success there, he quickly turned against Leptines of Engynne, another of those tyrants or chiefs, to whose rise Dion's expedition had given occasion. Leptines, less able to resist than Icetes, came to terms similar to those made with Dionysius; surrendered his town, and passed to Peloponnesus. Meanwhile Icetes had confidence enough in his strength, or hope enough in a remaining party, to make an attempt upon Syracuse, but was repelled with loss.

The expedition against Leontini having been unprofitable, and Engynne not affording enough for the existing need, it was necessary for Timoleon still to seek a war. Among the Grecian settlements no advantageous opportunity offered; those which had not claim for his protection being able to resist his power. To provoke the might of Carthage seems to have been rash, yet it might be popular; and so, want pressing, he sent his mercenaries to find among the people of the western end of the island the large arrears which he owed them. Faction among the Campanians of Entella perhaps invited to the measure, and seems certainly to have afforded the means for bringing under the power of Timoleon a place whose strength had baffled the arms of the first Dionysius. The manner in which he then arranged its affairs was thus: he caused fifteen principal men to be put to death, for having been faithful

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B. C. 340.
Ol. 109. $\frac{2}{3}$.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 73.
Plut. v. Timol.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 72.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 73.
Plut. v. Timol. p. 248.
A.

to those engagements in which, whether from necessity of circumstances, or choice as a free people, the Campanians had bound themselves and their state to Carthage. With this admonition how they should discreetly use the gift, he presented the Entellite people, in the historian's phrase, with liberty. Nevertheless in a country where the want of the advantages of civil government had been so severely felt as in great part of Sicily, where the expedition of Dion, in Strabo's strong phrase, had caused universal disturbance by setting all against all²⁴, the order which Timoleon's energetic and steady command established, and the degree of security which it gave, would be extensively beneficial and satisfactory. As soon therefore as it became recommended by the appearance of power to maintain it, not only many of the Grecian towns looked to him for patronage, but, if we may credit his panegyrist, several of the Sicel tribes, and some even of the Sican, solicited his alliance.

Whether Timoleon had foreseen a storm approaching from Carthage, or his aggression drew it, is not to be gathered from the very deficient historians of his transactions. In the next year however a very powerful armament passed from Africa to Sicily. The landforce, Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians, Balearians, together with the troops before in the island, is said to have amounted to seventy thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; the fleet to two hundred ships of war. If the landforce has been exaggerated, still Timoleon's means were very unequal to meet it. In the flourishing state of Syracuse, under the first Dionysius, when hands were wanted, for works of peace or deeds of war, at the call of that popular leader sixty thousand Syracusan citizens with forward zeal took either spade and mattock, or spear and helmet. The voice of all Grecian Sicily, and it is not from his friends that we have the account, called and almost compelled him to take the command for war with Carthage. But now, when danger so threatened from that enemy, represented continually by the later Grecian and all the Roman writers in such odious colors, Timoleon, as his most zealous panegyrist acknowledges, could persuade no more than three thousand

B. C. 338.

Ol. 112. 4.

Diod. l. 16.

c. 73.

c. 77.

²⁴ Ετάραξεν ἀπ᾽ ἁλλήλων πρὸς ἀπ᾽ ἁλλήλους. Strab. l. 6. p. 255.

Plut. v. Timol. p. 248. C.

Diod. l. 16. c. 77.

Syracusans to follow his standard⁹⁵. Nevertheless of whatever activity and courage and policy might do in his immediate circumstances, Timoleon seems to have failed in nothing. Not scrupling to try negotiation with Icetes, now no longer connected with Carthage, he ingaged him to coöperate against the Carthaginians.

c. 78.

But with all his exertions, some of them successful thus beyond reasonable hope, adding to his force of mercenaries, with the auxiliaries from Icetes, every Syracusan citizen that he could persuade, he was unable to collect more than twelve thousand men. Nevertheless, with this very inferior force, he resolved to seek the enemy rather than await attack. Indeed a choice only of great difficulties seems to have been before him. His maroding expedition among the Carthaginian settlements and dependencies, notwithstanding the acquisition of Entella, had not inabled him to settle accounts with his mercenaries. Large arrears were yet due to them. The promise of great and ready plunder allured them to march; but, in proceeding by the road of the southern coast, every new report, as they passed the Grecian towns, made the Carthaginian force more formidable, the prospect of hard fighting greater, and the hope of ready plunder less. Irritation being thus added to irritation, in approaching the Agrigentine territory they broke out into complete mutiny. 'It was intended,' they said, 'they found, that instead of plunder they were to be paid with wounds, or a final settlement was to be made by their destruction: they would return to Syracuse; and when it was known the Carthaginians were following, they did not fear but there they should obtain their just demands.'

Fortunately the rest of the army had no common interest with the mercenaries. Even toward these, however, Timoleon wisely avoided

⁹⁵ We have here a curious instance of Plutarch's carelessness of consistency or arrangement or explanation. He had just before given an account of sixty thousand new citizens added to Syracuse by Timoleon. It is probable that this making of Syracusan citizens took place mostly at a later period. But from the two circumstances, the small-

ness of the numbers that would follow Timoleon's standard, and the making of Syracusan citizens in great numbers, we may in a great degree gather the value of the terms the Greeks, and the Syracusans, as often used by Diodorus and Plutarch to distinguish the partizans of Dion and Timoleon from those of Dionysius.

harshness. In addressing persuasion and promises to them, he could little point out any clear prospect of the future, but he managed to interest them by talking of their past successful fellowship in arms. At length he prevailed upon three-fourths of them to proceed under his orders. About a thousand persevered in mutiny with Thrasius, the leader of it, and returned directly to Syracuse. Timoleon made light of the loss. 'They had foolishly,' he said, 'deserted glory and large reward, to which he should, in great confidence, hasten to lead the army. It was nothing impossible, or improbable, or unexperienced, that he promised to them and himself. Why should the victory of Gelon, over the same enemy, be the only instance of the kind⁹⁶?' A drove of mules, laden with parsley, the abundant wild growth of the country, commonly used for the soldier to sleep on, was entering the camp. Everything among the Greeks was an omen of good or evil, and the same thing, according to circumstances or fancy, might portend either. Parsley was the material of chaplets usually hung at funerals over the graves. Timoleon was alarmed. The mules lading might make an impression on the soldier's mind of the most fatal tendency. But parsley was also the material of the chaplet that distinguished the conquerors in the Isthmian games. With ready recollection therefore he cried 'Omen of Victory, I accept you!' and causing a chaplet of parsley to be immediately woven, which he put on his own head, animation pervaded the army, while all followed the example⁹⁷.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 79.
Plut. v. Timol. p. 248.

⁹⁶ To the vehemence of Plutarch's zeal for his hero's military fame, we are indebted for most unsuspicious testimony to the tyrannical character of his administration, which was supported by four thousand mercenaries, when his popularity was so deficient that he could obtain no more than three thousand citizens for his expedition. The strained panegyric afterward degenerates into puerile absurdity. The reply which Shakespear puts into the mouth of Henry the Fifth, before the battle of Agincourt, to the wish expressed for reinforcement, admirably paints the real hero, in-

fusing confidence by showing confidence, and using perhaps the most powerful argument, in his circumstances, to prevent desertion. But Plutarch represents Timoleon absolutely delighted with the desertion of a thousand men, exhibiting thus rather a fool than a hero, and doing injustice to a character which, tho very far from faultless, appears to have had much of the truly heroic.

⁹⁷ It was not till four centuries after, near Plutarch's time, that pine-leaves were made the material of the Isthmian crown, parsley remaining still that of the Nemean.

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The confidence of the Carthaginian general in his very superior numbers, led him to seek that quick decision which Timoleon's circumstances particularly required. While the Greeks occupied a brow overlooking the valley through which the river Crimesus flowed, supposing they would await attack in their advantageous post, he did not scruple to cross the stream in their sight. Timoleon seized a critical moment, when the Carthaginian army was divided by the river, to attack the advanced body; and tho he met with strong resistance, he broke it at length, and put it to flight. But in the meantime the rest of the army made the passage, and advanced in good order against his flank. In danger of being surrounded, his utmost ability might have failed against well-conducted numbers, when a violent thunderstorm came on. Amid repeated flashes of lightning, hail, of uncommon size, beat full in the faces of the Carthaginians. Unable to meet the storm, they were pressed by the weapons of the Greeks, not equally impeded by it. Confusion arising, and resistance at the same time to the assault of the elements and of the enemy appearing impossible, all became anxious to repass the river. Numbers hastening in one direction, while the noise of thunder overbore the voice of command, and the alternacy of gloom and vivid flashes disturbed the sight, and the hail and the wind impeded action, against an enemy pressing on in a manner as the associate of the storm, among the various nations composing the Carthaginian army, an uncommon kind of tumult arose. Unable to turn or even to look around against the enemy, some by mistake, and some perhaps in anger, fought one another. Still all pushed for the glen, anxious to pass the river. But the foremost, contending first with the swoln current, and afterward with the opposite steep, could no longer advance with sufficient speed to make way for those who, pressed by the pursuing Greeks, were still descending. The crowd in the bottom became in consequence intense. Many were overthrown, trampled on, and drowned, and many suffocated by the meer pressure. To restore order was no longer possible: the rout was complete, and the slaughter very great. Report made more than ten thousand of the Carthaginian army killed, and fifteen thousand prisoners. The extravagance of this however is indicated by another report, recorded by the

same writers, that only one thousand horsemen's cuirasses, and ten thousand shields, from slain and prisoners together, could be collected. The roundness of the numbers, even here, might excite suspicion of exaggeration; tho it was said that the larger part of the shields of the slain were carried away by the torrent. It is however far likelier that many more shields were found than bodies; for, in flight, to throw away the shield was common²⁸, and, in the authentic account of Xenophon, we have seen a Grecian army compelled, by the meer violence of a storm, where no enemy pressed, to abandon the incumbrance. The victory however was complete; the Carthaginian camp was taken, and the booty was rich enough to afford gratifying reward for the conquerors.

Ch. 26. s. 6.
of this Hist.

The consequences of the victory of the Crimesus were very great. Timoleon's credit, however, in the divided state of the Sicilian Greeks, his force might be feared, was before very dubious and little extensive. A small party, long considered as outcasts, lately indeed receiving accession through the distractions of the country, but still apparently a small party, acknowledged him as the representative of the parent-city of Syracuse, commissioned to liberate Sicily. Among far the greater part, even of the Syracusans, and even of those still residing in Syracuse, he was regarded either with horror, as the patron of their worst adversaries, or with suspicion and fear, as the leader of a band of mercenaries and adventurers. But, by the victory of the Crimesus, he acquired a solid foundation for the claim to be the protector of the Greeks against barbarians; and the zeal of his partizans would appear not wholly unreasonable, when they extolled him as a patriotic conqueror, rivalling, in merit and in glory, the first Dionysius, or even Gelon. Trophies, taken in the battle or found in the camp, were sent to all the principal Greek cities of Sicily; and the ostentatious compliment paid to Corinth, of transmitting a selection of them thither, appears to have assisted the promotion of Timoleon's interest there.

Nevertheless the accession to his party, whether from gratitude for his benefits, or fear of his power, was not such as to enable him to pro-

²⁸ — Non bene relictâ parmula, is Horace's well known confession.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

secrete conquest against the might of Carthage. On the contrary, to hold his footing in Syracuse required the most diligent exertion of his abilities, and, as his measures show, the utmost stretch of his authority. The crime of the mutineers demanded his first attention. On their secession from the army, he had, with ready prudence, provided for the quiet of the city, by forwarding directions to pay their arrears, and to avoid whatever might exasperate them. He had now no longer to fear what they alone could do; but it behoved him still to consider the interest that his more faithful mercenaries might take in their fate. His severity against them therefore went no farther than to require their immediate departure from Sicily. Not that this was, in effect, a light punishment. For the business of service in arms for hire, now become almost as regular a trade among the Greeks as any other, required, like all others, character to support it. A body which had earned the reputation of fidelity, as well as of valor and skill in arms, would of course be preferred. Untried men would be the next choice. Those who had once proved false to their engagements would be avoided. Thus arose some security to the employers of mercenaries, from the interest such troops had in a character. The simple dismissal of the mutineers by Timoleon, with loss of character, involved their ruin. Unable to find a reputable service, and little inclined to peaceful industry, they turned to piracy. Going to Italy, they possessed themselves of a town on the coast of Brutium. But, quickly blockaded in it by the collected Brutians, they were overpowered, and to a man destroyed.

c. 81.

Meanwhile the Carthaginians were preparing to revenge their defeat by measures founded apparently upon just information of the state of things in Syracuse, and throughout the Grecian cities of Sicily. Instead of sending for troops, as formerly, from the distance of Gaul or Spain, they resolved to use the opportunity which the long and violent distractions of the Grecian interest furnished, for extending the policy, not wholly new to them, of employing Greeks against Greeks. For means to oppose this policy, Timoleon's interest in Sicily, notwithstanding the glory of the victory of the Crimesus, seems clearly to have failed. Either mistrusting the Sicilians, or unable to induce them to

trust him, he imported five thousand colonists from Peloponnesus⁹⁹, among whom he distributed the lands and houses of the Syracusans, who had fled or been expelled. This was an effectual addition of that number to his mercenary army: the lands and houses were instead of pay. Thus strengthened, he entered into treaty with the Carthaginians, and apparently conducted it ably; for he obtained terms not unworthy of the fame of the conqueror of the Crimesus. The country westward of the Lycus (apparently the same as the Halycus, the boundary prescribed in the first treaty with the elder Dionysius) being ceded to the Carthaginians, they engaged not to interfere to the eastward of that river. This advantageous treaty confirmed the power of Timoleon in Syracuse, and added greatly to his weight throughout the Grecian part of Sicily. Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

SECTION IV.

Measures of Timoleon to reduce the independent Grecian Chiefs of Sicily. Successes, and Cruelties. Measures to repeople the Country; to restore Law and Order. Singular Magistracy. Despotic Character of Timoleon's Administration. Extent of the Revolution. Prosperity of the new People. Fate of Dionysius and his Family.

As in making war against the Carthaginians Timoleon claimed to be the asserter of Grecian freedom, the protector of the Grecian interest in Sicily, so in making peace he claimed equally to be the patron of all the Greeks of the island. The Grecian interest, however, tho divided so that it would have been weak against the power of Carthage, was yet no longer in that state of utter confusion which Dion's expedition had produced. Almost every town, still under the direction of some one powerful man, who bore regularly the title of archon, ruler or chief, had, under such superintendency, a government of some regularity: but, as everywhere were two parties, the party adverse to the chief,

⁹⁹ Plutarch mentions an antient writer, at ten thousand. The still more moderate Athanis, who made the number fifty thousand. He was contented himself to state it report of Diodorus has been preferred for the text.

would, in the common way of Grecian party-language, call him tyrant, and be ready to concur in any measures for a revolution. Among such governments, tho each seems to have had its sovereign assembly, some would be corruptly and some tyrannically administered. We are however without information of any particular demerits, either of the governments, or of those who presided in them, when Timoleon resolved to abolish all.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

No effectual confederacy existing among those governments, with the smaller he had little difficulty. Nicodemus, chief of Centoripa, fled at his approach, and the people received their law from Timoleon. A message sufficed to make Apolloniades resign the supreme authority in Agyrium. The Campanians of Ætna, obeying no tyrant, governing themselves under a popular constitution, but presuming to resist the exterminator of tyrants, as Timoleon is called by his panegyrists, and being overpowered by him, were utterly destroyed¹⁰⁰.

Plut. v. Timol. p. 251.
Diod. ut ant.
Plut. ut ant.

With Icetes, chief of Leontini, Timoleon, as we have seen, had formed friendly connection, and, in pressing need, had received from him important assistance. The pretence for hostility with that chief, according to Plutarch, was a report that he had entered into new engagements with the Carthaginians. Diodorus has mentioned no pretence. In tenderness apparently for a favourite hero, he has hurried over the abominable tale in these remarkable words: 'Timoleon conquered Icetes, and buried 'him.' From Plutarch's garrulity, notwithstanding his partiality, we gain more information; and, however doubtful the character of the conquered chief, the atrocity of the conqueror seems not doubtful. Icetes, and his son Eupolemus, and the principal military commander under them, Euthymus, were made prisoners. Euthymus was a man of such excellent character, so generally esteemed and respected, that many of the zealous partizans of Timoleon interested themselves for him. But it was objected that he had once used a sarcastical expression in derision of the Corinthians, and this sufficed to make all interference in his favour vain: Icetes and his son, and their general, were all put to death. Nor did the tragedy end so. The fate of the wives

¹⁰⁰ Καμπανούς εκπολιομένης διόφθιρι. Diod. l. 16. c. 82.

and daughters of these unfortunate men was submitted, nominally, to the decision of that multitude, collected mostly from beyond sea, which was now called the Syracusan people; and the miserable women and girls perished by the executioner. Unable to excuse, and unwilling to condemn, Plutarch says coldly, ‘This was the most ungracious of Timoleon’s actions¹⁰¹.’

Leontini being thus secured, it was resolved next to have Catana. The pretence against Mamercus, as against Ictes, unless it were only apology afterward, was connection with Carthage. We are indeed at a loss to estimate the value of such an accusation, so loosely stated as we find it by Plutarch. Timoleon himself had just made peace with the Carthaginians; and it seems very little likely that Mamercus, who had joined interest with him against the Carthaginians, when his circumstances were almost desperate, would, of choice, abandon him, now become the arbiter of the Grecian interest in Sicily, to connect himself with the Carthaginians. But if he saw it no longer possible to hold Timoleon’s favor or avoid his oppression; if he found himself, as in the account of Timoleon’s panegyrist he seems to have been, devoted to destruction, then indeed he would probably seek support from Carthage, or wherever it might be found. With crime thus problematical, or rather with imputation undeserving of credit, his merits are acknowledged. Amid the desolation of Sicily, when multitudes were wanting security for private life, he collected a considerable population in the deserted town of Catana, and made it a flourishing little state. Of any discontent of the people with his government, we have no information; and Timoleon himself seems not to have owed so much to any one man, excepting perhaps Andromachus of Tauromenium, as to Mamercus. Nevertheless Mamercus was driven from Catana. He found hospitality with Hippon, chief of Messena. But Timoleon, claiming to give liberty to all, would allow none to enjoy any liberty but what he gave. Possibly there had been a party in Catana desirous of rising to power and wealth on the ruin of the existing government. There was such in Messena. Timoleon undertook its patronage, and

¹⁰¹ The expression, as coming from a celebrated moralist, is curious enough to deserve observation in its original language: Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν Τιμολεόντος ἔργων ἀχαριστότατον εἶναι.

Plut. v. Timol.

laid siege to the town. Hippon, pressed at the same time by sedition within, and by an enemy of overbearing power without, attempted flight by sea, and was taken. It is not from an adverse pen, but from the panegyrist of Timoleon, that we have the account. The unfortunate Hippon had, like the elder Dionysius, been moderate enough in the use of power to avoid extensive banishment against the party adverse to him. He was now delivered by Timoleon to that party. They proceeded then to put in execution against him a kind of democratical law, which must have had, in some degree, Timoleon's approbation, and is not marked with any reprehension by the moral biographer. Hippon was carried to the great theater of Messena, and all the boys from all the schools were sent for to take the lesson of atrocity, while, with the most studied indignities, he was tormented to death.

Meanwhile Mamercus, in some confidence, apparently, of merit, both with Timoleon and with that multitude, which, not without important assistance from him, was become the Syracusan people, had surrendered himself; stipulating only for allowance to plead his own cause freely before the general assembly of Syracuse, with the condition annexed, that Timoleon should not appear as his accuser. Timoleon's accusation however was unnecessary: his interference to preserve some decency of proceeding might have been creditable to him. So was the assembly composed, and so regulated, that Mamercus could not obtain a hearing. Shouts and scoffing drowned his voice. In a mixture of indignation and despair, throwing off his cloak, he ran violently across the theater, the place of trial, with the purpose of destroying himself by dashing his head against the wall. He was however taken up alive, but, being considered as sufficiently tried and condemned, he was put to death in the usual way of execution for those convicted of theft. Not an evil deed has Plutarch found to impute either to Mamercus or Hippon. Nevertheless that admired moralist relates the shocking tales of their fate as if they did credit to his hero, and concludes, exultingly, 'Thus Timoleon abolished tyrannies, and destroyed his enemies.'

Ibid.

Yet it seems probable that Timoleon never wholly wasted cruelty: his atrocity, of which he was, on occasion, not sparing, was always subservient

subservient to his policy. As he repressed an adverse party by his executions at Entella, so he riveted an associated party by conceding Icetes, Hippon, and Mamercus to their vengeance; not merely thus gaining their uncertain goodwill, but increasing their dependency on him for protection against exalted animosity and hatred, and making any union of the Sicilian Greeks against him more impracticable. Their final reward, as likely in such circumstances, was more proportioned to their desert than to their hope. The mercenary soldiers and adventurers from Corinth and various parts of Greece, who had no interest in Sicily but what they owed to Timoleon, were his principal care. Paid for their services with forfeited lands and houses, the Syracusans were obliged to admit them to all the rights of citizens. Heartburnings and disagreements arose between the new citizens and the old, such that arms were taken and civil war ensued. Of this contest no particulars remain; but that the newcomers prevailed, and that the lot of the remnant of Syracusans, resting on the mercy which Timoleon's policy would allow, was more than before uneasy and degrading, is sufficiently indicated.

Aristot. Pol.
l. 5. c. 3.

Henceforward Timoleon treated Sicily as a conquered country; for so it appears even in the accounts of those who extol him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks. It is remarkable that not a single Sicilian is mentioned by them, in either civil or military situation, under him. Corinthians and other foreigners are named, and Plutarch, the most extravagant of his panegyrists, goes so far as to say that he could not trust the Syracusans¹⁰². How much of the large population, which flourished under each Dionysius, was extirpated or exterminated in the troubles preceding Timoleon's expedition, and what he himself

Diod. l. 16.
c. 82.

Plut. v. Timol.

¹⁰² Perhaps Plutarch, professing not to write history, might claim to omit historical facts at pleasure; and with Diodorus, from carelessness and misjudgement, important omissions are too ordinary. Neither has noticed the war between Timoleon's mercenaries and the Syracusan people, whose support was the original pretence for Timoleon's expedition. Indeed to make any

account of it accord with their panegyric of him as the deliverer of the Sicilian Greeks, must have been difficult. Yet what Plutarch has acknowledged, of the denial of confidence to Syracusans, and admission of strangers only to power, possibly among the causes, would however be a ready and perhaps necessary consequence of the war, of which we get information from Aristotle.

destroyed

destroyed or expelled, history remaining only from his partizans, we have no means of knowing, but the void altogether was very great. This he determined to repair, and certainly he showed himself great in the business of reparation, not less than of destruction. His first measure was to invite adventurers, by proclamation over Greece, with the promise of lands and houses and the rights of citizens. To collect numbers thus would not be difficult, from among the exiles always so abounding in Greece; some always from every state, and from some states sometimes half the people. On the immediate territory of Syracuse, it is said, he established at once four thousand families, and in an adjoining plain, called the Agyrinæan, of great extent and extraordinary fertility, no less than ten thousand.

B. C. 337.
OL. 110. $\frac{1}{2}$.

Diod. ut ant.

The arduous business remained to establish civil order among a mixed multitude, thus new in the country, and to blend his mercenary soldiers with these fresh adventurers, and with the remnant of Syracusans, if any might be, into one mass of citizens. Nor was this wanting for Syracuse only, but for almost every Grecian town of Sicily; all being now brought under his power, through revolutions more or less violent and sweeping. In this very difficult business his principal assistants are said to have been two Corinthians, Dionysius and Cephalus. On a revision of the old laws, those relating to property and the rights of individuals, which had obtained under Dionysius, were found so unexceptionable, that in them little alteration was found expedient. The political constitution, which seems to have stood, under the two tyrants of that name, nearly as it had been established by the demagogue Diocles, is said to have been almost totally altered. There occurs however ground for doubting the justness of this general assertion, unattended with any account of particulars. For had there not been merit in the institutions of Diocles, the first Dionysius, who seems certainly to have had the power, surely would have altered them; and the alteration would have been matter for charge against him among the adverse writers. That under Dionysius the constitution was good; the flourishing state of the country under him, and for some years after him, in regard to which all remaining evidence concurs, will at least afford large presumption. But under the constitution of Timoleon also

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the country flourished. Diocles and Timoleon equally pretended the warmest zeal for democratical sway; tho, provident, no doubt, of those temporary enjoyments for the multitude, which were necessary for ingaging its favor, they profited from circumstances to rule with severity; a severity for which Diocles was famed, and Timoleon appears to have deserved fame, however his superior management, or good fortune, averted the imputation with his party and with posterity. But it seems not probable that two governments of democratical form, under each of which the country flourished, could be, upon the whole, very dissimilar. Timoleon indeed made an addition to the constitution of Syracuse, the only one of which we have any particular information, well deserving notice. However his policy led him to avow himself always the champion of democracy, yet, in settling the government of the country, aware of the necessity for a balance to the sovereign power of the people, and of the impossibility of giving sufficient weight to any civil authority for the purpose, he had recourse to the superstition of the age. The magistrate to whom he committed the salutary power of controuling popular despotism, he called the Minister of Olympian Jupiter. What were the particular functions of this ministry, we are not informed; but its permanence, through many succeeding revolutions, and the continuance of its high estimation, as we are assured by Diodorus, till in his own time, near three hundred years after Timoleon, its authority was in a great degree superseded, and its dignity in a manner overshadowed, by the extension of the privileges of Roman citizens to all the Sicilians, are satisfactory indication of the wisdom with which it was adapted to the temper and circumstances of the people; that new or mixed people which was thenceforward to be called Syracusan.

But Timoleon's care was not confined to Syracuse. Diodorus says Diod. l. 16. c. 32. 'that he restored liberty to all the Sicilian Greek cities, rooting out tyrants, and receiving the people into alliance.' We learn from much higher authority, in the course of Lacedæmonian, Athenian, and Theban history, what such liberty and such alliance were. But Timoleon evidently exceeded the ordinary despotism of Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes. The accounts remaining from his panegyrists, of his introduction of new citizens, affords the best ground for estimating the

amount of his destruction or expulsion of the old. Scarcely in any city does the chief power seem to have been trusted with natives. In Syracuse, as already observed, we do not find a Syracusan in any authority. Agrigentum was, under his patronage, occupied by a colony of mixed people, among whom were a number of Agrigentine refugees: but the leaders, those to whom he committed the commanding authority, were two Eleians, Megellus and Pheristus. A similar colony, led by Gorgus of the island of Ceos, took possession of Gela. The Camarinæans seem to have been more favored; being only compelled to admit a number of strangers to share with them the rights of citizens of Camarina. Those Leontines, who neither suffered death with their chief, nor banishment for their fidelity to the cause in which they had been engaged with him, probably not numerous, were removed to Syracuse. The first Dionysius, and Gelon before him, had made many such removals; but a revolution so extensive and so complete, in governments, in property, in population, as that effected by Timoleon in Sicily, had not occurred among the settlements of the Greek nation since the return of the Heracleids.

Plut. v. Timol. p. 253. A.

That the government of Timoleon, even in Syracuse, was highly despotic, is evident from all accounts. Nepos calls him king, and his command a kingdom¹⁰³. Plutarch says ‘he was beloved and venerated everywhere as a founder;’ and then follows the proof; ‘neither war nor peace was made, law enacted, colony established, or constitution settled, that was thought rightly done, unless he approved.’ The same authors furnish anecdotes, indicating the character of the administration of this king and founder. We have seen in Athens, where something nearer to pure democracy, than perhaps ever anywhere else, had practical effect as a lasting government, what licentiousness of invective was used in the general assembly, and what libellous repre-

¹⁰³ Cum tantis esset opibus ut etiam invitis imperare posset, tantum autem haberet amorem omnium Siculorum ut nullo recusante regnum obstineret.—Quod ceteri reges imperio vix potuerunt, hic benevolentia tenuit. Corn. Nep. v. Timol. Those whom the biographer calls *all the Sicilians* were, for the

most part, according even to the panegyrist of Timoleon, foreigners, brought into Sicily in the room of Sicilians, either destroyed or made outcasts; and the *lore* was of those who owed to him, and under him only had hope of holding, property taken by violence from the owners.

sentation in the theaters, against the truly great Pericles, in the fulness of his power. Many anecdotes, mostly preserved with a view to defame the elder Dionysius, show that, under his administration in Syracuse, public debate was generally very free. But under that celebrated destroyer of tyrants Timoleon, it was considered as an extravagance for any one to think of opposing the executive power, either in the general assembly or in the courts of law. Demænetus is named as a remarkable instance of a person venturing, in the general assembly, to impeach any part of Timoleon's conduct, whose well-imagined reply shows how little he had to fear opposition. Not deigning to enter into any refutation of the charges, he said, 'he thanked the gods who had been propitious to his constant prayer for freedom of speech to the Syracusans.' Laphystius was presumptuous enough to institute a suit at law against him, and to require surety, in regular form, that he would stand the trial. Timoleon's warm partizans were so indignant, that they excited tumult and began violence. The wiser Timoleon restrained them: 'His very purpose,' he said, 'in all the toil and danger he had undergone for the Syracusan people, was that the law should be equal to all.'

But that Timoleon, pretending to give universal freedom, really governed all with despotic authority, should perhaps less be attributed as blame to him, than considered as, in some degree, a necessity imposed by the general deficiency, among the Greeks, of any conception of principles, on which that civil freedom might rest, for which they were so generally zealous. The following anecdote, in which, even in Trajan's time, Plutarch seems to have seen nothing but wise decision, marks a deficiency of jurisprudential principle, which even of Timoleon's age might appear now hardly credible. Timoleon was engaged with the ceremony of a public sacrifice, when, in the crowd about him, one man suddenly stabbed another, and fled. A third, hitherto a quiet bystander, instantly sprang to the altar, and, claiming asylum, declared himself ready to confess all. Being told to speak out, and no harm should befall him, he said 'he had been sent by Icetes, together with the man just killed, to assassinate Timoleon; and they were going to execute their commission, when his comrade was stabbed; by whom he knew not.' Meanwhile the effectual assassin had been overtaken,

and was brought back, insisting 'that he had committed no crime; 'having taken only just revenge for his father, who had been killed in 'Leontini by him whom he had now put to death.' It happened that some persons present, recognizing him, bore testimony to the truth of his account; upon which he was not only set at liberty without reprehension, but rewarded with a sum equal to thirty pounds sterling, for having been, in committing one murder, so accidentally the means of preventing another. Whether this story were in all points true, or the confession was the invention of the partizans of Timoleon, to palliate the cruelties used toward Icetes and his unfortunate family, whose partizans could now little raise their voices for themselves, yet as transmitted from Timoleon's age, and reported in Trajan's, it must deserve attention among indications of the characters of government and jurisprudence in both. Not only the principle of allowing private revenge to supersede public justice is admitted, but encouragement is held out for murder, by showing that as, in the chance of things, benefit might result to the public, so instead of punishment, profit and honor might follow to the perpetrator.

Diod. l. 19.
c. 3.

Nevertheless the result, for which we have satisfactory testimony, shows the policy of Timoleon to have been very ably adapted to the temper and circumstances of the mixed people, for whom he was to legislate. The first evidence we have from history consists indeed in its silence. That historians were not wanting we are well assured. That they had nothing to report therefore of Sicilian affairs, during nineteen years after the establishment of Timoleon's power, but some inconsiderable hostilities between Syracuse and Agrigentum, and that at the end of that period, when new and great troubles called their attention, the Sicilian Greek towns were flourishing, nearly as under the first Dionysius, seems unquestionably to mark extraordinary wisdom in the institutions of Timoleon. Diodorus, if our copies give the number rightly, says that he lived only eight years after his first arrival in Sicily, and only two after his victory of the Crimesus. Plutarch is less explicit on this subject. They agree in asserting that he became completely blind for some time before his death; and accounts altogether appear to imply that the period in which he was active in administration, and the

the period in which he lived honored in the blindness that in a great degree incapacitated him, must together have been considerably longer than the historian has reported.

If, however, the many who were indebted to Timoleon for fair possessions in Sicily, some instigated by gratitude, and all by interest, would extol the living founder of their fortune, amplify his merit, and extenuate his failings, still more would his premature death, or even that blindness which would render him in a manner dead to military and civil business, call forth the voice of panegyric from the zeal or regret of both friendship and party. Had a revolution quickly followed, Timoleon's fame, turbid even in the accounts of his panegyrists, might have been still more blackened than that of Dionysius or of Phalaris. But the long peaceful prevalence of that party, to which he gave possessions and power, secured his reputation. Andromachus, chief of Tauromenium, tho we are nowhere given to see how his authority was more constitutional in itself, or less exceptionably exercised, than that of Mamercus, Hippon, or Icetes, nevertheless preserving Timoleon's friendship, retained his own power. From the pen of his son Timæus, therefore, one of the principal historians of Sicily, eulogy only of Timoleon could be expected. Either gratitude, or hope, or fear, or all together, might prompt his exclamation, in the words of the great tragic poet, reported by Plutarch, 'O ye divinities, what Cyprian goddess, what god of desire, presides over all his actions!' But recollecting the treatment of Mamercus, of Hippon, of Icetes, and, beyond all, of the women of the family of Icetes, as reported by the moral biographer his zealous panegyrist, we shall hardly agree with that moralist of four or five centuries after, in his unqualified admiration and praise.

Sophocl. ap.
Plut. v. Ti-
mol. p. 252.

While Timoleon's adventure was attended with such extraordinary success in Sicily, it appears that the party, with which he was connected in Corinth, prospered, so that opposition was overborne, and the powers of government rested in their hands. The liberal treatment therefore which Dionysius found, on first taking his residence there, may reflect some credit on Timoleon himself. By the Corinthians, and by others resorting to that central city, the great emporium of the nation, the seat

Plut. v. Ti-
mol. p. 242.

of

Plut. v. Timol. ut ant.

Cic. Tusc. l. 3.

Epist. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161. ed. Reiske.

of the Isthmian games, Dionysius was treated with such consideration, that he appears to have been the most distinguished person of Corinth and of Greece. This however excited a jealousy that threatened his safety: he found it prudent to avoid the attentions of considerable men; and, whether led more by considerations of expediency, or by his natural disposition, he is said to have affected low company, and frivolous or dissolute amusement, with a carelessness about serious concerns. But Plutarch himself has had the candor to avow that many anecdotes preserved of him, marked a manly firmness under misfortune. He has even reported several, which show very illiberal behavior toward him, and much good temper, good sense, and ready wit in his manner of meeting it. But all did not suffice for obtaining justice from the Syracusan government or permanence of protection from the Corinthian. Whether still under Timoleon, or not till after his death, the stipulated remittances to Dionysius ceased, and his consequent distress is said to have driven him to seek his livelihood by the occupation of a schoolmaster; for which probably both his literary acquirements and his superior manners gave him advantages. At one time he was compelled to fly from Corinth. By birth a citizen of Athens, the privilege having been given to his father, as we have before observed, for himself and all his posterity, the state of the Athenian government however was not such as to invite him, and he preferred retiring to the less polished regions of Epirus.

It is difficult to judge what credit is due to Plutarch's mention of the fate of the women of the family. It was in the way of democratical party-spirit, among the Greeks, to glory in the most diabolical revenge against an adverse faction; and this spirit was cherished among philosophers under the Roman empire, apparently with the same view with which it was adopted by the French philosophers of the present age, who have, in truth, been in almost everything copiers, tho in atrocity they have at least equalled or perhaps outdone their masters¹⁰⁴. It has been

¹⁰⁴ This spirit seems to have been early caught, on the revival of letters, by some of those learned men, far more on the conti-

nent than in our island, who undertook the translation of the Greek authors; and it has led them often to outgo their originals in

been in this spirit that Plutarch has held out, ostentatiously, the punishment which the younger Dionysius suffered, in the calamities of his family, living to see the death of his wife and all his children. The manner in which his sons perished is not said. The treatment of his wife and daughters, mercifully concluded by drowning them, appears to have resembled that which the unfortunate daughter of Hermocrates had suffered, many years before, from the same party. The story is related with so much complacency, by the moral philosopher, that we are left only to hope his favorite hero, Timoleon, was not implicated in the atrocious wickedness. It was, probably, when the family of Dionysius were obliged to fly from Locri, that the destruction fell upon that city, which we find obscurely mentioned by Aristotle.

Plut. v. Timol. p. 242.

Aristot. Pol. l. 5. c. 7.

Timoleon's history has assuredly deserved to be better known; and the account of such a cotemporary as Timæus, however partial, could not but have been of high value. Of Dion, who, in the geographer's phrase, set all at variance with all, we should perhaps little desire to know more; nor indeed of Timoleon for his works of destruction, which have been so much the subject of panegyric. But we want information how, through a revolution so violent and so complete, he produced a prosperity and lasting quiet, of which examples, in all history rare, occur, among the Grecian republics, almost only under the administration of Sicilian chiefs, and those mostly described by the title of tyrants.

in violence of expression, and to prefer the most injurious sense of every dubious phrase. Thus Plutarch's, 'Α δ' ἔπραξε τυραννῶν (ὁ Διονύσιος) οἷς ἔπαθεν ὑπερβαλόμενος, is rendered by Rhodoman and Wesseling, *Hic scelera sua superavit calamitatibus*. Those trans-

lators cannot but have known that *τυραννῶν* does not necessarily imply any *scelera*, and the context would rather imply reference to the splendor of the first years of his reign or administration.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Affairs of MACEDONIA, from the Reign of PERDICCAS Son of ALEXANDER, to the Establishment of PHILIP Son of AMYNTAS.

SECTION I.

Macedonian Constitution. Macedonian Territory. State of Macedonia under Perdiccas Son of Alexander. Splendid and beneficial Reign of Archelaus Son of Perdiccas.

Ch. 2. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Polyb. l. 5.
p. 375.
Arrian. de
exp. Alex.
l. 4. c. 11.
Q. Curt. l. 6.
c. 8. s. 25.
Lucian. dial.
Alex. & Phil.

WHILE among the numerous states of Greece, and their extensive colonies, security for civil freedom had been vainly sought in various forms of republics, and permanence of public strength had equally failed in experiment of various systems of confederacy, there remained, on the northern border, a people of Grecian race, who held yet their hereditary monarchy, transmitted from the heroic ages. This, as we have seen formerly, in treating of the times described by Homer, was a limited monarchy, bearing a striking resemblance to the antient constitution of England, and, in his age, prevailing throughout Greece. Of the countries which preserved this constitution, the principal in extent and power, and the most known to us, was the kingdom of Macedonia; whose affairs, for their implication with those of the leading republics, have already occurred for frequent mention¹. According to the concurring testimony of antient writers, who have treated of Macedonia, the king was supreme, but not despotic. The chief object of his office, as in the English constitution, was to be conservator of the peace of his kingdom; for which great purpose he was vested with the first military and the first judicial authority; he commanded the army, and he presided over the administration of justice.

¹ The principal passages, in the foregoing history, relating to Macedonia, occur in s. 2 & 5. ch. 9. s. 1. ch. 13. s. 4. ch. 14. s. 2. ch. 15. s. 2. ch. 16. s. 2, 4, 5, 6. ch. 26. s. 2. ch. 1. s. 1 & 2. ch. 6. s. 3. ch. 7. s. 3. ch. 8. 3, 4.

But

But he was to command and to judge according to established laws. He had no legislative authority but in concurrence with the assembled people; and condemnation, and the decision of all more important causes, rested with popular tribunals; in which, as among our forefathers, in what thence bears yet the title of the King's Bench, the king presided in person, but the court gave judgement. Even in military jurisdiction his authority continued to be limited, even to the latest times of the monarchy¹⁰⁶. Thus far our information is positive and clear. What we want farther to know is, what was the composition of the Macedonian people; whether there was any distinction between one part and another, in the injoyment of rights, and participation of power; and, what is not a little important in the estimate of any constitution of those times, what proportion the number of those who had civil rights bore to that of those who had none, or next to none, the slaves. The silence of authors however, concerning these matters, especially in accounts of civil wars in Macedonia, indicates that the Macedonian government was little disturbed with those pretensions to oligarchal privilege on one side, and to democratical despotism on the other, of which we have been observing the evils among the republics; in some of which, as Lacedæmon and the Thesalian cities, honor and office were arrogated exclusively to a few families, in others, as Athens and Argos, the poor oppressed the wealthy, and in all a division of interests subsisted, frequently interrupting the public peace, and always threatening the public safety. How the gradation of rank, necessary in numerous societies, was arranged, we are not informed, but equal law for all freemen appears to have been, as in our common law, or Anglosaxon constitution, the first principle of the Macedonian government¹⁰⁷; whence it has been observed that the Macedonians were freer in their kingdom than the

¹⁰⁶ De capitalibus rebus, vetusto Macedonum modo, inquirebat exercitus: in pace erat vulgi. Nilul potestas regum valebat nisi prius valuisset auctoritas. Q. Curt. l. 6. c. 8. s. 25. Ἐξ Ἀργους εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἦλθον, οὐδέ βίη ἀλλὰ νόμῳ Μακεδόνων ἀρχοῖς διατίλισαν. Arr. de Exp. Alex. l. 4. p. 86. D. A very

remarkable instance of the restriction upon the military jurisdiction of the Macedonian kings is related by Polybius, b. 5. p. 375.

¹⁰⁷ Ἄλλοι μὲν γὰρ Πολυπίτες γῆρας, ἔπειτα γέ εἰσι. This has been noticed in note 6 of the first section of the fourth chapter of this History.

Greeks in their republics¹²⁸. Time then, not merely a destroyer, but often an improver of human institutions, brought them an advantage which seems hardly yet, in Homer's age, to have gained steady footing anywhere. That popular attachment to the constitution and to the reigning family, the firmest support of political arrangement, the most discouraging check to adventure in revolution, was established among the Macedonians. The rules of succession to the throne, indeed, unfortunately remained so far defective, as in England before the wars of the Roses, that, within the reigning family, competition would often arise, and produce civil war. Yet civil war, calamitous everywhere and always, appears however to have been of a less atrocious temper among the Macedonians, in the struggle for a crown, than among the republican Greeks, in the contest for democratical, oligarchal, or tyrannical sway. Half a people banished or massacred are circumstances at least not reported in Macedonian history. Against the constitution, and against the rights of the royal family, as the keystone of the constitution, the salutary prejudices of the people, the growth of ages, would allow no competition.

Nor was this steddier form of free government the only advantage of the Macedonians over their southern neighbors. In extent of territory the Macedonian kingdom far exceeded any of the republican states, and it exceeded most of them in proportional extent of level country and valuable soil. Its frontier indeed, except where verging toward the sea, was of lofty and rugged mountains, but the interior was mostly champain. As then the natural division of Greece, by highlands and gulphs, into small portions of difficult access, had contributed much to its political division into very small states, so the freedom from such hindrance of communication in Macedonia, had produced, and gave facility for maintaining, the union of such an extent of fruitful territory under one government.

These advantages however were not unattended with balancing

¹²⁸ I have observed Arrian quoted for this. I think the observation just, but not exactly Arrian's, who, tho superior to most of the Grecian writers under the Roman

empire, was not intirely free from their common prejudice in favor of that licentiousness of the republics, whence there was more power to do ill than security in doing well.

evils.

evils. The Macedonians were unfortunate in their continental situation, nearly surrounded by powerful hords of the fiercest and most incorrigible barbarians. If actual warfare was sometimes intermitted, yet the danger of it was unceasing. Nearly excluded then from the sea, their communication with the more polished parts of the world was limited and precarious. Nevertheless the Macedonians appear to have been not ruder than many of the republican Greeks, the Dorians, the Locrians, perhaps the Arcadians; and no account shows them so barbarous as Thucydides has described the Ætolians. Under the first Amyntas, when Darius invaded Europe, the Macedonian kingdom, tho unable to withstand the vast force of the Persian empire, appears to have attracted consideration from the Persian commanders, as a civilized country, of some importance among the powers of the age; and this was increased under his son, the first Alexander, after the great defeat of the Persian army near Platea. In the Peloponnesian war the second Perdiccas, son of Alexander, seems to have maintained its former consequence. Afterward, in the heat of party contest among the republics, the foul language of democratical debate would sometimes stigmatize the Macedonians with the name of barbarians. But this is not found from any others. Among the Greek historians their Grecian blood has been universally acknowledged. Their speech was certainly Grecian, their manners were Grecian, their religion was Grecian; with differences, as far as they are reported to us, not greater than existed among the different republics¹⁰⁹.

Thucyd. l. 3.

Ch. 15. s. 6.
of this History.Herod. l. 5,
6, and 7.

But a practice, apparently originating in the purpose of obviating an immediate difficulty, contributed much to disturb and weaken the Macedonian kingdom. It was usual to provide for the younger sons of the reigning family, by committing frontier provinces to their government; where their situation resembled that of the lords marchers

¹⁰⁹ We find Isocrates putting the Macedonian name in marked opposition to the barbarian, and the title of king of Macedonia, in equally marked opposition to the titles of tyrant, and despot: Ἀμύντα, τῷ Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖ, καὶ Διτισίῳ, τῷ Σικελίας τυράνῳ, καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῆς, Ἀσίας κρατοῦντι. Panegyric, p. 250. t. 1. ed. Auger. And this was when the king of Macedonia was allied with the enemies of Athens, to oppose purposes which the orator desired to promote.

of the feudal times in western Europe. The revenue of the province supported the dignity of the honorable but troublesome and dangerous office. The employment was worthy of the high rank of those employed, and suited the temper of a martial age. Nor was it probably without its advantages to the state; the frontier territory being so defended, the interior rested in peace. But, in progress of ages, the multiplication of these appanages, which seem to have been generally hereditary, might reduce the kingdom to weakness and insignificance; so that it would be no longer able either to resist foreign enemies or controul its own vassals. Accordingly we find, from this source, jarring interests arising, which not only produced troubles within the kingdom, but afforded opportunity and even invitation for the interference of foreign powers. We have seen one of the subordinate princes, Amyntas, son of Philip, becoming an instrument in the hands of the great monarch of Thrace, Sitalces, for overthrowing the supreme government of Macedonia; and we have seen the leading Grecian republics, Athens and Lacedæmon, by turns forming connection with those princes for nearly the same purpose. It seems therefore to have been a wise policy of Perdicas son of Alexander, after having baffled the violence of the Thracian monarch, to reunite those severed principalities with the kingdom, or bring them under a just subordination. In the prosecution of this reasonable purpose, he is said indeed, not to have been duly scrupulous of foul means. The measures by which he acquired the territory which had been the appanage of his brother Alcetas, if we should believe the story told by Plato, were highly nefarious. But in Plato's time, books being rare, and authentic history little extensively known, if a statement of facts was wanted for illustration of moral or political argument among philosophers, any report was taken, and whether considered as true or supposed, it equally served the purpose. It is therefore necessary to be careful how we take reports, so stated, as intended by the authors themselves to be taken for historical truths. The character of Perdicas, however, as represented by Thucydides, is not pure. But in his purpose of reuniting the severed principalities, being thwarted by the ready interference, sometimes of Lacedæmon, sometimes

Ch. 15. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Plat. Gorgias.

sometimes of Athens, sometimes of Thrace, his success seems not to have been complete. Nevertheless his administration was evidently altogether able, and, tho of various fortune, as of doubtful character, yet, at his death which happened about the time of the defeat and destruction of the Athenian fleet and army under Nicias and Demosthenes in Sicily. he appears to have left his kingdom altogether improved to his son Archelaus.

It appears very uncertain what credit, or whether any, may be due to report which apparently had currency many years after in Athens, of the illegitimacy of this prince's birth, and of the crimes by which he acquired or secured the throne. Thucydides, his cotemporary, likely beyond others among the Greeks to know Macedonia, calls him son of Perdiccas, without mentioning illegitimacy, and speaks of him as the immediate successor, without any intimation of interfering pretensions. In a short summary then of his actions, he ranks him effectually with the most illustrious princes. Archelaus son of Perdiccas, he says, raised most of the present fortifications of the kingdom: he formed strait roads, and he improved the military establishment, providing horses, heavy armour, and whatever else military use might require, more than all the eight kings his predecessors ¹¹⁰.

In the actual circumstances of Macedonia an improved military was perhaps the first thing necessary toward all other improvement. The Macedonians, like the republican Greeks, were all soldiers; for so the ever-threatening pressure of hostilities around required: but they did not live like the republicans, especially the democratical republi-

¹¹⁰ The authority on which this date is assigned for the accession of Archelaus will be mentioned in a following note.

¹¹¹ In Plato's dialogue, intitled Gorgias, one of the interlocutors mentions Archelaus, king of Macedonia, as the illegitimate son of Perdiccas, and as having acquired the crown by the murder of the proper heir, the legitimate son of their common father. Atheniens has considered this as scandal, to which he says Plato was addicted. It is however likely enough that a story of this kind was cur-

rent in Athens, and Plato appears to have introduced it in his dialogue merely for illustration of moral argument, by supposed facts, which, whether true or feigned, would equally answer the purpose of illustration. What credit therefore Plato himself gave to the story, which has a mixture of the ridiculous with the shocking, does not appear; but, on the other hand, in the same dialogue it is clearly indicated that Archelaus left behind him the reputation of a powerful, fortunate, rich, and liberal prince.

C. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

cans, crowded in towns, leaving the country to their predial slaves. Confident in unanimity, all ranks having an interest in the maintenance of the constitution, as well as in the defence of the country, they resided on their estates; and, having little commerce, their towns were small and mostly unfortified. But the irruption of the overbearing force under Sitalces, during the reign of Perdiccas, had made them feel their error, or perhaps rather the misfortune of their continental situation. Unable either to withstand his numbers in the field, or to defend their unwall'd towns, they had been compelled, as we have seen, to abandon their less moveable property, and seek shelter in their woods and marshes.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 70.

B. C. 410.
Ol. 92. 3.
Diod. 1. 13.
c. 49.

The measures of Archelaus, possibly not unproductive of following evil, seem to have been, at the time, in an extraordinary degree effectual for their important object, the security and quiet of the country. In a turbulent age, he found means so to obviate war as to maintain peace with dignity. With the Athenian democracy indeed, the common disturber of states, as it is called by the great Athenian historian, he could not avoid hostilities. The Athenians excited the people of Pydna, a Macedonian seaport, to rebellion, and supported them in it. Archelaus did not then hesitate to use the force he had prepared; and he was successful: he vindicated his kingdom's rights, and he seems to have pushed the purpose of arms no farther.

The policy then, by which he proposed to secure to Macedonia so valuable a possession as its only seaport, will deserve notice. We have had occasion formerly to observe how very commonly, in early times, the dangers of maritime situation drove habitation to some distance from the seashore. But spots which the peaceful tillers of the soil would avoid, seafaring adventurers would often in preference covet. Hence the Macedonian and Thracian shores became occupied by Grecian colonies, established, perhaps many, with little violence, and some, tho not quite in the spirit of Penn's settlement in America, yet possibly without any violence. Peninsulas especially, hazardous possessions for the husbandman, unless protected by a government possessing a powerful navy, were peculiarly convenient for men addicted to piracy or commerce. Thus the Thracian Chersonese and the Chalcidic peninsulas

peninsulas became early Grecian land. The settlers who emigrated with Perdiccas from Argos to Macedonia would probably carry with them some seafaring disposition, which would however be likely to be lost among their progeny, led by the circumstances of their new country to establish themselves within land. Such, even so late as the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was the superfluity of fruitful soil within the Macedonian dominion, that the prince then reigning, Perdiccas son of Alexander, could furnish settlements for the whole population of several Grecian towns of the Chalcidic peninsulas, emigrating at once to avoid the oppression of the imperial democracy of Athens. The Macedonians therefore, invited by the ample opportunities and better security of inland situation, appear to have neglected the coast, and become almost intirely a nation of hunters and husbandmen. The widely differing pursuits and mode of life then of the inland and the coastmen, led to a difference in habits, in character, and in personal interests, which produced a disposition to separation and even opposition in political concerns. The inlanders lived scattered in villages, subsisting from the produce of their lands, warmly attached to their homes, to their country, to its constitution of government, which insured their private property and their public strength, and, for the sake of these, if for nothing else, to one-another. The coasters, on the contrary, traders and navigators, assembled in towns, anxious for fortifications that might afford security for collected stores, careless otherwise of territory, even for subsistence looking to commerce or piracy, averse to connection with any controuling government, ready for communication with all the world, and little attached to any country.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Such a people, so differing from the rest of the Macedonians, the Pydnæans appear to have been. Archelaus therefore, when, after their rebellion, he had reduced them to submission, was aware of the difficulty of assuring their loyalty to the Macedonian government. The policy of the Athenian republic, to obviate revolt among its subject towns, often denied them the fortifications requisite for defence against the ordinary dangers of maritime or any limitary situation. The resource of Archelaus, violent it might appear now, but for his

his age, mild and liberal, was to remove the town to the distance of two miles from the shore. There it might be controuled in rebellious purposes by loyal armies, and not readily assisted by foreign fleets. Its conveniencies for trade would be somewhat lessened; but they might still at least equal those of Athens, Megara, Corinth, Argos, and most of the old maritime towns of Greece, placed, originally for security, at a greater distance from the shore, and yet found capable of flourishing by commerce¹¹².

But with talents for war, and a mind capable of the necessary exertion, the delight of Archelaus, fortunately for his people, was in the arts of peace. He had the just discernment to be aware that his kingdom wanted internal improvement far more than increase of territory. Nor is it little that is implied in the cotemporary historian's Thucyd. l. 2. concise information, 'that he formed strait roads.' Till assured of c. 100. ability to defy invasion, through a military force prepared with attachment to the government and country, as well as with discipline, no prudent ruler of a country, situated like Macedonia, would make roads. But security being provided and roads formed, improvements in agriculture, in commerce, in civilization, in provincial administration, and in the general comforts of the people, would readily follow. Silent however about these, antient writers have nevertheless reported what still goes farther to imply them. Archelaus was sedulous to dispel ignorance and rudeness, and promote science and the fine arts among his people. He was the greatest patron in his age of the learned and

¹¹² The urgency, formerly, to avoid maritime situation on account of piracy, is strongly marked even in the circumstances of the English shores. All the existing towns on the coast of Hampshire and the Isle of Wight are, comparatively, of recent origin. Not one contains the mother-church, or gives name to the parish. Portsmouth is in the parish of Kingston, in the middle of Portsea island, where remains the church, deserted by its town. With circumstances nearly similar, Gosport is the parish of Alverstoke, Lymington of Bolder, Yarmouth of Freshwater, Newtown of Cal-

born, and Cowes of Northwood, or rather of Canisbrook, the mother-church of Northwood. The Cinque Ports may seem some exception: their maritime strength indeed would assist for their security; but old Winchelsea alone of them seems to have trusted in its strength of hands: Hastings and Dover depended on the protection of their castles. Even at Plymouth, the very superior situation of the present Docktown, and the harbour of the Tamar, were neglected for the sake of better safety, some way up the narrower water of the Plym.

ingenious, whom he invited from all parts of Greece. It cannot but be creditable to him to have invited Socrates, tho the philosopher's refusal, recorded by Aristotle, has been taken by declamatory writers under the Roman empire, as ground of sarcasm against him. The invitation however which Socrates, for the sake of his fellowcitizens, whose instruction he had undertaken as a sacred duty, not without foresight of their ingratitude, refused, Euripides, the friend whom he is said most to have esteemed, thought not unfit to accept. Euripides lived long at the Macedonian court; which, by the assemblage of talents there, as well as by the security enjoyed under a well-administered free government, seems to have been the most desirable residence, for men of leisure, anywhere to be found in that age.

Arist. Rhet.
1. 2. c. 23.

In the great deficiency of history concerning this interesting reign, Ælian's anecdotes will have value; and the more, because his purpose has not been the eulogy which they effectually involve. He informs us that the celebrated painter Zeuxis, was among the artists entertained at the Macedonian court; and that his works, adorning the royal residence, formed an inducement contributing not a little to occasion the great resort of strangers, in the reign of Archelaus, to the capital of Macedonia. It appears to have been in the same spirit with which he entertained Euripides and Zeuxis in his court, that Archelaus instituted games, in imitation of those of southern Greece; the Pythian rather than the Olympian, but apparently an improvement on both. Dedicating them to the Muses, he chose for their celebration the town of Dium in Pieria, the province to which the old Grecian mythology assigned the birth and principal residence of the Muses. These games were called Olympian, perhaps from the neighboring mountains of Olympus, held equally the seat of the Muses and of Jupiter. The administration must have been able that, in such a kingdom as Macedonia, could provide funds for all that Archelaus, within a short reign, accomplished; fortifying towns; greatly improving the military; repelling, when occasion required, but mostly deterring hostilities, and thus maintaining peace with advantage and dignity; forming roads; promoting literature, science and arts; and all so as to give eminence

Ælian. var.
hist. 1. 14.
c. 17.

Diod. 1. 17.
c. 16.

and celebrity to Macedonia, among the Greeks of the time of Thucydides and Socrates.

But, indowed as he was with great and valuable qualities, Archelaus remains accused, on high authority, of giving way to strong and vicious passions, which brought him to an untimely end. Report indeed was transmitted, which Diodorus adopted, that he died of a wound accidentally received in hunting. But Aristotle, to whom the best opportunities, which the next generation could furnish, must have been open, speaks of a conspiracy as undoubted, tho the occasion and manner were so variously related, as usual of that dark kind of transaction, that he was unable to fix his belief of them. All that remains ascertained is, that Archelaus, after a short but most beneficial reign, was cut off, in the vigor of his age, by a violent death.

Aristot. Polit. I. 5. c. 10.

Diod. I. 14. s. 17.

B.C. 400.²
Ol. 95. 1.

SECTION II.

Disputed Succession and civil War. Acquisition of the Throne by Amyntas, Son of Philip. Bardylis Prince of Illyria. Hereditary Interest of the Macedonian Royal Family in Thessaly. Revival of the Olynthian Confederacy. Antient Connection of Macedonia with Athens revived and improved. Grecian Princes of Lyncestis.

UNDER the administration of four successive able princes, the Macedonian kingdom had acquired a consistency, and under the last of them, with great increase of internal strength, a polish, that might have given it splendor in the leading situation to which it was rising in the civilized world. Archelaus seems to have prepared it for pro-

² Our copies of Diodorus, as it has been well observed by the critics, are evidently corrupted in regard to the number of years, only seven, assigned to the reign of Archelaus; for the historian mentions Archelaus as king when engaged in war with the Pylæans, supported by the Athenians, in the

tenth year before that of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, to which he ascribes his death. Prætaux and Dodwell have agreed in fixing upon the term of fourteen years as probably about the extent of his reign; and Wesseling assents to this conjecture, which, unable to mend, I have adopted.

ducing

ducing its own historians, when his death gave occasion for troubles and confusion, in which all history of the country was nearly overwhelmed, his own reputation, and even his birth thrown into doubt and obscurity, and the succession itself of princes after him, when the restored and increased splendor of the monarchy excited new curiosity about it, no longer to be exactly ascertained.

Orestes, son of Archelaus, was an infant when his father perished. The confusion however on the occasion, was not such as immediately to disturb the succession. But while Æropus, one of the royal family, claimed the regency, Craterus, favorite of the late king, and author, whether by design or accident, of his death, assumed it. Within four days Craterus was killed, and the unfortunate boy Orestes did not long survive. Æropus, accused, by report, of his murder, ascended the throne, but little to enjoy it. During four years who really held the sovereignty remains unascertained; and indeed it seems probable that the country was rather divided between several competitors than, during any part of that time, intirely governed by any one prince. In the fifth year, at length, Pausanias, of another branch of the royal family, had so far overborne the rest, as to be generally acknowleged sovereign¹².

Aristot. &
Diod. ut ant.

Plat. Alcib 2.
p. 141. t. 2.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 37.

B. C. 395.
Ol. 96. 2.

During these troubles of the Macedonian kingdom, the Upper Macedonian principalities, under the government of Derdas, and Amyntas, tho probably in some degree affected, seem to have been preserved from any violent convulsion. Amyntas, who, after being dispossessed by the king his uncle, Perdiccas, as we have formerly seen, had, under the patronage of Sitalces king of Thrace, not only recovered his principality, but contended with his uncle for the kingdom, with fairer pretension now asserted his claim against Pausanias; who, after a precarious reign of scarcely a year, was assassinated. Report of the party adverse to Amyntas would of course impute to him participation, at least, in the crime. All that seems ascertained is that, in consequence of it, he became king of Macedonia, nearly about the time of the successes of Agesilaus king of Lacedæmon in Asia.

Ch. 13. §. 4.
of this Hist.
B. C. 394.
Ol. 96. 3.
Diod. l. 14.
c. 89.

¹² The curious reader may find, in Weseling's Diodorus, two good notes, and in Bayle, art. Archelaus, a third, on the uncertainties of this part of Macedonian history.

Would Amyntas have been contented to have held his mountain-principality in secure peace, it was probably little in his power: and yet the change to the more splendid situation, at the head of the Macedonian kingdom, was only from smaller to greater troubles. Pretenders to the crown remained, holding, in parts of the country, considerable interest among the people. None indeed was able by himself to assert his own cause, but there were neighboring powers, whose ambition or rapacity were ready to profit from the distractions of Macedonia. On its western border the Illyrians, in manners and character much resembling the Thracians, tho' apparently of different race and language, had been brought more than formerly to union under one dominion, by the power and popularity of a chief named Bardylis. Venerated for his courage, activity, and military talents, Bardylis is said to have extended his power and influence still more by his discovery of the value of a maxim, before little known among the Illyrians, and not always duly estimated among the Greeks, that honesty is the best policy: he was famous for his equitable division of plunder taken by his armies of robbers. By his military force, and his fair reputation together, he had united under his authority all the Illyrian clans, so that he was become a very formidable potentate. While this new power thus grew on the west of Macedonia, the Olynthian confederacy, of which we have seen formerly the rise and the fall, by its alluring policy, still more than its military force, pressed the eastern. On that side, the richest of the Macedonian territory, and the readiest for maritime communication, were all its principal towns. Whether the policy of Archelaus, in fortifying these, led to the dismemberment of Macedonia, which followed, the defective relics of its history will not inable us to say, farther than that it seems probable. While then Bardylis, avowing himself the protector of Argæus, one of the pretending princes, invaded and ravaged the country on the western side, many principal towns, on the eastern, renounced their connection with the Macedonian kingdom, to become members of the Olynthian confederacy. If, indeed, we may trust Diodorus, this was not wholly without the consent of Amyntas; who rather chose that his people should owe protection to the Olynthians,

thians, than become subjects to his rival, or to the Illyrian prince. Unable, however, under all the circumstances pressing on him, to maintain himself in Macedonia, he withdrew into Thessaly.

Between the wealthy aristocracy, which mostly governed that fruitful country, and the Macedonian kings, we have seen connection old and hereditary. One numerous and powerful family, the Alevads, a name said to be derived from a king of the country, their reputed ancestor, was bound to the Macedonian royal family through the prejudice of connection by blood, claiming the honor of a common descent from Hercules. The frequent exercise of hospitality, to which the right on both sides was also esteemed hereditary and sacred, upheld and made efficacious this prejudice of kindred, real, or imaginary. The Thessalian nobles were frequently entertained at the Macedonian court, not without some claim of right to be entertained there; and they esteemed it equally a duty and a privilege to entertain the Macedonian kings whenever they might visit Thessaly. Under these circumstances, no struggle of faction in Thessaly could be indifferent to the Macedonian princes, nor any contention for the Macedonian throne to the great families of Thessaly. Teeming with inconvenience as such connection might be to governments capable, by their own consistency, and the force of the country under them, of maintaining complete independency, yet for narrow territories, with defective constitutions, divisions of one people under different governments, rather than distinct nations, such might be the need of the advantages that they might overbalance the evil.

Ch. 16. s. 5.
of this Hist.
Herod. l. 7.
c. 6.
Diod. l. 16.

Whether Amyntas was considered, by the Thessalian nobility, as the truer representative of the Macedonian branch of the family of their common great ancestor, Hercules, or, in his mountain-principality, he had better cultivated the connection, he found favor among them, such as to encourage him to attempt the recovery of his kingdom. Probably he relied also upon assistance from his kinsman Derdas prince of Elymia, a brave and active soldier, always upon friendly terms with him. The difficulty seems to have been to obviate opposition from the Illyrian prince, whose acquiescence was however purchased.

Diod. l. 14.
c. 92. & l. 16.
c. 2.

thus

thus deserted by the protector to whom he owed his throne, was compelled to fly, and Amyntas became again sovereign of Macedonia.

But the richest and most populous part of his kingdom, the eastern towns and their cultivated territories, far more valuable than many times the extent of ill-inhabited lands of the interior, was still held by the Olynthian confederacy. He demanded its restitution, the Historian says, according to compact. But the Olynthians, already risen to that power, which Xenophon has described as alarming to all southern Greece, far from disposed to restore acquisitions, were bent only upon aggrandizement. Not only refusing therefore to surrender anything, but prosecuting still zealously their plan of association, and supporting everywhere political intrigue with military force, they gained Pella, the largest town of Macedonia; and Amyntas, as Xenophon intimates, was again in danger of losing his kingdom.

It was an unfortunate combination of circumstances, that made the overthrow of the most liberal and advantageous system of republican government, yet seen in Greece, necessary to the preservation of the last relics of the patriarchal constitution, the balanced monarchy of the heroic ages. The Lacedæmonians, for so much Xenophon indicates, would hardly have undertaken the war against Olynthus without assurance of coöperation from the Macedonian princes; and, without that coöperation, would have been little likely to have succeeded in it. The Macedonian forces, which joined them, were commanded by the prince of Elymia, Derdas, who, as we have formerly seen, at the head of the cavalry, did important service. On the ensuing dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy, the Macedonian kingdom recovered all its towns. Whether then better to assure the controul of the general government of the country over them, or merely for a more advantageous situation, readier for communication with the sea, and through it, with all the more polished countries of the age, Amyntas moved the seat of government from Edessa or Egæ, where it had subsisted from the foundation of the monarchy, to Pella, which was thenceforward the capital of Macedonia.

It is almost only when, as in the Olynthian war, the affairs of Macedonia

Diod. l. 11.
c. 92.

Ch. 26. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Ch. 26. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Excerpt. ex
Strab. p. 330.

Macedonia and of Olynthus have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics, that we gain any information about them. From the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy, therefore, till some time after the battle of Leuctra, which so changed the circumstances of Greece itself, we have no particulars of their history. But after that battle, Lacedæmon being no longer able to controul Olynthus, and Thebes of course disposed to support everywhere a party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest, the Olynthian confederacy was restored, and quickly so prospered as to become again formidable to Macedonia.

We have seen much intercourse formerly, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, between the Macedonian kings, and the Athenian commonwealth. The event of the Peloponnesian war, depriving Athens of the dominion both of the Ægean sea, and of the towns on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, removed almost all ground for farther political connection between them. But with the restoration of the Athenian marine by Conon, the pretensions of the Athenian people to their former sovereignty over so many towns around the Ægean, and to hold a controul over all the commerce of that sea, being revived, Athens and Macedonia became again interested in each other's affairs; and Olynthus, formerly subject to the imperial sway of the Athenian people, and recently threatening the overthrow of the Macedonian kingdom, would, in its new independent power, be looked upon with jealousy by both. The peace of Antalcidas, however, which soon followed, controuling the Athenian naval empire, without establishing the Lacedæmonian, relieved Olynthus from immediate danger, and diffused indeed over all the various members of the Greek nation, severed by seas from those called imperial republics, a more real independency than they had for ages known.

In the denial of dominion, to which the Athenian people were thus obliged to submit, no portion of their former empire seems to have been so much and so constantly regretted as Amphipolis on the Strymon; a conquest, inasmuch as the territory was usurped by force of arms, but otherwise a colony, first settled under the protection and at the expence of the Athenian government. The Lacedæmonians, however, after it had yielded to their arms under the direction of
Brasidas.

Isocr. or. ad
Philip. t. 1.
p. 316.

Ch. 27. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Æschin. de
legat.

Æsch. de
legat.

Brasidas, had added to its population a large body of settlers from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa; and the congress of Grecian states held at Lacedæmon, a little before the battle of Leuctra, had confirmed the independency given to it by the treaty of Antalcidas. Athens was a party both to that treaty and to the decrees of the congress. But through the event of the battle of Leuctra, with the depression of Lacedæmon, the comparative importance of the Athenian commonwealth, among the Grecian powers, was considerably augmented. Another general congress was soon after held at Athens. Representatives of almost all the Grecian states attended, and, among them, a minister from Macedonia, as a Grecian state¹¹. The professed purpose of this congress, like that of the former, was to obviate the pretensions of any that might aspire to be imperial people, and hold command over other Grecian people, such as Lacedæmon and Athens had alternately held; a revival of which both Lacedæmon and Athens now dreaded in Thebes. With this view it was proposed to enforce the strictest execution of the provisions of the treaty of Antalcidas, confirmed by the congress of Lacedæmon, which denied to every Grecian state the sovereignty over any other Grecian state. The Athenian representative asserted the claim of the Athenian people to hold the people of Amphipolis, their colony, as their subjects, to be a distinct case, and imputed injustice to the denial of it. There appeared however little disposition to allow the distinction. The Amphipolitans, it was contended, not Athenian colonists only but Lacedæmonian, Grecian people from various parts, had the common right of all Greeks to be free.

It seems probable that the political connection was already begun, which we find afterward close, between Amphipolis and Olynthus, and that the king of Macedonia found reason again to be apprehensive of the growing power of Olynthus. His deputy in the congress contended strenuously in favor of the Athenian claim; which was at length allowed by a majority of votes, principally obtained through his arguments and the Macedonian interest. The advantage resulting to Macedonia, not perhaps at the time generally obvious, appears to have been very considerable. The acquisition of Amphipolis to the

¹¹ Συμμαχίας γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων συνελθούσης, ἣς ὦν τούτων Ἀμύθας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ, καὶ πέμπων σπένδοι.—Æschin. de legat. p. 216. ed Reiske.

Athenian dominion, except as a loss to the Olynthian, could not be desirable for Macedonia. But the Amphipolitans, regardless of the vote of the congress, continued to assert their independency successfully. At the same time Amyntas gained the credit, among the Athenian people, of being a valuable and beneficial ally. Communication with the commanders of the Athenian fleet, generally maintained on some part of the Thracian coast, was of course ready for him; and he formed a particular intimacy with that eminent and highly respectable officer Iphicrates. These circumstances would be favorable to the maritime commerce of Macedonia; and the constant hostility of Athens, toward Olynthus, would make both the arms and the policy of Olynthus less formidable and less troublesome to Macedonia.

*Æsch. de
legat.*

The power acquired by that extraordinary man Jason, tagus of Thessaly, his military force and his avowed ambition, could not but require the attention of a neighboring prince, and especially one so connected as Amyntas with the principal Thessalian families. It seems probable that Jason's interest was connected with that of those families. For his great purpose then, the restoration to Thessaly of its antient superiority among the southern republics, usurped, as the Thessalians might term it, successively by Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes, peace on his northern border would be necessary. Circumstances however were such, that not only peace but alliance was maintained between Macedonia under Amyntas, and Thessaly under Jason.

*Diod. l. 15.
c. 57 & 60.*

The practice subsisted in Macedonia, which, in the times described by Homer, prevailed throughout Greece, and, as far as Homer's history extends, through Asia, for princes generally to chuse their wives, without their own dominions, among the daughters of other princely families. Nor were princely families, boasting high Grecian blood, yet wholly wanting, among whom the Macedonian royal house might chuse; for others, beside the Temenids of Argos, driven to seek, among the northern wilds, a repose, which the spreading republican system of the southern parts denied, had been fortunate enough to find, how far repose we know not, but honor there. The princes of Lynceus or Lyncestis, a country bordering on Macedonia and Epirus, doubtful within

*Strab. l. 7.
p. 326, 327.*

the proper boundary of which, but generally acknowledging some subordination to the Macedonian kings, claimed their origin from the illustrious house of the Bacchiads of Corinth. Of these princes we have seen Arrhabæus oppressed by the late king of Macedonia, Perdiccas, and relieved by the generous policy of the Lacedæmonian general Brasidas. Amyntas, in a milder way, succeeded better in the purpose of establishing an interest in Lyncestis, marrying Eurydice, granddaughter of Arrhabæus by his daughter Irra.

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 99.
Ch. 4. s. 2.
of this Hist.
Ch. 16. s. 4.
of this Hist.
Strab. 1. 7.
p. 327.

Farther of the reign of Amyntas, said to have been of twenty four years, we gather only its general reputation of having been wise, vigorous, and beneficial. Dying in advanced age, he left, by his

B. C. 370.
Ol. 102. 3.

queen, Eurydice, three sons, Alexander, who succeeded him, scarcely arrived at manhood, and Perdiccas and Philip, still boys.

SECTION III.

Reign of Alexander, Son of Amyntas. Macedonian Interest in Thessaly maintained. Accession of Perdiccas, Son of Amyntas. The Family of Amyntas supported by the Athenian General Iphicrates. Breach of Alliance with Athens and Connection with Thebes. Illyrian Invasion and Death of Perdiccas.

WHEN the youthful Alexander was called to the Macedonian throne, circumstances produced by the recent assassination of the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, pressed for the attention of the Macedonian government, and especially interested the royal family. In the administration itself perhaps of Jason, but very eminently in the events following his death, was manifested the danger of preponderant standing armies to free governments. Jason indeed had ruled Thessaly with the constitutional title of tagus, and, possibly, for history tells nothing to the contrary, with the constitutional authority. His successors also, even those for whom crimes opened the way, were raised to the same constitutional title and power, as far still as history tells, in all constitutional term. Wanting, however, possibly, Jason's inclination, and certainly his

his talents, to make their administration smooth through popular esteem and respect, they soon recurred to the use of the means of violence, which he had left to their hands. The worthy Polydamas of Larissa, whom, even as an opponent, Jason had always respected, was murdered, with eight of his principal friends: numbers fled; and the tyranny insuing seems to have been among the most really cruel of the many, among the various states of Greece, execrated by Grecian writers.

Ch. 27. s. 1.
of this Hist.

But these Thessalian tyrants did not overlook the ordinary and necessary policy of those who affected sovereignty in the Grecian republics: they courted the rabble of the towns; and their army, which served equally by sea and land, was held at their devotion, through the profits of a general piracy which they encouraged. The government of Pheræ, and its chiefs, appear then to have nearly resembled those of the northern states of Africa in modern times. But the nobility, and, in general the landholders, suffered under their administration. These, therefore, looking around for succour, applied to their hereditary ally and host, the young king of Macedonia.

Alexander was not deaf to the calls of their interest and his own. His measures were so well concerted and so rapid, that, tho the tagus, apprized of his purpose, was prepared to give battle on the borders, the Macedonian army, evading him, reached Larissa, the principal seat of the friendly party, without opposition. The tagus followed, but found the united strength of his opponents such, that, avoiding action, he withdrew again to Pheræ. The king, thus left at leisure to arrange matters with his friends, placed a part of his force in Larissa, and a part in Cranon, and, with the rest, having fulfilled the purpose of his expedition without bloodshed, he returned into Macedonia. Pretence for invective, nevertheless, was found by those who were disappointed by his success. They exclaimed against what they termed the garrisoning of the cities, not only as a measure of tyranny, but a direct breach of faith, plighted to the Thessalians for their freedom. Diodorus, from whom alone we have the account, has given credit to the historians of their party. But we have seen enough of Grecian politics to be aware, and the course of events, even in the account of Diodorus, shows, that

Diod. 1. 15.
c. 61.
B. C. 369.
Ol. 102. 4.

another party would not only approve, but earnestly desire the measure, as that without which their liberty, property, and life itself would be utterly insecure.

Meanwhile in Macedonia the good government and tranquillity of a few years, closing a reign, like that of Amyntas, begun in a train of revolutions and bloodshed, had not sufficed for radical correction of the looseness of principle, political and moral, among the Macedonians, which had given occasion to those evils, and which such evils have in themselves a strong tendency to nourish and increase. Two pretenders to the throne, Argæus, who had been competitor with Amyntas, and Pausanias, perhaps son of him by whose death Amyntas had risen, still had each his party among the Macedonian people. The youthful Alexander, soon after his return from Thessaly, was assassinated. Concerning the conspiracy, which produced this catastrophe, our only trustworthy information, incidentally given by Demosthenes, amounts to no more than that a citizen of Pydna was principal in it. That either of the pretending princes was implicated in its guilt is not said, but both were at the time preparing to prosecute their claims to the throne¹².

Such was the clouded prospect under which the right of Alexander devolved to his next brother Perdikkas, yet a boy. Pausanias hastened to profit from the confusion likely to prevail among the young prince's friends. Prepared with numerous adherents to his cause among the people, he engaged a force of Grecian mercenaries, and entering Macedonia, he quickly became master of Anthemus, Thermia, Strepsa, principal towns, and some others of less importance. The expected confusion among those about the young king followed. Some, who had been supposed loyal, went over to the rising power; the intention of others became suspected, and the few of clear fidelity were at a loss for measures.

¹² The stories of Justin and Athenæus, the orators indicate of Macedonian affairs, dealers in wonderful tales of dark private history, seem unworthy of notice. The and especially the scanty but unsuspicious testimony of Diodorus, reported in the text. we must take, under correction from what

In these distressing circumstances, when manly wisdom and courage failed or were unavailing, the queen-mother, Eurydice, resolved to take upon herself to act for her unfortunate family; not by assuming any manly office, tho we have seen, in the foregoing history, successful examples of such an undertaking, but in her proper character, as a woman and a mother. Iphicrates then commanded an Athenian squadron on the Thracian coast, for the general purpose of maintaining and extending the empire of the Athenian people, but more particularly for restoring their dominion over Amphipolis, still asserting independency. The particular intimacy of the late king, Amyntas, with that general, formed the ground of hope for the distressed queen. She sent her supplication to Iphicrates, who in consequence went to Pella. The interview ensuing, which the decency of antient manners required to be very public, remains shortly and simply, but interestingly described by a cotemporary Athenian, who was afterward ambassador from his commonwealth at the Macedonian court, the orator Æschines. The queen-mother, entering the chamber of audience with both her sons, introduced the young king, Perdicas, to the hands of Iphicrates, and placed her younger boy, Philip, on his knee. Addressing him then, in the manner usual among the Greeks, as a suppliant, ‘ she conjured him, by the ties of that private
 ‘ friendship, borne him by the late king Amyntas, who valued him no
 ‘ less,’ she said, ‘ than as an adopted son, and by the claims of public
 ‘ alliance between the Macedonian kingdom and the Athenian common-
 ‘ wealth, subsisting of old, with the forefathers of the children now
 ‘ presented to him, and especially cultivated by their lost father, to
 ‘ take those children under his protection.’

The purpose of the queen’s pathetic address, favored as it might be by the generous feelings of the Athenian general as an individual, would obviously be favored also by his consideration of the interest of his commonwealth. In the circumstances, and with the views of the Athenian government, it remained much an object to hold its interest in Macedonia. With the family of Amyntas the connection was already old: with the opposing families, it remained to be formed, and probably they were already engaged with hostile powers: Olynthus,
 and

and perhaps Thebes. Accordingly Iphicrates interfered so effectually, whether using the force under his command, or only his influence and the terror of the Athenian name, that Pausanias abandoned his enterprize, and the government of the young king, Perdiccas, was established over all Macedonia.

But when the authority and wisdom of Iphicrates were withdrawn, troubles, in the existing circumstances of Macedonia too likely to attend the minority of a reigning prince, arose. Female rule, we have seen, was not unknown among the Asian Greeks: the examples of Artemisia and Mania might afford encouragement for the attempt. But the Macedonian scepter had never been borne by female hands. The direction of the government therefore was committed to a prince of the blood royal, named Ptolemy, and distinguished by the addition of Alorites. Troubles of no small amount followed; but what precisely they were, and whether more arising from the ambition of Ptolemy, or any perverseness of Eurydice, tho both are accused, while the pretensions of Pausanias and Argæus, and the hostility of foreign powers appear to have been concurring causes, we have no trustworthy information. It is still only where the Macedonian affairs have been implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics, that we find light beaming upon them; and even that light, when given, as through painted glass, by some celebrated writers of the later antiquity, especially Plutarch, with a dazzling splendor of coloring, shows too often but imperfect, incongruous, and distorted forms¹⁴.

¹⁴ Trogus, or his abbreviator Justin, for historians, far over fond of tragical effect, tell of strange intrigues, and horrid dark crimes, in which Eurydice was deeply implicated. But the tales, tho such as, in the violence of faction among the Greeks, appear to have been ordinary, were unknown to Diodorus and even to Plutarch, or, even by them, thought unworthy of notice. Diodorus makes Ptolemy Alorites a son of Amyntas (meaning apparently an illegitimate son) and the murderer and successor of the eldest legitimate son, Alexander. But some notice of this crime, had it been

real, could hardly have failed among the orators, especially Demosthenes, who, as we have seen, mentions the assassination of Alexander; and, for the succession of Ptolemy, it is clearly marked by Æschines to have been only to the regency. We find the republican Greek writers frequently careless in applying the titles βασιλεύς and τύραννος, giving them indifferently to kings, or to regents, or to men in commanding situations who were neither kings nor regents. Hence apparently has arisen much of the confusion, found among later writers, concerning the Macedonian succession.

When

When the Macedonian government, implicated in domestic troubles, could no longer extend its protecting arm to the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, who had resisted the tyranny of the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, that tyranny threatened them again with redoubled violence. Fortunately, however, about this time, a new protecting power appeared on their opposite border, through the rise of Thebes to a leading situation among the Grecian republics. The Theban government, with all the energy of recently acquired power, was willing to interfere as a protectress anywhere, for the sake of advancing that power. Accordingly a strong army marched, as formerly related, under the command of Pelopidas, to support the Macedonian party against the tagus. Coöperation from the Macedonian government was of course highly desirable, but the existing alliance of Macedonia with Athens was adverse to a connection with Thebes; for Athens had then lately withdrawn itself from the Theban alliance, and become the confederate again of Lacedæmon in war against Thebes. Such being the obvious difficulty, Pelopidas quitted his army in Thessaly to act as ambassador from his republic at the Macedonian court. In this office his conduct appears to have been able, not less than in his famous embassy to the court of Susa; and the success was answerable. Not indeed that it could be a very hard task to show, either the importance to Macedonia of preserving its Thessalian interest, or the impolicy of assisting so ambitious and restless and unscrupulous a government as the Athenian, to hold so commanding a place as Amphipolis on the Macedonian frontier. The promised support therefore of the Theban confederacy, in opposition to the Athenian pretensions, with perhaps some stipulated means for Macedonia itself to hold a commanding influence in Amphipolis (for the sequel shows this probable) induced the regent, Ptolemy, to desert the Athenian alliance and ingage in the Theban.

Ch. 27. §. 4.
of this list.

Esclm. ut
ant.

But alliance with a regency, the regency too of an ill-settled kingdom, could not but be precarious; and Pelopidas desired to give permanency to the advantage of the Macedonian connection, which he acquired for his country. It was already becoming a common practice among the Grecian states, for youths of wealthy families to go, for the

Plut. de
Pelop.

Plut. v. Pe-
lop.

Æschin. de
Fals. Sp. 213,
214.

the completion of their education, wherever any of those teachers, after-ward dignified with the title of philosophers, acquired fame. Athens drew by far the greater number. There the great tagus of Thessaly, Jason, had placed his sons under the tuition of Isocrates. Thebes, tho no rival to Athens in literary fame, was, for politics and war, the focus of everything greatest in Greece, and at this time it is said to have been also the residence of some eminent philosophers. To Macedonian prejudice it would be moreover a recommendation that Thebes was the reputed birthplace of Hercules, the great progenitor of the Macedonian royal race. Opportunity therefore for the king's younger brother Philip, with some other youths of the principal families, to go, under the protection of such a man as Pelopidas, to complete their education at Thebes, might be esteemed, by the queen-mother and regency, an advantage highly desirable. It is indeed said they accompanied his return from Pella, not voluntarily, but as hostages, for insurance of due attention from the Macedonian court to the imperial will, whether of Pelopidas or of the Theban people. But however this may have been, it seems probable that the Theban general's able negotiation produced effects important and lasting. Perdiccas, when, arriving at years of discretion, he assumed the government, followed the line of policy taken by the regent for him in his minority, and persevered in it. He supported the Amphipolitans in their claim of independency; he sustained a war with Athens in their defence; and that he was not unsuccessful in that war is evident from the result; for the Athenians made peace with him leaving Amphipolis free¹⁵. For the other circumstances of this reign, certainly interesting,

we

¹⁵ Diodorus makes Perdiccas put Ptolemy to death to get possession of the government. But the silence of the cotemporary orator concerning such a matter, when relating the succession of Perdiccas and its consequences, and mentioning Ptolemy in the situation of regent, renders this more than questionable; and the refutation is still strengthened by the line of conduct, which, as we learn from the orator,

the king pursued, after he had assumed the government.

It should be observed that the oration whence we gather all the circumstances mentioned in the text, was pronounced by Æschines in defence of himself, when it was most important for him to conciliate the favor of the Athenian people, and avoid whatever might give them the least umbrage. Hence apparently he claims for them

we want authority like that of the cotemporary orator, which, as usual, deserts us, in the moment when the Macedonian affairs cease to be implicated with those of the leading Grecian republics. According to the shreds of information remaining, while the prince gave his time to science and literature, corresponding with Plato at Athens, and unfortunately misplacing his confidence in an unworthy scholar of that philosopher, the more important concerns of his kingdom, its military force, its foreign affairs, and its civil economy were misconducted or neglected. Nevertheless, when necessity became pressing, he showed no deficiency of spirit. A very inconvenient and disgraceful claim is said to have devolved on him from his father. In the distressing pressures, against which Amyntas had had to struggle, he had purchased the friendship or forbearance of the Illyrians, by payments of

Caryst. ap.
Athen. l. 11.
c. 15. p. 250.
vel 508.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 2.

them the honor of general success in a war in which they were evidently, upon the whole, unsuccessful, and imputes to their generous confidence in the uprightness of their enemies, the disadvantageous terms of the peace. Some partial success of the Athenian forces may have given some ground for his assertion; but we know that, without ratification from the people, no compact of their generals was allowed to be valid. When therefore a disadvantageous peace was made, we may apparently conclude with assurance, that their success in the war was not great.

The amount of evident romance, extravagant romance, in Plutarch's *Life of Pelopidas*, which has been noticed in a note to the fifth section of the twenty-sixth chapter of this History, makes credit difficult for any part, not in some degree confirmed by other writers. The succession of Perdiccas, the regency of Ptolemy, and the opposition of the Macedonian government, under the regency and after it, to the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, are amply authenticated by the cotemporary orator Æschines; but for the transactions of Pelopidas in Macedonia, where Plutarch

makes him do more with a word than Hercules with his club, and for Philip's journey to Thebes and residence there, we wholly want any comparable testimony. Diodorus is the oldest extant author from whom we have any mention of them. He places the embassy of Pelopidas into Macedonia (and here Plutarch follows him) in the short reign of Alexander. But this, if it was not refuted by the orator's better authority, would ill accord even with his own narrative, compared with his dates. Of Philip's journey to Thebes he has given two irreconcilable accounts; an inconsistency on which Wesseling has two good notes, in the second volume of his edition of Diodorus, p. 55, 8, and p. 82, 58.

It is remarkable that Nepos, supposed cotemporary with Diodorus, neither in his *life of Pelopidas*, nor in that of Epameinondas, mentions either Philip or Macedonia; tho he speaks of the war of Pelopidas in Thessaly, and of his captivity in one expedition and his death in another. Nevertheless, that negotiation from Thebes was carried into Macedonia, and ably and successfully managed there, we seem warranted by the account of Æschines to believe.

money. Whether future payments were engaged for or no, the Illyrians, whose profession was predatory war, founded, on past concessions, new demands. These Perdiccas refused: the Illyrians were indignant, and the veteran Bardylis, perhaps otherwise unable to appease his turbulent and greedy people, led them into Macedonia. Perdiccas took the lead of his forces, to repel the invaders, and, in a battle ensuing, was defeated and slain.

SECTION IV.

Accession of Philip, Son of Amyntas. Pretenders to the Throne. War and Negotiations with Illyrians, Pæonians, Thracians, and Athenians. Renewed Alliance of Macedonia with Athens.

B. C. 360. By this disastrous event, in the summer of the third year after the
 Ol. 105. 1. battle of Mantinea, which was fought in autumn, and the second after the death of Agésilas, which happened in winter, the Macedonian crown devolved to Philip, only surviving son of Amyntas. According to the account, in itself by far the most probable, and also the best authenticated, Philip was then settled in the government of a frontier province, committed to him by the late king his brother as an appanage, according to the antient manner of providing for the younger branches of the Macedonian royal family. The recommendation of Plato, it is said, who had conceived a high opinion of the young prince, and held great sway with Perdiccas, overbore the obvious objections to such dismemberment of the kingdom. Here Philip had been diligent in training the military strength of the country in a system of tactics, improved upon the best practice of Greece; and, from the advantage with which he thus was prepared, immediately on succeeding to the throne, for meeting the various dangers pressing upon him, it became afterward a favorite observation, among the schools of philosophy, that he owed his kingdom to Plato.

Nevertheless the circumstances around him were perilous in extreme. More than four thousand Macedonians are said to have fallen
 with

Caryst. ap.
 Athen. l. 11.
 p. 249, vel
 506.

with their king in the battle, and the victorious Illyrians were pursuing measures to profit from their success by extensive plunder. Excited by the desire of sharing in advantages thus opened, the Pæonians descended from their mountains upon another part of Macedonia. The unfortunate people knew not which way to turn to defend, if they might be at all able to defend, their property. Thus hope arose for the former rivals of the family of Amyntas, and they proceeded to put forward their pretensions. Pausanias, supported by the great sovereign of the Thracian hords, Cotys, successor of Sitalces and Teres, prepared to invade the eastern border. Argæus had already a party, not inconsiderable, in some principal towns; and the Athenian government, resenting the conduct of the late king Perdiccas in joining the Theban confederacy, and opposing the Athenian claim on Amphipolis, sent a fleet, with a landforce of three thousand men, under Mantias, to support him.

Fortunately the young king who had to defend his own claim, and the welfare of that large majority of the Macedonian people which had a common interest with him, against so many formidable enemies, was in no ordinary amount qualified for the arduous undertaking. Blessed by nature with very superior powers of mind, and, in a degree scarcely less uncommon, with that grace of person, which gives to mental powers their best advantage in communication among mankind, these natural excellencies had been improved by a very advantageous education. How far this was gained at Thebes, whether at all at Athens, and how far at Pella, among the learned Greeks, especially of Plato's school, whom Perdiccas had entertained there, all information is very doubtful; but that the opportunities must have been very advantageous, the result, of which we have full assurance, amply shows. Even among the Athenians, Philip's eloquence was allowed to be, not only of the readiest, but of the most correct, and his manners were universally admired as singularly polished and engaging¹⁶.

Died. ut ant.

Æsch. de
legat.Æsch. de
legat.

These

¹⁶ Considering the confidence with which the residence of Philip, as a hostage, at Thebes, is mentioned by Diodorus, as well as by Plutarch and other later writers, it appears extraordinary that, in all the va-

rious mention of him in the yet extant writings of cotemporaries, Æschines, Demosthenes, and Isocrates, not a syllable should be found, indicating their knowledge that he had ever been, in his youth, at

Thebes,

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 3.

These qualifications, advantageous for all men everywhere, were peculiarly so for a prince in Philip's circumstances, and in a country where the powers of government were distributed among all ranks. And his hope rested wholly on the energies of his own mind, and the attachment of his people to him, for he had no allies. He held frequent assemblies of the Macedonian people: how formed, and whether general meetings, or several assemblies in the several cities, we want to know. The fact however, such as it is stated, and the phrase used by the historian, the same commonly applied to the general assemblies of a democracy among the Greeks¹⁷, marks the freedom of the Macedonian constitution. In those assemblies his eloquence obviated despondency and infused animation; and wherever he went, the manly confidence he expressed in his addresses to the people, encouraged those attached to his cause, alarmed those disposed to any adverse party, and won the indifferent. In his free and extensive communication with individuals, the readiest affability, dignified by justness of manner and obvious superiority of talent, ingratiated him with all. Sedulously then he applied himself to spread among the Macedonians generally that improved discipline, which he had already established among the people of his little principality; and hence is said to have originated the fame of the Macedonian phalanx. Nevertheless, on a comparison of his own yet ill-prepared means with the combined power of his numerous adversaries, aware of their inadequacy for contest with all together, he resolved, with ready deci-

Thebes, or elsewhere in Greece. There is, in the third of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip, a phrase which Auger has translated as if the rhetorician meant to say he had never seen Philip; but the phrase is far from necessarily meaning so much: *Ὅτι γὰρ συγγενῆσαι σοὶ πρότερον*. It relates to seeing him within a particular time, when a particular purpose might have been answered by it, and may be paraphrased, 'I had never seen you between the time when you might first have projected war against Persia, and the time when I first wrote to recommend it to

'you.' Any personal acquaintance of Philip with Isocrates however this leaves uncertain; but that the prince's education, whether at Thebes, at Athens, or wherever else, was completely Grecian, and excellent, is unquestionable. We find Æschines reproaching Demosthenes for low illiberality in joking on Macedonian phrases which Alexander, a boy when Demosthenes was at the Macedonian court, would be likely occasionally to use; but no opportunity was found for any such joke against Philip: his speech was purely Grecian.

¹⁷ Ἐκκλησία.

sion, whither to direct the energy of his arms, and whither the policy which might obviate the want of them.

In the course of Grecian history occasion has frequently occurred to see how rarely the maintenance of conquest, or any use of a conquered country, was the purpose of antient warfare. The Illyrians seem to have thought of no profit from their great victory but plunder, with the means to bear it off unmolested, for injoyment in their own country. If they carried their view farther, it was only to new and extended plunder, or in their utmost refinement of policy, to being paid for abstaining from plunder. Those rude conquerors therefore being gone, the Pæonians, who remained within the country, required Philip's first attention. He threatened at the same time and negotiated; and, by many fair words, with, it was said, tho such assertions must commonly rest on suspicion, a dexterous distribution of money among their chiefs, without the shame of a public payment, he prevailed upon them to return quietly home. Negotiation, upon the same principle, would be the easier with the rude monarch of the Thracian hords, because among them, we are told, it was held, nearly as among the Turks at this day, not less honorable for princes and great men to receive presents, than among other nations, to make them. A suspension, at least, of the measures of Cotys in favor of Pausanias was procured; and thus Philip was inabled to direct his military force intire against Argæus and the Athenians, by whom alone he remained immediately threatened.

Herod. l. 5.
c. 6.
Thucyd. l. 6.
c. 97.

But the power and the opportunities of these remaining enemies were formidable. Methonë, a Grecian colony on the coast of the Macedonian province of Pieria, the key, on the seaside, to the richest part of the kingdom, the nearest seaport both to Edessa, the antient, and Pella, the new capital, at this time acknowleged the empire of the Athenian people. There the Athenian fleet under Mantias, landed three thousand men, whom Argæus joined with the troops he had collected. In Edessa itself, a party favored the cause of Argæus; and, encouraged by the powerful support of the Athenian republic, its leaders sent him assurance that, would he only show himself before the walls, the gates would be opened to him. Under this invitation Argæus
and

and his allies marched to Edessa, the distance about thirty miles; not without prospect that by the acquisition of so important a place, Pella itself, lying between Edessa and Methonë, might be brought under his obedience, and that the submission of the rest of the kingdom must follow.

But Philip's friends in Edessa, holding still the powers of government, used them watchfully and ably in his cause and their own. When Argæus appeared before the walls, his partisans feared to stir, and nothing was indicated but readiness for vigorous resistance. Disappointed thus of promised coöperation, it became his care that, instead of making acquisition, he might not incur loss, and he hastened his retreat for Methone. But Philip, prepared to profit from contingencies, attacked him on his march. Argæus fell, and the troops about him fled. The Athenians, with those nearest in the line to them, altogether a considerable body, retreated to advantageous ground, where they repelled assault. Unable however to move, and unable to subsist without moving, pressed at length by evident necessity, they surrendered at discretion.

A victory more complete or more critical was perhaps never won. To use it was the complex and difficult task remaining. The most formidable competitor for the throne was no more, but numerous and powerful enemies remained. To obviate enmity by benefits, so as to make the farther prosecution of the hazardous trial of arms, as far as might be, needless, became Philip's object. To show his disposition, he began with dismissing all his prisoners without ransom. But among his foes were Greeks and barbarians; and of the former, two powerful states adverse to him, Athens and Olynthus, were so hostile to each other, that peace with both was out of all hope. Could he chuse, he could hardly hesitate to prefer the friendship and alliance of Athens, the old ally of his family, and less, through interference of near and deep interests, necessarily an enemy than Olynthus¹⁴. With youthful

¹⁴ In the defective accounts remaining of this contest for the Macedonian throne, Olynthus is not mentioned; but had the actual government of Olynthus not been adverse to Philip, it would have assisted him in opposition to Argæus whom Athens assisted; and had Olynthus assisted Philip, the notice of it, if falling from historians, would hardly have failed from the orators.

warmth then he seems to have proposed to overbear the repugnance of the Athenian people, by a liberality approaching extravagance. Having, contrary to all common usage of the times, given unbought liberty to all his prisoners, he distinguished the Athenian with peculiar kindness, inquired after those losses of every individual, which are incident to defeat in war and the condition of prisoners, caused restoration to be made or recompence, and provided conveyance for all to Athens. Knowing then that, of all their former empire, the Athenians most coveted the recovery of Amphipolis, he sent immediate orders for a body of troops stationed there, probably from the time of his brother Perdiccas, perhaps of Alexander, to be withdrawn, and, with this preparation, he sent ministers to Athens to propose peace, and, if a favorable disposition should be found, to cement it by alliance.

Demosth. in
Aristocr.

Demosth. ib.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 3.

This generous policy was not unproductive of its proposed effect. The enfranchised prisoners, arriving at Athens, sounded the praises of the young king's liberality, affability and magnanimity, which they had so to their surprize, and out of all common course, experienced. Soon after came the account of the withdrawing of the Macedonian troops from Amphipolis. It was difficult then, for those who had been most forward for the support of Argæus against him, to contend that the interest of the commonwealth required still opposition to him, as successor to the politics of his brothers, who had connected themselves with the Thebans and supported the rebellious Amphipolitans, rather than of his father, who had procured the allowance of the common congress of the Greek nation for the Athenian claim of dominion over them, and of so many former kings of Macedonia, allies and friends, bound in hereditary hospitality with the Athenian people. A party nevertheless endeavored to interpose impediments. The right of sovereignty of the Athenian people over Amphipolis, they said, should be formally acknowledged by the king of Macedonia. But those who obtained the lead were more liberal or more prudent. In return for conduct very uncommonly generous, to demand of a victorious prince to debase himself in the eyes of all Greece by a breach of faith toward those whose common right of a Grecian people, to the freedom they asserted, had been once declared by the common voice of the

nation,

nation, and still existed in general opinion, a right of which the Macedonian kings had long been protectors, they saw was not likely to produce cordiality in a restored alliance. A treaty of peace and alliance accordingly was concluded, in which all mention of Amphipolis was avoided.

Matters being thus accommodated with the Athenians, Philip had leisure to direct his measures against those of his remaining enemies, whose deficiency of policy lessened the danger of their force. Of these the Illyrians, the least tractable and altogether the most formidable, were fortunately not disposed for new enterprize, while the fruit of their former victory remained to be enjoyed. Meanwhile the circumstances of PÆONIA attracted his attention. According to tradi-

Hippocr. de
Epidem.

Ch. 1. s. 4. of
this Hist.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

B. C. 359.
Ol. 105. 2.

tion preserved by Hippocrates, the Pæonians were once a more civilized and powerful people than the Macedonians. But this seems to have been in those very early ages, before Homer, when Thrace was held by a people capable of civilizing the savages of Greece; when the river Hebrus, the vales of Pieria, and the mountains of Hæmus and Olympus were the favorite haunts of the Muses, while the Castalian fountain and the heights of Parnassus and Helicon were yet less known in song. When Thucydides wrote, part of Pæonia was a province of the Macedonian kingdom, within the bounds of that called the Lower Macedonia. Whether this had been separated, or they were the highland Pæonians only, who, after the battle in which Perdiccas fell, invaded the plains, we are not informed. It seems however to have been a powerful principality which, with the name of Pæonia, was then under the dominion of a prince bearing the Grecian name of Agis. This prince dying, Philip suddenly marched into the country; and, without resistance from the people, or claim of any heir to the principality, as far as extant authors tell, annexed the whole to his kingdom.

The succinct and ill-connected narrative of Diodorus, with all the little incidental information dropping from the orators, affords but a glimpse of able and rapid measures, assisted by popularity of manners and growing popularity of name, by which this acquisition was effected. The very silence however of the orators, especially Demosthenes, enough indicates that, in the opinion of the age at least, nothing in the transactions was uncreditable to the Macedonian prince. It is a
misfortune

misfortune for history to be reduced to conjecture, yet, in the failure of direct testimony, it may behoove the historian to offer that for which ground appears. The tradition then preserved by Hippocrates concerning the Pæonians, and their settlement within the Lower Macedonia, concur with the Grecian name of their prince, to imply that they were a people of Grecian blood and language; whether originally, or through some colony, like those which had migrated from Argos into Macedonia, and from Corinth into Lyncestis; and all the circumstances, here stated, together may perhaps warrant conjecture, that the principality was the appanage of a younger branch of the Macedonian royal family, which became extinct with Agis. Thus, on his death, it would be the right and the duty of the Macedonian king to reunite it with the kingdom; and by its reunion the scheme of policy of the second Perdiccas, perseveringly directed to the acquisition of the severed principalities, would be completed.

Threatened still by the Illyrians, Philip resolved, instead of awaiting their inroad, to invade their country. The veteran Bardylis headed the Illyrian forces, to oppose him; and, in a battle which ensued, exerting himself with the spirit of youth, tho said to have passed his ninetieth year, he fell fighting. Philip's victory was complete; and he so pursued its advantages, that, before the end of the next year, all the Illyrian tribes, so formidable to his predecessors, were brought to submit to terms of peace which he, in a great degree, dictated. The Macedonian kingdom was extended, if not beyond all antient claim, yet far beyond any late possession; and a very advantageous barrier was either acquired or recovered, in the lake Lychnitis, which was to be thenceforward the boundary of the Illyrian lands against the Macedonian.

Thus this young prince, called to a throne nearly overwhelmed by two forein enemies within his country, attacked by a third, threatened by a fourth, and contested by two pretenders, each possessing an interest among the people, had, before the end of the third summer, not only overcome all the more threatening evils, by defending his dominion, but by a considerable extension, had acquired for it new power, and, still more, new security. Uneasy circumstances yet re-

Diod. l. 16.
c. 4.

Lucian. de
Macrob.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.
B. C. 353.
Ol. 105.3.

mained, for him and for his people; but, to prepare for an account of them it will be necessary to revert to the affairs of the Grecian republics, and especially Athens¹⁵.

¹⁵ Ἀνέκαμψεν (ὁ Φίλιππος) εἰς τὴν Μακεδονίαν, συνεθέμενος ἑνδοξὸν εἰρήνην πρὸς τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς, περιεσθῆος τε ἐπάρχην παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς δὲ ἀνδρείαν καταβρωμένοις. Diod. l. 16. c. 8. Philip's popularity among his own subjects, to which Diodorus here gives testimony, seems never to have been disputed; but in vindication of the account given of his accession, it may be requisite to say somewhat more than could, without inconvenient interruption of the narrative, be inserted where the matter occurred.

The testimony to Philip's establishment in the government of a Macedonian province, at the time of his brother's death, has been preserved by Athenæus. For its probability only, compared with the commonly received story of his accession, taken from Plutarch, it would deserve high consideration. But it has been, in the opinion of some critics, averse to the contradiction of Plutarch, considerably invalidated by an expression of Athenæus himself; *Τοῦτο δ' ὅπερ Ἀθηναῖος ἔχει, θὰς ἂν ἰδίῃ*. To gather the just meaning of this expression, the tenor of the author's discourse must be observed, which relates not to Philip but to Plato, and the piece of Macedonian history has been introduced but incidentally. The passage runs thus: 'Speusippus asserts that Plato, 'who was most highly esteemed by Perdiccas 'king of Macedonia,' (for certainly we must read Perdiccas instead of the careless transcriber's Ἀρχελάω) 'was the cause of Philip's 'acquiring his kingdom. Carystius of Pergamus, in his historical memorials, writes 'thus: "Speusippus, being informed that "Philip had spoken disrespectfully of Plato, "wrote in a letter, as if it was not generally "known, that Philip owed his kingdom to "Plato. For Plato sent Euphræus of "Oreus to Perdiccas," Περδίκκῳ here properly, "through whom he persuaded him to

"allot a principality to Philip. There "established, Philip formed a military "force, with which, upon the death of "Perdiccas," (Περδίκκας again justly,) "he "came out prepared for the circumstances.' 'Whether this was so,' says then Athenæus for himself, 'God knows.' Now it appears to me that Athenæus meant this expression to refer, not at all to the matters in themselves of public notoriety, namely, that Philip at the time of the death of Perdiccas, held the command of a territory appendant to the Macedonian kingdom, that he had there prepared a well-trained military force, and that, thence issuing, he proceeded to assert his rights against his numerous enemies; the doubt expressed by Athenæus has been intended to relate to the private history, only, Plato's interference in favor of Philip, and the effect of such interference; but especially he meant it to relate to the concluding assertion of Speusippus, so flattering to the idle learned, that Philip actually owed his kingdom to Plato. 'Whether this was so,' Athenæus might well say, 'God knows;' tho he considered the rest as undoubted fact, of general notoriety.

It may be farther observed, that every circumstance of the account of Carystius carries evident probability. The known favor of Philip afterward to Aristotle, assists to warrant the account of Athenæus, of the attachment of Perdiccas to Plato and his scholars; surcharged, perhaps, but no otherwise improbable. The well-attested accomplishments of Philip make it likely that, whether known from personal communication or otherwise, Plato might think highly of him, and judge him an object for recommendation to the king his brother's favor. Nor is it unlikely that, in maturer years, a preference of Aristotle's very different man-

Athen. l. 11.
p. 249, vel
506.

ner of treating philosophical, and especially political subjects, might lead Philip to speak of Plato so far with comparative disrespect, as to excite the indignation of a zealous follower of Plato, as Speusippus was, and induce him to write a letter that might be shown and published, stating the fact of the recommendation of Philip to Perdiccas, with the advantageous consequences, namely, that a principality was given to Philip, which afforded him those opportunities through which he was enabled afterward to vindicate his kingdom.

But, instead of eliciting truth out of the varying and contradictory accounts of the later antient writers, giving credit only where it may appear most justly due, it has been a prevailing fancy of critics to employ their ingenuity in torturing into accordance those who have themselves evidently had no purpose of accordance, or disposition at all to accord. An instance in Wesseling may the more deserve notice, because he is generally acute, and more than most others above prejudice. Nevertheless, in one of his notes, which I have, in a recent note of my own, observed to contain largely just criticism, he makes Diodorus responsible for much more than Diodorus has anywhere said. Diodorus's account of Philip's escape from Thebes really wants no violence to make it accord with the account of his establishment in Macedonia, just given from Carystius and Speusippus. 'On the death of Perdiccas,' he says, 'Philip, having escaped from his confinement as a hostage, took upon himself the government of the kingdom. Τούτου δὲ (Περδίκκου) πεσότος—Φίλιππος ὁ ἀδελφός, διαδράς ἐκ τῆς ὀμνήας, παρέλαβε τὴν βασιλείαν.' Diod. l. 16. c. 2. But Wesseling apparently holding Plutarch's tale in a respect to which it is not intitled, speaking of Diodorus, says, 'Auctor dicit Philippum, cognita fratris cædē, ex custodia Thebanorum clapsum, regni curam in se transulisse;' thus implying that he did not leave Thebes till informed of his brother's death;

which the words of Diodorus, well rendered by Wesseling himself in his Latin text, are far from warranting.

Among extant antient authors Justin alone tells of an infant son left by Perdiccas, who succeeded him on the throne, and for whom Philip long acted as guardian and regent: *Philippus diu non regem, sed tutorem pupilli egit*; till at length, *compulsus a populo, regnum suscepit*. The Delphin annotator, Cantel, says boldly to this, *Errat Justinus: cum enim hostes imminerent undique, continuo regia dignitas illi delata est*. To judge from Justin, even the great work of Trogus has been a compilation of stories, selected for amusement and tragical effect, rather than a history, for which political and military transactions were with any care investigated, or with any judgement connected. From Justin we have many horrid tales of the queen Eurydice, wholly unnoticed by earlier writers, and some of them directly contradicted by the narrative of Diodorus. Were there any truth in them, had they even had any popular credit, we should scarcely have failed of some intimation of them from the orators. However then we may find occasion often to mistrust the simplicity of Diodorus, yet Justin can deserve little consideration in the scale against him, and Justin's tale of a son left by Perdiccas, for whom Philip was regent, could hardly be more positively contradicted by one who could not foresee that it would be told, than we find it by Diodorus. That writer declares his purpose to relate the manner of Philip's accession, thus: *φίλιππος, ὁ ἀμύντου υἱός, — παρέλαβε τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν διὰ τοιαύτης αἰτίας*. Mentioning then briefly his being placed as a hostage, first with the Illyrians, then with the Thebans, and noticing the death of Alexander, of Ptolemy, and of Perdiccas, he proceeds to say, 'that, on the death of Perdiccas, having escaped from his confinement as a hostage, Philip took upon himself the administration of the kingdom, then

‘then in distressful circumstances. The whole account implies that the historian understood him to have left Thebes before the death of Perdiccas, and to have been ready in Macedonia for the emergency; and there is not a hint of his having had, among his numerous difficulties, those of a guardian or regent.’

‘Macedonians were in the utmost perplexity; yet, notwithstanding the general consternation and the greatness of the dangers around, Philip was not dismayed, but proceeded immediately to the measures which the crisis required.’ The

CHAPTER XXXV.

Affairs of ATHENS, from the general Peace following the Battle of MANTINEIA, and of MACEDONIA, from the Establishment of PHILIP, Son of AMYNTAS, to the Renewal of War between MACEDONIA and ATHENS.

SECTION I.

Revived political Eminence of Athens. Increasing Defect in the restored Constitution. Uneasy Situation of eminent Men. Opportunity for political Adventurers. Unsteadiness of Government. Decay of Patriotism. Subserviency of Administration to popular Passion. Decay of military Virtue. Tyranny of popular Sovereignty over subject States.

WHEN the Macedonian kingdom, happily rescued from civil strife and foreign war, was placed in circumstances to grow in prosperity and power, the Grecian republics remained in that state of discord and confusion, of mutual animosity or mutual mistrust, of separate weakness and incapacity for union, which we have seen, in the description of Xenophon, following the death of Epameinondas, and which the orators sufficiently assure us did not cease. Demosthenes describes the state of things, about the time of Philip's accession, in terms very remarkably agreeing with Xenophon's picture: 'All Peloponnesus,' he says, 'was divided. Those who hated the Lacedæmonians were not powerful enough to destroy them, nor were those who had formerly ruled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, able to hold their command in their several cities. Peloponnesus, and, in short, all Greece, was in a state of undecisive contention and trouble.' But, in the fall of the more powerful, the people of the inferior republics found consolation,

Ch. 28. s. 8.
of this Hist.

Demosth. de
Cor. p. 231.
ed. Reiske.

consolation, and even gratification : as they were relieved from dangers, and raised to new importance. For, as in the Grecian system, unavoidably some state must take a commanding part, those which had been secondary rose to the first consideration, and the lower had their proportion of advancement ; not in positive improvement, but in a flattering comparison of power and consequence. Hence, among other causes, there remained so extensive an attachment to that system, whence unavoidably followed such national discord, with its infallible attendant, national weakness.

We have seen the Athenians, after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, in the conscious feebleness of convalescency, generally submitting their executive government to the direction of able and moderate men. And fortunately, in this period, arose among them men who would have done honor to any government in any age. Thrasybulus, Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, valuable to their country as statesmen, have become conspicuous in history principally through their military achievements. The extraordinary estimation of Niceratus, son of the unfortunate Nicias who perished at Syracuse, a most steady opponent of democratical power, and yet always highly respected and esteemed by the people, has survived through the contentions of the orators. Isocrates, by his writings, which have fortunately reached us, has transmitted his own fame. Under these men, while Thebes was contending with Lacedæmon for empire by land, the maritime power of Athens so revived, that, tho the Syracusan navy might be superior in the eastern seas of Greece, nothing in the western could contend with the Athenian. The strength of Lacedæmon then being broken by the arms and policy of Epameinondas, and the energy of Thebes failing with his death, Athens remained, by her power, and by the reputation of her most eminent citizens, the most respected of the republics.

Unfortunately Athens had not a government capable of maintaining a conduct, that could either hold or deserve the respect which a large part of Greece was ready to pay. When, after overthrowing the tyrannical government of the thirty, and of their successors the ten, Thrasybulus refused to meet any proposal for checking, in the restored
democracy,

democracy, the wildness of popular authority, it seems to have been because he saw no sufficient disposition to moderation among those who put forward such proposals. The faults of both parties had produced violence in both. The profligate tyranny of the former democracy had been such (Isocrates ventured, in a chosen opportunity, to aver the bold truth to the people in their restored sovereignty) that a majority, even of the lower ranks, had voted for the oligarchy of the four hundred. But the tyranny of the thirty afterward so exceeded all former experience, that, in natural course, the popular jealousy, on the restoration of popular power, would become, in the highest degree, suspicious and irritable. In this state of things it was a sense of public weakness, while the power of Lacedæmon or Thebes threatened, that enforced respect for the counsels of such men as Conon, Thrasybulus, Iphicrates, Timotheus, Chabrias, and Niceratus. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, sycophancy again reared its baleful head. Wise men accommodated themselves, as they could, to the temper of the times, endeavoring so to bend before popular tyranny as not to sink under it. But Thrasybulus himself, as we have formerly seen, tho honored as the second founder of the republic, did not escape a capital prosecution. The great men who followed him, began, like the Lacedæmonian kings, to prefer military command abroad to residence in the city. Giving their advice in the general assembly only when pressure of circumstances required, they avoided that general direction of the republic's affairs, that situation of prime minister, which Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, and Thrasybulus himself had held. It has been remarked that Conon chose to pass his leisure in Cyprus, Iphicrates in Thrace, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigæum, and Chabrias in Egypt, or anywhere rather than in Athens.

Xen. Hel.
l. 2. c. 4.
s. 29.

Isocr. de
Pac., p. 242.
v. 2.

Ch. 25. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 12. c. 8.
p. 264, vel
532.
Corn. Nep.
v. Chabr.

This dereliction of civil situation by the great political and military characters of the republic, encouraged the evil which produced it. The field was left open for adventurers, without other recommendation than readiness and boldness of speech, to take the lead in public affairs; and oratory became a trade, independent of all other vocations. We have seen Iphicrates, appointed by the voice of the people to a great military command, requesting a colleague, and for that colleague a popular

Ch. 26. s. 8.
of this Hist.

popular orator, unversed in military command, and not his friend. Such a choice, which elsewhere would be most absurd, was, under such a government as the Athenian, obviously politic. The orator general became responsible, with the real military commander, for all the consequences of their joint conduct; and his popularity and talents, instead of being employed for the ruin, must, for his own sake, be exerted for the support and defence of his colleague. Perhaps Iphicrates drew, from the prosecution of Thrasybulus, the warning that urged him to a measure, which Xenophon's manner of relating it shows to have been considered, at the time, as extraordinary. But shortly after, if not for the business of the field, yet for that of the assembly of the people, the connection of the orator and the general, the orator commander-in-chief, with a general under him (it is the phrase of Demosthenes) became quite familiar¹.

When the fear of Lacedæmon or Thebes, long the salutary check upon this vicious government, was removed by the event of the battle of Mantinea, its extravagances soon grew extreme. The people in general assembly being sovereign, with power less liable to question than that of a Turkish sultan, who dares not deny his veneration for Mahomet's law, or his respect for those appointed to high situations under it, any adventurer in politics, who had ready elocution, could interfere in every department of government. Ratification by the people was required for every measure of administration. The most delicate foreign interests were discussed before the people at large, and the contending orators abused foreign powers and one another with equal grossness. Unsteadiness then became a characteristic of the Athenian government. Propositions rejected in the morning, says Isocrates, are often ratified before night, and condemned again at the next meeting of the assembly; and we find even Demosthenes, the popular favorite of his day, complaining, that a measure decreed was as uncertain of execution as if it had never been taken into consideration. Assurance therefore for foreign states, of any maintenance of public faith, was impossible. As soon as a treaty was concluded, it was the business of the opposing orators to persuade the people that they had been deceived

Demosth. &
Æsch. & al.
var. in loc.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 204.

Demosth. pro
Rhod. mit.

¹ Πρῶτος ἡγεμὼν, καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτῳ. Demosth. περὶ Συνέλαξ. p. 172.

and misled. If the attempt succeeded, the consistency of government and the faith of the republic were equally disregarded: the treaty was declared null, and those who had persuaded to it, rarely escaping capital prosecution, were fortunate if they could escape capital punishment. Seldom, therefore, tho everything must be discussed, could there be any free discussion. In the sovereign assembly of Athens, as in democratical assemblies in England, a common hall of the city of London, or a county meeting for political purposes, freedom of speech often was denied; the people would hear the orators only on one side. Flattery to the tyrant, as we have seen the people in democracy often called among the Greeks, was always necessary. But honest and plain admonition, tending to allay popular passion, to obviate mischievous prejudice, or even to correct popular misinformation, could rarely obtain attention, unless in times of pressing public danger, and alarm among all parties².

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2.
s. 16.
Isocr. de
Pace, p. 176.
Demosth.
περὶ συνταξ.
& al.

It seems to have been a liberal spirit that, on the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, gave the freedom of the city to all who had borne arms in the contest for it. Nevertheless the precedent was dangerous for a state where despotic power, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial authority, was constitutionally vested in the whole people. Formerly, tho the large patriotism, which should have embraced the whole Greek nation, was rarely found among the republics, yet that narrower political virtue, the love of the city, was often seen warm. But as, through the successive alterations of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon, security for property, and especially for landed property, was weakened, and at length almost destroyed, attachment to the Attic soil would proportionally fail. So many strangers to Attic blood then, admitted among the citizens, would of course be desirous that the purity of Attic blood should no longer be the honorable distinction, and would be ready to vote, on all occasions, for the admission of others, who possessed it no more than themselves. Accordingly the freedom of the city became an ordinary favor, profusely conferred. Perhaps we should ascribe somewhat to joke in the story of the two youths, raised to the once envied dignity of Athenian

Athen. l. 3.
p. 119.

² Δημοκρατίας δόσης, οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία. Isocr. de Pace, p. 176.

Isocr. de
Pac.

citizens, for the merit of their father, an ingenious cook, in the invention of some approved new sauces. But the reproach which the cautious Isocrates ventured to address to his fellowcountrymen, will command credit: 'Boasting,' he says, 'that we hold our country from time beyond all tradition, we ought to afford example of good and orderly government; but, on the contrary, our administration is more irregular, and more abounding with inconsistency, than that of many newly founded colonies. Valuing ourselves upon antiquity of origin, and purity of Athenian blood, we give community in the rights of the city, and in all the honors of that origin and that blood, with less consideration and selection than the mountaineers of Thrace or Italy use in admitting associates to their clans.' Demosthenes, the flatterer and favorite of the multitude, has been led, in the course of his pleadings, to declare, in still more pointed terms, the amount and the manner of the corruption. Decrees of citizenship, he has not scrupled to assert, were become an article of trade among the venal orators; to be procured for their foreign or metic clients, at prices proportioned to the labor, which deficient claim, or the discredit, which bad character, might implicate with the undertaking.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 687.

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2. s. 9.

Xen. resp.
Ath.
Aristoph. &
Isocr.

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2.
s. 10.

Long ago Solon's laws, for promoting industry and disgracing idleness, had been obsolete or ineffectual: a sovereign multitude would not work: they would live by sacrifices, provided by the public treasury, and feasts given by the wealthy of their respective wards, or the daily salary for attending the courts of justice. Clothed, many of them, as Xenophon assures us, little better than the slaves, so much more numerous than themselves, and uncertain even of their daily food, they had nevertheless their favorite luxuries, with which they would not dispense. Not the wealthiest individual, says Xenophon, could have his baths, his dressing-rooms, his places of exercise, and of meeting for conversation, of a splendor comparable to those erected for the multitude of Athens. The magnificence of the theatrical entertainments provided for them, as we can judge even from existing ruins of the theaters, was what nothing in modern times has approached. The excessive fondness of the Athenians, for these entertainments, commanded of course attention from those to whom the favor of the

Many was necessary. Pericles is said to have been the first who, by an act of the people, which he proposed, appropriated a part of the public revenue to the maintenance of theaters, and the provision of theatrical exhibitions. The example was found so commodious by following orators, that, in process of time, almost the whole certain revenue of the republic became appropriated to theatrical entertainments, together with what at Athens were nearly congenial, the ceremonies of religious festivals; and, when thus the means of former orators were exhausted, bold ingenuity, pressed to a last resource, procured the decree which has immortalized the name of its mover Eubulus, making it capital even to propose the application of the theoric revenue, as it was called, to any other purpose. It requires remark, however, that Eubulus is represented as altogether one of the most respectable men of his age; the associate in politics of the most approved patriots, and a steady opponent of the extravagancies of democratical power. Some light will occur in the sequel on this curious, but altogether dark subject³.

Demosth.
Olynth.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 346.
Dionarch. in
Demosth.
p. 66.

When such was the subserviency of the Athenian government to popular extravagance and folly, and such the luxuries which the multitude, living in idleness, commanded, to expect that the Athenian citizen would obey, as formerly, the call for military service abroad, or even bear the restraint necessary for maintaining the antient discipline and skill in arms at home, would have been preposterous. The antient law, of every Grecian state, required, that every citizen should be trained to arms. Practice with weapons began in early boyhood. From eighteen to twenty the Athenian youth formed the regular standing garrison of the city and country; and thus, even in peace, had that practice of acting in bodies, which prepared them advantageously for real warfare. But in later times the young Athenians, or their fathers, intent on more profitable employment for them, learnt to obtain excuse very extensively from this duty. Formerly the service of the panoply, or the phalanx, the first name describing the armor of

³ Some modern writers have undertaken to pronounce judgement very boldly upon this law, and upon Eubulus, its author, but they have left what remains from the cotem-

porary orators upon it. I must own, very dark to me, and I must add, I rather think to themselves too.

the individual, the latter the formation of the body, was jealously vindicated as the exclusive privilege of the citizen. The most laborious service, and generally the most dangerous, but of overbearing efficacy, it was considered as that on which rested the superiority of Greeks to barbarians, the safety of every Grecian state against neighboring Grecian states, and even the security of dominion, in every one, over resident foreigners, and the slaves which, generally in Grecian states, far outnumbered the freemen. In the perpetual wars of Greece, however, the reiterated calls upon the citizen, to leave all his domestic concerns for service to the state in arms, becoming more severely felt as civilization, and the arts contributing to the comfort of private life, improved, it is not wonderful that any expedient, which might obviate such a pressure, became popular. The hazardous resource thus of employing mercenaries, as we commonly find them termed from the Latin, soldiers by profession, engaged for hire, and forming what we call a standing army, grew into common use among all the republics. Men in the uneasy and perilous situation of generals, under a democracy, would be likely to approve and promote the change; for an army of sovereign citizens, impatient of controul always, would in its turn, of course, but indeed whenever it pleased, command and judge its generals; whereas a hired army had no pretence but to obey while paid, and, when dismissed, had no legal authority to command or judge those who had been its legal commanders.

Ch. 24. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

For about ten years after the restoration of the democracy by Thrasybulus, Athens, without foreign dependencies and unassailed at home, had no occasion for military exertion. But her engagement in confederacy with Thebes against Lacedæmon, and, still more, the revival of her empire over other republics, resulting from Conon's victory, produced necessity for again employing forces of land and sea. After so long a desuetude, however, when affections had been engaged by domestic interests and the luxury of public entertainments, and passions by political intrigues and the contentions and flattery of orators, the call to arms was little satisfactorily heard by the Athenian people. Instead of jealously asserting their exclusive right to the honors of the panoply, they would make the metics, not Greeks only, but

but Lydians, Syrians, barbarians of various countries, share with them its labors and its dangers, and, with these, of course, unavoidably its honors. For this change indeed the admission of so many strangers to the rights of citizens, on the first restoration of the democracy, seems to have prepared the way. Nevertheless, in the first wars, against the Lacedæmonians, and then against the Thebans and their allies, the mercenary troops were mostly employed, yet a part still of the army was Athenian; both citizens and metics served under Iphicrates and other generals in Peloponnesus. Gradually, however, the sovereign citizens more and more dispensed with their own service; and when the fear of Thebes and Lacedæmon ceased to press, they would, at least on any ordinary occasion, serve no more. They did not so soon refuse themselves wholly for the ordinary service of the navy; where the labor and danger were reckoned generally less, and the hope of profit through means accruing, as will be hereafter seen, from the command which the Athenians possessed of the Ægean sea, was considerably greater. But, in time, this also, through the same indulgence of the sovereign people to themselves, was extensively avoided. Thus the glory of the Athenian arms, won at Marathon, at Salamis, and in so many battles since, by sea and by land, was in a manner renounced; and the maintenance and extension of the republic's empire abroad, if not its defence at home, was committed to men ingaged for pay, from whatsoever country they could be collected.

Xenoph.
resp. Ath.

Demosth.
Olynth.
Æsch. de
legat.

Xen. & Isocr.
& Demosth.

Such, according to the remarkably agreeing testimonies of cotemporary writers, of different views and opposite interests, was the state of the Athenian government, when the decline of the Lacedæmonian power, and the Theban energy, left Athens, principally through her navy, and the revenue which it commanded from numerous little commercial republics, the first potentate of Greece. While the contest between Thebes and Lacedæmon lasted, Athens could disregard the treaty of Antalcidas, and other following conventions, whose purpose was to establish the independency of every Grecian commonwealth. That purpose indeed was evidently enough impracticable. In universal independency, the incessant strife, of each with its neighbors, was found to produce greater evils than the admission of the superiority of

Xenoph.
Isocr. Lys.
Demosth.
Æsch.

of one; and partial superiorities would arise, while the general superintending power was denied. Piracy meanwhile, with the endless opportunities afforded, by the division of the islands and shores of the *Ægean* among almost numberless sovereign powers, threatened the annihilation of maritime commerce. For it was not confined to the private adventure of men in the situation of outlaws. There were states, powerful among those of Greece, which (like the barbarians of Africa, who have been tolerated to the shame of modern Europe) avowed piracy. It was a trade that suited equally republics and tyrants. Of the former, *Alopeconnesus* particularly is mentioned as principally subsisting by it; tho *Athens* itself is not without its share of imputation; and *Alexander*, tyrant of *Pheræ*, is said to have acquired the wealth which enabled him to hold the tyranny, chiefly by his share of the plunder of the Grecian seas and shores, for which he sent out fleets and armies. The smaller maritime states, therefore, feeling their insufficiency for the vindication severally of their own security, and little disposed to concede enough to one another for coalition in any firm confederacy, were prepared for submission to a protecting power.

Demosth in
Aristocr.
p. 675.

Diod. l. 15.
c. 95.

In this situation of things, the conduct of such men as *Conon*, *Thrasybulus*, *Iphicrates*, *Chabrias* and *Timotheus*, acquiring the reputation of liberality for the Athenian government, most of the islands, and many cities of the Asiatic and Thracian shores, to have the protection of the Athenian navy for their trade, and perhaps not less to avoid its oppression, became again tributaries, and really subjects of the Athenian people. The assessment of the just *Aristeides* was restored, not without some degree of general satisfaction; recommended, not only by its moderation, but probably also by the advantageous regulation, from which he had derived renown. Athens thus became again the head of a great confederacy. *Timotheus* alone, in his various commands, is said to have acquired to it seventy-five cities, of importance enough to have each its representative in the congress, or, in the original term *synedrium*, which assembled at Athens. Nevertheless, the little information remaining to us, on the interesting subject of the constitution of this assembly, and the privileges of its members, as they stood

stood indeed at a somewhat later day, does not show them calculated to give the security to the subordinate states, that could make the Athenian empire satisfactory to those under it. To have protection against all enemies, they renounced the right of separate war and peace, binding themselves by oath to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenians. To provide for a just attention to their interests in the councils of the sovereign people, their deputies at Athens had their separate assembly to consult together on their common interests; and either in common, or severally, as occasion required, they communicated with the executive council of the Athenian republic, the fivehundred. They were admitted to the general assembly of the people, only with the approbation and through the introduction of the fivehundred; and only under restrictions, nearly as foreign ambassadors, they were allowed occasionally to address the sovereign people. But they had no vote; and in all other points they were upon the footing of foreigners, excluded from all rights of Athenian citizens. Nevertheless, for the readiness with which so many little states appear to have admitted again the supremacy of the Athenian people, tho abundantly indicating uneasiness in their former independency, this restoration of empire, like its original rise, was honorable to the Athenian name.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 247.

While Athens, with this empire growing beyond sea, was held in check and alarm at home by Lacedæmon or Thebes, the administration was so generally discreet, and the willing attachment of the syndrian allies was so obviously important, that the means of tyranny, which the imperial republic held, seem to have been little used. Even the old title of the subordinate ally, *hypecoös*, nearly synonymous with subject, or dependent, a term familiar in the time of Thucydides, appears to have been avoided. The Grecian word which we render ALLY, thus becomes, with the writers after the age of Epameinondas, a term often of double and often of doubtful import; being used indifferently to imply independent sovereign states, or the tributary allies. Nevertheless we have formerly seen, while Thebes was successfully contending with Athens for the lead of the democratical interest through the Greek nation, and even aiming at a maritime rivalship, three of the most powerful of the syndrian confederated states, whether

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

suffering

Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 2.
s. 2. & seq.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 188
—194.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 170
& 190.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 206.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 200.
Xen. resp.
Ath. c. 1. s. 1.

suffering real evil, or seeking only prospective good, revolted. This possibly may have been taken as ground for new severity by the sovereign people, when the rebelling states were compelled again to submit to its authority. After the battle of Mantinea, when the decay of Theban influence over the confederacy, whose councils Epameinondas had been able to guide, became manifest, an altered disposition toward the subject states appeared. Interested adventurers in politics quickly saw the opportunity, and hastened in contention to profit from it. The former empire of Athens, and the advantages which the body of the people derived from it, became the favorite topics of declamation in the general assembly. The people heard with eager attention, when it was asked, 'Whence was the want of energy, that the fleets brought no 'treasures home? Why was free navigation allowed? The Athenian 'navy commanded the seas. Why then was any republic permitted to 'have ships, and maritime commerce, that would not pay tribute as 'formerly?' Thus wrought into fermentation, the public mind, with a favorite object in view, would no longer bear contradiction. To urge the injustice of arbitrary exaction would have been dangerous for the most popular orator. Even for showing the impolicy, without venturing to name the iniquity of such measures, none could obtain a hearing. Fleets therefore were sent out, under the imperial mandate of the people, with general instructions to bring home tribute. For command in such interprize, military ability and experience were little requisite; and, as the cautious Isocrates did not scruple publicly to aver, men of such mean estimation, that, for managing any private concern, none would trust them, were commissioned, with dictatorial powers⁺, to conduct the affairs of the republic with the Greek nation. A sovereign multitude, and the orators who, by flattery, ruled the sovereign multitude, would be likely to allow great indulgence to those ordered, without limitation by any precise instructions, to extend empire and bring home money. Complaints insuing, endless, from the injured allies, were generally disregarded. Money, judiciously distributed among the officers of the courts which ought to take cognisance of such complaints, was generally necessary even to bring the matter

⁺ 'Αυτοκράτορες.

to a hearing; and then any justice in decision was very uncertain. Fraud, rapine, all sorts of iniquity and violence not only went unpunished, but the people often showed themselves even amused Isocr. ut ant. with the attested reports of enormities, committed by their tribute-gathering armaments.

SECTION II.

Projects for improving the Athenian Revenue. Affairs of the Athenian Colony of Amphipolis. Produce of the Thracian Gold Mines. Summary of Affairs of the Olynthian Confederacy. Opposition of Olynthian and Athenian Interest. Alliance of Olynthus with Amphipolis.

THE renewal of the old tyranny of the Athenian republic, over its allies and subjects, was professedly what gave occasion to that curious treatise, formerly noticed, which remains to us from Xenophon, on the revenue of Athens. His plan, more immediately concerning the revenue, as a necessary foundation for the rest, extended however to a general improvement of the government. Far from visionary, like Plato's, it might nevertheless have been difficult, or even impossible to execute; less from any inherent impracticability, than from its interference, real or apprehended, with the existing private interests of powerful men. That from which Xenophon proposed the greatest, or, however, the most immediate advantage, was an improved management of mines of the precious metals; and this appears to have been always a favorite purpose of those who actually held the principal direction of the popular will. But tho the objects were similar, the principles, on which it was proposed to pursue them, were widely different. Xenophon's first purpose, what he considered as most important, was to obviate all necessity for that oppression exercised by the Athenians against others; not only as the oppression of others was abominable, but as the evil would recoil on themselves. His project therefore was confined to the mines of Attica. But the individuals to whom the working of these was already engaged, not

Ch. 29. s. 1.
of this Hist.

indeed in perpetuity, but for terms of which they hoped renewal, would strenuously oppose any proposal for alteration of management. The Attic mines moreover gave only silver, whereas those of the Thracian mountains, in the neighborhood of Amphipolis, afforded gold. For the superiority therefore, real or imaginary, of the object, and for avoiding interference with the private gains of fellowcitizens, perhaps friends and relations, persons however whose votes and influence might be important, they disregarded violence against any others.

Ch. 12. c. 1.
of this Hist.

We have formerly observed the Thracian mines furnishing the first temptation for the Athenian republic, almost immediately on its rise to empire, and while Cimon, son of Miltiades, yet commanded its forces, to oppress those whom it had undertaken, as a sacred duty, to protect. The people of the little island of Thasus were driven, by the injustice of the Athenian government, to a renunciation of alliance, which was resented and punished, as rebellion against the sovereignty of the Athenian people. The Thracian mines were then seized, as the proper possession of the Athenian people; and, to secure it, a colony of no less than ten thousand persons, Athenians, and citizens of the allied republics, was sent to occupy the neighboring territory. The resentment of the surrounding Thracians, so exerted as presently to produce the total destruction of this numerous colony, seems to mark a sense of injuries, such as they had not experienced from the less powerful islanders of Thasus. The calamitous event however did not deter the Athenian people from new pursuit of so inviting an object. Under the able and benign administration of Pericles, the colony led by Agnon, father of the unfortunate Theramenes, was apparently conducted with juster policy; and the town which he founded, with the name of Amphipolis, quickly became flourishing.

Thucyd. l. 1.
c. 100.

Ch. 16. s. 4,
5, 6. of this
Hist.

But the people of this colony, collected from various parts of Greece, respecting the Athenian government under Pericles, and attached to their leader Agnon, would be little likely to retain any firm attachment to a government tyrannical and capricious as that of Athens afterward became. Accordingly when Brasidas marched into Thrace, little more than ten years after the foundation of Amphipolis, disaffection was ready; and, with the assistance of a large party among the citizens, that

that able soldier and politician gained this favorite colony from the Athenian empire to the Lacedæmonian. By the treaty of peace however, which soon followed, while the other Grecian towns on the Thracian shore had their freedom assured, paying only the assessment of Aristides for the maintenance of the Athenian fleet, Amphipolis, as an Athenian colony, was restored unconditionally to the dominion of the Athenian people. Seventeen years it seems to have so remained, when the battle of Aigospotami gave it again, with all the other transmarine possessions of Athens, to be dependent on Lacedæmon.

According to Herodotus, who says he made inquiries upon the spot, the Thasians drew, from their Thracian mines, a yearly revenue of from two to three hundred talents; at a medium perhaps fifty thousand pounds; which he appears to have reckoned, for them, very considerable. It seems probable that the Athenian government, while it held Amphipolis, tho always intent upon the mines, yet distracted by various troubles, never worked them to any great profit. The Lacedæmonians, implicated with a great variety of new and great concerns, and especially allured by prospects of golden harvests in Asia, were likely to be indifferent to adventure among the Thracian mountains, of a kind for which their institutions peculiarly unfitted them. We have seen them so neglecting even the highly cultivated settlements of the Thracian Chersonese, touching almost on Asia, that they nearly became the prey of neighboring barbarians. Towns therefore farther removed from the countries whither their principal solicitude was directed, would still less be objects of any very earnest care. Thus apparently the Amphipolitans were left to make the most they could of independency; and it appears they defended themselves against the Thracians, and managed their intestine disputes, but were little able to vindicate the possession, and carry on profitably the working of the mines, which seem to have been abandoned.

Herod. l. 6.
c. 46, 47.

Ch. 23. s. 1.
& Ch. 24. s. 1.
of this Hist.

It was in this dereliction, by the Lacedæmonians, of their dominion over the Thracian colonies, that the growth of Olynthus, which we have formerly noticed, and the rapid extension of its confederacy, almost overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and became formidable to Lacedæmon itself. On the dissolution of the confederacy,

Ch. 26. s. 2,
3, & 4. of
this Hist.

which the united arms of Lacedæmon and Macedonia effected. the towns, not before belonging to the Macedonian kingdom, received the gift of nominal independency, each holding its separate government; but under conditions of alliance, which made them, with Olynthus itself, effectually subject to Lacedæmon. Taught by experience then the importance of maintaining its interest in Thrace, the Lacedæmonian government, to hold the Thracian towns in suberviency, resorted to the common policy of the age, giving their patronage to a party in each, which, for the sake of that patronage, would obey their commands. Perhaps then it was that, under Lacedæmonian

Or. Isocr. ad
Philipp.
p. 316. t. 1.
Ep. Philipp.
ap. Demosth.
p. 164.

patronage, new colonists, principally from the Grecian town of Cyrene in Africa, were established in Amphipolis, in number so large, that occasion thence was afterward taken to call it a Lacedæmonian colony. The Lacedæmonian authority was thus altogether so maintained in those northern parts, that while so many of the southern republics joined Thebes in war against Lacedæmon, a body of Olynthian horse, as we have formerly seen, served with the Lacedæmonian armies in Peloponnesus.

Ch. 26. s. 7.
of this Hist.

B. C. 351.
Ol. 102. 2.

But when after the battle of Leuctra, fought about eight years after the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy, Lacedæmon, pressed by the war with Thebes, became less and less able to stretch a commanding arm to the northern shore of the Ægean, those raised to power, under Lacedæmonian patronage, began to totter in their situations, and the prospect of success in opposition to them invited ambitious, and perhaps patriotic citizens. Olynthus, in its glory, had been the ally of Thebes. The party which had then led its councils, would of course seek to share in that patronage which Thebes, become the leading state of Greece, was extending on all sides, and most ready to give in opposition to Lacedæmon. Thus it seems to have been that the administration of Olynthus reverted to that party. But Thebes, separated by many intervening states, and possessing little naval force, tho she might check exertions of Lacedæmon against them, was little able herself to prevent the Olynthians from taking their own measures in their own concerns. To restore their dissolved confederacy therefore becoming their object, it was quickly effected to a very considerable extent; how far upon the former model we do not learn;

learn; but so that Olynthus became again a very powerful city, with influence spreading over perhaps the whole of that fruitful part of the continent called the Chalcidic, and most of the towns of the three adjoining peninsulas.

Olynthus thus reviving in opposition to the decaying power of Lacedæmon, while Athens, to check the alarming growth of the Theban power, became the ally of Lacedæmon, the interest of the Olynthian would be placed in necessary opposition to that of the Athenian people. About eight years after the battle of Leuctra followed that of Mantinea. In the state of things, after that event, the Athenian people, no longer, as before, restrained by the dread of Thebes, looked for empire wherever their fleets could sail. Among many and greater objects then, which their orators put forward in the general assembly, in a manner more adapted to promote their own interest with the Many than the popularity of the Athenian name in Greece, or indeed any real interest of Athens itself, the recovery of their colony of Amphipolis became a favorite point. But in two successive congresses of the Grecian states, as we have formerly seen (for, in unfolding the complicated interests of Greece, repetition is often unavoidable) the claim, which the Athenian people asserted, of sovereignty over the Amphipolitan people, was denied. In a third congress it was at length allowed, through the interest principally of Amyntas king of Macedonia, father of Philip. The Amphipolitan people nevertheless resisted, and being supported by the Olynthian confederacy, the able Iphicrates was in vain placed at the head of an armament to reduce them to obedience. It was among the imprudent boasts of the Athenian orators, in flattery to their sovereign the Many, that they had been formerly lords, not of Amphipolis only, but of Olynthus too. Circumstances indeed abounded to admonish the Olynthians, for their own safety, to support the Amphipolitans, and the Amphipolitans, if they would avoid the dominion of the Athenian people, to profit from the ready alliance of Olynthus. But the Amphipolitan people, a recent colony, were divided, less in the manner of the old republics, into the parties of the Many and the Few, the rich and the poor, than according to their various origin, as established under

B. C. 363.
Ol. 104. 2.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 212.

Demosth.
Olynth.

Athenian

Athenian patronage or Lacedæmonian, or accustomed to receive protection from Olynthus or from Macedonia. Now however the Athenian interest had been long overborne; Lacedæmon was utterly without means to support friends across the Ægean; the king of Macedonia had abandoned his interest, in favor of Athens. Thus, for those averse to the sovereignty of the Athenian people, the patronage of Olynthus only remained, and accordingly the connection between Amphipolis and Olynthus became intimate.

SECTION III.

Armament under Timotheus. Expedition proposed to Asia; diverted to Samos. Measures of Timotheus against Olynthus. Coöperation of the King of Macedonia. Injurious Conduct of Athens toward Macedonia.

B. C. 359. **AFFAIRS** in Lesser Asia, the most favorite of all fields for military adventure, drawing the attention of the leading men of Athens, gave a temporary relief, from the pressure of their ambition, to the Grecian states on the northern shore of the Ægean. Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, having engaged in that extensive revolt of the western provinces of the Persian empire, which we have formerly seen excited by a Greek, Evagoras of Cyprus, desired to strengthen his military with Grecian troops. Evagoras was the ally, and adopted citizen of Athens. Ariobarzanes, forming connection with the Athenian people, accepted also the honor of becoming one of them. The Athenian government, professing to hold inviolate its peace with the Persian king, nevertheless sent an armament to coöperate with the citizen-satrap in rebellion; and Timotheus, for so inviting a field as Asia, did not refuse the command. His instructions forbid, in general terms, whatever might be contrary to the articles of the treaty with Persia; but it was common, as we have formerly seen, for the satraps to make war effectually against the king, pretending it to be only against one another.

Timotheus was on his way to join Ariobarzanes, when intelligence reached

reached him of the dissolution of the confederacy of the revolted chiefs. The tide, thus turning in favor of the royal cause, produced revolt on the other side. In the island of Samos, as in many Grecian states of the Asiatic main, was a party which preferred the patronage or sovereignty of the Persian king to that of the Athenian people. Cyprothemis, head of that party, assisted by Tigranes, the king's commander-in-chief in Lesser Asia, effected a revolution, by which he became chief of the island. Timotheus was still on the Asiatic coast when news of this revolt reached him. He hastened then to Samos, overbore Cyprothemis, and, with the reëstablishment of democratical government, restored the dependency of the Samian upon the Athenian people.

It was about this time that Philip, king of Macedonia, had completed his successes against the Illyrians, and established security for his western border, hitherto so much threatened. Olynthus and its confederacy remained his most dangerous and troublesome neighbor. A plan was concerted, between the Athenian and Macedonian governments, for the reduction of Olynthus by their combined arms. But with regard both to the leading circumstances, and to the stipulations on both sides, we are left by ancient writers wholly in the dark. Timotheus commanded still the Athenian fleet. For the Asiatic service perhaps it was needless to put the republic to expence in maintaining troops; volunteers being probably ready for adventure, under a general of the reputation of Timotheus, in a field where so many Grecian soldiers of fortune had found large success. But for the war in Thrace, where stubborn resistance was in near view, and far less amount of gold even in distant prospect, volunteers would not be found, without an expence which the orators dared not propose. For that service, accordingly, we find Timotheus was without a landforce. This deficiency, however, the king of Macedonia undertook to supply. A Macedonian army and the Athenian fleet together laid siege to Potidæa, the contest for which had given birth to the Peloponnesian war. Potidæa was so critically situated, near Olynthus, as to give great opportunity for intercepting its communication with the sea, and completely commanded the way by land into the fruitful peninsula of Pallenië,

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.

Pallenë, full of commercial towns, and altogether the best territory of the confederacy. Yielding to the Macedonian arms, it was conceded to the Athenian general, and an Athenian garrison was placed there. Teronë, the principal town of the neighboring peninsula of Sithonia, was presently after taken by the confederate forces, and also received an Athenian garrison. Olynthus was thus so circumscribed in territory, reduced in strength, and checked in maritime communication, that its ruin seemed hardly avoidable.

For the next event, the hinge on which the following history of Athens and Macedonia turns, the historian wholly fails us, and the orators, to whom we owe certain knowledge of the important fact, have avoided all detail and all circumstances. The purpose of Athens, in the Olynthian war, evidently was conquest; nor have the orators disguised it. The views of Philip are less obvious. To reduce or even overwhelm the power of Olynthus, which could not but be inconvenient and dangerous to Macedonia, would be among them; but to establish the power of Athens, over the whole Macedonian coast, on its ruin, without any recompense for Macedonia, would seem to be carrying to excess the generous policy, by which he had formed his first connection with the Athenian government. Athens had long possessed Methonë, the nearest seaport to both his capitals; and Pydna was the

Ch. 33. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
Phil. 1. 1. 43.

Theogeny.
p. 11. 1.
Said.

avoids notice of all the circumstances, assists to prove. Justification of the profligate measure seems to have been no more attempted at the time, than by the great orator afterward. But the forms of a democratical government gave facility for procrastination, and for shifting responsibility from shoulder to shoulder, while insult was added to the injury, by professions made, in the name of the republic, of the purpose of still honorably maintaining peace and alliance.

Demosth.
ut aut.

SECTION IV.

Expedition under Iphicrates against Amphipolis. Supercession of Iphicrates by Timotheus. State of the Thracian Chersonese. Acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian Empire. Honors to Charidemus of Eubœa.

FARTHER coöperation from the king of Macedonia, in making conquests for the Athenian people, being no longer now to be expected, prosecution of hostilities immediately against Olynthus was suspended; and it was resolved to direct the energy of the republic to the conquest of Amphipolis, in the hope apparently that, Olynthus, in its reduced state, could not, and the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the provocation given him, would not interfere. Eminent men, we have seen, could not live at Athens in quiet: they must lend themselves continually, not only to public service, but to popular passion. Many circumstances strongly recommended Iphicrates for the command against Amphipolis. None had more military experience, or higher military reputation. He had then the extraordinary advantage of close connection with the great sovereign of Thracæ, Cotys, the successor of Seuthes, Sitalces and Teres, by having received his sister in marriage⁵. Among the Amphipolitans themselves, moreover, a

⁵ Demosthenes calls Iphicrates *κρηδεύς* of Cotys (Or. in Aristocr.) which is generally understood to mean brother-in-law. Cornelius Nepos calls the wife of Iphicrates daughter of Cotys. There can hardly be a doubt in preferring the cotemporary ora-

tor's authority. But, if the father of the Cotys, of whom he spoke, was also named Cotys, which seems not improbable, the biographer's error would be only deficiency of explanation.

mixed people, with an Athenian party, a Macedonian party, an Olynthian party, and a Thracian party, esteem for him was extensive. And farther, for his important services formerly to the Macedonian royal family, he was likely to be respected beyond others at the Macedonian court. Those then who led the Athenian counsels, while they evaded redress of injury, desiring nevertheless to obviate obstruction to their purposes from resentment, the popular vote directed Iphicrates to take the command of the fleet on the Thracian station.

But the favoring party in Amphipolis was not such, that success could be reasonably expected from a fleet alone, without a landforce. Troops therefore were to be provided; and the command by land and sea, being in the usual manner of the antients, committed to the same officer, the levy, or rather the hire of a mercenary force, was to be managed by Iphicrates. Of those who made the command of mercenaries, ready to fight the battles of any state, their profession, Chari-demus of Oreus in Eubœa was eminent, and he was recommended to Iphicrates by his conduct, in a service already of three campaigns under him. That officer, with the body attached to him, was therefore ingaged, and the fleet and landforce proceeded together to Amphipolis.

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 669.

Demosth. ut
ant.

The losses, and consequent weakness of Olynthus, the increased and daily growing power of Athens, the formidable appearance of the armament, the reputation of the general, and his popularity, had together such an effect, that the Amphipolitans presently listened to negotiation. Terms were agreed upon; even the gate was named of which possession was to be given to the Athenian troops, and hostages were delivered by the Amphipolitans to insure performance of the conditions. Through what jealousy or what intrigue the Athenian people defeated their own fond hope, so long entertained, and now so nearly fulfilled, we have no information. Timotheus, hastily ordered to supersede Iphicrates, arrived in the critical moment. Alarm and hesitation of course arose among the Amphipolitans. Their confidence had rested, not in the Athenian people, but in Iphicrates, supposed capable of answering for the Athenian people. The character of Timotheus might perhaps have been not less respected than that of Iphicrates;

Iphicrates; but it was made inefficacious by a decree which presently followed him, commanding that the hostages, which had been specially intrusted to the faith of Iphicrates, should be sent immediately to Athens. This profligate decree however was rendered vain, by the provident integrity of Iphicrates; who, in surrendering his command to Timotheus, had committed the hostages to the general of the mercenaries, Charidemus; and, apparently with the consent of Iphicrates, we may hope also with the tacit approbation at least of Timotheus, they had been restored to their friends⁶.

The ungracious office remained for Timotheus, to take up the negotiation, necessarily resigned, with his command, by Iphicrates. But the Amphipolitans would no longer treat with an agent of the Athenian government, tho that agent was Timotheus. Force was therefore again to be employed; but the ready means of effective force were done away, by the same violent and improvident measures, which had overthrown an almost concluded negotiation. It seems probable that Charidemus, and the troops under him, had engaged with Iphicrates, whom they knew, for little or no present pay, under promise of large profit from success in enterprize. Disappointed of hope nearly realized, and altogether dissatisfied with the Athenian government, they refused now to serve under Timotheus, to whose personal character it is little likely they would have objected. Meanwhile the Olynthians, greatly relieved by the cessation of pressure from Macedonia, exerted themselves to provide support for the remains of their confederacy, against the arms and the policy of Athens. They engaged large assistance even from the Thracian hords; and marching with the utmost Grecian strength they could assemble, they were so superior by land, that Timotheus found it expedient to imbark and withdraw.

⁶ It is remarkable enough how, in relating these transactions, Demosthenes, the favorite orator and minister of the Athenian democracy, has adopted and encouraged the profligate sentiments of the Athenian democracy. His object being to incense the Athenian people against Charidemus, he has not imputed to him any dishonesty; it sufficed to describe an honorable deed, adverse to the interest of the Athenian republic. It is then perhaps not less remarkable that the fascination of his oratory, even in the dead letter, has wrought upon some modern writers, especially the good Rollin, all the effect that could have been desired upon the Athenian multitude.

It behoved him then to find enterprize within the limits of his commission, and not beyond his means, by which, if possible, he might maintain his credit with his wayward sovereign. Against Olynthus no hope remained; but the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, formerly under the Athenian dominion, afforded some prospect. That rich territory, once held by the celebrated Miltiades, nearly as an independent principality, afterward brought under the direct dominion of the Athenian people by the great Pericles, at this time acknowledged a barbarian sovereign. The principal object of Pericles seems to have been to provide a resource, which the circumstances of the Attic government required, for occasionally disburthening the country of a superfluous growth of free population. For where industry became considered as the virtue of slaves, the number of citizens must necessarily be limited. Many then, who could not, or would not maintain themselves by sober industry at home, might, in the Chersonese, through adventure more suited to their disposition, find subsistence, and some even affluence. Land highly fruitful was nearly open for occupancy; the Thracians valuing it the less, as the Greeks far the more, for being nearly surrounded by the sea. The ready sword indeed was necessary to guard the spot to which value might be given by husbandry; for the Thracian, little solicitous about the possession of land, was in his vocation fighting for plunder. The wants then of warring and mountainous Greece; and especially of rocky and restless Attica, made cultivation profitable, wherever the soil was advantageous for produce, and the situation for export, and means occurred for procuring slaves to perform the labor. It was from the countries around the Chersonese that the Grecian slavemarkets were principally supplied; and inroad, and violence, and surprize, such as, in the course of this history we have had occasion to notice as ordinary with the Greeks, would provide either hands for husbandry, or an object of trade, for which, not in Greece only, but in all the richest countries, within the sphere of Grecian navigation, there was a constant demand. Agriculture, thus, in alliance with commerce, flourished, so that the Chersonese became, next to Eubœa, the chief resource for supplying Athens with bread; and Sestus, the principal port for exportation, was called the corn-bin of Peiræus.

But

Ch. 12. s. 4.

Ch. 18. s. 4.
& ch. 23. s. 5.
of this Hist.Aristot. rhet.
1. 3. c. 10.

But tho the Chersonesites had a double advantage in their peninsular situation, which made the escape of slaves, as well as the approach of hostile armies, difficult, yet, through some deficiency in their policy, they remained always unequal to their own defence against the thirst of plunder and unceasing enmity of the Thracians, from whom their country had been usurped. The gift of independency which, on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, they received from Lacedæmon, brought them shortly in danger of utter ruin; from which they were saved, as we have formerly seen, by the private adventure of a Lacedæmonian exile, Clearchus. That able and enterprizing soldier of fortune being called by more alluring adventure elsewhere, their dangers and sufferings recurred, and again they owed their relief to the voluntary exertion of a Lacedæmonian officer, vested indeed with more regular authority, Dercyllidas. If then the Athenians, when, through Conon's victory, they recovered naval empire, were to require tribute again, nowhere apparently, if protection were duly given in return, might it be required on fairer claim than from the Chersonese; not only as its Grecian inhabitants were mostly settled under Athenian protection, but as they never ceased to want protection. Little able, with their own means, to profit from independency, again restored to them by the peace of Antalcidas, it was fortunate for them that, tho the barbarism of the Thracian people was little improved by any communication with the Greeks, yet the Thracian princes had gained better views of their own interest. They had discovered that more profit might be made by protecting, than by plundering the Grecian settlements on their shores. The Chersonese was, in consequence, without effort, as far as appears, revindicated to the Thracian dominion; and the Grecian towns flourished, while the Thracian monarch drew from their lands a revenue of thirty talents yearly, and from their trade three hundred; making together not less than six hundred thousand pounds sterling.

Ch. 23. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Ch. 24. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Demosth.

This revenue, from a country colonized from Athens, and made effectually Grecian, the Athenians, leaders and people, might not unnaturally see in the hands of a barbarian prince with some mixture
of

of indignation and desire. But the barbarian prince, Cotys, had acquired it apparently as rightfully, at least, as they had ever acquired any dominion beyond Attica; and moreover they had admitted him to alliance with them, and even acknowledged benefits received from him, by the double compliment of associating him in the number of Athenian citizens, and presenting him with a golden crown. It seems probable that Timotheus, however unlimited his commission to prosecute the interests of the Athenian people, was restrained by such considerations; and that two or three seaport towns, which, tho destitute of landforce, he added to the republic's sovereignty, were not torn from the dominion of the Thracian prince.

Demosth. or.
in Aristocr.

With the accomplishment of these acquisitions the term of Timotheus's command appears to have ended. It is remarkable that, as in reporting measures, contrary to all faith, against Macedonia, the orator, tho extolling the deed, has avoided naming the doer, so in reporting similar measures, which followed against the king of Thrace, the name of the officer, directing the business, is omitted. Attempts were made, by the Athenian fleet, to gain some towns from the dominion of Cotys. Iphicrates did not scruple to take the direction of the fleet of the king his brother-in-law, against the officer commanding the fleet of his own country, to oppose them, and he opposed successfully. In the failure, which there has been so often occasion to notice, of historians, we owe some interesting facts to the very profligacy of the times. The orators have little scrupled to avow matters indicating the grossest ill faith in their party, if so the assertion of any claim to have promoted the good of the Athenian people might be assisted. At the same time it appears creditable to a large portion of the Athenian people, in these profligate times, and yet marks a strange versatility and inconsistency in the government, that Iphicrates, who, in the service of a foreign prince, had so opposed the measures of an Athenian ornament, could presently after return to Athens, and without being called to any account for his conduct, resume his former importance there. It seems probable that, against the Thracian towns, as before against the Macedonian, measures were ventured without regular instructions of

Demosth. in
Aristocr.

just authority; and failing of success, it was judged not advisable to stir the question, how they had failed, in fear of exciting the farther question, why they had been undertaken.

Charidemus, with the troops attached to him, lately serving under Iphicrates, had passed into the Olynthian service, and a squadron of ships was intrusted to his command. No battle is noticed by the orator, from whom alone we have the account, when Charidemus was made prisoner by the Athenian fleet. Vengeance against him, as a deserter, apparently might be expected from the sovereign many of Athens, were they still under the same guidance as when he refused to serve under their general Timotheus, and engaged in the service of their enemies, the Olynthians. But, on the contrary, he was presently taken into the republic's service: he was even recommended to the people to be appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace; it was urged in his favor that he alone held that influence with the Amphipolitans, which might draw them from the Olynthian to the Athenian interest, and that he would effectually exert that interest. Not long after, Amphipolis was actually brought over to the Athenian interest; but how, the orator, who desired that Charidemus should have no credit with the Athenian people for it, has avoided to say. It seems likely that Iphicrates was the principal mover, and Charidemus his dexterous instrument. Some treachery to Olynthus is strongly implied in the orator's account; but, according to the principles we find always asserted in his orations, treachery, whence advantage accrued to the Athenian people, was no matter for reproach to any one. That for some service Charidemus was esteemed to have deserved highly of the Athenian people, we have direct information from the orator his violent enemy. Testimonies in his favor, transmitted to Athens by persons in the highest situations in the republic's service, or pronounced by them before the people, were numerous. Accordingly he was rewarded with the freedom of the city: but this, tho probably valuable to him, being become a vulgar honor, he was farther presented with a reward reserved yet, by the custom of the republic, for merit in high station, a golden crown, placed on his head before the assembled people, in pursuance of their decree. He

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 669.

p. 625.

Demosth. in
Aristocr.

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 650. &
659.

was thought worthy of a particular privilege, to which the frequency of the crime of assassination among the Greeks, gave high value; a decree making any person who should attempt his life amenable to the Athenian courts from all the territories of the subject allies of Athens⁷. Little as this may appear among us, or among any, familiar only with the liberal government of modern Europe, it seems to have required a far greater exertion of influence at Athens, and to have been esteemed a much more extraordinary favor, not only than admission to the freedom of the republic, but than the honor of a golden crown.

SECTION V.

Restored Extent of the Athenian Empire. Maladministration of Athens. Growing Oppression of the Allies. Revolt of Rhodes, Cos, Chios, and Byzantium, and War ensuing, commonly called the Social or Confederate War. Revolt of Eubœa: Summary History of Eubœa: Interference of Thebes in Eubœa. Expedition under Timotheus, and liberal Composition of the Affairs of Eubœa. War impending from Macedonia.

Isocr. Areiop. THE empire of the Athenian people was now again approaching the extent which it had obtained before the Peloponnesian war. Their navy was not less preponderant; all the islands of the Ægean were tributary. The cities of the Asiatic main indeed, preferring the more liberal patronage of the Persian satraps, appear to have found that patronage effectual, both for their security and their prosperity, and far more favorable to their civil liberty than their former subjection to the Athenian people. But on the Thracian shore all was subject to Athens except Olynthus, which with the small relics of its confe-

⁷ It is one only among numerous instances of oversight or negligence in Diodorus that he has omitted all mention of so important an occurrence as the recovery of Amphipolis to the dominion or alliance of Athens, tho, in the sequel of his narrative, he speaks of that city as actually recovered.

deracy, maintained a precarious independency: and the towns of the Chersonese, which were under the patronage of the Thracian, nearly as the Asiatic of the Persian king. Toward all these the ambition of the Athenian people was continually excited by the leaders of the high democratical party, and the Chersonese appears to have been the first object.

Demosth. in
Aristocr. &
Olynth. &
περὶ συστάξ. &
Philip.

But with ambition in excess, the republic's affairs were now misconducted in excess. Military commanders of high reputation led its armaments; orators, among the most celebrated of antiquity, were contending for popular favor, and yet who directed the administration does not appear; or rather it appears that there was no regular administration. Never was more complete democracy. Every measure of executive government was brought before the assembled people. Candidates for the first places in public favor were numerous, and none held a decided lead. To flatter the multitude, and to flatter excessively, was the burthensome, disgraceful, and mischievous office principally incumbent upon all. There was a constant canvas for popular favor, which nothing perhaps, in modern Europe, has resembled so nearly as the contest for the representation of a county in England, especially Middlesex. Amid so general and constant a fermentation of the popular mind, which those who have had most experience of contested elections in England will perhaps best, and yet but inadequately conceive, the three great men, whom all the respectable part of the community respected, and whose characters have been transmitted singularly pure from so corrupt and calumnious an age, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, unfortunately were not perfect friends: they did not lead opposite factions, but they seldom completely coalesced in public business. Their influence thus was not what it ought to have been. In public calamity and danger, the public mind would turn to them; but, in prosperity, those who would flatter more were better heard, and public affairs at least appeared yet prosperous.

Xenoph. ut
ant.
Isocrat. ut
ant.
Demosth.
περὶ συστάξ. &
al.

In every Grecian town of the Chersonese, as in Grecian towns everywhere, there would be an Athenian party, or a party ready for any

revolution; but in every town also were those, and perhaps mostly a majority, interested in preserving the actual state of things. Expence then, such as the republic, if not unable, was unwilling to provide, would be necessary for the preparation and maintenance of a force equal to the proposed conquest; for the restless and imperious Many of Athens would neither serve nor pay, but rather require distribution to themselves from the public treasury; and the wealthier Few were constantly, and not unnecessarily, intent upon obviating or evading the evils of the arbitrary and oppressive system of democratical taxation. Even the quiet and cautious Isocrates, who never sought military or civil honors, who had more extensive friendships and fewer interested enmities than perhaps any man of his time, could not avoid the pressure of the tyrannical law of exchange. Under authority of that law, a person, required by a decree of the people to equip a trireme for public service, called upon Isocrates, at the age of eighty-two, to take the burthen from him, or make a complete exchange of property with him. Perhaps Isocrates could afford the expence, better than many others who had been compelled to bear it, and yet possibly not better than the person who brought the action of exchange against him. Isocrates however, as the less evil, took the burthensome office, while the other, such was the inequality of that kind of taxation, escaped, for the time at least, all payment, all risk, and all further trouble.

Isocr. de per-
mut.

A people in the circumstances of the Athenian, possessing power to tax others and spare themselves, would be likely, in the use of such a power, to exceed moderation. When the assembled Many were told that the treasury was empty, they would be indignant, and their indignation was always dangerous. Those who managed the administration at home endeavored to put the blame upon those commissioned to collect tribute from the allies abroad. They said there could be no money in the treasury, if none was brought in. Reproaches and threats then commonly followed against the commanders of the tribute-gathering squadrons. 'If there was not dishonesty,' it was insisted, 'there was negligence. The tribute should be more exactly collected:

Isocr. de
Pace.

{ the

' the requisition should be extended: no state which had any maritime commerce should be excused the payment: free navigation should be allowed to none who refused tribute.'

Against such effusions of popular sovereignty, the party for which Xenophon and Isocrates wrote, and with which Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias acted, vainly remonstrated. On the other side it was urged that 'men whom the people might trust, men of their own sort, ought to command the fleet, and direct the tribute-gathering business.' The people decreed accordingly, and oppression and insult to the allies increased. The commander of the tribute-gathering fleet made his own terms with all the numerous maritime states of the shores of the *Ægean*. Paying him as he required, they were to have protection for their commerce: not so paying, they would be open to depredation from pirates, especially the greatest of pirates, the commander of the Athenian fleet. The peculation was reduced to a system. Every man in the fleet, according to his rank, had regularly his share. The treasury profited little: but every individual seaman being interested in the corruption, and the fleet being a large part of the commonwealth, not only to bring any to punishment was seldom possible, but the peculator, through the interest he acquired by allowing a share in peculation, was generally safer than the honest commander, who would dare to deny to those under him the wages of corruption.

Demosth.

Æsch. Demosth. de Cherson. p. 96.

About six years before the acquisition of Pydna to the Athenian empire, while the extravagance of popular sovereignty was yet restrained by the fear of Thebes, three of the most powerful of the allied states, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, nevertheless feeling the pressure of that sovereignty indignantly, had revolted, as we have formerly seen, against the Athenian, and engaged in the Theban alliance. The same three states now, with the addition of the newly flourishing commonwealth of Cos, united in confederacy to resist a dominion which they considered as intolerably oppressive and degrading; and they engaged in their alliance Mausolus, prince of Caria, who suffered with them from Athenian exactions upon the commerce of his subjects.

Ch. 28. s. 4. of this Hist.

Isocr. de Pace. Diocl. l. 16. c. 21.

B. C. 358. jects. Measures being then concerted, they joined in declaring to the
 Ol. 105. 3. Athenian government, 'that they were resolved thenceforward to
 'protect their own commerce with their own fleets, and wanting thus
 'nothing from the Athenian navy, they should of course pay no more
 'tribute for its support.'

This declaration was as a stunning blow to the public mind at Athens. Felt as an injury it excited indignation; but it excited also universal alarm. The multitude became furious, while the more serious and informed entertained perhaps more apprehension. How to maintain the navy, necessary to the præminence and wealth of the republic, and which that very præminence and wealth made the more necessary to its safety; how either to pay mercenary troops, or persuade the people to take military service upon themselves; how to feed the numbers habituated to profit from the various business of building, fitting, and equipping ships, and to share in the exactions of the commanders; and, what pressed perhaps not less than all these, how to appease or withstand the popular indignation, should the funds fail for public sacrifice and theatrical exhibitions, were considerations urgently interesting all who possessed property at Athens. The circumstances of the moment nevertheless offered what, as the first emotions of alarm subsided, might not only elate the Many, but incourage the ambition of leading men. The power and influence of Athens might be esteemed at this time predominant among the Grecian states. Lacedæmon and Thebes were become inert. The rising means of Olynthus were severely checked by Athenian garrisons almost blockading the city itself; and Macedonia, hardly yet reckoned formidable, was, by the loss of Pydna, nearly deprived of means to communicate with the sea, but at the pleasure of the Athenian people. The interest of a party, powerful among the Many, met these considerations, and the result of popular deliberation was a decree, declaring 'that the rebellion of the allies
 'should be repressed by arms.'

We find it the frequent reproach of Demosthenes to the sovereign people of Athens, that they were quick and spirited in resolving, but

slow and deficient in executing. Little seems to have been done in prosecution of the decree against the rebellious allies, when the alarming intelligence arrived of a revolt still more nearly interesting the commonwealth. Of all dominion beyond the bounds of Attica, that of Eubœa was most important to the Athenian people. On the produce of Eubœa Athens principally depended for subsistence. Nevertheless a civil war among its towns, for some time now going forward, had been little noticed by the Athenian government, perhaps reckoning it rather good policy to leave them at full liberty, if they had no other liberty, to vent their passions and waste their strength against one another. But as soon as it was announced that a Theban force had entered the island, and there was great danger that the whole would be subjected to Thebes, indignation, with alarm, pervaded Athens.

Why the people of Eubœa, the largest island of the Ægean sea, whose principal city, Chalcis, so flourished in the early ages, as to establish, in Italy, Sicily and Thrace, colonies the most numerous of any one Grecian state, were, through all the more splendid times of Greece, mostly in a state of subjugation, and always of insignificance, seems not to be completely accounted for. The form of the country, indeed, was evidently a contributing cause; divided, like the neighboring continent, by lofty mountains into portions not commodiously accessible from each other. Chalcis, on the Euripus, was, from early to late times, the largest and most powerful city, and it maintained generally a fortunate harmony with Eretria, its nearest neighbor, and next to itself in importance. Oreus, at the northwestern, and Carystus at the southeastern end of the island, followed; and tho some smaller towns might claim independency, the whole effectual dominion generally rested with these four. Wars and seditions among the people probably gave occasion to the early colonies from Athens, of which both Chalcis and Eretria are said to have been. Before the first Persian invasion we find the greatest part of Eubœa was under the dominion of Athens. In proof of the importance of that dominion, we have observed Thucydides remarking that when, in the wane of the Athe-

Strab. l. 10.
p. 446, 7, 8.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 691.

Ch. 19. s. 7.
of this Hist.

nian

nian affairs, in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, among the disturbances of the revolution of the Four Hundred, Eubœa revolted, Athens was more agitated than by the news of the destruction of all the best military and naval force of the republic, under Nicias and Demosthenes, in Sicily.

With the reduction of Athens by the Lacedæmonian arms, Eubœa became of course, with all Greece, dependent on Lacedæmon; but after Conon's victory at Cnidus, it reverted again to the dominion of Athens. The rise of Thebes to eminence among the Grecian states, gave much occasion to division among the Eubœan cities, but little to any assertion of independency. Bordering as Eubœa was on Bœotia, divided from it only by a water at times fordable, the discontented under Athenian sovereignty would of course look to Thebes for patronage. Connection between some of the Eubœan towns and Thebes, appears to have been of long standing. So early as toward the beginning of the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, we have seen a party in Oreus faithful even to Thebes in distress, and prevailing even while a Lacedæmonian garrison held their citadel. With the advancement then of the Theban power, under Pelopidas and Epameinondas, when Theban patronage became extensively desired among the Grecian states, Theban influence spread over all Eubœa. It had been under the patronage of the Athenian democracy that Themison of Eretria became the leading man of that city, with power so preponderant and lasting, that, with some Grecian writers, he had the title of tyrant of Eretria. Nevertheless, when the Theban democracy undertook the patronage of those Athenian citizens whom the Athenian democracy had driven into banishment, Themison, in concert with the Theban government, assisted the exiles to get possession of Oropus, an Attic town on the confines of Bœotia, which they continued to hold under the protection of Thebes. Afterward, however, when Thebes became less able to protect and Athens more able to revenge, Themison seems to have had the skill to make his peace with the Athenian government, so that Eretria returned quietly to its former dependency on Athens, tho Oropus remained under the dominion of Thebes.

But

B. C. 357.
Ol. 100. 4.
Ch. 26. s. 8.
• of this Hist.

Xen. H. 1.
l. 7. c. 5.
s. 4.

Æschin. con
Ctesiph.
p. 478. t. 3.
ed. Reiske.

Ch. 28. s. 3.
• of this Hist.

But when the revolt took place among the allies, on the eastern side of the Ægean, Eubœa was ripe for a similar measure. The troublesome and dangerous sea between them, however, with the command which the Athenian navy held in it, made communication difficult, and mutual support uncertain. The Eubœans therefore negotiated with Thebes; fallen indeed since the death of Epameinondas, yet still in power and reputation considerable. The passage of the narrow strait separating Eubœa from Bœotia was easy. A Bœotian force was welcomed by the two principal cities, Chalcis and Eretria; and, tho there was, in every town, an Athenian party, yet the revolters had the superiority throughout the island.

On news of this rebellion, the Athenian people being hastily summoned, consternation and dismay pervaded the assembly. The usually forward talkers, accustomed to accuse the best men of the republic, and arrogantly to claim all political wisdom and probity to themselves, fearing now to be silent, yet feared to speak. Such circumstances invite and urge forward conscious worth. Timotheus, so often the leader of the republic's forces to victory, the surety of its faith in negotiation, diffident generally and backward in debate, now mounted the speaker's stand. 'What!' said he (we may perhaps trust Demosthenes for the words, which he probably heard) 'are the Thebans in the island, and is there a question what should be done? Will you not cover the sea with your ships? Will you not, breaking up instantly this assembly, hasten to Peiræus and go aboard?'

Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 108.

This energetic address, from a man so respected, surprized the people into animation and energy; for so only now could the Athenian government be directed. The wisdom of the ablest, in cool argument, availed nothing: sober reason were in vain applied to: the fate of the republic depended on the popular passion that could be in the moment excited. Fortunately the quick and just judgement of Timotheus, which could excite the feeling that the moment required, was able also to conduct it to its proper end. Of the animating speech, reported by the greatest of the cotemporary orators, the fortunate result remains reported in panegyrical strain by his principal rival. 'Only five days,'

says

Æschin. con.
Ctesiph.
p. 179.

says Æschines, 'after the Theban forces landed in Eubœa, the Athenians were there. Within thirty the Thebans were compelled to a capitulation, under which they quitted the island; and the Athenian democracy gave freedom to the Eubœan towns, which it was the purpose of the Theban democracy to enslave.'

Diod. l. 16.
c. 7.

We shall be aware that a Theban orator would have given a different turn to his account of the same transactions. If his candor, or the notoriety of the facts compelled him to admit all the success that the Athenian orator claimed for the Athenian arms, he would still have asserted the good principle of his own and the bad of the Athenian democracy; he would have contended that the Thebans, solicited by the Eubœans themselves, went to restore to them the freedom which the Athenians had oppressed. For the real character of the Eubœan war, the account of Diodorus may deserve attention; apt as he is to be misled by party-writers, but least disposed to partiality where the Theban and Athenian democracies were in opposition. 'The Eubœans,' he says, 'torn by faction, called in, some the Thebans, some the Athenians. War pervaded the island, in little conflicts, without any general action. After much slaughter on both sides, and war carried into every part of the country, the people, hardly at length admonished by their sufferings, settled into concord, and made peace with one another. The Bœotians then withdrew, and interfered in their affairs no more.'

p. 253, 4.

Comparing this account with what remains from the orators, we may gather that, while the Eubœans contended only among themselves, the Athenian government, as we have observed before, was little solicitous about the event. Like some of the modern, or, rather, late Italian governments, as amends for the want of other liberty, it indulged the people in that of killing one another. But as soon as the Thebans interfered, jealousy became at once violent. Under the wise guidance of Timotheus, however, preponderancy being restored to the Athenian interest, the Theban troops were reduced to such straits, without any military action that caught much the common eye, as to be glad to have means, under a capitulation, to leave the island. The

Strab. &
Plut.

liberality

liberality then, shown toward the vanquished party of the Eubœans, is eulogized by both the orators. Apparently the popular temper, chastened by alarms and dangers, restrained the noisy adventurers in the field of oratory, and allowed a just influence to the magnanimity and humanity of Timotheus. It was settled, that every town should acknowledge, as formerly, a political subjection to Athens, and, for the benefit of protection against each other, as well as against foreigners, pay a tribute, but of fixed amount; that, for the purpose of a regular and just superintendency of the general concerns of the island, every town should send its representative to reside at Athens, and attend the council and assemblies, as occasion might be; but, for the management of affairs merely civil, each was to preserve its former constitution, and its own independent administration. All then being highly jealous of one-another, and the governing party in every one jealous of another party among their fellowcitizens, all conscious of the want of a superintending power, and no other more desirable and sufficiently powerful appearing, all were led to attach themselves again, by a subjection in a great degree voluntary, to the imperial democracy of Athens.

Thus the most pressing of the dangers, which had threatened the republic, was averted, and hope began again to soar high in the popular mind. Nothing was seen remaining to prevent the direction of the full force of the state against the contumacious allies, whose resistance, hitherto so distressing, could not, it was supposed, then be maintained much longer. They being subdued, not only the empire of the Athenian people might resume its former extent and splendor, but the public view might, with fair expectation of success, be extended to farther conquest. Such, as the cotemporary patriot Isocrates informs us, were the intemperate purposes which a large part of the ill-judging multitude were, at this season, led to hold. On the return of the force under Timotheus, from its truly glorious expedition, the city was given up to gladness, and the greetings on the joyful occasion were still going forward, when the vain hopes of the ambitious were checked, and the just gratification of the more moderate turned again to

Demosth. de
cor.
Æsch. ut
ant.

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.

anxiety and apprehension. Ministers arrived from Amphipolis with the alarming news, that Olynthus and Macedonia were united in confederacy, to carry their arms against that favorite colony of the Athenian people, so recently recovered to their dominion, and that it must fall, without that speedy support which they were sent to supplicate.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Affairs of ATHENS and MACEDONIA, from the Renewal of Hostility between them, to the End of the War between the ATHENIANS and their Allies, called the Confederate or Social War.

SECTION I.

Alliance of Macedonia with Olynthus against Athens. Negotiation between Athens, Macedonia and Olynthus. Hostilities prosecuted. Successes of the Allies.

IN all Grecian history there is scarcely any period more interesting than that with which we are now engaged, and for that interesting period we are almost without an antient historian. The Sicilian annalist, Diodorus, fuller on the concerns of his native island, assists, for the general history of Greece, principally by the ground he affords for connection and arrangement of materials given by others, especially the orators, but even for this he often fails. Occasional assistance we gain from Plutarch, but the orators furnish incomparably the richest mine. The testimony of an orator however must be received with much caution. For facts indeed, of general notoriety among those before whom he spoke, his first object, persuasion, would generally forbid gross falshood. But, whatever he might venture to disguise would receive a coloring from the purpose of his argument: where he might venture to feign, even fiction may be suspected. Toward ascertaining truth, adverse orators, in the scanty opportunities offering, should be compared; the course of events, the character of the times, the characters of parties, the character of the orator himself, his purpose in the moment, and the opportunity for answering him, should be considered. The task indeed of the modern

writer, on this portion of history, thus becomes laborious, and sometimes, from an unsatisfactory result after all labor, irksome; but to do any justice to the subject it must be undertaken. Those who, like Rollin, and some others, give intire confidence to Demosthenes, may produce an amusing romance, with touching panegyric and invective, but their narrative will be very wide of réal history¹.

The war against Olynthus, prosecuted with such advantage to Athens, while she had the benefit of coöperation from the Macedonian arms, had nearly slept since that coöperation had been repelled by the insolently injurious aggression at Pydna. The situation of Macedonia meanwhile was such as could not but excite apprehension and anxiety in its government, and among its people. After having lost Pydna, its last seaport, it had seen Amphipolis pass, from the alliance of Olynthus, under the dominion of Athens. We find Demosthenes rating the importance of Amphipolis to the welfare of Macedonia very high. 'While the Athenians,' he said, 'held Amphipolis and Potidæa, the king of Macedonia could not reckon himself safe in his own house.' When with Amphipolis and Potidæa then, Methonë and Pydna also were subject to Athens, and all the rest of the Macedonian coast was held by the Olynthians, against whom he had waged war for Athens, the danger to himself and to his people must have been great indeed.

It was scarcely possible for two powers more to have interests unavoidably interfering, jealousies in consequence necessary and extreme, hostile disposition therefore ever ready, and réal conciliation impracticable, than Macedonia and Olynthus: they were as Scotland formerly and England, or even worse: they must be completely united, or ever hostile. As then Olynthus was in a way to be subdued by Athens, but not to be united with Macedonia, and, in subjection to the Athenian

¹ One cannot but wonder in what confidence Rollin has represented even the private character of Demosthenes good and even perfect. Auger, whose translation of the orators has obtained wide estimation, eulogizing, after the manner which is not new with the French school, the politics of Demosthenes, and reckoning him a

consummate patriot, admits, tho with professed regret, that his private character did not assort with his public reputation: 'Je suis fâché (he says) pour l'honneur de Demosthene, qu'il nous ait laissé lui-même des preuves de sa mauvaise foi, & de son défaut de probité.' Note on his translation of the speech on the Embassy, p. 230.

empire would be still more dangerous than in independency, it seems to have been fortunate for Macedonia, that the Athenian government, by conduct apparently little less impolitic than profligate, prepared the way for what was of all things most desirable, but otherwise most impracticable. Terms of alliance with the Macedonian kingdom, which the ambition of the Olynthian leaders, in the prosperity of their confederacy would have scorned, were looked upon, in the present pressure, with more complacency. Philip used the open opportunity. Peace was made between the two governments, and an alliance followed, the express purpose of which was to profit from the existing embarrassment of the Athenians, in unsuccessful war against their allies, for driving them intirely from the shores of Macedonia and western Thrace.

Diod. l. 16.
 c. 8.
 B. C. 357.
 Ol. 105. 3.

This alliance appears to have been a complete surprize upon the administration of Athens; who seem to have depended upon the speculation, that friendly connection between Macedonia and Olynthus was impossible. The occasion was fair for reproach to that party which had so embroiled the republic, and great contention of oratory insued. Of the particulars no information remains; but we find that the result was not altogether favorable to those who, by the nefarious aggression at Pydna, had forced a valuable ally to become a dangerous enemy. Tho not driven from their leading situation, they were either unable, or, in the existing circumstances, fearful to follow up their own measures; which nevertheless they would not abandon. The decree which the sovereign multitude was at length persuaded to ratify, declared, 'That no military force should at present be diverted from the important purpose of reducing the rebellious allies; but that negotiation be entered upon for obviating the injury threatened by the Olynthians and Macedonians.'

Demosth.
 Ol. 2. p. 19

In pursuance of this decree, ministers were sent into Macedonia; and, in return, ministers came both from Macedonia and Olynthus. The Macedonians appear to have been received with some due respect; but the spirit of freedom, in the republicans of Olynthus, was ill accommodated to the spirit of dominion in the republicans of Athens. These, holding the Olynthians themselves as rebellious subjects, heard with

Demosth.
 Olynth. 2
 p. 19.

scorn

Theopomp.
ap. Ulpian.
& Suid.

scorn the arguments of their ministers in favor of the freedom of Amphipolis, decreed by successive congresses of the Greek nation. Philip's ministers are said to have proposed that the Macedonian forces should be withdrawn from Amphipolis, provided Pydna were restored to Macedonia. The Athenian administration however coming to no conclusion, yet pressing for a cessation of hostilities, Philip declared, in a letter to the Athenian people, if an oration of the time, transmitted among those of Demosthenes, may be trusted, 'that he would 'conquer Amphipolis for them².' But the orator has carefully avoided notice of stipulations, which Philip, taught by experience, when he conquered Potidæa and Toronë for them, would hardly fail now to annex to such a promise. The proposals however, of which the orator has avoided an account, appear to have excited serious attention, and produced much discussion. But the party, bent upon war and conquest, provided that decision should be delayed, while ministers from the republic went again into Macedonia; and, they naming the ministers, nothing was concluded³.

Meanwhile measures were put forward by the Macedonians and Olynthians for confirming their alliance, of the need of which the circumstances of their unsuccessful negotiation at Athens had afforded abundant proof. In this business we find Philip still pur-

² The character of the oration on Halonessus, in which this is found, will occur for future notice.

³ Should the reader, having perchance looked at the account of these negotiations in Rollin's antient history or in Leland's life of Philip, suppose that I have not related them so fully and clearly as antient authorities would warrant, and especially that I have been deficient in exposing the wiles and falshood of Philip, I would request him to look into Demosthenes, rather certainly into the original, but even Leland's translation, and see whether even Leland's Demosthenes will warrant half what is to be found in Leland's life of Philip, for which the authority of Demosthenes is there claimed. The good sense,

and even perspicacity, which Rollin has shown in treating the early part of Grecian history, seem to have been bewildered when he lost those invaluable guides, the cotemporary historians. For Sicilian history he has bowed to Plutarch, and for Macedonian he has been imbued with all the venom that Demosthenes could have wished to infuse into the Athenian multitude. Demosthenes himself is no such unfair historian. His credit and the ready means for conviction forbid. Guarding only against the fascination of his coloring, for facts necessarily of public notoriety we may trust him generally; the occasion will occur in the sequel to notice some important and curious exceptions.

suing that system of liberality approaching extravagance, by which we have seen him accomplishing his first connection with Athens, and persevering while Athens allowed the connection to hold. Anthemus, a principal town of Macedonia, in the neighborhood of Olynthus, had formerly, in the early part of the reign of Amyntas, been among those which renounced their connection with the distracted kingdom, to join the then flourishing Olynthian confederacy. On the dissolution of that confederacy it was restored to the kingdom, of which, before its defection, it had been a member from time immemorial. Philip now, resigning his right of dominion, allowed it to become again a member of the confederacy of which Olynthus was again the head⁴. The knowledge of a strong predilection among the Anthemuntines for the Olynthian connection, was probably among Philip's inducements to such a concession.

Demosth.
Philipp. II.
p. 70.

On the other hand we are told that, among the Amphipolitans, there was a Macedonian party of such fervent zeal, that they paid divine honors to Philip, as a hero or demigod, the lineal descendant of the god Hercules. Among parties, extravagance is apt to be mutual: a beginning on one side excites it on the other. Where it began among the Amphipolitans we are without information; but it seems to have pervaded them. The party adverse to the Macedonian interest, holding the principal power in the city, proceeded to violences, which are no otherwise described by the historian than as very offensive, and giving large and repeated provocation for the direction of the Macedonian arms against them. Hence apparently, omitting, for the present, the nearer concerns of Potidæa, Methonë and Pydna, the united arms of Macedonia and Olynthus were directed against Amphipolis.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.

For this interesting period much of our information comes from most consummate politicians, the Athenian orators; but we wholly want for it writers with the military knowledge, as well as the candid impartiality, of Thucydides and Xenophon. We learn however that the art of sieges had been much improved since the Peloponnesian war. Battering engines, then little known, or, from inartificial construction and unskilful application, little efficacious, were now brought to consider-

⁴ Thus I think the orator's phrase, *ἀνθιμουῖτα μὲν αὐτοῖς ἡφίει*, may be, with most exactness, represented.

able perfection and into extensive use. The siege of Amphipolis being formed, by the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia, under the orders of the Macedonian king, battering engines were applied against the walls, and a breach was soon made. Some bloody assaults followed. According to Diodorus, the town was taken by storm. The cotemporary orator's words indicate a capitulation; where, his purpose being to excite odium against both Philip and the Amphipolitans of the Macedonian and Olynthian party, he attributes the loss of the place to treachery. The fact, as far as we may best gather it, seems to have been that, when, after repeated assaults at the breach, defence became at length desperate, the leaders of the Athenian party could no longer hold their authority over the Many, less deeply interested in the event. The friends of Macedonia and Olynthus then, regarded as those who alone could avert impending destruction, acquired a leading influence; and the surrender of course followed, which the orator, pleader for the Athenian interest, equally of course called treachery.

On this occasion the humanity and the magnanimous liberality, which had before shone in Philip's conduct, were again conspicuous. Executions, so common among the Greeks, and not least among the Athenians, were totally avoided. The violent only of the Athenian party either were banished, because they could not be safely trusted in the place, or voluntarily withdrew, because they could not trust themselves among their fellowcitizens. According to Philip's custom, all prisoners of war were freely dismissed. None of the remaining inhabitants suffered for party opinions or past conduct. The king's usually engaging affability and civility were extended to all; but those who had exerted themselves in the Macedonian cause were rewarded with marked attention. In uniting Amphipolis to the Macedonian kingdom, no violence appears to have been put upon its municipal constitution: it became a member of the Macedonian state nearly as our colonies, holding their several constitutions, are members of the British empire.

The necessary arrangements being made in Amphipolis, Philip marched to Pydna. A large party there had remained attached to the Macedonian connection, and with this party matters had been so prepared, that the Macedonian army no sooner appeared before the town

town than the gates were opened. This important place being thus easily recovered to his kingdom, Philip proposed, without delay, to employ his military force and his military abilities where the interest of his new allies—the Olynthians most pressingly wanted them. In conjunction with the Olynthian forces he formed the siege of Potidaea. A majority of the people were enough dissatisfied with Athenian sovereignty to have renewed, long ago, their connection with Olynthus, but that an Athenian garrison restrained them. Presently therefore after the united forces of Olynthus and Macedonia appeared before the place, the Athenians and their friends found themselves obliged to seek personal safety, by withdrawing into the citadel. The town immediately opened its gates to the besiegers, and the citadel, being invested, was soon reduced to surrender at discretion.

We have many times seen, and we shall again have occasion to see, how very wretched, among the Grecian republics, commonly, was the condition of prisoners of war, and how deplorable the lot of a town taken. The elder Dionysius had been giving examples of liberality and clemency, not only in foreign but even in civil war, scarcely heard of before among the Greeks. This is so uncontested, that it may seem to have been in envy of his superior character that his reputation has been otherwise so traduced. Philip, who appears at least to have equalled him in nobleness of sentiment and conduct, has met with nearly an equal share of such malice. The clearest courage, and extraordinary military talents have been his undisputed merits; yet, in the checkered accounts of him, his generous anxiety to obviate, by a liberal policy, the necessity for using arms, so shines through all the clouds of party invective, that it seems to have been really the more prominent part of his character. Conceding Potidaea, with all its appurtenances, to the Olynthians, he was careful to require that the Athenian prisoners should be his; aware how necessary his interference would be against the revenge of the Potidaeans of the party adverse to Athens, who had been held in a subjection so severe, that we find it marked by a term implying subjection approaching to slavery. Philip not only gave his prisoners present security, but liberally supplied their wants, and then, without requiring anything of the ransom, which we have seen

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.
p. 19, 20, &
in Art. to r.
p. 100.

the republics, in their utmost liberality to prisoners of war, requiring of one another, he furnished conveyance for them to Athens¹.

¹ Modern writers have sometimes made antient history wonderful, on the claimed authority of antient writers, who really give them no warrant for miracles. Thus Leland, in his life of Philip, says, 'The Amphipolitans were obliged to surrender themselves to the mercy of the conqueror, whom they had provoked by an obstinate defence, tho, by an unaccountable inconsistency of conduct, they continued to pay him divine honors.' The wonder will vanish when it is observed there were at least two, but rather three or even four parties in Amphipolis. Diodorus, tho not always so clear and explanatory as might be wished, has given here all necessary explanation: *Ταὺς μὲν (τῶν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν) ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς αὐτὸν (τὸν Φίλιππον) διακείμενους ἐφογάδεις, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις φιλανθρώπως προσπνέχον.* It is obvious that the *ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς αὐτὸν διακείμενοι* would not be those who paid him divine honors, and that the *ἄλλοι* were not those who obstinately resisted him.

But, tho Leland seems to have resigned his judgement often most weakly to the presumptuous liveliness of his French predecessor in the history of Philip, yet we sometimes find from him sober criticism, apparently his own, which does him credit. 'The revolt of Pydna,' he says, 'afforded Philip a fair occasion of marching against that city, to reduce it to his obedience. The siege was formed, and the Pydnians, unsupported by their new sovereigns' (the Athenian people) 'were soon obliged to surrender. Libanius and Aristides have both asserted that, at the very time when the people were performing those solemn rites, by which the terms of their capitulation were ratified, Philip ordered his soldiers to fall on them without mercy, and thus cruelly massacred a considerable

number of the citizens. But such an instance of barbarity would not, it may reasonably be presumed, have been omitted by Demosthenes, who represented all the actions of this prince in the blackest light; nor is it at all consistent with the tenor of his actions: for, altho his humanity was, on many occasions, made to yield to his policy' (even for this accusation, however, I must say I know not what good authority is to be found) 'yet unnecessary barbarity was neither consistent with his temper nor his interest. It seems therefore more reasonable to suppose that he accepted the submission of the inhabitants without inflicting any extraordinary severities, and without disgracing his present to the Olynthians, to whom he now gave up Pydna, by putting them in possession of a city depopulated, and polluted by the blood of helpless wretches, who had laid down their arms and yielded themselves to his mercy.' Leland's life of Philip, book 1. sect. 2.

It is enough indicated by Demosthenes that Pydna was recovered to the Macedonian kingdom through a party among the people, without any great effort in arms. That no execution of rebels, whom all law and policy would condemn, followed, were too much to conclude from the meer silence of one habituated, like Demosthenes, to the operation of the cruel law of treason of the Athenian and other surrounding republics; but that the report of Aristides and Libanius, if even it had such executions for some foundation, was grossly exaggerated, Leland seems with good reason to have judged. Demosthenes, who, with all his fire and vehemence, was a wise and discreet speaker, would not risk the assertion of falsehoods such as Aristides, who had less enmence to

fall

SECTION II.

Cotys, King of Thrace. Expedition of Philip into Thrace. Acquisition and improved Management of the Thracian Gold-mines. Affairs of Thessaly. Liberal Conduct of Philip in Thessaly, and Advantages insuing.

By these rapid measures the scheme of offensive operations, concerted between the Macedonian and Olynthian governments, was completed. The Athenian republic was deprived of every tributary dependency on the northern shore of the Ægean, from the border of Thessaly to the Thracian Chersonese; unless some small seaports, strong on the land-side by situation, and subsisting either by commerce or piracy, might

fall from, might hazard; but he was most ingenious in the use of hints and half-sayings, to raise or to confirm scandalous reports that might promote his purposes, without incurring the imputation of asserting falsely. Such we find concerning those who served Philip's cause at Amphipolis and at Pydna: Καὶ ὥσπερ (ὡς Ὀλύνθιοι) ἂν τ' Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοὺς παραδόχους ἀλλὰ τὴν πόλιν, καὶ Πυδναίων τοὺς ἐποδίζαμένους. Olynth. I. p. 10. 'The Olynthians know what he did to those 'Amphipolitans who surrendered their town 'to him, and to those Pydneans who admitted his troops.' If by such hints he could excite any mistrust of Philip's frequent friendly proposals to the Athenian people, or obviate, in any degree, his growing popularity, it would be so much gained to his cause, without risk. On this indeterminate phrase of Demosthenes seems to have been founded the story that Plutarch has preserved, of merit for its moral tendency, tho utterly unlikely to be true. The Macedonian soldiers, says the biographer, reviled the Amphipolitans, who surrendered their town, with the name of traitors. The Amphipolitans complaining to Philip of this, he

told them 'they must not mind it: his soldiers were plain men, who always called 'things by their names.' The inconsistency of this with the deep and unremitted policy so frequently attributed to Philip, is obvious. But as the plain account of Diodorus, compared with all that remains from the orators, leaves no room for doubt but that it was a party from of old friendly to the Macedonian interest, that delivered Amphipolis to Philip, it does not appear that the imputation of treachery could at all attach upon them.

Leland has followed the common reading of the passage of Diodorus, which says that Philip gave Pydna to the Olynthians. But the supposition of Barbeyrac and Wesseling, that Pydna has, in that place, been inserted, by the carelessness of transcribers, for Potidæa, is so warranted by Gemistius Pletho, by the scholiast on Demosthenes, citing Theopompus, and even by Demosthenes himself, who, in the second Philippic (p. 70.) mentions Anthemus and Potidæa as given by Philip to the Olynthians, without any notice of Pydna, that I have no scruple in following their proposed correction.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 8.
B. C. 356.
Ol. 105. 3.

find it necessary yet to respect the Athenian navy, and hope it needless to respect any other power. Meanwhile the Athenians had made no progress in their distressing war with their allies. Philip therefore proceeded to use the leisure, which the embarrassment of that war to the Athenian government afforded him, for improving the acquisitions he had made; and he directed his attention particularly toward those gold-mines, which seem to have given Amphipolis, in the eyes of the Athenians themselves, its principal value.

The Amphipolitans, even when supported by a close political connection with Olynthus, yet always threatened by the claims and growing power of Athens, appear to have been either unable or fearful to profit from the riches, which the mountains of their neighborhood contained. In this neglect of the mines by others, the people of the island of Thasus, their first Grecian possessors, again directed adventure to them, and had now a factory there. It seems probable (for, in the loss of the many Grecian histories of the time, we are reduced to rest upon probability) that the Thasians purchased the forbearance, and perhaps the protection of the nearest Thracian princes, by the payment of a tribute. Thus the Thracian mines, in the hands of the people of Thasus, would produce a profit to those princes, which would never have accrued through their own people; and here appears probable ground for the war, which Grecian writers report to have ensued, without noticing its cause, between the king of Macedonia, and the sovereign of all the Thracian hords, the successor of Scuthes, Sitacees, and Teres, whom those writers have described by the name of Cotys⁶.

Ch. 23. c. 6.
of this Hist.

This prince is said, first among the Thracian kings, to have deviated from the antient rough way of living of his nation, of which we have seen an authentic picture from Xenophon, and to have set

⁶ The king of Macedonia, in his letter to the Athenian people, extant among the works of Demosthenes, calls his prince Sitacees. Whether Sitacees or Cotys may have been either name or title, or whether the Thracians may have borne several names, as the antient Romans, or several titles, as among the modern orientals, or what else may have occasioned the variety in the appellation, is fortunately of little consequence, the person being sufficiently ascertained under either name.

the example of a soft and enervating luxury. His purpose, however, altogether seems to have been good; he desired to improve the ignorance and rudeness of his people, by introducing Grecian science and arts among them. But, whether aware of the gross corruption of Grecian manners, and the extreme evils of Grecian politics, or habitually disliking confinement within the walls of a town, the favorite scenes of his luxury, and even of the conviviality, in which, after the disposition of his nation, he delighted, were the banks of rapid streams among shady woods, chosen, as the account indicates, with taste and judgement, and improved at great expence by art; probably Grecian art, having been what Greeks might admire. The misfortune of a supervening derangement of understanding, rather than any original deficiency, seems early to have checked his improvements and thrown his government into confusion. He is said to have fancied himself inamored of the goddess Minerva, and sometimes to have supposed her his bride. Athens, as her favorite seat, had a large share of his respect; and his disordered imagination led him to insist that he would wait at table upon his brother-in-law Iphierates, the general of the armies of her people. These anecdotes, from a cotemporary, tho given to the fabulous, are probably not wholly unfounded. Another from a far more respectable cotemporary, may deserve attention, as it marks both the character of Cotys and that of the government of the Grecian commercial colonies; showing the freedom of those colonies, while tributary to the Thracian prince, and expecting protection from him. Wanting money to raise a force of mercenary troops, Cotys applied to the rich citizens of the commercial town of Perinthus, on the Propontis, for a loan⁷. This being refused, he requested that the Perinthians would undertake to garrison some towns for him, so that he might safely withdraw his own troops, for the service for which he would otherwise want the new levy. The Perinthians, thinking they saw here opportunity for advantage with little hazard, consented: once in possession of the towns, they would keep them, or be paid their own price for restoring them. Perinthian citizens accordingly marched

Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 12. p. 531.

Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 4. p. 131.

Aristot.
Oecon. l. 2.

⁷ That Perinthus was among the tributary towns of the dominion of Cotys, is marked by Demosthenes, in the or. ag. Aristocr. p. 674, 675.

to the several places. But Cotys obviated the perfidy by concealing an overbearing force in every town, so that the Perinthians, on entering, were made his prisoners. The plan being everywhere successfully executed, he sent information to the Perinthian government, that he had no purpose of injury to them or their fellow-citizens; if they would remit him the loan he had desired, all should be released. Thus he obtained the money, and, on his side, was faithful to his bargain.

Plut.
apophth.

Cotys however was no emulator of the military virtues of his ancestors. When Philip invaded the Thracian territory, if we may believe Plutarch for the anecdote, Cotys fled, and wrote him a letter. Probably Teres and Sitalces could not write. The simple mention of a letter from Cotys is said to have excited wonder and ridicule among the Macedonians, already beginning to esteem themselves a superior people. Of its contents we are no farther informed than that they drew a smile from the polite Philip, who proceeded unopposed to Onocarsis, one of the Thracian prince's favorite forest residences, on which much expence had been bestowed, and still found no resistance prepared. His object then being not to oppress a weak prince, or conquer a wild country, but only to provide security for that territory in the neighborhood of Amphipolis, containing mines of the precious metals, which he reckoned, as the Athenians had reckoned them, an appendage of his new acquisition, he turned his march to Crendæ.

Deod. l. 16.
c. 8.

It would be under the impression rather of an opinion of possible future advantage, than in any expectation of great immediate profit, that Philip proceeded, with his usual discernment and his usual liberality, to take measures for an improved management of that much coveted possession. No way oppressing the Thasian settlers, he provided for them the protection, which they were likely to want, against the fierce votaries of Mars and Bellona around them, and which they might be still more anxious to have against the abler conduct of the tribute-gathering generals of Athens. By encouragement, he added greatly to the population of the place; and, as a pledge of future attention, he gave it, from his own name, that new appellation of Philippi, under which it acquired fame, some ages after,
through

through the decision of the fate of the civilized world, by the victory which Octavius and Antony obtained there, over Brutus and Cassius.

It was not without great expence that he improved the manner of working the mines. The abundance of subterranean waters, increasing, as the veins of ore were pursued deeper, had confined the scanty means of the Thasians to superficial labors, and to adventure daily less promising. In the want of the astonishing powers of the steam-engine, which give such advantages to the modern miner, Philip did what might be done by the best mechanical art of his age, assisted by numerous hands. With well-directed perseverance, he is said so to have succeeded at length, as to draw from his Thracian mines a revenue of a thousand talents, nearly two hundred thousand pounds, yearly. Small as this sum appears now for great political purposes, the Thracian mines seem supposed by some later antient writers, and have been more confidently asserted by some modern, to have furnished a revenue sufficient to give him a preponderancy among the potentates of his time. But, from mention of the Macedonian revenue remaining from Demosthenes, it appears that the king of Macedonia, at least till late in his reign, could not be a very wealthy prince; and that the produce of the Thracian mines never made any very considerable part of his revenue. The customs of some seaports in Thessaly are mentioned as an important source: even his share of prizes made by his cruisers was considerable to him; but of the mines no notice of any cotemporary orator is found. Importance is attributed by Demosthenes to the possession of Amphipolis, only for the security of Macedonia. Indeed it is obvious that, tho the produce might be considerable in the end, the expence, at first, would greatly reduce, or perhaps even overbear the profit; and after all, possibly, the plain between the mountains and the sea, one of the most extensive and fertile of that fine part of the world, when duly cultivated under the protection of a benign and steadily government, would be a more valuable accession to the Macedonian kingdom, than the mines at their utmost improvement.

In the next spring, while the Athenians were still engaged in doubtful war with those Grecian republics which they called rebellious allies, and at the same time distracted by contests of their orators at home,

Diod. ut ant.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.
p. 15.

Demosth.
Phil II.
p. 70.

B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. 4.

CH. 34. s. 2.
of this Hist.

CH. 34. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Ch. 34. s. 2.
of this Hist.

home, affairs in Thessaly called the attention of the king of Macedonia. We have seen his father, Amyntas, owing his throne to his hereditary interest among the principal families of that productive country, and his eldest brother, Alexander, repaying the obligation by protecting those families against the tyranny of the tagus, Alexander of Pella. During the insuing troubles of Macedonia, the tagus had again extended his authority, among the townships where it had been reduced to constitutional, or perhaps narrower than constitutional bounds. With the restoration of tyrannical power, grievances were renewed and augmented: insomuch that the crime, by which the tagus perished, gave general satisfaction, and a momentary popularity accrued to the assassins. But the supreme dignity, to which they succeeded, hazardous in the best-balanced government, would, in the defective constitution of Thessaly, be hazardous in extreme. To carry the necessary authority, and hold with it popular favor, would require the greatest talents united with the greatest prudence. The new tagus, Tisiphonus, and his brother Lycophron, who is said to have shared his authority, were soon found not less tyrants, tho far less able rulers, than Alexander. The Alevads, whom we have had occasion already to notice, connected by hereditary hospitality and intercourse of good offices, and, as they flattered themselves, by blood, with the Macedonian kings, looked with satisfaction toward one in whose conduct, with uncommon vigor and uncommon prudence, had been seen united such uncommon liberality as in that of Philip. They solicited his assistance, and he marched to their relief.

We have now seen too much of the Athenian democracy to be surprized that it should make common cause with the worst tyrants that ever oppressed a Grecian people. Nevertheless we must recollect that, in Athens, were always two or more parties, and that not all Athenians, and often not a real majority, approved the profligate measures, for which the authority of the sovereign people was in legal course procured. Often also the government became, through imposition upon the folly of the sovereign Many, so implicated, that the best citizens would be at a loss to decide between what its necessities, in the actual state of things, required, and what should have been done

in circumstances of freer choice. The power of the king of Macedonia, growing, in a manner, out of the injustice of Athens, was becoming an object of jealousy perhaps not wholly unreasonable. That party which had excited the injurious conduct toward him, professing to be the high democratical party, watchful of course of all his measures, led the people to vote assistance to the Thessalian tyrants against him; but they were unable to procure effect to that vote, and none was sent. Diodorus, whose account receives support even from the hostile orator, relates what followed thus: 'Philip,' he says, 'marching into Thessaly, defeated the tyrants; and acquiring thus freedom for the cities, he showed a liberality which so attached the Thessalians, that, in all his following wars and political contests, they were his zealous assistants, and continued such afterward to his son.' Tisiphonus and Lycophron continued to hold the chief authority in Pheræ; but in Pharsalus and Larissa, the principal seats of the Alevads, and nearly throughout the rest of Thessaly, the king of Macedonia was thenceforward looked to as the protector of the constitution of the country⁸.

Demosth.

Diod. l. i6, c. 14.

SECTION III.

Affairs of Thrace. Different Views of Parties in Athens concerning Forein Interests. Measures for recovering the Dominion of the Thracian Chersonese. Charidemus of Eubœa, Citizen of Athens, and Son-in-law of the King of Thrace. Assassination of the King of Thrace, approved and rewarded by the Athenian People.

THE Athenians had now been engaged two years in war with their allies, upon terms so equal, and with consequences so little striking, that no account of the transactions has been transmitted. Indeed the ambition and avarice of the people seems to have been so variously

⁸ Demosthenes himself has been led to confess, in plain terms, Philip's assistance to the Thessalians against their tyrants:

Θετταλοῖς—ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἐξουθενσε. Olynth. 2. p.22.

Demosth.

Demosth.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 655.

p. 659.

directed, in rapid succession, from one object to another, as this or that set of orators prevailed, and occasionally interrupted in all by the momentary prevalence of those who desired quiet, that, with much undertaken, little was or could be done. But while great public purposes were thwarted or neglected, each party would pursue its own objects, amid all interruptions and disappointments, with persevering ardor and watchfulness. Thus, tho the decree for assistance to the tyrants of Thessaly produced them no assistance, and even the confederate war in a manner slept, yet the active spirit of Athenian politics was busy. That party which had embroiled the republic, both with its independent ally the king of Macedonia, and with its subject allies the Chians and others, now found a new object to ingage a preference of their attention. Miltocythes, a prince of the royal family of Thrace, raised rebellion against Cotys, the actual sovereign, the ally of Athens, who had been honored, by the Athenian people, with the two most flattering presents yet in use toward foreigners, the freedom of the city and a golden crown. Notwithstanding this, and notwithstanding the complicated circumstances and adverse events of wars, in which the republic was already ingaged, that party, which had distinguished itself as the war-party, persuaded the people to undertake a new war, in support of the rebel against his king, their ally and fellowcitizen. Just ground for the measure the able advocate of the party, Demosthenes, has utterly failed to show. Nor did success immediately reward the iniquity. The first commander commissioned to put it forward, Ergophilus, was superseded before he had done anything of which notice has reached us. The next, Autocles, was not only soon recalled, but prosecuted, and condemned for deficient zeal in the dishonest business. Successful in a measure so generally gratifying to the Athenian Many as the prosecution of an eminent man, the party were still unable to procure the appointment of a commander hearty in their cause.

After that train of mysterious circumstances, formerly noticed, the capture of the chief of mercenaries, Charidemus, by the Athenian fleet, the insuing acquisition of Amphipolis to the Athenian dominion, and the honors that followed to the captive general from the Athenian

people,

people, that officer, with his band of mercenaries, had passed into the service of Artabazus, satrap of Bithynia, who was in rebellion against the king of Persia. Whether then the military adventurer was unreasonable, or the satrap faithless, disagreement arising between them, Charidemus was without means for the remuneration to his troops, for which they reckoned him responsible to them. The difficulty and danger, immediately insuing, he obviated by dexterous management, through which he raised contribution from the towns of Æolia, which were within the Bithynian satrapy. But in a wide country, with the government hostile, tho his small numbers, with superior discipline, might resist direct assault, he had to apprehend being at length starved into a submission, which must be destructive to him. From these threatening circumstances he was relieved by a new favor of the Athenian people, a decree, directing their new commander on the Hellespontine station, Cephisodotus, to transport him and his troops to the European shore. Such a decree would not be the measure of the party promoting the rebellion against the king of Thrace, which on the contrary was ended by it: for Charidemus was taken, with his troops, into the king of Thrace's service; and Miltocythes, seeing his rival thus strengthened, and the Athenian people issuing decrees indicating that he was to expect no more support from them, abandoned his enterprise?

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 672.
Aristot.
Œcon. l. 2.
p. 391. t. 2.
ed. Paris.

Charidemus, who, through the force of mercenaries attached to him and his reputation for military and political abilities, had risen to be one of the most important characters of the age, was, if we should believe the invective of Demosthenes, the son of a woman of Oreus in Eubœa, by an uncertain father, and began his military career in the lowest rank in the lowest service, a slinger in the lightarmed. His first eminence, according to the same authority, was in the command of a small pirate ship, in which he did not spare the allies and subjects of the Athenian people. The profits of his skill, activity and boldness in that line enabled him to raise a considerable landforce, ready for

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 691.
p. 658.

⁹ The orator's words *Τρίτων ἐντοπῆσας παρ' ἑμῶν*, Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 672, seem fully to imply a decree of the people authorizing the conduct of Cephisodotus; and

such a decree was obviously adapted to produce that despair of Miltocythes, which he attributes to a decree of the Athenian people. Or. in Aristocr. p. 655.

adventure under his orders, in the cause of any state among the almost numberless around the Grecian seas, which were now in the habit of employing such troops. From the silence of the orator, his vehement enemy, about any previous service, it should seem that the first in which he engaged was the Athenian, under that highly respectable general Iphicrates. The same orator's testimony, then, still in the midst of invective, is positive to the advantageous circumstances already noticed, that, after having acted three years under that great man's orders, Charidemus was not only again engaged by him for the critical service of the siege of Amphipolis, but trusted as his most confidential friend; that his services were rewarded, by decrees of the Athenian people, with the freedom of the city, the honorary gift of a golden crown, and the still more extraordinary favor of a decree of privilege for the protection of his person against assassination. And tho the recommendation of him to the people for the high trust of commander-in-chief of the republic's forces in Thrace was unsuccessful, yet that the very proposal could be ventured, for one not born an Athenian, largely indicates a superiority of reputation. The esteem, which it thus appears he held with the aristocratical party in Athens, would no doubt assist to recommend him at the court of Thrace; and such was his estimation there, that, apparently to secure his services for the support of a weak prince on a tottering throne, he received in marriage the daughter of Cotys, niece of the wife of Iphicrates.

Imperfectly as the military and political transactions, of these times, have been transmitted, yet the views and principles, of the contending parties in Athens, remain largely indicated in the works, which we have the advantage to possess, of an orator of each party, Isocrates and Demosthenes. The party for which the former wrote, and with which Iphicrates acted, adverse to the oppression of subjects, and to injurious and insulting measures against independent allies, proposed to repair, as far as might be, the error of alienating Macedonia, by improving the old connection with the king of Thrace, and by supporting the Thracian monarchy as a valuable balance against the growing weight of the Macedonian. But the other party, whose leading orator Demosthenes afterward became, were not discouraged by

by their defeat. The right of the Athenian people to the rich dominion of the Chersonese, was a topic on which they were likely to be favorably heard, and nearly secure against contradiction, which might afford opening for the charge of corruption, or of disaffection to the popular cause. The intrigues, however, of the party, its orator would not disclose. We can only draw conjecture concerning them from the events, for which also we are nearly confined to those which his purpose in public speaking led him to mention. The next transaction, of which we find notice, is, that Charidemus besieged and took two Grecian towns of the Chersonese, Crithotë and Eleüs. The tenor of the orator's information sufficiently indicates that a party in those towns, holding correspondence with the war-party in Athens, had led them to rebellion against the king of Thrace, in hope of support from the Athenian people¹⁰.

Not long after this, Cotys was assassinated, in the midst of his court, such as a Thracian court might be, by two brothers, Heracleides and Python, citizens of the Grecian town of Ænus in Thrace. Both escaped, and both found places of refuge for assassins. Python went to Athens, presented himself to the assembled people, avowed the deed, and, glorying in it, demanded the reward which the Athenians, universal patrons of democracy, had been accustomed to give for tyrannicide. The motive to the crime, according to the orator, was private revenge for the death of the father of the assassins; which however, for any thing said to the contrary, might have been suffered in legal course

Demosth. in
Aristocr.
p. 659.

¹⁰ Demosthenes, in his oration against Aristocrates, having in view to incite the Athenian people to the utmost against Charidemus, speaks of these two towns as the last remaining to the Athenian dominion in the Chersonese. But the tenor of his following argument shows that the conduct of Charidemus, on that occasion, was not, at the time, considered as any act of hostility against Athens. Indeed it appears that Charidemus never ceased to hold his connection with that party in Athens with which he had originally been connected, which would not have ventured to counte-

nance an act of notorious hostility against the republic. But if, as is probable, a powerful party in those towns remained always connected with that party in Athens of which Demosthenes became the leading orator, this would be ground sufficient for his assertion, to the Athenian people, that Charidemus had wronged them by reducing towns, friendly to Athens, under the dominion of the king of Thrace. In the sequel we shall find a Charidemus intimately connected with Demosthenes, of which notice will be taken in its place.

and

and for just cause. The Athenian people however were persuaded to adjudge the murder of the king, their fellowcitizen, to be highly meritorious. They decreed the freedom of the city both to the bold petitioner and to his absent accomplice; and they added for each the honor of a golden crown. Obviously the party of Iphicrates did not then guide the popular voice. It were indeed somewhat saving for the general credit of the Athenian people, might we believe, what the orator would not avow, but his account affords ground to suspect, that a political purpose did combine with the passion of revenge, in prompting to the atrocious deed, and that the assassin confided in a party in Athens, from whose intrigues and incitement, rather than from any general sentiment deliberately held among the people, he derived his reward. Yet, on the other hand, when we find the greatest orator known to fame recalling to popular recollection both the assassination and the public approbation of it, solemnly given in a decree of the sovereign assembly, when we find this brought forward, not for reprobation, but as just and solid ground on which public measures should thereafter be taken, it must be difficult to find apology, even for the people. For the orator, it may be doubtful whether the impolicy of his doctrine should most excite wonder, or its flagitiousness indignation and disgust.

SECTION IV.

Cephisodotus Athenian Commander in Thrace. Political Principles of the Athenian Administration. Rebellion encouraged in Thrace. Admirable moral Principle of the Thracians. Athenodorus Athenian Commander. Pressure upon the young King of Thrace. Mission of Chabrias to Thrace, and liberal Composition of Differences.

WHEN the unfortunate king of Thrace was murdered, his son and legal successor, Kersobleptes, was yet a boy. Those then who had persuaded the Athenian people to cherish and reward the assassins of the father, were not slow in endeavors to profit from the weak age of the son. War with Thrace was not avowed; the pressure of the confederate war, and the strength of the opposing party, forbidding; but, as before against both Thrace and Macedonia, while peaceful purpose was still pretended, the most injurious and insulting hostility was committed. In the wealthy commercial town of Perinthus, opportunity, such as before at Pydna, inviting, Cephisodotus led the fleet thither. Fortunately Charidemus was at hand to assist the councils of the young king his brother-in-law; and to his abilities and superior acquirements the Thracians had the moderation and prudence to defer. He went to Perinthus; the party proposing revolt there was checked, and the purpose of the Athenians was defeated. Cephisodotus received then orders to besiege Alopeconnesus, a town situated at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, and, equally as Perinthus, within the acknowledged dominion of the Thracian king. Nevertheless, in directing their officer to take possession of this town, the Athenian rulers did not scruple to aver that the hostility was not at all intended against the king of Thrace, but only against the pirates, robbers and drowners, as the orator calls them, who found refuge there¹². Chari-

Demostb.
in Aristocr.
p. 674.

p. 675.

¹² The similarity of the French professions in invading Egypt, and on other occasions, cannot but occur to the reader.

demus,

Demost. in
Aristocr.
p. 676.

demus, however, judging that, within the Thracian dominion the Thracian government should undertake the repression of wrong rather than an Athenian officer, marched to Perinthus. Cephisodotus, hopeless of success through violence, entered into negotiation with him, and a treaty was concluded. Of the terms we have no information, except that they were dissatisfactory to the high democratical party, who procured the recall of Cephisodotus, and brought him to trial for his life. To institute prosecution against the officers commanding the republic's forces was now become so ordinary, that of itself it seems to involve no reasonable presumption of any guilt; but Cephisodotus appears to stand exculpated by the failure of the orator to specify any objection to the treaty, or misconduct of any kind in his command, if the treaty was not objectionable. Nevertheless death, in the usual form of Athenian prosecution, was the punishment proposed in the indictment; and, of the multitudinous court, a majority of three votes only saved his life. His condemnation to a fine, the delight of the Athenian Many, to the amount of five talents, about a thousand pounds, his friends were unable to prevent.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.

The leaders of the party, at this time governing Athens, which prosecuted Cephisodotus, proposed to oppress the infant monarch of Thrace, and decreed high reward for the assassination of his father, are not named by antient writers, but its principles, should we doubt Isocrates, or did the facts reported leave them dubious, we learn from authority, utterly unsuspecting, that of the great orator who became its advocate. 'The troubles and jealousies of your neighbors,' we find Demosthenes telling the Athenian people, 'are the best foundation and surest support of your power and dominion.' Mentioning then the frequent wars and unceasing discord of the principal Grecian cities, he says 'they are what Athens should always rejoice to see.' Coming afterward to the consideration of the concerns of the Athenian people in the affairs of Thrace, he does not scruple to contend, in direct terms, that Charidemus, brother-in-law of the Thracian monarch, and trusted by him with the situation of his first minister and commander-in-chief of his forces, should nevertheless, being also an Athenian citizen, have betrayed the king and people of Thrace to the people of Athens:

Athens. ‘Charidemus,’ he says, ‘ought to have made the Chersonese
 ‘yours; and not only so, but, when Cotys was assassinated, he ought
 ‘to have consulted you how the Thracian throne should be disposed
 ‘of; and, in common with you, he should have established one king
 ‘or several, as your interest might require.’

When talents, like those of Demosthenes, were prostituted to the purpose of so instructing the sovereign many of Athens, that the scepter in its hands should be ill wielded cannot appear wonderful; nor will candor attribute the vices of the government to anything in the natural character of the people. Profligate conduct only could be expected, when a party, avowing such principles, carried a majority of votes in the general assembly. Accordingly, not only ratification of the treaty made by Cephisodotus with Charidemus was denied, but Miltocythes, who had before taken arms against Cotys, was now encouraged to resume them against Kersobleptes. The Eubœan adventurer was still the support of the Thracian monarchy. He got possession of the persons of the rebellious Miltocythes and his son. Aware then of a deficiency in the Thracian policy, which, tho highly honorable to the Thracian character, was of a kind to be highly dangerous to any government, he committed his prisoners to the custody of the Cardians.

After observing, in the Greeks, founders of science and fine taste among mankind, the shocking deficiency of moral principle, and all the horrors of practice insuing, which so darkened and deformed the brightest days of that illustrious people, it is a phenomenon equally surprizing and gratifying, a meteor, not surely out of the course of nature, yet seemingly out of all analogy within human comprehension, that we find among the barbarian Thracians: enemies of science and useful industry, votaries of the horrid imaginary deities of war and rapine, they held, in opposition to the Greeks, principles of the purest morality and humanity, and carried them in practice even to excess. ‘Charidemus knew,’ says the same great orator who has reported with complacency the murder of Cotys, and the honors granted by the Athenians to his assassins, ‘that, had Miltocythes been surrendered to

‘ Kersobleptes, his life would have been secure: BECAUSE THE LAW
 ‘ OF THE THRACIANS FORBIDS TO KILL ONE ANOTHER.’ The
 Thracians, it appears, not only abhorred that flagitious and base assassi-
 nation, so familiar among the most polished of the Greeks, but all
 killing of those who had been once admitted to friendship; so that
 even treason against the state did not, in their ideâ, justify capital
 punishment. Nothing can be found, in the history of mankind, more
 honorable to human nature than such principles, followed up by such
 practice, among such barbarians. Those eulogies of Scythian virtue,
 which might otherwise appear extravagance of fancy, imagined, by
 Greek and Roman writers, only for the purpose of reproaching, with
 more powerful effect, the profligacy of their own polished ages, seem
 thus in no small degree warranted. From such barbarians may seem
 to have been derived that generous spirit of chivalry of later times,
 which held it meritorious to seek combat everywhere, yet a sacred duty
 to spare the lowly and relieve the oppressed; and from such barbarians,
 could we trace our origin to them, we might be proud to derive our
 stock.

Whether Miltocythes was really more criminal or unfortunate, we
 are without means to judge; any farther than as the support of a con-
 siderable party, among the Thracians, might speak in favor of his
 pretensions, and, on the contrary, the total omission of so able an
 advocate as Demosthenes to state them, implies their deficiency. The
 conduct of Charidemus, however, appears to have been prudent; and
 nothing, even amid the orator’s invective, affords fair presumption that
 it was in any point unjustifiable. To have shocked the generous prin-
 ciples of the Thracians, by delivering Miltocythes to the executioner
 would have been impolitic; but to have allowed the means of renewing
 attempts against the actual government, would have been to betray
 the high trust confided to him. The Cardians, to whom he committed
 his illustrious prisoners, were distinguished for persevering assertion of
 their independency, against all claim of dominion of the Athenian
 people. Only obloquy would thus be earned from the Athenian
 orators; but it seems to warrant the presumption, that the Cardians
 would

would not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Thracian kings but upon liberal terms. It were however too much to expect that they should be wholly free from the ordinary vices of the republican Greeks. In revenge apparently for the purpose of reducing them under the subjection which they abhorred, or perhaps judging it necessary for the prevention of so great an evil, they put Miltocythes and his sons to death. We have the account only from the great orator, who adds that the execution of those princes was rendered shocking by circumstances of studied cruelty. Too consistent however as this is with what we find ordinary among the Greeks, it should perhaps not be admitted without some allowance for the obvious and avowed purpose of the oration, to incense the Athenian multitude against those who had disapproved the patronage granted to Miltocythes, and the honors to the assassins of Cotys.

The party in Athens, however, which had so perseveringly coveted the dominion of the Chersonese for the republic, or for themselves, was not, by the death of Miltocythes, deprived of resources. The branches of the royal family of Thrace were numerous; and most of them, like Scuthes son of Sparadocus, known to us through the service of Xenophon under him, appear to have held appanages, such as those of the Macedonian princes, by which they might be formidable to the king on the throne. Two of the blood royal of Thrace, Berisades and Amadocus, were connected with Athens by marriage; a sister of the former being wife of Athenodorus, an Athenian, and two sisters of the latter being married to Bianor and Simon, Thracian Greeks by birth, but adopted citizens of Athens¹³. These were now excited to rebellion against Kersobleptes. What hopes were held out to them we do not

Ch. 23. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 624.

¹³ Leland has supposed, I know not on what authority, that Berisades and Amadocus were younger brothers of Kersobleptes, and intitled to divide the sovereignty of Thrace with him. It is amply marked by Demosthenes, that they were not so nearly related, either to Kersobleptes or to each other; nor am I aware of anything in any

ancient author to warrant the supposition that the kingdom of Thrace was legally so divisible. Younger brothers of Kersobleptes could not themselves have managed any such contest with him; for Demosthenes expressly says (or. in Aristocr. p. 656.) that Kersobleptes was a boy when his father was assassinated.

Demo. 30.
in *Alcibiades*.
1. 654.

1. 676.

p. 654.

learn, but we have explicit information of the purpose of the ruling party in Athens, from the great orator who became one of its leading members. It was, first, that Athens should gain the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and of all the Grecian towns, as far as the Euxine, and then that even the wild remainder of the extensive country should not be given to the two friendly princes, but divided between all the three; that so, through their separate weakness and mutual animosity, all might be always dependent on Athens.

To carry this purpose into execution, the party obtained at length the appointment of a commander-in-chief zealous in their cause. Athenodorus; apparently him who had married a sister of the Thracian prince. They feared however to press their interest with the people so far as to ask the service of Athenian troops; and, if they obtained any money, it was in very inadequate amount. A fleet, the wealthy as usual being charged with the equipment, was readily granted. For raising and maintaining a landforce, they probably hoped that the influence of an Athenian general, and the zeal with which Bianor and Simon and Berisades and Amodocus would support him, might suffice; so that they might have the credit of making a great acquisition to the Athenian empire, free of cost to the people. The measures seem to have been ably concerted: a large force of mercenaries was raised; and Kersobleptes was so pressed, that he was reduced to treat about the surrender of the dominion of the Chersonese to Athens, and a division of the remainder of his dominions. If the orator might be believed, the treaty was concluded. But from the sequel it appears probable that, increase of troubles arising for the republic, Charidemus found opportunity to protract the negotiation. Evidently no surrender had been made, either to the Athenian republic, or to the Thracian princes, when the want of pecuniary supplies, which we have seen, in better times, crippling or deranging the measures of the greatest Athenian commanders, so disabled Athenodorus, that he could neither command nor persuade his troops to continue their service. This being once known to Kersobleptes and Charidemus, no surrender was likely to follow.

p. 677.

The

The sudden and total failure of the expedition under Athenodorus, after great hopes raised, appears at least to have assisted to produce a change of men and measures in the government of Athens. The sway reverted once more to that party which, with Isocrates and Xenophon, always reprobated a policy oppressive to allies, and injurious to all neighboring powers. Chabrias was sent, without any new force, to take the direction of the republic's affairs in Thrace. He found Kersobleptes and Charidemus, as Demosthenes himself confesses, disavowing the treaty pretended to have been concluded by them; but disavowing equally any purpose of enmity to the Athenian people, and professing, on the contrary, a readiness and desire to renew alliance upon any equitable terms. Chabrias meeting them with only just views, a treaty was presently concluded. What advantages were stipulated for Athens, the orator, as the treaty was managed by those adverse to his party, would not say; but he has mentioned as matter for complaint, as of injury to the Athenian people, that the dominion of the Chersonese, with the undivided sovereignty of Thrace, remained to Kersobleptes.

Demosth. 3
 in Aristocr.
 p. 677.

SECTION V.

Slowness of the Athenians in the Confederate War. Expedition under Chares: Death of Chabrias. Characters of Chares and of the Athenian People. Offensive Operations of the Allies. Exertion of the Athenians. Relief of Samos. Trial of Timotheus and Iphicrates.

WHEN the affairs of Thrace were thus, for the present, composed, the confederate war still held a threatening aspect. The states, combined to resist the sovereignty of the Athenian people, had, not without some thought and preparation, engaged in a contest in which failure, as from all experience they must expect, would bring a lot the most severe. Ships, such as the antients used in war, being soon built and

equipped, they had raised a fleet capable of balancing the naval power of the imperial republic, and disputing with it the command of the *Ægean*. At Athens, on the contrary, hitherto, through the opposition of opinions, the contention of parties, and the fluctuation of a commanding influence in the general assembly, decrees for the prosecution of the war were slowly, interruptedly, and at last defectively carried into execution. To repair and augment the fleet, and to engage mercenary troops, would be necessary; while the existing force could ill be spared from the important business of aiding the remaining allies and subjects, and preventing farther defection. Enterprize therefore, through the first year, was confined to depredations on commerce, and invasions without view beyond plunder.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 7.
Ol. 105. $\frac{2}{3}$.

B. C. 357.
Ol. 105. $\frac{1}{4}$.

At length, after the establishment of peace with Thrace by Chabrias, some serious consideration, among all men, of the waning state of the republic's affairs, appears to have led to a coalition of parties, apparently through concession of the moderate to the high democratical, or war-party. Chares, the most eminent officer of that party, was appointed to the command; Chabrias consented to serve under him¹⁴, and it was resolved to carry attack first against Chios.

Assistance meanwhile for the Chians, from their confederates, was ready; and so powerful, that the meditated blow must be rapidly struck, or it would be obviated, and before invasions and sieges could be undertaken, the command of the sea would be to be vindicated. The landforce, under Chares and Chabrias, being small, the coöperation of the fleet was necessary to any measures against the city of Chios. The resolution was therefore taken to force the way into the harbour. In this enterprize Chabrias led; and, not being duly supported, he was overpowered. Others, engaged with him, found personal safety by

¹⁴ Diodorus joins Chabrias in the command with Chares, assigning him however the second place. According to Nepos, he served as a private individual, but, even so, was more respected and more consulted, says the biographer, than any officer of the armament. The sequel of the account,

however, would rather mark him to have been the command of his own troops, which seems more probable. In comparison of the commands to which he had been accustomed, he might in that situation be called, as the biographer calls him, *privatus*.

throwing

throwing themselves into the sea. Thinking this an example at all risk to be discountenanced, Chabrias refused to quit his ship, and fell fighting. The loss of the Athenians, beyond the valuable life of Chabrias, appears not to have been great, but the enterprize wholly failed, and, in the course of that year, nothing farther of importance was attempted.

Wanting a regular history of this time, it may be gathered, from the scattered information remaining, that the loss of Chabrias to the republic, in its existing circumstances, was as great as that of one man could easily be¹⁵. The Roman biographer seems justly to rank him among the first characters that Greece had produced. Aristotle has left an anecdote indicating the exalted estimation in which he was held, and which yet had not secured him against a criminal prosecution. Even Demosthenes has been led to high eulogy of him; and it is remarkable that, in an age of such licentiousness, and such violence of party-spirit, detraction of him is found from none; while of Chares, whose associate and advocate Demosthenes afterward became, no good remains reported even by his own party. Favorite as he was of the multitude, and always the most eminent military man of the high democratical party, yet we find him vehemently decried by those later writers who have favored that party; while his opponents, not Chabrias only, but Timotheus and Iphicrates also, have received from them large eulogy. It is to the candor

Aristot.
rhet. l. 3.
c. 10.

¹⁵ Diodorus has related the death of Chabrias among events of the first year of the confederate war, Ol. 105. 3. but this is hardly to be reconciled with what we have from the cotemporary orator concerning the transactions of Chabrias in Thrace. Indeed Diodorus seems often, in reporting matters summarily, to have gone on beyond the year of which he was particularly treating. Thus we shall shortly find him, in regard to the siege of Methone, stating its beginning perhaps in the proper place, but proceeding immediately to relate its conclusion, which probably did not happen till the next year, when he again relates the

same story more circumstantially. For all such matters I miss, in this part of the history, my valuable assistant for them in the former part, Henry Dodwell. Reiske's gleanings of chronology are little satisfactory: *Congessi hunc indicem, he says, ex observatis Schotti, & Corsinii & Tafelii, in schedis. Univerſe præmentium duo hostres auctores interdum in annis discrepare; aliis eadem ætate vetustiora anno, aliis priora jacentibus.* Observing then that the Attic year began at mid-summer, he says, those writers may seem to differ by a year, when they really differ only by a month.

of Xenophon that the character of Chares is indebted for refutation of the sarcasm, which Plutarch has not scrupled to attribute to Timotheus, 'that Chares was fit only to be a baggage-carrier.' Xenophon describes him, in his service in Peloponnesus, during the Theban war, an active, enterprizing, brave, and able officer. Less equal to greater commands, he was, nevertheless, according to the observation of a cotemporary writer, more made for the times than his more virtuous and higher-gifted opponents. It was probably not a discovery peculiar to Chares, that, in the Athenian service, real merit little found its just reward or credit: but he, less than most others, scrupled to take advantage of the vices of the Athenian government: careless of the duties of command, indulging himself to excess in the gratifications it might furnish, and diligent principally in watching and flattering the fancies and passions of the people. In figure, in bodily strength, and in speciousness of conversation, supported by boldness of manner, he confessedly excelled. Confident thus in his power to maintain popular favor, he even made a parade of luxury, carrying about with him, on foreign command, a train of musicians, dancers, and harlots. Public money and private fortune he spent freely together, on the ministers of his pleasures and the supporters of his conduct, the leading orators, framers of decrees, and all who gave their time to the courts of justice. Thus not only he obviated resentment of his profligacy, but became, and remained, longer perhaps than any other since the great Pericles, the most popular man in Athens. 'And this,' says the same cotemporary writer, the Chian Theopompus, 'was no more than fair; for 'just so the Athenian people live themselves. The young men pass 'their time in hearing music and conversing with prostitutes: the 'elder in playing at dice, and other such dissipation: and the people, 'whose imperial voice disposes of the public money, require more for 'public banquets and distributions of meat, than remains for all public 'services.'

With such claim for public favor, Chares, notwithstanding his failure at Chios, remained commander-in-chief of the republic's forces. Zeal, however, for the prosecution of the war, seems to have become less general, and exertion in consequence deficient. The allies mean-
while

while were active. In the next spring, while Chares had only sixty ships, they put to sea with a hundred, and proceeded to offensive operations. Imbrus and Lemnus were islands allowed, even by the peace of Antalcidas, to remain under the dominion of Athens. These they plundered, and then proceeded against Samos, perhaps the richest of the republic's remaining tributaries. The critical circumstances of the commonwealth then either produced a renewal of the coalition, or gave it new vigor. Iphicrates and Timotheus consented to serve with the favorite general of the multitude. If we should trust the Latin biographer, Menestheus, son of Iphicrates, who had married a daughter of Timotheus, was appointed to the command, and the illustrious veterans embarked with him, only to assist with their advice. It appears however that responsibility, and of course effectual command, rested with them. Sixty triremes were rapidly equipped, and hastened, under their orders, to join the fleet of equal number under Chares.

B. C. 356.
Ol. 105, 4;
Diod. l. 16.

Corn. Nep.
v. Timoth.
& Iphicr.

The fleet of the allies then would no more quit the harbour of Samos, but lying there, assisted in the prosecution of the siege. The Athenian commanders, judging attack upon it in its station too hazardous, sailed for the Hellespont; which, of two desirable events, could hardly fail to produce one: if the enemy followed, Samos would be relieved; if they did not, Byzantium might be assailed, weak in the absence of its principal force at Samos. The result answered expectation. The course taken by the Athenian fleet was no sooner ascertained, than alarm, in some degree pervading the allies, was among the Byzantines vehement; and it was quickly resolved by all, to postpone enterprize against their enemies, for protection of their friends.

They reached the Hellespont before the Athenians had entered it, but found them in a situation to dispute the passage. It happened that the wind became violent, yet not adverse to their course, which they resolved, at all hazards, to pursue; the disturbance of the elements, if it should not become extreme, being favorable for their purpose of progress, and adverse for that of the enemy to prevent it. The storm then did increase, so that Iphicrates and Timotheus concurred in opinion, that the danger of attempting action overbore all reasonable hope of advantage from it. Chares held, or

affected afterward to have held, a contrary opinion. Action however was avoided, and the enemy passed up the Hellespont, molested only by the storm. The project against Byzantium was then necessarily abandoned, but the great object of the reinforcement for the fleet, the relief of Samos, was fully accomplished.

Nevertheless Chares, thinking the opportunity favorable for ruining his colleagues, whom he considered as his rivals, resolved to use it. In his letters to the sovereign people, he averred that the enemy's fleet would have been destroyed, but for the failure of Iphicrates and Timotheus in their obvious duty. The suspicious and irritable multitude was inflamed: Timotheus and Iphicrates were recalled, and put on trial for their lives. We have an anecdote from Aristotle, implying the conscious integrity of Iphicrates, and the notorious profligacy of his opponent: 'My speech,' said the veteran general, whose rhetorical talents are noticed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 'must take its way ' through the middle of the actions of Chares.' But when a party-purpose was to be served, calumny of every kind was vented by the accusing orators, with a licentiousness of which a conception can be gathered only from perusal of their extant works. Aristophon, who conducted the prosecution, averred that the accused generals had taken bribes from the Chians and Rhodians. We find it asserted by a later orator, that Timotheus confessed having received money from the Lesbians. He would however hardly confess a dishonorable transaction. It was ordinarily incumbent upon Athenian commanders to find supplies for the force under them, by taking money wherever it could be obtained. Such courts then as those of Athens could not always enter into very accurate examination, and would not always require the most regular proof. Bold assertion would suffice to excite suspicion, and suspicion often, even where party-views did not warp, would suffice to decide the vote. Not in the sovereign assembly only, but in the courts of justice also, freedom of speech was always liable to be overborne by the turbulence of party. Against such injustice Iphicrates is said to have provided himself in a way, which the licentiousness only of democracy could admit, and only the profligacy of democracy could in any degree justify. Some daring youths, whether of low or high rank,

is

Aristot.
rhet. l. 3.
c. 10.
Dion. Hal.
in Lys. p. 85.

Dinarch.
orat. in
Demosth.

Polyan.
Strat. l. 3. §.
29.

is not said, but known favorers of his cause, attended the trial, with daggers under their cloaks, which they managed to show, so far as to intimidate his opponents. We have seen exactly the same thing practised under the tyranny of the thirty, and it may very possibly have been repeated in the lawlessness of the following democratical sovereignty. But in attending to such stories, even where the fact may be perfectly credible, we must guard against the coloring which may be given, by a cotemporary, through party interest or prejudice, and by a late writer, (and it is from a very late writer among the antients that the story in question comes,) through utter inexperience of the character of republican times. The result of the trial however affords some presumption in favor of the report. Iphicrates was acquitted; while Timotheus, than whose reputation hardly a purer has been transmitted from antiquity, and who, if the averration of Æschines to the Athenian people was not exaggerated, had, in the course of his long services, added to the republic's empire seventy-five cities, of consequence enough to be represented by their several deputies in the assembly of the allies, was condemned in a fine of nearly twenty thousand pounds sterling. This operating as a decree of banishment for life, he spent the remainder of an honorable old age at Chalcis in Eubœa¹⁷.

Ch. 21. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Corn. Nep.
v. Iphicr.
& Timoth.
Æschin. de
legat. p. 247.

¹⁷ Diodorus speaks of Timotheus and Iphicrates, without discrimination, as condemned to pay many talents; not specifying the sum, nor mentioning any consequence. But the acquittal of Iphicrates, positively asserted by Nepos, receives confirmation from Demosthenes, in his oration against Aristocrates, so far at least as to show that he was not driven into banishment; and the biographer's account is farther supported by the cotemporary orator, Dinarchus, who mentions the amount of the fine on Timotheus. Dinarch. or. adv. Demosth. p. 11. t. 4. or. Gr. ed Reiske.

SECTION VI.

Deficient Supply to the Armament under Chares. Irregular Measure of the Armament. Peace with the Confederates.

B. C. 356. THE political victory of Chares was, for the moment, decisive: he
 Ol. 106. 1. remained sole commander of the great armament on the Asiatic station. But that great armament, of which the landforce was wholly mercenary, wanted great funds for its support; and his friends at home either dared not ask the people for supplies, or could not obtain them. He was therefore to find them, in the way to which we have seen the most renowned commanders before him driven, often to the great interruption of the public service, by exactions from any states weak enough to be reddily compelled to pay them, or, like Athenodorus lately, he must dismiss his forces. But those allies who had principally supplied former commanders, were now the enemy, to contend with whom the supplies were wanted; and to dismiss his forces would have been to ruin at once the public service, the power of his party, and his own greatness.

An extraordinary resource happened to occur. The satrap of Bithynia, Artabazus, whose rebellion against the king of Persia Charidemus had assisted, was now again threatened with overbearing numbers, marching from the interior provinces. Report made them seven hundred thousand fighting men. Hopeless of resistance with any barbarian force he could collect, Artabazus saw his only safety in Grecian troops, could he obtain them timely in sufficient number. Need thus pressing, probably his offers were high. The temptation sufficed for Chares, who, with the whole armament placed under his command for the reduction of the rebellious allies of the Athenian people, went to Bithynia to assist Artabazus. Demosthenes, who became afterward the leading orator of the party of which Chares was the principal military character, bound to apologize for his friend, has been reduced to plead his deficient authority over those he was appointed to command, and even to hazard imputation against the Athenian

Athenian people. In the failure of remittances from home, he says, it was impossible to retain the unpaid and starving troops; they would go into the satrap's service, and Chares did not lead, but was led by them. The historian Diodorus, following probably some elder writer, calls it a very irregular measure¹³. Chares however did not disappoint the satrap's hope, or his own. The royal army was defeated; and the amount of reward for the important service enabled him to conciliate so many orators, and so to gratify the Athenian people with sacrificial suppers, that he obtained, not pardon, but approbation and applause.

Demosth.
Phil. I. p. 46.

Diod. ut ant.
Theopomp.
ap. Athen.
l. 12. p. 264.

In this extraordinary state for a government to exist in, alarm arose for all Greece, but especially for Athens. Report came that great naval preparation was making by the Persian government in the harbours of Phenicia. The purpose was not declared, but it was said that the great king, incensed at the support given to rebellion in his dominion by Charidemus, but more especially afterward by Chares, would send his Phenician fleet, of three hundred ships of war, to assist the revolted allies of Athens against their oppressors, and revenge the Persian name for the defeats formerly suffered from the Athenian arms.

Under this disadvantageous impression negotiation was opened with the hostile confederates, who seem to have made no difficulty of entering into treaty. Ministers from their several states came to Athens, and a decree of the Athenian people authorized negotiation with them. All the better men of the republic, and men of property in general, desired to use opportunity, thus far opened, for making peace with all powers, with whom the republic was at war, and putting an end to the system of war and troubles. But Chares, and the orators his associates, had acquired such command over the Many, that none in opposition to them could speak in the general assembly. Disapproving voices, and the tumult of overbearing numbers, prevented their being heard. Denied, by this violence, their right of addressing the sovereign assembly in the way which the constitution prescribed, the peaceful resorted to the resource, with us so familiar, of circulating their opinions and arguments among the public by pamphlets. In earlier times, as we have formerly seen, when writing and reading were less

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 186.

p. 178.

p. 168 & 172
& 176.

Ch. 4. s. 2.
Ch. 5. s. 1.
Ch. 11. s. 1.
& Ch. 16. s. 6.
of this Hist.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 178.

p. 184.

p. 186.

familiar, poetry was commonly used for such purposes. Now the form of an oration, such as might be spoken from the bema, was preferred; and Isocrates in this crisis published his oration intitled on peace; for its matter one of the most interesting, as it is also one of the most ingeniously composed, and most exquisitely wrought and finished, of any remaining from him¹². In this publication, managing argument with much art and delicacy, and introducing public facts to support it, he proceeds by degrees to strong imputation against those, whom he describes only as having possession of the public ear, and the direction of the affairs of the commonwealth. Bad men he calls all; notorious drunkenness he mentions of some, and peculation he repeatedly imputes to them generally. ‘Ruin,’ he says, ‘must come upon the commonwealth, if counsellors and measures are not changed. The decree just made concerning peace will avail nothing, unless a general reformation follow. Peace should be made, not with the Chians, Rhodians, Cœans and Byzantines only, but with all mankind; and not upon the terms now offered for your consideration, but upon the liberal principle formerly established by the king and the Lacedæmonians,’ (the convention commonly called the peace of Antalcidas,) ‘requiring that all Grecian states should be independent, and garrisons of the troops of other states allowed nowhere. Not justice only but the republic’s interest requires it. Were we just to others, we should neither have war with Persobleptes for the Chersonese, nor with Philip for Amphipolis; but when they see us never contented with what we possess, but continually grasping at what does not belong to us, they are reasonably fearful of us for neighbors. Opportunity is abundantly open for increasing the power and wealth of the republic in better ways. Colonies might in many parts be established, as many have been, without injury to any; and this would more become those ambitious of being esteemed the first people of Greece, than, what now is the favorite purpose, to be eminent by making continual war with hired troops. Far from such extravagance, it should be our care not only to make peace, but to maintain it. But this will never be till

¹² The oration on Peace has been a favorite of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who has chosen it for exemplification of the author’s

powers and best manner in political discourse, in preference to the more artificially adorned compositions of his earlier age.

‘we

‘ we are persuaded that quiet is more profitable than disturbance,
 ‘ justice than injustice, the care of our own than grasping at what
 ‘ belongs to others. Of these things, nevertheless, none of your orators
 ‘ has ever dared to speak to you, while, on the contrary, some have not
 ‘ scrupled to contend that, tho injustice may be shameful, yet it is pro- Isocr. de
 ‘ fitable, and even necessary ; that uprightness, honorable indeed, is how- Pace, p. 196.
 ‘ ever a starving virtue, beneficial to others rather than to its owner. It
 ‘ were easy to show such arguments as false as they are disgraceful ²⁰.

‘ The popular passion now is to command all the world, and yet p. 198.
 ‘ avoid arms; committing the honor and safety of the republic to
 ‘ vagabonds, deserters, runaways for all crimes, ready always to leave
 ‘ our service for better pay in any other. Hence we are obliged to
 ‘ indulge such miscreants as if they were our children. If complaint
 ‘ comes to us against them of rapine, violence, every kind of disorder,
 ‘ not only we do not resent their misconduct, but rather seem amused p. 200.
 ‘ with it; and while in want, many among us, ourselves of daily neces-
 ‘ saries, we oppress our allies with exaction of tribute to pay these
 ‘ common enemies of mankind. Those of our forefathers who made
 ‘ themselves most obnoxious by their ambition, went to war however
 ‘ with a treasury able to support it, and they carried arms themselves;
 ‘ but you, poor as you are, and numerous as you are, will, like the great
 ‘ king, have your hired armies. They, when they sent out a fleet,
 ‘ employed foreigners and slaves to pull the oar, and themselves took
 ‘ shield and spear; but now those who aspire to be lords of Greece go
 ‘ ashore, in foreign parts, in the garb of galley-rowers ²¹, while the vaga-
 ‘ bonds, whom I have described, bear the honors of the panoply.’

The orator adverts afterward to the pains taken to persuade the 202—208.
 people that the desire of peace marked a disposition to oligarchy, while
 the promoters of war were all sure friends of democracy; to the unsted-
 diness of administration and frequency of contradictory measures; to
 the carelessness and profusion with which the rights of the city were

²⁰ We shall however in the sequel find Demosthenes avowing these maxims. the wheries on the Senate. Had Aug-

²¹ *ἑπὶ πρῆσιν ἔχοντες*—*remum in manibus habentes*. Auger. This seems the bold guess of a Parisian, the idea gained from ever been at Marsden, such a notion would surely have been corrected. The uncertainty of the meaning of the term *ἐπὶ πρῆσιν* has been noticed in a former note.

given to strangers; to the neglect of the important law, making it death to give money for votes to obtain offices, so that the most important situation in the commonwealth, that of general, on which rested not only the supreme military command, but the principal direction of executive government, was obtained by the most notorious bribery; to the departure from antient practice in electing, to the same exalted office, men incapable of speaking from the bema, and dependent upon professed orators to communicate with the sovereign assembly for them. 'It may be asked,' he proceeds to observe, "How, with all this 'mismanagement, do we exist? How is it that we are inferior to no 'Grecian state in power?" I answer, because our adversaries are no 'wiser than ourselves. They make allies for us by their tyranny, as 'we for them by ours; and so we are balanced.'

The most difficult subject, yet that on which he laid principal stress, was the tyrannical empire which the Athenians asserted over the Ægean; requiring, from every island and every shore, tribute for permission to sail on the business of commerce, without interruption from the Athenian fleets, maintained for the purpose of such interruption. This he insisted ought wholly to be given up; not only as the injustice was glaring, but as the object was neither attainable, nor desirable; and this he proceeded to show by arguments, supported, by reference to all past experience, both of their own and of the Lacedæmonian government.

Drawing toward his conclusion, he spoke more at large of those actually holding popular favor, and directing the republic's affairs.

Isocr. de
Pace, p. 254.

'Pericles,' he said, 'took the administration when the constitution 'was already injured considerably, yet he used his power in no degree 'for his private profit; but, on the contrary, leaving his own estate, at 'his death, less than he received it from his father, he carried into the 'public treasury eight thousand talents (toward two millions sterling) 'exclusively of the dedications and sacred money. But these men so 'differ from him, that while they dare tell you their care of the public 'interest is such as to prevent all attention to their own, we see those 'neglected affairs of their own so improving as formerly they would 'not have ventured to pray the gods for: while we, for whom they
' profess

‘ profess so much care, are faring worse than the people of many states
 ‘ under oligarchal government. None live in any ease, but the whole
 ‘ city abounds with complaint: some being obliged to declare publicly
 ‘ their poverty and wants; some lamenting them among their friends;
 ‘ all, who have anything, feeling the pressure of troublesome duties.
 ‘ expensive offices, requisitions for contribution to the treasury, or
 ‘ demands for change of property; altogether bringing so many evils,
 ‘ that those of some estate live more uncomfortably than those in
 ‘ absolute poverty.

Isocr. de
 Pace, v. 252.
 p. 254.

‘ I wonder then you cannot see that there is no race of men more p. 256.
 ‘ evilminded toward the people than ill-principled orators and dema-
 ‘ gogues. It is for their interest that, in addition to other evils,
 ‘ you should be scanty even of daily necessities. For they observe that
 ‘ those who are able to live upon their own, are attached to the republic,
 ‘ and look to better men for advice on its concerns; but those who
 ‘ depend for their livelihood upon the pay of juries, and general assem-
 ‘ blies, and emoluments in whatever way thence arising, are compelled
 ‘ by want to look up to them, and are always ready to thank them for
 ‘ the accusations, prosecutions, sycophancies of every kind, which they
 ‘ put forward. They would therefore gladly see all the citizens in that
 ‘ penury, through which themselves are powerful. And of this you
 ‘ have the most evident demonstration; for you see all their measures
 ‘ directed, not to provide an independent livelihood for the needy, but
 ‘ to bring all, who possess anything, to one level of want.’

He finishes then with summing up his advice for mending the evil
 state of things; reducing it to two points: ‘First,’ he says, ‘with p. 258.

‘ regard to government at home, we must take such men, for advisers
 ‘ on public affairs, as we should desire for our private concerns; we
 ‘ must cease to reckon sycophants friends of the people, and men of
 ‘ worth friends of oligarchy. Then, for forein interests, we must treat
 ‘ allies as friends, and not, while we give them independency in words,
 ‘ permit our generals, in fact, to use them as they please; knowing now
 ‘ from experience, that tho we are stronger than any one state among
 ‘ them, we are weaker than all united. We should show our equal
 ‘ aversion to all tyrannical power: we should imitate and emulate

‘ the regal authority of Lacedæmon; where the kings are more restrained
 ‘ from committing injury than any private persons, yet so honored.
 ‘ that those who, in battle, show any unreadiness, in their defence, to
 ‘ lose their lives, are subjected to greater ignominy than those who quit
 ‘ their ranks and abandon their shields. Such is the supremacy that
 ‘ it should be our ambition to obtain among the Greeks; and it might
 ‘ be ours, would we show that our power is directed, not to their sub-
 ‘ jection, but to their preservation.’

This is a picture of the party of Chares by an adversary, but by a most respectable adversary; checked also by the irritable jealousy of the sovereign people whom he was addressing; and it is contradicted by nothing, but on the contrary supported by everything, remaining from antiquity, tho far most remains from those partial to the opposite, as more the democratical cause. There is appearance that this appeal to the reason of the Athenian people had considerable effect, but it was very far from having complete success. The party of Chares, that they might not be compelled to treat, as the other party desired, with all those with whom the commonwealth was at war, and thus abandon their system, hastened to make peace with the confederates. Arrangement clearly would have been readier, friendly connection and confederacy might more easily have been restored, could those have had the direction, on the part of Athens, who had always shown themselves adverse to the tyrannical system which had occasioned the war. With those of the political principles publicly avowed by the orators of the party of Chares, the allies would of course treat with diffidence, and not readily ingage in any new alliance.

Accordingly the terms were, for Athens, very disadvantageous and even degrading. Every object, for which the war had been undertaken, was abandoned. The claim of the Athenian people, equally to military command over the forces, and to political authority over the states, of Rhodes, Cos, Chios and Byzantium, was given up for ever. Ships were no more to be required from them to swell the Athenian fleets, nor pecuniary compositions instead. The Athenian tribute-gathering squadrons were no more to visit their ports, nor were their subjects
 any

any longer to be liable to the intolerable inconvenience of being summoned to the courts of Athens by others, or necessitated to go thither to solicit justice for themselves. Nor does it appear that, in return for so complete a renunciation of long exercised sovereignty, together with, what was far more important, the revenue which so contributed to the power of the imperial republic, anything was conceded by the allies. Demosthenes, afterward apologizing for the conduct of his friends on this occasion, admits that the terms of the treaty were not what the republic might have expected; but, he says, the blame was due to those who terrified the people into acceptance of them, by spreading the alarm, which he asserts to have been unfounded, of war threatened from Persia. The success, however, of the party of Chares in their principal purposes was complete. Not only they obviated treaty for peace with Macedonia, with Thrace, with Thebes, with any except the revolted allies, but they so held their influence that they could soon engage the republic to pursue the purpose, to which Isocrates so energetically objected, of conquest with mercenary armies. But circumstances meanwhile occurred, deeply involving the interest of all Greece, to which it will be necessary to give some attention, before we can proceed with the particular history of Athens.

Demosth.
 pro Rhod.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Affairs of GREECE during the first Period of the Contest for Possession of the Temple and Treasury of DELPHI, called the PHOCIAN or the SACRED WAR.

SECTION I.

Persevering Ambition of the leading Grecian Republics. Circumstances of the Council of Amphictyons. Summary History of Phocis. Antient Sacred Wars. Regulation of the Council of Amphictyons by Solon: Treasure deposited by Cræsus King of Lydia. Subjection of Delphi to Lacedæmon, and Depression of the Amphictyonic Authority.

WHILE the Athenians were prosecuting schemes of ambition and avarice, wherever, among the Grecian republics and beyond them, their naval strength might avail, neither the Thebans nor the Lacedæmonians had abandoned their pretensions to an imperial authority over the landforce, and a supremacy in the general councils, of all the states of the nation. Much as a superintending power, under just regulation, was wanted, and beneficial, even with very defective regulation, as it had sometimes been, yet the continued contest for it teemed with evil for almost every state, and could hardly fail, in the end, to ruin the independency of all. Hence, in the next year after that in which the Athenians made peace with their revolted allies, a new war, originating with a people hitherto of little name, quickly involved all the European continental republics, and led to consequences most momentous, not for Greece only, but for the whole civilized world.

B. C. 557.
Ol. 106. 2.

Ch. 3. s. 3. of
this Hist.

Among circumstances of very early Grecian history, the council of Amphictyons has formerly occurred for notice; but, from the sacred war

war in which the great Athenian legislator Solon commanded the army of the god, as it was called, to the period at which we are arrived, scarcely any mention of it is found among antient writers. Occurrences now brought it forward to a new or revived importance; whence a view of its history, such as among the very deficient memorials remaining may be obtained, will be necessary for elucidation of the general history of the nation.

The principal information extant on the subject is contained in an oration of Æschines, who was a member of the council, as representative of Athens, at the time of its revived eminence. The very detail, however, which the orator thought necessary to lay before the assembled Athenian people concerning it, is among indications of the obscurity and disregard into which it had fallen. Its history, and even its constitution, tho the Athenian people had always the right of representation in it, were at that time, in Athens, it appears, little generally known. The orator informs the assembly that the Amphictyonic people, whose cities participated in the right of representation in the council, were twelve nations or races. Of the twelve names, however, which he certainly proposed to give, one has been lost from the extant copies of his works. The eleven mentioned are, Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Locrians, Ætæans, Phthiots, Malians, Phocians. But two other different lists are extant: one, from Pausanias, has twelve names; but among them two, Dolopians and Ænians, are not mentioned by Æschines: in the other, from Harpocration, are only ten; and one of these, the Achaian, is found in neither of the others. The list of Æschines will carry most authority for things as they stood in his age. But it seems probable that instances of depriving an Amphictyonic people of its Amphictyonic rights, and giving them to others, not before admitted into the Amphictyonic association, occurred in different ages, and warranted the example which we shall see in the sequel. Possibly also, in the different catalogues, the same people may be designated under different names, or two races may be included under one name. Very antiently, we are assured, the Ionian name was very widely applied, if not even as generally as afterward the Hellenic; and in Homer's time the Achaian had very extensive prevalence.

Ch. 5. s. 5.
of this list.

Ch. 2. s. 1. of
the list.

Ch. 5, s. 1. of
this Hist.

valence. But far more important than any difference in these catalogues, is their agreement in one remarkable point, the prevalence of Thessalian interest, indicated in all of them. Every name, in each catalogue, the Locrian and Phocian only excepted, is of people seated, or deriving their origin from these seated, on the Thessalian side of Thermopylae. For the Ionians, Dorians, and Eæotians, tho the celebrity of those names was acquired in settlements to the southward, were, according to the geographer, all emigrants from Thessaly; and the Achaian name always remained among the Thessalian people. Hence it appears that the distribution of the right to a seat in the council of Amphictyons, has been originally accommodated to the extent only of that territory over which, according to tradition, thus not lightly confirmed, the sons of Deucalion, king of Thessaly, reigned; and that this distribution, whether always subsisting or at whatever time restored, was standing, little if at all altered, in the time of Æschines.

Strabo, l. 9.
p. 420.

We inquire in vain what were the regulations made by Acrisius king of Argos, on which, according to Strabo, the constitution of the assembly at one time rested. But a king of Argos, interfering with power enough to make essential regulations, would hardly have failed to provide that, during his time at least, or during the permanence of his power there, more of a balance against Thessaly should rest in the southern, and especially the Peloponnesian states. From Homer, as formerly observed, we have no notice of the Amphictyons: whence it seems probable that the power of the council sunk, at least in southern Greece, with the expulsion of the princes of the Perseid line; and that under Pelops and his posterity it was insignificant, or limited, as in its original constitution, to the affairs of the northern states, formerly members of the Thessalian kingdom. The Dorians, however, who, under the Heracleids, expelled the Pelopid princes, carried with them, into their new settlements, the claim to be an Amphictyonic people. But the wars, quickly insuing among themselves, and rarely intermitted, left them little leisure or means for interfering with much effect, in an assembly of states on the border of Thessaly; while the northern people, holding the principal sway in the Amphictyonic council, might equally be impotent, or careless, to interfere in quarrels,
which

which little disturbed any beyond the bounds of Peloponnesus. Thus, tho all the Peloponnesian Dorians always maintained their claim to Amphictyonic rights, yet the patronage of the assembly would revert to the Thessalians; while Iphitus king of Elis, to supply its deficient means or deficient disposition to answer the purposes of its institution within the peninsula, established the Olympian meeting there.

Ch. 3. s. 4. of
this Hist.

It appears indeed enough, in the scanty documents of Thessalian history, scattered among antient writers, that the Amphictyonic council was far from equal to its office: even in the immediate neighborhood of its session, even among the Thessalians themselves, it could not prevent wars, it could not humanize the virulent and destructive spirit of Grecian hostility. Nevertheless it will not follow that, because many and great evils escaped or overbore its preventing power, it therefore prevented none. Benefits to mankind, we have had occasion to observe, far less than troubles, engage the notice of recorders of events. What benefits, unnoticed by historians, may have resulted from the Amphictyonic institution, may perhaps best be conjectured from a view of the evils of which report has reached us, when no superintending power has interfered with the animosities, arising among the unnumbered little self-governed states of Greece.

Herod. l. 8.
c. 27, 30.
Xen. anab.
l. 6. init.
Æsch. de
Cor.
Pausan. l. 10.
c. 1.

In the more powerful and eminent republics, even those called imperial, through deficient administration of law, frequent sedition, danger almost unceasing from forein enemies, we have seen the safety and quiet of private life was always highly precarious; and yet, wherever we catch any light on the smaller and obscurer states, we discover only greater uncertainty, and generally an uneasier lot. The province of Phocis, bordering Bœotia on the west, was a mountainous country, comprizing the southern part of the lofty and craggy range of Parnassus, with its rugged appendages; itself a branch from the vast mass of mountains, Ceta, Othrys, and various other names, on the confines of Thessaly and Epirus. One small plain, called sometimes Crissæan, sometimes Cirrhæan, bordering on the bay, was of renowned fertility, but of extent scarcely six miles square. Through the rest of the country, cultivation and population were confined to narrow dales, with each its torrent stream, and each its town; so inclosed by mountain-

crag,

Strab. l. 9.
Pausan. l. 10.

Pausan. l. 10.
c. 5.

Strab. l. 9.
p. 418, 419.

crags, that the torrent's course alone afforded means for a practicable road. The people, divided thus into portions by natural barriers, all acknowledged a political connection, revered for its antiquity, and valued for its obvious advantages; every town sending its deputies to a general council, which, as a common arbiter, might compose injurious disputes, and, in common danger, might provide means of common defence. The municipal government of every town, nevertheless, ruled its valley with sovereign authority; and not unfrequently, in spite of the superintending council, made war on its neighbor. This inconvenient sovereignty intitled each town to the appellation of *POLIS*, which we render commonly *CITY*; and so, in this small and little populous province, were twenty-two cities.

Among these, the early and lasting importance of Delphi, arising from its oracle, has occurred for frequent mention. The population assembled there, and the great concourse of occasional visitants, occasioning demands which the rugged Delphian territory could not supply, gave new value to the rich Crissæan plain at hand. Two small seaports, on the verge of that plain, Crissa and Cirrha, flourished, not only by the produce of their lands, but still more by the maritime commerce to which Delphi gave occasion. This commerce the circumstances of the adjoining shores inabled them to command. For the bottom of the bay, where stood those towns, alone afforded convenient landing; the sides were abrupt and rocky, and the mountainous coast of the Corinthian Gulph, far eastward and westward, denied a port for those arriving by sea, and a road for passing by land; so that, not only the maritime commerce of Delphi, but the approach of strangers, numerous from Peloponnesus, depended upon the people of Crissa and Cirrha.

These advantages, after a season of prosperity, produced the ruin of both towns. With increasing wealth the spirit of rivalry between them became violent; and due restraint from the defective political system of Phocis failing, war followed, as between independent states. Crissa used victory with the intemperance which we have seen common among the Grecian republics, and Cirrha was utterly destroyed.

The rivalry of these towns had been a common benefit to the

Greek nation, interested in the oracle of Delphi. As soon as it was removed by the destruction of Cirrha, the Crissæans proceeded to use their advantages, with no more moderation toward all others than toward their vanquished enemy. The exorbitance of their exactions, both upon the commercial and the personal intercourse with the sacred city, at length excited extensive indignation through Greece. Accusation was formally preferred against them before the Amphictyons, then holding their session only at Thermopylæ. The council issued a proclamation for a sacred war, a kind of crusade, against Crissa, exhorting all Greece to arm, in the cause, as it was called, of the god. The Thessalians took the leading part; and their general, Eurylochus, commanding the sacred army, for such was the title it assumed, retaliated upon Crissa the destruction of Cirrha.

It seems probable that the claims of the antient Thessalian kings, whose power, according to all accounts of the early ages, was respected widely over Greece, were asserted by Eurylochus as his pretension for the chief command of the sacred army; and that he used the authority, acquired by his success, for committing the superintendency of the temple of Delphi and its treasury to the Amphictyons, whence their vernal session was thereafter held at Delphi. Pretences, that might appear plausible for a conqueror, were not wanting; for the Thessalians were always considered as in some degree the fathers of the Greek nation, and the Amphictyons as from time immemorial its representatives. Nor can the restoration of the town of Cirrha, which we find was restored, be attributed to any other with such apparent probability as to Eurylochus. While then concord and good government enabled the Thessalian administration to exert the united strength of the country, Phocis would be in a great degree subject to Thessaly. But Herodotus, unconnected as his accounts are, shows divisions and weakness in the Thessalian political system, ample to account for its failure to maintain its superiority. The Cirrhæans therefore, flourishing in their restored city, and unrestrained in the unrivalled enjoyment of the same advantages which had given prosperity and insolence to Crissa, forgot the lessons of adversity, and equally abused those advantages. Arms being at

length taken or threatened, under authority of the Amphictyons, against them, they carried their impious violence so far as to attack the temple itself of Delphi.

Of the numerous states interested in the temple and its appendages, none at this time commanded so much respect as Athens, under the administration of its great legislator Solon. The insuing interference of the Athenian government, and the success of Solon in the command of the sacred army, have been formerly noticed. Arrangement, necessarily to follow, would of course be much in his power; and he is said to have settled the difficult business so as to give extensive satisfaction through the Greek nation.

Of Solon's legislation for the Amphictyonic assembly, precise information has been transmitted only in regard to one matter, but that very important. The form of the Amphictyonic oath, as it remained in the time of Æschines, and as it has been given in treating of the origin and constitution of the council, was, according to that orator, settled by Solon. What has been altogether the tenor of his regulations, may perhaps nevertheless be gathered from circumstances. The Amphictyonic council being in so large a proportion composed of representatives of the states of Thessaly, a Thessalian legislator would be likely to propose extension of its political authority, which, on the contrary, a member of any of the southern Grecian states would rather abridge. Athens and Sparta would not be disposed to commit their interests to the votes of Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Ætæans, Phthiots, Malians, and other obscure people, with names hardly known in Grecian history. Solon then, respected as he was for his legislative wisdom, and powerful at the head of the victorious sacred army, could little hope for such influence among the many republics of divided Greece, as to procure their admission of a new authority, to have a direct controul over all the political concerns of the nation, even under the best and most equitable constitution that could be devised. Aware of his deficiency, he seems to have legislated for the general good of Greece, with the same wisdom and the same temper which are attributed to him in his legislation for his own commonwealth. Avoiding

to grasp at that best which could not be attained, he earned the just gratitude of his country, by doing the best that its circumstances would bear. After him, the Amphictyonic council seems no longer to have claimed that direct political authority, apparently intended in its institution, but impossible, as Greece was politically constituted, to be carried advantageously into effect. He gave it however great power and importance, of a less invidious kind, and therefore, as circumstances stood, more really useful. By securing to it, with the general consent of the Grecian republics, the presidency of the temple of Delphi, he strengthened that bond of union, a common attachment to a common religion, which principally held the Greeks, in their several republics, in any degree together as one people. At the same time, by providing more certain protection for the Delphian treasury, he gave a security, far the best that the circumstances of the times would admit, and altogether a wonderful security, to a national bank: he gave firmer establishment to that quadrennial respite from war among the republics, the armistice for the Pythian games; and he restored and extended respect for that beneficial law of nations, which was sanctioned by the Amphictyonic oath.

But a farther alteration, of considerable importance in the constitution of the Amphictyonic assembly, evidently not the measure of a Thessalian, may, apparently, with most probability, be referred to Solon. Originally every Amphictyonic city sent only one representative, whose title of Pylagoras, indicating no reference to religious affairs, marked simply that he was charged with the interests of his republic in the assembly held at Pylæ, otherwise Thermopylæ. Afterward an additional member was sent from every city, with the title of Hieromnemon; marking that he was charged with the religious concerns of his republic and of the nation; and he was honored with priority of rank. We have formerly seen it of the temper of the republics of Solon's time, and after him, to be jealous of committing any important office to a single person; an embassy scarcely ever, and even the command of an army seldom, was intrusted to one man. The innovation which doubled the number of the Amphictyons, and marked, by a new

title, the special designation of the new members to the charge of sacred matters, giving them also priority or rank, seems to have been judiciously adapted to obviate jealousy of political designs, and to lead those republics, formerly careless of their Amphictyonic rights, or perhaps adverse to Amphictyonic pretensions, to concur in supporting an institution so little threatening any evil, and so much promising great advantages.

The account given by Herodotus of the treasure deposited at Delphi by the king of Lydia, cotemporary with Solon, Cræsus, however mingled with tales of superstition, and carrying, otherwise, on first view, perhaps some appearance of extravagance, may not be undeserving of attention here. When that prince became apprehensive of the result of the contest, in which he was going to be engaged with the mighty conqueror of the Assyrian empire, he sent deputations to consult the more celebrated oracles, known in that part of the world, Delphi, Dodona, and others, in Greece, Branchidæ in Ionia, and the temple of Ammon in Africa. We have seen it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to gather in Xenophon's account of consultations of oracles and forebodings of sacrifices, by himself and by his master Socrates, what should be attributed to superstition, and what to policy. Not less difficulty will be expected in an account, from Herodotus, of the consultation of oracles by a king of Lydia of the age of Solon. But it seems nevertheless sufficiently evident that Cræsus had more in view, than merely to obtain the guidance or assurance of prophecy. He gave a decided preference to the oracle of Delphi, the historian says, because he had proof of its prophetic powers, which intitled it to such preference. This was between himself and, at most, a very few others. But the matter public and notorious, was that he sent a very great treasure to Delphi; thus decisively showing that, whatever he thought of the several oracles, he judged, from the accounts brought to him by his ministers, and perhaps from personal communication with Solon, who is said to have resided some time at his court, that the temple of Delphi was the safest bank.

His manner of proceeding also, on the occasion, as it is reported by the

Ch. 6. s. 1. of
this Hist.
Herod. l. 1.
c. 46. & seq.

the historian, may deserve notice. He made a most magnificent sacrifice; the number of cattle slain, great and small, being three thousand. At the same time, and with the same pretence of a pious offering to the gods, were committed to the flames, of his own, and of the wealthy Lydians, who were persuaded to follow their king's example, furniture and utensils of gold and silver, to a great amount, with much costly apparel, purple robes and rich habiliments of various kinds. But in this sumptuous oblation there seems to have been little, beside the apparel of luxury, lost to the use of men; and nothing done without a political and economical purpose. The feast of victims would conciliate the goodwill of the Many, and the whole ceremony was calculated to infuse hope of divine protection, both much wanted for the coming trial. The gold and silver were so disposed among the flames, that, as they melted, they were cast into the form most commodious for carriage and store, that of ingots, or, in the Greek phrase, bricks. Much of the common temptation of the age, for invading armies, was thus removed, perhaps with the least waste that easily might be. 'The ingots,' says the historian, 'were some six palms long, some three, and all one palm in thickness. The whole number was a hundred and seventeen, of which four were pure gold, each weighing a talent and a half, the others of white gold (perhaps gold mixed with silver) each weighing two talents'. Cræsus made besides a figure of a lion, of pure gold, weighing ten talents, which was placed in the temple of Delphi upon the half ingots; whence it fell when the temple was burned, and it now stands in the Corinthian treasury, reduced in weight by the fire to six talents and a half. Cræsus sent also to Delphi two very large vases, one of gold, the other of silver, which were also moved when the temple was burned, and the golden weighing eight talents and a half and twelve mines, now stands in the Clazomenian treasury; the silver, holding six hundred amphors, stands in the corner of the vestibule. In this the Delphians mix the wine at the feast of the Theophanies, or manifestations of the gods. It is said to have been made by the Samian. Theo-

Herod. l. 1.
p. 50.

¹ The talent was about fifty-seven pounds Troy.—Arbuthnot on Weight and Measures.

'dorus;

‘dorus; and I believe it; for it is of no ordinary workmanship. Cræsus sent, moreover, four silver barrels, which are in the Corinthian treasury. He dedicated also a golden and silver ewer, of which the golden bears an inscription attributing it to the Lacedæmonians. But this was done with the desire of gratifying the Lacedæmonians, by a Delphian whose name I know, but will not tell. The boy, through whose hand the water runs, is a dedication of the Lacedæmonians; but neither of the ewers. He sent moreover a small figure of gold, three cubits high, and very many other things of smaller note, ornaments of his queen’s person, necklaces and various toys. Beside these deposits at Delphi, he sent to the temple of Apollo Ismenius at Thebes, a shield and a spear, with its furniture, all of solid gold, and a golden tripod. All these things remained to my time, but many others have been lost. The golden oxen at Ephesus, and most of the columns, were also offerings of Cræsus; and his dedications in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, in the Milesian territory, are said to be nearly equal in value, and nearly of the same kind, with those deposited at Delphi.’

Herod. l. 1.
c. 92.

The transport of such treasure to Delphi must have been difficult and hazardous, and to draw thence, when occasion might require, not obviously easy. Accordingly little, if any, seems ever to have been withdrawn by the proper owner. The communication with Branchidæ was comparatively ready; but if the Lydian kingdom fell, the Milesian republic would not be likely to avoid the conqueror’s power, and therefore the prudent king seems so to have divided his wealth; a policy in which we have seen Xenophon, in later times, following his example.

Ch. 28. s. 9.
of this list.

Nevertheless it appears that the liberality of Cyrus, and the fidelity of those under him, left the treasury of Branchidæ untouched, so that the deposits of Cræsus there were matter for question, as we have formerly seen, among the Asian Greeks, when they afterward revolted against Darius. Such a treasure, as Cræsus sent to Delphi, would not be committed to a place the object of a sacred war, or any place not supposed of rather peculiar security. The fame of a recent arrangement widely satisfactory, as that attributed to Solon, would on the contrary

contrary be most likely to recommend Delphi to the preference which it obtained.

To return to the Amphictyonic council, how the power of voting was distributed, and in what way the business was managed, tho some account remains from Æschines, that might suffice for the Athenian people, is far from being now in all points clear. It rather seems however that the representatives of each of the twelve nations, or races, of Amphictyonic people, had their separate poll, where the majority of votes of individuals decided the vote of the race, or nation, and that the decree of the council was decided by a majority of votes of races, or nations, and not of individuals. Æschines says expressly that, for the Ionic name, the towns of Eretria in Eubœa, and Prienë in Lesser Asia, the former rarely independent, the other often subject to a Persian satrap, were each equal to imperial Athens; and for the Dorian, the obscure village-republics of Dorium and Cytinium, among the mountains of Doris, were each a balance to Lacedæmon, holding nearly half Peloponnesus as its own territory, and commanding all Greece besides*.

When the Lacedæmonians had established that ascendancy among the Greeks, which already in Solon's time they were beginning to acquire, they found the matters, over which the Amphictyonic council presided, highly interesting to them, but the council itself, on account of the great preponderancy of the Thessalian and other northern votes in it, not readily within their influence. The silence of historians, con-

* Æschines, neglecting distinctions which, for his auditors probably were needless, uses the word *ἔθνος* equally to describe nations or races, as Thessalian, Ionian, Dorian, and cities, as Lacedæmon, Athens, Cytinium, Prienë. But the manner in which he opposes the two inferior Ionic towns to Athens, and the two Doric to Lacedæmon, tends to indicate that it was a majority of the votes of the twelve races that decided the decree of the council; and this seems strongly confirmed by the substitution afterward of the one double vote of Macedonia for the vote of the twenty-two cities of

Phocis. Learned commentators, too often, passing by more important matters, which really want explanation, waste their ingenuity upon little ones, and sometimes with a haste and negligence that must expose to error. Wolfius would correct the common reading of Æschines in this place, *τὴν Ἐρετρίαν*: he says *τὴν Ἐρυθραίων*, fortasse: nam *Eretria Eubœa est*: and this Reiske has carelessly enough thought worth inserting in a note of his edition. Eretria was in Eubœa true enough, but the Eretrians claimed to be Ionians, equally with the Erythræans of the Asiatic Ionia.

cerning what followed, indicates the prudence which obviated such disturbance as would force their notice. It is to the geographer we owe the information, that the resource of the Lacedæmonians was to take the Delphians under their particular protection, declaring them a sacred people, dedicated to the god, and therefore independent of the general council of Phocis, and of all other human authority. Thus the temple and the treasury, of which the Delphians had the immediate charge, were brought effectually under the power of the Lacedæmonian government; and the authority of the Amphictyons was in a large degree superseded. Yet tho the Phocians could scarcely but consider this as a great injury, the Lacedæmonians, in whatever way cultivating their favor, held them so far attached that, throughout the Peloponnesian war, they were among the allies of Lacedæmon; and, in the wars which followed, between Lacedæmon and Thebes, they still maintained the connection, till after the battle of Leuctra. Then Theban influence, or Theban power, pervading northern Greece, the force of the Phocian towns swelled the army with which Epameinondas invaded Laconia. The Phocians, however, who had suffered from the enmity, and perhaps the injustice of Thebes, seem to have been, of all the Theban allies, least hearty in the cause. When called upon, nine years after, for the expedition which ended with the fatal battle of Mantinea, they refused to march; boldly maintaining that the terms of their alliance with Thebes required their contingent only for defensive war. After the death of Epameinondas, as the patronage of Thebes was less inviting, so its enmity was less formidable, and thus Phocis became prepared for renewing its old connection with Lacedæmon.

Strab. l. 9.
p. 423.

Ch. 24. s. 4.
& Ch. 25. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Ch. 28. s. 7.
of this Hist.

SECTION II.

State of Thebes after the Death of Epameinondas. Prosecution of Lacedæmon by the Thebans in the Court of Amphictyons. Prosecution of Phocis.

THE event of the battle of Mantinea, the glory of which accrued principally to Thebes, was to no other republic of Greece perhaps so effectually disastrous. The loss of such a man as Epameinondas, great to any state at any time, was rendered singularly so to Thebes by the circumstances in which she stood; with a democratical government, recently become the head of a confederacy of numerous democratical governments. In him the Theban people, in him the allies of Thebes had confided. Eminent men may have survived him: we read of Pammenes, his most confidential friend. But the influence of Epameinondas himself had been sometimes overborne by the adverse or misguided will of the imperial Many, even in his own city; and the means he possessed to command, so extensively over Greece, that respect which had enabled him to hold so many little jealous republics in union and energy, could pass immediately to no talents. Thebes nevertheless retained a high situation among the Grecian states; regarded still, tho' with diminished attachment, as the head of a great and glorious confederacy. Nor did the popular pride, founded on the consciousness of admired actions and increased estimation, in any degree fail; and the popular ambition, which had maintained corresponding growth, and the popular hatred of Lacedæmon, which was of much elder birth, remained in full vigor.

The party ruling in Thebes, the same which had been the party of Epameinondas, maintained the friendly intercourse in Thessaly, which had been formed or confirmed by Pelopidas; and the Theban party in Thessaly was that with which the Macedonian reigning family had friendly connection, the party adverse to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Phæræ, the ally of Athens. It was become almost habitual for Mace-

Ch. 27. s. 4.
& ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

donia to be allied with Athens and Thebes alternately; so that, if the connection of Macedonia with Thebes was not already renewed, the breach with Athens would have cleared the way for its renewal. On this view of things the Theban leaders appear to have rested, in a project for making the Amphictyonic council an instrument of their ambition and revenge; of power to obviate the decay of their political influence, and balance the failure of their military talents.

Injured as Thebes had formerly been by Lacedæmon, revenge had been so largely taken, that it might have been just, not less than wise, to have forbore pressing it farther. One king, and a greater number of the Lacedæmonian people, than in any war within tradition, had paid the forfeit of their lives; empire, and the hope of empire were overthrown, much territory lost, the rest plundered and wasted, the capital itself insulted, the glory of the Lacedæmonian name tarnished. Unsatisfied with this splendid vengeance of their predecessors, and impotent to emulate it, the Theban government instituted a prosecution in the court of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon, for the old crime, so already punished, of seizing the citadel of Thebes. That court, now little fit for what the Theban leaders would assert its pretension to be, the great council of the Greek nation, pronounced against the Lacedæmonian people, in their humiliation, a sentence which too evidently it would not have ventured against them vigorous in uncurbed guilt: it condemned them in a fine, according to Diodorus, of five hundred talents, near a hundred thousand pounds sterling, to be paid to the god. But, reduced as Lacedæmon was, neither the Amphictyons, nor the Thebans as their vice-gerents, could enforce obedience to the sentence. The time was passed when all northern Greece could be united under Theban banners, to march into Peloponnesus, and be joined by half the peninsula itself to invade Laconia. The fine therefore, remaining unpaid, was, after a limited time, according to the Amphictyonic law, doubled, and equally remained unpaid¹.

In

¹ The time, when this prosecution was instituted, is very loosely indicated by Diodorus, relating the fact twice, under different years, and by Pausanias not at all. The omission of all notice of it by Xenophon affords strong presumption that it was posterior

In these measures the Theban leaders appear to have had no view to immediate contest in arms with Lacedæmon; whose inability to attack them they knew; sensible also of the deficiency of their own means for carrying war to the farther end of Peloponnesus. But exciting embarrassment for the Lacedæmonians, and maintaining and extending the animosity of other states against them, would be useful and even necessary toward the success of an enterprize they had projected, less glorious, but safer, and teeming with great means for farther enterprize. The people of the little bordering province of Phocis, always ill-affected toward Thebes, were always for that, if for no other reason, disposed to maintain connection with Lacedæmon, and also with Athens when hostile to Thebes. Beyond the Phocians, westward, was the country of the Ozolian Locrians: always at variance with them, and for that, if for no other reason, friendly to Thebes. Northward was Doris, also of the Theban alliance; but a corner of Phocis stretched on beyond Doris, north-eastward, to Thermopylæ and the border of Thessaly. Between the Phocians and Thessalians, from the time of the old sacred wars, enmity had subsisted, such that not even by heralds was communication allowed between them. Hence it seems to have been that the Thessalian interest in the Amphietyonic council was given readily to Theban purposes. The Athenians then could not assist Phocis but across the Theban territory, nor without exposing Attica. Lacedæmon was yet more liable to have its support intercepted. The confederacy of the two might indeed be formidable, if their combined energies were exerted; but it was known that the party generally prevailing among the Athenians, was utterly indisposed to any cordial coöperation with Lacedæmon. Phocis therefore, excluded by surrounding enemies from friendly succour, seemed, for the power of Thebes, an easy conquest. Delphi, with its oracle, perhaps no small advantage, but with its treasury too, certainly a very great one, would

Herod. l. 8.
Xen. Hel.

rior to the term of his history, and of course work. Diodorus has in one place (c. 23. l. 16.) named five hundred talents as the not a measure of Epameinondas. It may have been among the circumstances of amount of the fine assessed on Lacedæmon, trouble and comasion which Xenophon in the other (c. 27.) a thousand, meaning, lived to see, and with the mention of which, in the later place, apparently the dotted in general words, he concludes his historical fine.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

thus be at the mercy of the Theban rulers. According to Diodorus the value of the precious metals, at this time lying in the several treasuries of Delphi, for every considerable republic had its separate treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury, exceeded a thousand talents, two millions sterling. Of this, the riches deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia seem to have remained yet the largest portion, and the historian seems to have considered them as unimpaired. But the far more exact Herodotus assures us that, even in his time, there had been, beside loss by the burning of the temple, other losses. Nevertheless the treasure altogether at Delphi was, according to all accounts, such that we might perhaps more reasonably wonder it had lain so long inviolate, unless by small purloinings, than that at length it should become an object of appetency among the contending states of Greece. That it was now the object of the Theban rulers is asserted equally by Demosthenes, at the head of one party in Athens, and by Isocrates, at the head of the opposing party; and transactions, as far as they are made known to us, mostly by writers favoring the Theban cause, are generally of a tendency to confirm, and never to refute the imputation.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 347.
Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.

With this then their great object, a pretence for war with Phocis, but especially a pretence to be sanctioned by a decree of the Amphictyons, with Amphictyonic law for its ground, was desirable. No violation of the common law, or law of nations of the Greeks, such as that notorious of the Lacedæmonians, in seizing the Theban citadel, could be imputed to the Phocians. Ingenious policy nevertheless discovered, in an obscure tradition, foundation for a charge, which might possibly even better answer the purpose; a charge of offence against the common religion of Greece. Various instances are found of such consecration of land to some deity, that all disturbance of the soil for tillage, or whatever purpose, afterward, was esteemed highly sacrilegious. In Attica we have observed consecrated olive-trees, whose fruit was legally brought to use, while to break the earth, as far as the roots might spread, was utterly forbidden. Here offence against the sacredness of the ground was the concern only of the state in whose territory it lay. But often the bordering lands of neighboring republics

Ch. 21. s. 1.
& Ch. 22. s. 1.
of this Hist.

lies were made the nominal property of a deity, and there were some consecrations of ground in which all Greece was interested. It seems probable that these consecrations did not originate from superstition, but rather from a wise and beneficent policy, calling superstition to its aid. The advantage of the consecration of olive-trees we have already noticed; and that of giving the estimation of holy land to the borders of jarring states, is obvious; especially where no indelible features of nature marked the boundary. On the soil then whose sacredness was placed under the common protection of the whole nation, as great part of mount Parnassus, the unfortunate exile from any state might find security of person, when he could find it nowhere else. But, as often happens of human institutions, what was originally good became bad, by excess, by perversion, or by meer change of circumstances. Land was sometimes consecrated, not under a blessing, but under a curse; and then pasturage, and all use of any of its productions, was held impious.

A vague report, of uncertain foundation, seems to have obtained some extent of credit in Greece, that, after one of the sacred wars, doubtful which, the Cirrhæan district of the rich vale of Crissa had been consecrated by the Amphictyons, to the god of Delphi; under a heavy curse against any who should convert it to any human, or, as it was called, profane use. In all states the interest of powerful individuals will be too much interfering with the public interest, but most in the two congenial governments, as Aristotle calls them, simple or absolute monarchy, and simple or absolute democracy; and more in others as they more approach those extremes. It is to Aristotle also we owe report of a private quarrel, which gave immediate origin to a war involving the interests of all the republics of the Greek nation. A wealthy heiress in Phocis, of Theban extraction, sought in marriage by a Theban of an eminent family, was won by a Phocian. The disappointed Theban, unable to revenge himself by any measures against his individual rival, proposed to use the ready enmity of his fellowcitizens against the Phocian people, as the instrument of his private passion. The purpose of oppressing Phocis, and, through the Delphian treasury and Amphictyonic decrees, commanding

Aristot.
Polit. l. 5.
c. 4.
Duris, ap.
Athen. l. 13.
c. 1. p. 560.

commanding Greece, appears to have been already extensively cherished; but the decisive measure of prosecuting the Phocian people in the Amphictyonic court, for sacrilege committed by cultivation and pasturage on the accursed Cirrhæan land, is attributed to the disappointed lover⁴.

The fact asserted as the foundation of this prosecution, that the Cirrhæan land ever had been consecrated or accursed by the Amphictyons, or any other competent authority, appears to have been utterly doubtful. That diligent antiquarian, Pausanias, whose curiosity the question engaged some ages after, assures us that those writers, who insisted on it, contradicted one another; some asserting that it followed the sacred war in which Solon commanded the sacred army, while others ascribed it to the earlier age, when the Thessalian general Eurylochus destroyed Crissa. His honest conclusion then is that he was unable to satisfy himself, from any documents remaining in his time, whether the Phocians, in cultivating the Cirrhæan land, had committed any transgression. It remains however reasonably ascertained, that this land had been used by the Phocians from time beyond certain memory, and was become necessary to the subsistence of the actual population; and that, tho it was the right and the duty of every Amphictyon to demand the execution of the Amphictyonic law, most especially against all profanation, yet neither memory of man, nor record of the court, could be produced to show that any notice had ever before been taken of the use of the Cirrhæan land as a profanation. Nevertheless, the Thessalian interest among the Amphictyons concurring with the Theban, a decree was made, declaring 'that the Cirrhæan land had been devoted, that the Phocians must immediately cease to use it, and pay a fine,' the amount of which the decree stated⁵.

⁴ When we meet with such anecdotes as this, narrated by two unconnected contemporaries, such as Aristotle and Duris, they merit but little respect. We might better know how to form some opinion of men, some of their much stranger anecdotes, related by writers under the Roman empire, if they would all, like Athenians, have informed us whence they had them.

⁵ Accounts remaining in the time of Pau-

sanias, it appears, so marked the preponderance of the Thessalian interest among the Amphictyons, and the inveterate enmity of the Thessalian people toward the Phocians, that he doubted if the oppressive decree was not a Thessalian measure. But the train of history enough shows, even without the corroborating testimonies of Aristotle and Duris, that the Thebans, using the Thessalians, were the real leaders in the business.

In the long desuetude of all interference of the Amphictyonic council, and enforcement of the Amphictyonic law, in any momentous concerns of the Grecian republics, it seems to have fallen into doubt, if indeed it was ever clearly decided, whether fines decreed should be imposed on the state, whose government should then proceed to ascertain and assess the criminal individuals, or whether the council itself should not make the inquiry, and direct its vengeance only against those really implicated in the imputed guilt. The Amphictyonic oath may seem to imply the latter; but the council took the method in itself easier, and far most accommodated to the purpose of the Theban leaders, making the Phocian government responsible. Much uneasiness was excited, but the fine remained unpaid, and the land continued to be used. On the expiration of the appointed time, the fine, as before on Lacedæmon, was, by a new decree, doubled, and the increased severity of the law only excited a stronger disposition to evade or resist its execution.

SECTION III.

Decrees of the Amphictyons against Lacedæmon and Phocis. Alarm of the Phocians. Philomelus General of the Phocians. Support from Lacedæmon to Phocis. Expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi.

THE Theban leaders were disappointed in their hope of exciting a general readiness in their confederacy for their meditated war. The strength of Eeotia might have sufficed to overwhelm Phocis, but they feared the jealousy of their allies, should they move in the invidious business without them. Recurring therefore again to the Amphictyons, the hatred of the Thessalians toward the Phocians standing instead of zeal for the purpose of the Thebans, they obtained a decree declaring that all Amphictyonic states, guilty of so pertinacious a contempt of the Amphictyonic law, as, after the duplication of a fine imposed, to let the limited time pass, without any measures for payment,

B. C. 355.
 OL. 106. 2.
 PHOT. I. 1. 1.
 C. 22.
 Pausan.

payment, forfeited all their lands to the god; and that accordingly all the lands of the Lacedæmonians and Phocians were forfeited. A proclamation followed, in the manner of those of the crusades of after-times, admonishing the Greek nation 'that it behooved every state and every man, as they hoped for divine favor, or would avoid divine wrath, to do their utmost toward carrying the decree into strict execution.'

Diod. l. 16. The Phocians now apprehending the long-threatened storm ready to burst upon them, dismay pervaded their vallies. They had always maintained the reputation of brave and good soldiers. But to the might of Thebes and its confederacy, or even of Bœotia alone, their collected strength bore no proportion. Their government, moreover, had no practice in the conduct of a great contest; they had been accustomed to act only in the subordinate situation of auxiliaries; nor had Phocis ever given a splendid character to the list of Grecian warriors or politicians. In such circumstances, if there is not a man already eminent, ready to ingage popular confidence, vigor in public measures is hardly possible. Such a man however was fortunately ready in Philomelus, against whose family the private enmity, which gave immediate spring to the public measures of the Thebans, had been directed. In the congress of the Phocian cities, assembled to deliberate on the critical circumstances of the country, Philomelus maintained, 'that a firm resistance to the oppressive decree of the Amphictyons was not less just than necessary, nor only just, but a religious duty; and if the Phocian people would confide in him, he had no doubt of making it successful. What was the mercy to be expected, to which some, with ill-judging timidity, proposed to trust, might readily be estimated. The very amount of the fine, utterly overproportioned to the imputed crime, even were the imputed crime real, would sufficiently show it. But no such crime had been committed: the Cirrhæan land never had been devoted: their ambitious and implacable enemies, adding new to old injuries, proposed nothing less than their utter ruin: they would rob them now of land necessary to their subsistence, while they required of them a fine, not only unjustly imposed, but beyond their means to pay. Long ago they robbed them

Aristot ut
ant.

Diod. &
Pausan. ut
ant.

‘ them of the presidency of the temple and oracle of Delphi, always of
 ‘ right theirs, and never, of any right, committed to the Amphictyons.
 ‘ Possession, wrongful possession, was the only ground of claim the
 ‘ Amphictyons could show; whereas tradition, the most authoritative,
 ‘ recorded by the great poet, to whose works all Greece had always
 ‘ most deferred for its antient history, reckoned Delphi, by its well-
 ‘ known and unquestionable description, the rocky Pytho, among the
 ‘ Phocian towns⁶. The Phocians then, and not their oppressors, had
 ‘ a holy cause to maintain. It behooved them to exert themselves, and
 ‘ they might most reasonably hope for the divine blessing upon their
 ‘ endeavors.’ The assembly accepted the argument; and the supreme
 direction of the military and political affairs of all the Phocian cities
 was committed to Philomelus, with the title of general autocrator.

The fulmination of the Amphictyons, diligently spread over Greece, produced little of the effect the Thebans desired. Curiosity and conversation were extensively excited; as about old matter, nearly buried in oblivion, and now brought forward as of new interest. In some places warm public discussion ensued; but still as of facts questionable, with reasoning on them uncertain. Nevertheless the crisis for Phocis, were the contest to be only with the Amphictyons and with Thebes, was highly formidable. But Philomelus, in persuading his fellowcountrymen to resistance, had not relied solely on the narrow means of Phocis. The interest of Lacedæmon, of Athens, of all Greece, to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Delphi, was obvious. The great advantage however, which Philomelus saw, was what the imprudence of the Theban leaders gave, in making the cause of Phocis and of Lacedæmon so completely one. He resolved therefore to proceed immediately to communicate in person with the Lacedæmonian government, leaving the defence of Phocis, if in the interval it should be attacked, weak in troops, but strong by its rocks and mountains, to his brothers Onomarchus and Phaëllus.

⁶ Ἀντὰρ Φωκίων Σχίδιος καὶ Ἐπίτροφος ἦρχον,

Ὅι Κυπάρισον ἔχον, Πυθιά τε πύρηνσαν. Hom. II. l. 2. v. 517.

The king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, appears to have been, according to all antient testimony, except what has come from sources evidently tainted with party malice, one of the most respectable characters of his age; not of shining talents, but of much courage and firmness, and, like Archidamus his grandfather, in the phrase of Thucydides, a wise and moderate man⁷. Philomelus was well received by the Lacedæmonians generally, but especially by Archidamus. To prevent Phocis from becoming an accession to the dominion, and an instrument of the ambition and animosity of Thebes, was itself of important interest for Lacedæmon. Yet even this was little, compared with the obvious consequences, that, not the oracle only of Delphi, so interesting to Grecian superstition, would be in their power, but the treasury, the great national bank of Greece, would become the fund for means to destroy Lacedæmon and overbear the Greek nation. Whether through the difficulty of keeping the counsels of a democratical government secret, this purpose became demonstrated, or rumor, to which Demosthenes and Isocrates have equally given authority, arose and gained credit on probability only, the circumstances appear to have been such as to excite, on most reasonable ground, very alarming suspicion. Scarcely more than ten years before, the Olympian treasury, probably much less rich than the Delphian, but hardly held less sacred, had been plundered by the Arcadians, allies of Thebes. Epameinondas, so famed for virtue, was then at the head of the Theban government; yet the Arcadians neither lost the alliance of Thebes, nor, as far as appears, even incurred any censure from the Theban government, for a sacrilege so extensively injurious. Were then the Theban government only as little scrupulous now, as when the virtuous Epameinondas presided in it, the Delphian treasury could not be considered but as in very great danger.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 24.
Pausan. l. 10.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 347.
Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.

Ch. 28. s. 6.
of this Hist.

⁷ Ἄνθρωπος ξυμμετρίως δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων.
Thucyd. l. 1. c. 79. & ch. 13. s. 5. of this Hist.
Diodorus gives the grandson's character
thus: Ἀρχίδαμος—ἀνὴρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν στρατηγίαν
καὶ τὸν ἄλλον βίην ἱπανοῦντος, κατὰ δὲ τὴν
πρὸς Φωκίαν συμμαχίαν μόνον ἐλασφοῦντος.
Diod. l. 16. c. 63. It is much to say for

him that, in the very difficult circumstances of his reign, with party raging as it did throughout Greece, he earned praise for all his conduct through life, excepting his alliance with the Phocians, the character of which it will be the business of the sequel to unfold.

Whatever

Whatever may have been at this time the state of parties, or the influence of Archidamus in Lacedæmon, where, often, the kings had little political weight, it would apparently have been difficult for any not to concur in the resolution that Phocis should be supported against the oppression of Thebes. This being decided, what followed, however otherwise questionable, seems to have been urgently required by the necessity of the case, that the temple and treasury of Delphi, in danger from the subserviency of the Amphictyons to the Thebans and Thessalians, should be placed again, as of right, it was asserted, it ought to be, in charge of the common government of the Phocian people. But the Lacedæmonian government could not easily afford either men or money for those purposes. The treasury instituted by Lysander, to be filled from various tributary states, was no more; and men, on whom the government might depend, could ill be spared from the defence of the remaining frontier, and the watch of the disaffected within it; nor could a Lacedæmonian force perhaps reach Phocis, without fighting its way through intermediate adverse states. The resource therefore was to open, in the modern phrase, a subscription, for the support of the common cause, depending upon that pressing interest, which wealthy individuals had in supplying the deficient means of government, for the preservation of private property and public order. Archidamus, accordingly, and Philomelus are said to have contributed, each from his private fortune, no less than fifteen talents, near three thousand pounds sterling.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 24.

Philomelus having succeeded, perhaps to the utmost of his hope or beyond it, in his negotiation at Lacedæmon, his next business was to use the means he had acquired for raising a mercenary force, to assist the small strength of Phocis. Opportunity for this abounded; for beside the common throng of exiles from various republics, the remission of hostilities, following the battle of Mantinea, had left numbers of practised soldiers, restless in indigence and ready for adventure. Philomelus, by his emissaries, quickly engaged between two and three thousand. These reached the Corinthian gulph, without exciting alarm. The strength of Phocis meanwhile was quietly prepared. The mercenaries were brought across the gulph at the critical moment; and

Delphi, unfortified, was suddenly attacked by a force vainly resisted by the partizans of Thebes, described by the unexplained name of Thracids; possibly having some reference to the Thracian founders of Grecian religious ceremonies. Philomelus and his party became completely masters of the place. The property of the Thracids was declared forfeited for the benefit of the army, which had delivered the temple: the other Delphians were assured of safety for themselves and their estates, under the just protection of the common government of Phocis, to the advantages of which they were restored.

It was apprehended that, upon intelligence of this violence against the sacred city, rapidly communicated every way, all the neighboring people under Theban influence, but especially all Bæotia, would have been immediately in motion. The measure however had been so well concerted, and the Theban government was so little prepared for it, that only the Ozolian Locrians, in unadvised zeal, marched toward Delphi. Philomelus, informed of their approach, met and easily overcame them. Occupying then the principal passes of the frontier with detachments of his army, especially against Locris and Bæotia, he placed Phocis so far in security, that he could proceed in some quiet to provide for its future government and future defence.

SECTION IV.

Measures of Philomelus for Defence of Delphi and Phocis: Difficulties of the Phocians: Violence of their Enemies: Oracle: Manifesto of Philomelus: Disposition of Athens: Disposition of other States: Allies of Thebes: Barbarity of the Thebans: Retaliation: Death of Philomelus.

PHILOMELUS and the governments in concert with which he acted, B C. 357. asserting, as a principle of their conduct, that the authority exercised Ol. 106, 2. by the Amphictyons at Delphi was usurped, and of no legality, it was Diod. l. 16. among his first businesses to destroy, with public ceremony, their c. 24. decrees against the Phocians and Lacedæmonians, and to deface the marble which, after the common manner of diplomatical publication among the Greeks, bore ingraved copies of them for the public eye. A care more important was at the same time pressing, to obviate, as far as might be, the alarm his enterprize might cause among states not before hostile to Phocis. Accordingly he circulated a declaration, stating, 'that he came to Delphi under the just authority of the common government of Phocis, for no irreligious or unlawful purpose, but 'to assert the antient indefeasible right of the Phocian people to the 'superintendency of the temple, and to maintain their laws against 'the usurpation, and their property against the unjust decrees, of the 'Amphictyons: that, under that superintendency therefore, the 'temple, and its ministers, and the treasures placed in sacred deposit 'there, should be most religiously and zealously protected³.'

Delphi, strong by its situation yet stronger hitherto by the sacred character of the place, and the deep interest of all Greece in its security, had remained unwall'd and open. But being gained now by arms, those who held it would of course have to apprehend the use of

* Justin who, among much absurd matter, 'animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios & Phocenses, quasi parva & plena has owed his reputation, describes the origin 'cadibus & rapinis luissent, apud commune Græcæ concilium superbe accusaverunt prorsus quasi post arma & bellum potirentur, secundam fortunam imbecillo 'locum legibus reliquissent.' l. 8. c. 1.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 24.
Ch. 25. s. 4.
of this Hist.

arms against them. It was therefore among the earliest cares of Philomelus to raise fortifications for its better safety. Meanwhile he was diligent in arming and training the Phocian people. Like the Greeks in general of the western highlands, less familiar with the panoply, they generally excelled in the use of light arms and missile weapons. Philomelus, judiciously avoiding to thwart the popular propensity, directed his attention to improve their method in the kind of warfare to which they were habituated, and which was peculiarly accommodated to their mountainous country: he formed a body of middle-armed in the Iphicratean discipline. Nor did the temper of the people disappoint his hope, but, on the contrary, the general firmness in attachment to him, and readiness to act under his orders, seemed to warrant expectation of final success. Shortly, beside the force stationary in the towns and passes, he had a moving army of five thousand men.

The inaction of the Thebans, whether owing to wisdom or weakness, appears to have disappointed and even distressed the Phocians. While the armies of the Grecian republics, as on various occasions we have seen, consisted of citizens, the soldier, in defensive war, subsisted on his own means, with assistance commonly from those public means only which were equally ready to relieve the wants, or promote the enjoyments of the citizen in peace. In offensive war plunder was always looked for, as that in the failure of which offensive war could hardly be prosecuted. When afterward the practice of employing mercenary troops obtained, a revenue appropriated to the purpose became indispensable; but still, in offensive war, plunder was always calculated upon, at least to lessen the call upon the revenue. But the expence of a mercenary force which might inable the people of the Phocian vallies to balance in arms the powerful confederacy of Thebes, was so over-proportioned to its revenue, that when once such a force was raised, to rest would not be in the choice of the general or the government. Hence, in the forbearance of the Thebans, Philomelus probably found offensive measures necessary. Hitherto Phocis had been actually attacked only by the Locrians. In the delay of threatened enterprize from Thebes therefore, he carried war into their country. Entering it
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with little resistance, his troops made considerable booty. But as he was carrying it off, the irritated enemy hung upon his rear; and chusing well their opportunity among defiles, killed about twenty of his men, whose bodies he was obliged to leave in their power. As usual, on such occasions, he sent a herald to request the restoration of the slain for burial; but he received for answer 'that the common law of the Greeks denied burial to the sacrilegious.' Indignation pervaded his army; but he had influence to check the dangerous effervescence, and prevailed that the just vengeance should be submitted to his direction. The enemy's little success increasing their confidence, he soon found opportunity for advantage over them; put many to the sword, compelled the rest to flight, and the dead remained in his power. Such was then the force of the common notions of the importance of burial, that neither fear nor shame were powerful enough to prevent the Locrians from becoming solicitors to their enemy, for what they had themselves so lately denied to his solicitation. Philomelus, on condition of receiving his own, did not refuse the Locrians their slain; but he proceeded to punish their former insult by prosecuting his new success. Advancing again into Locris, he extended plunder to parts before untouched; and, conducting his retreat then with caution taught by experience, he led back his army highly gratified with the expedition.

The command which Philomelus now held of the temple and oracle and treasury of Delphi, all so interesting to the whole Greek nation, gave him great means, but requiring uncommon discretion in the use. The Thebans, and their party throughout Greece, were urging against him, and all his supporters, the charges of impiety, profanation and sacrilege. To obtain a response from the oracle, of a tendency to justify his measures, probably not difficult, would be highly important, could credit be obtained for it. A response of a tenor very favorable to him, did then so gain reception, that even his enemies, hopeless to invalidate its authenticity, endeavored only to obviate its force. They asserted that it came from the Pythoness in an effusion of anger, indignant at the violence of profane hands, dragging her to the tripod; and they contended for an interpretation of
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her words, as applied only to such profanation. But, the Phocian cause being favored by a large part of Greece, including the two powerful republics of Lacedæmon and Athens, an interpretation advantageous to that cause had more general acceptance. Reports, moreover, of omens and prodigies, portending success to it, obtained popular credit extensively, and assisted the reception of the oracle in the favorable sense.

Philomelus now, from a man hardly known but among his own people, who were low in consideration among the Grecian republics, had not only himself risen to be one of the leading characters of the age, but had raised his hitherto obscure country to be among the leading powers; and, what deserves notice among Grecian revolutions, the measures, by which he rose, had been mild and almost bloodless. With the better confidence therefore he addressed now a second declaration, in the name of the Phocian people, to all the Grecian states: ‘The Phocians,’ he said, ‘in repossessing themselves of Delphi, their antient right, neither intended, nor would allow any violence to the temple or any of its appendages. The treasure should be preserved with the most religious care. An account of the number of offerings, with a specification of the weight of the precious metals in each, should be given, on demand, to any state which had offerings there, with free leave to examine their condition. With regard to the presidency of the temple, the Phocian people not only held themselves justified, in resuming it as their antient indefeasible right, but reckoned upon a fair claim to the support of the whole Greek nation. If therefore from malice or envy, or whatever bad motive, for no good one could be, any state should wage war against them, they were bold to request assistance from all others, as in a holy cause. Should that be denied by any, still they claimed peace with all, intitled to so much at least for their own peaceful principles and purposes.’

Diod. l. 16.
c. 27.

This declaration was communicated by ministers specially sent to every state, not omitting even Thebes. It would hardly be expected to find, in the ruling party there, a disposition to peace with Phocis, on any moderate terms; but the hope would be reasonable, that such demonstration of a disposition to conciliation, in the Phocian government,

ment, would tend to its credit. The measure indeed appears to have been, like those of Philomelus in general, judiciously conceived and ably executed. No particulars remain of discussions on the occasion at Athens, but preceding and following circumstances indicate generally the temper with which the application of the Phocians would be received by the contending parties there. Isocrates, and others who associated in politics with Timotheus and Chabrias, would be ready to concur with Lacedæmon in support of Phocis and in opposition to Thebes. Chares and his party would be ready to seize occasion for gaining the command of Phocis, and to prevent any others from gaining it; but they would oppose any advantage to Lacedæmon, not less than to Thebes. Animosity against Thebes, however, was a popular passion, and the partizans of Chares were courtiers of the sovereign people. Thus circumstances altogether were favorable for Philomelus, and the Athenian government avowed the support of Phocis, against the Amphictyons supported by the Thebans. Rarely as any measure of executive government escaped reprobation from some party at Athens, yet the Phocian alliance on this occasion, it appears from the orators, none would venture to blame.

Nevertheless it could not be denied that the expulsion of the Amphictyons from Delphi was a measure of extreme violence, against an establishment for ages held sacred by the Greeks, and a principal bond of the several governments of the nation; a violence to be justified only as civil war, by the last necessity. Accordingly the Thebans were sedulous to profit from the advantage so before them. In the name of the Amphictyons the call was sounded, throughout Greece, to arm against the sacrilegious Phocians, as in the common cause of the country and the god. But so prudent, in his critical and difficult circumstances, was the conduct of Philomelus, and so little popular the cause of the Amphictyons, under Theban patronage, that, of the numberless republics of the nation, only that branch of the Locrian name, which was distinguished and degraded by the epithet of Ozolian, the stinking, would obey the call. The Thebans therefore ventured upon no offensive operations; the common season of warfare ended, and winter passed, without farther hostilities.

But the season of repose seems to have produced no disposition to peace. The Phocians therefore could not safely reduce their mercenary force, which neither could they, with any ordinary means, maintain. But the abilities and popularity of Philomelus found extraordinary means, and apparently nevertheless unexceptionable. Among the Phocians were men of wealth, mostly acquired through the commerce of all Greece with Delphi; and whether by loan or how we are uninformed, the sum wanted for the public exigency was raised, and no complaint appears to have been excited.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 28.

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3. Spring came, and the Thebans, still refusing peace, nevertheless forbore action. Their powerful native military was of no expence to their government, and, unable as they were to excite their former confederacy to energy, they might hope for the advantage of victory without risk and without effort. It was much for the Phocians to have maintained their mercenaries through the winter. When the season for action came, that predatory war, which circumstances probably made indispensable, Philomelus directed where it might, with the best justification, be directed, still against the Locrians, who had invaded Phocis.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 28.

The Ozolian Locrians, a little subordinate people, aware of their inferiority to Thebes, Athens and Lacedæmon, but accustomed to reckon themselves more nearly equal to the Phocians, flew to arms, probably with more courage than good conduct, to defend their ravaged country; and venturing a battle with Philomelus, were again defeated. The slaughter was such, that the survivors, far from hoping to protect their fields, doubted of their ability to defend their towns against an enemy to whose slain they had denied burial. In extreme alarm therefore they addressed supplication and remonstrance to Thebes, praying that relief and support, to which such faithful allies, suffering in the common cause of the god and the Theban confederacy, were intitled.

The successful inroad of Philomelus, whether the wisest measure in his circumstances, we are without information sufficient for any clear judgement, was, however, in its result, not altogether fortunate. The cries of the Locrians produced a sensation in Greece, which the decrees

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of the Amphictyons, supported by the influence of Thebes, could not excite; and exaggerated report, of the successes and power of Philomelus, increased the effect. The advantage thus afforded to the Theban leaders, and their associates in the Amphictyonic assembly, was not neglected. If, when the Phocians first possessed themselves of Delphi, the Amphictyons took any of those measures which might have become their pretensions, and their generally acknowledged dignity, the effect was so little as to have escaped the notice of the only extant historian of these transactions, their advocate Diodorus. But now the council met, apparently at Thermopylæ; and while the Theban government sent ministers to every state, in which it could hope to excite an interest suited to its views, the Amphictyons issued decrees in the name of the Greek nation, invoking all to arm, in the cause of the god, against the sacrilegious Phocians. But even now the voice of that reverend council was, in the confession of the same historian, but as the trumpet of discord through Greece². The violent measures of Philomelus, on one side, the known ambition of Thebes, on the other, the critical situation of the Delphian treasury, and the means it might afford for prosecuting purposes of ambition and violence, whichever party prevailed, to the general injury of Greece, were subjects of anxious consideration for all informed and thinking men. Meanwhile among the Many, while some were vehement in indignation against the Phocians, and eager that they should suffer all the severity of punishment decreed for the most abominable sacrilege, (a crime, to judge from remaining accounts, far more engaging their solicitude than the overthrow or weakening of a political institution of common importance to the Greek nation,) others contended no less ardently that they were an injured people, whom it behooved united Greece to protect against the cruellest oppression, wickedly, with the pretence of service to the god, attempted against them.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 28.

The deficient merit, or credit, of the Theban leaders at this time, successors of the renowned Epameinondas and Pelopidas, is not weakly indicated by the antient writers, advocates of their cause, in the omission to name a single man of them. In ambition nevertheless and

² Πολλὴ ταραχὴ καὶ διάσπαις ἦν καθ' ἑλπί τῇ Ἑλλάδι, κ. τ. ε.

arrogance, they seem not to have been below their great predecessors. Yet, in measuring our censure to them, the uneasy and difficult situation of party-leaders among the Grecian republics, and the impossibility of avoiding party, should be considered. It appears indeed a truly wonderful tendency to tyranny, in various shapes, and from various causes, that we find in every democratical government which has been at all laid open to us. All that remains from antiquity on this part of history tends to show, tho no writer has so entered into detail of Theban and Bœotian affairs as to explain satisfactorily the cause, that the democratical party could not hope to maintain their power in Thebes, without holding the other towns of Bœotia in a political subjection, such that civil freedom, if any were really left them, must be utterly precarious: with the restoration of freedom to the Bœotian towns, the supreme power in Thebes would surely revert to the aristocratical party, and the democratical chiefs must probably seek personal safety in exile. This we have seen a principal moving spring of Theban politics in the long contest with Lacedæmon, and it remained so in the contest now with Phocis.

When the Thebans, under Pelopidas and Epameinondas, proposed to establish their own power over all Greece, on the ruin of that so long, with more or less plenitude, exercised by Lacedæmon, they could persuade almost all the northern republics, and half Peloponnesus itself, to zealous coöperation with them. But now, making common cause with the Amphictyons, the antient representative council of the nation, violently driven from that by long custom their place of meeting, and resisted in the execution of their offices, the list of allies they could obtain is of a very different description. The zeal of the Ozolian Locrians, already unfortunate enough, did not however abate. The Thessalians, apparently checked by domestic troubles, had assisted hitherto only by their influence to procure Amphictyonic decrees. The people now coming forward were the Perrhæbians, Dolopians, Athamans, Magnetes, Ænians and Achaïans; Thessalian names all, but so little familiar in Grecian history that it hardly appears what part those who bore them ever before took in any of the great concerns of the Greek nation. Lacedæmon and Athens, with all the states where
their

their interest prevailed, avowed themselves the allies of Phocis. The rest, even the Arcadians of Megalopolis, who owed their actual political existence to Thebes, appear to have avoided stirring.

But neither from Lacedæmon nor Athens was any effectual assistance ready, when the force of the Theban confederacy was assembling. Diod. l. 16.
c. 30. Philomelus therefore found it necessary to increase still his mercenaries, and, for their maintenance, to carry them again into the enemy's country¹⁰. Again he chose the Locrian territory for invasion. A body of Bœotian horse hastened to assist in its protection. A battle, in the usual way of Grecian warfare, followed, and Philomelus was victorious. Soon after no less than six thousand Thessalians joined the unfortunate Locrians; another battle was fought, and still the victory was with Philomelus. Then at length the Thebans got the whole force of Bœotia to move, to the amount of thirteen thousand men; but fifteen hundred Achaïans, from Peloponnesus, joining the Phocian army, Philomelus ventured to hold his ground.

Superior as the Thebans must have been in force, yet they did not hasten to a general action; but they intercepted the return of a c. 31. foraging party of Phocian mercenaries, who were made prisoners. With the hope of superiority, the disposition to a barbarous severity in the execution of the law, of which they took upon themselves to be the judges, or whose judges were their creatures, prevailed with the Theban leaders. They declared by proclamation that a sentence of the Amphictyons condemned the prisoners, as accomplices in sacrilege, to death; 'and immediately,' says the historian, 'following up their words by deeds, they put all to the sword.' Vengeance was indignantly demanded by the Phocian army, and the abilities of the general soon provided means for the necessary gratification. He found opportunity to make a considerable number of Bœotians prisoners, and, with the formality of retaliative justice, he delivered them to his incensed soldiers, who put all to death. 'Thus,' says the historian, 'Philomelus checked the cruel arrogance of the Thebans.' But when,

¹⁰ Diodorus, apparently following some author of the Theban party, says that Philomelus now trespassed on the sacred treasury. Afterward we find him, with candid simplicity, stating evidence that this was unfounded slander. Farther notice of this will occur hereafter.

in consequence of the enemy's superiority or equality, he could carry depredation no farther, as he had entered Locris principally to find subsistence for his troops, so, for subsistence, it would become necessary for him to withdraw again into Phocis; and, among the mountains, pressed in his retreat, he received a mortal wound.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 31.

Occasion was taken by the Thebans, from the death of Philomelus, to boast of a great victory; but, whatever may have been their success in action, it is evident that they were unable to prosecute the advantage. Winter indeed was approaching, which in the stormy atmosphere of a mountainous country, made a pause of military operations generally necessary for armies so unprovided as those of the Grecian republics; yet, if the success of the Thebans had been clear, they would have endeavored to penetrate to Delphi, the great object of the war. But, without an effort, they returned home, leaving their enemies to retreat unmolested, and take their measures at leisure for repairing their loss, whatever, beyond that of one most valuable life, it may have been. The Phocians thus retained the entire and undisturbed possession of their own country, including their new acquisition, or what they called their recovered and enfranchised dominion of the sacred city.

SECTION V.

Negotiation for Peace between Thebes and Phocis unsuccessful. Assistance from Thebes to the Satrap of Bithynia against the King of Persia. War of Invective among the Greeks. Onomarchus Successor of Philomelus. Invasion of Doris and Bœotia by Onomarchus.

THOSE who directed the administration of Thebes and Bœotia, whose names are to be found neither among historians nor orators, had expected, as Demosthenes and Isocrates both observe, that Phocis must yield to them, and would probably yield without resistance. The only hazard of their measures would arise, they supposed, from the alarm and indignation of Lacedæmon and Athens and their confederates.

Demosth.
de legat.
p. 347. &
in Aristocr.
Isocr. or. ad
Philipp.

But

But with these the Theban confederacy had been accustomed to contend, and would contend with better hope when Delphi should be in their power, and a clear majority of the Amphictyons subservient. Rarely we gain any direct information of the state of parties in Thebes. Events however imply that those who had hitherto directed its councils, were, in consequence of the total failure of their projects, obliged to yield, in some degree, to wiser and more moderate men, but of the same party, at least so far that they were of the party of Pelopidas and Epameinondas. In the winter following the death of Philomelus, the Phocians, before represented as involving in the contamination of sacrilege, and subjecting to the high displeasure of the gods, all who should communicate with them, unfit even to be allowed burial when slain in battle, were looked upon with somewhat less severity. Negotiation was opened with them, and the propositions were such as to engage the serious consideration of the Phocian leaders, in consultation with their allies. But the liberal party in Thebes could not carry their measures through. The terms at last insisted on were too severe, or too obviously insidious, to be accepted by men with arms in their hands, and led by able advisers. If any remission of the utmost rigor of the sentence of the Amphictyons was proposed, it was only partial, and calculated, by dividing the Phocians, to reduce them to their enemy's mercy. The negotiation therefore produced nothing".

Diod. l. xiv.
c. 32.

Successful

" Diodorus, compiling, abridging, and remarking, with his usual honesty of purpose and deficiency of judgement, has given a very inconsistent aspect to his narrative, which nevertheless affords, for the careful investigator, a store of materials in a great degree satisfactory, giving means at the same time to discover their own coherency, and to distinguish the sophisticated matter which party-writers have led the historian to mix with them. Speaking of the battle in which Philomelus fell, as a great and nearly decisive victory won by the Thebans, and his death as his own act, the result of despair, he shows withal that it was really a small

part only of the Phocian army that was overpowered among the mountains by a superior force. 'Οι Βοιωτοὶ τῶν πολλῶν πολὺν προέχοντες, ἐνίκησαν. But if even over that small part it had been a clear victory, they would have possessed themselves of the body of the slain general, which, as it is not said they did, we may very safely conclude they did not. Diodorus, however, proceeds to say, 'The Bœotians then returned home, ' because they thought the death of Philomelus sufficient for their purpose.' The conclusion is too ridiculous. Their ultimate purpose avowedly was to carry into full effect the decrees of the Amphictyons, and their

Successful so far as to prevent peace, the turbulent were however unable to command so as to carry on the war with any vigor. The Thessalians avoided to furnish troops, and the other allies were little more disposed to exertion. A remission of hostility with Phocis ensued, and the attention of the Thebans was drawn another way. Artabazus, satrap of Bithynia, still maintaining his rebellion against the great king, and again threatened by eastern multitudes under loyal satraps, desired again the experienced advantage of Grecian science and discipline to enable him to resist them. Whether less satisfied with the character of the Athenian general, Chares, than with the service of the troops under him, his commissioners now sent into Greece were instructed, it is said, to seek, in preference, men raised to fame under Epameinondas. It is not a little remarkable that, while not a name of a Theban officer who commanded against the Phocians, or a Theban politician who promoted the sacred war, not a name of an Amphictyon, or of any one engaged in council or in cause with the Amphictyons, has been preserved by the historian, or by any other extant author, yet, when within the same period, the Theban arms were directed other ways, the names of generals immediately appear. Pammenes, the philosophical Pammenes, the friend of Epameinondas, said to have been also the host and protector of Philip king of Macedonia, when a youth at Thebes, did not refuse to take the command of the auxiliaries for the satrap. From the time of the invasion of Xerxes, the Persian connection had been the reproach of Thebes among the Greeks. War against the king's forces, therefore, tho' in the cause of a rebellious satrap, might carry some credit with it, to the commander and to his country. At the same time Asia would be, both to general and army, a more inviting field than Phocis, for profit, as well as for glory. Under

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.
Polyæn.
strat. 1.5. 16.
& Frontin.
1. 11. 3. 3.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.
Plut. v. Pe-
lop. p. 292.

Demosth.
de class.

their first object to recover possession of Delphi, and restore the Amphictyonic session there. Undoubtedly they would have marched thither without delay, had they gained a victory to open means for it. But on the contrary, as the historian proceeds to inform us. 'The Phocians withdrew to Delphi, delivered, for the present, from all pressure of war; and, holding council with their allies, deliberated concerning war and peace.' The sequel we shall find amounting to proof that they had not been materially weakened by the events of the campaign.

such

such a man as Pammenes accordingly such was the zeal for this service, that five thousand volunteers were presently raised; whether all Thebans, or men promiscuously collected, we are uninformed. Possibly the Thebans among them were such as the promoters of the Phocian war would willingly see emigrate; and Pammenes himself may have been not a warm approver of their measures. Contributing principally, however, it is said, toward two great victories obtained over the king's forces, with much profit to those engaged under him, he added not a little to the military renown of Thebes¹². B. C. 353.
Ol. 105. 4.

In a war of the character of that called the sacred, which produced the deliberate massacre of prisoners as a measure of piety, necessary to the justification of one of the parties in the sight of the deity, minds would be more than commonly heated, invective would of course abound, and the rancorous spirit would not cease with the contest in arms, but live with the survivors, and fade but gradually among their posterity. Of virulence then only second to that of a war for which perverted reason claims religion as its ground, would be hostility so founded as that between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians. The Messenians bound to the Thebans, as the restorers, and second founders of their nation, had however yet taken no part in the sacred war; but they were adverse to the Phocians, not more because the Phocians were enemies to Thebes, than because they were befriended by Lacedæmon. Popular prejudice therefore among the Messenians gave ready circulation to a story, wherever originating, that the kings, the ephors, and all the senate of Lacedæmon favored the impious cause under the instigation of bribes from the Delphian treasury. Men of letters, now abounding in Greece, and even men of superior talents and acquirements, some excited by party-attachments, some allured by Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

Pausan. 1. 4.
c. 5.

¹² Diodorus remarks, on this expedition of Pammenes, 'that it appeared wonderful how the Bæotians, deserted by the Thes-salians, and pressed by the Phocian war, could send an army beyond sea and be successful.' He had just before shown that, in Greece, they were very generally unsuccessful. The inducement, therefore, to send such a force, if really a Theban force, or composed of Bæotians friendly to the Theban connection, would indeed appear mysterious. But the measure was more than probably a measure of a party adverse to the Phocian war, whether obtaining a temporary superiority, or only licence for the adventure.

M. T. Cic.
orat.
Diod. Hist.
ep. ad Ann.

profit, addicted themselves to the compilation, and perhaps often invention of anecdotes and secret history, and especially of the defamatory kind. Among these, the Chian Theopompus, a scholar of Isocrates, admired for the force and elegance of his style, was at this time eminent. From him a tale has been preserved, nearly to the same purpose as the Messenian, but throwing the mire with more ingenuity, and not with such undistinguishing boisterousness. Archidamus, according to Theopompus, was not himself disposed to favor the sacrilegious Phocians; but the dispensers of Delphian gold, at Lacedæmon, gaining his queen, Deinica, her interest with the king at length overbore his probity¹¹. Such stories would be likely to have circulation. But with the clear and pressing interest of Lacedæmon to support the Phocians against Thebes, it is obvious that bribery could be little necessary to persuade to it; and if for any matter, not of completely public notoriety, Diodorus is worthy of credit, his report, that, instead of receiving money from the Phocians, Archidamus, and perhaps others, assisted them with money, will deserve it. We shall hereafter see the probity of Philomelus, and his abstinence from trespass on the sacred treasury, to a degree beyond evidence common in such cases, placed above just suspicion. If he was clear, the imputation against remoter hands, while he ruled at Delphi, must fall of course.

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 31, 32.

On the death of Philomelus, his next brother, Onomarchus, who had been his principal assistant in council and in the field, was raised, by election of the Phocian people, to the arduous office which he had so ably held. In talents not inferior, Onomarchus seems to have had a more soaring ambition and less scrupulous probity. He is said to have begun his administration with trespass upon the sacred treasury. But the proof seems to rest wholly on the difficulty of otherwise accounting for the means he appears to have possessed for maintaining,

¹¹ Athenæus, quoting Heracleides Lembus, relates that a king of Lacedæmon, named Archidamus, was fined by the ephon for preferring a rich bride, with a person under the proper size for breeding succession of Hercules, to one of a finer person with less wealth. (Athen. l. 3. p. 280. vel

586.) Plutarch mentions the same story (De lib. educ. init.) Some modern writers, to make so good a story more complete, give the name of Deinicha to the little lady, unnamed by either Athenæus or Plutarch, and make her husband equally without authority from either, the son of Agesilaus.

and considerably increasing, the military force raised by his late brother. According to the same historian, who relates that the Phocian army was completely defeated when Philomelus was killed, the Phocian force was, within a few months after, greater than Philomelus had ever commanded. The Thebans, to deter enemies and allure friends, would endeavor to profit from the death of the adverse general for spreading the belief of a great victory; while they circulated also new fulminations of the Amphictyons, threatening with divine as well as human vengeance, all who should in any manner or degree favor their sacrilegious foes. Nevertheless the Phocian cause continued rather to gain ground among the Grecian states; the policy of Onomarchus, which was evidently able, being apparently assisted by the credit which the wise and honorable conduct of Philomelus had extensively conciliated. During the season of rest from arms, according even to the historian's partial account, attributing all success of the Phocian cause to bribery, the turn in politics, where any occurred, was in favor of Phocis. The principal defection was of the Thessalians, who did not indeed join the Phocians, but no longer sent auxiliaries to Thebes. Open then as the treasury was to the examination at least of the states friendly to Phocis, if there was trespass to any considerable amount, it must have been managed either with extraordinary dexterity or extraordinary concert.

The continued inactivity of the Thebans, in a war of their own seeking, is unaccounted for by antient writers, any farther than as it is indicated that the leaders of the war party among them were not superior men, and that an opposing party was powerful. Nevertheless the forbearance may have resulted in some degree from policy; for Onomarchus could not, any more than Philomelus, remain inactive, and he was probably not yet strong enough to invade Boeotia. Accordingly he led his army into the Epicnemidian Locris, where he took Thronium, the principal town, and, if the historian followed trustworthy authority, sold the inhabitants to slavery. Possibly he may have exercised such severity against some of them, obnoxious for violence, such as we have seen some of the enemies of Phocis disposed to; but the

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 31.

B. C. 353.
Ol. 106. 4.
Diod. . 16.
c. 33.

historian's own account of his general conduct, and his political success, forbids the belief that he would passionately, or for small profit, make himself odious and his cause unpopular in Greece. From Doris he turned back across Phocis into the Ozolian Locris. Amphissa, the principal town of that province, only threatened by his army, surrendered. Amphissa was but seven miles from Delphi. Probably the inactivity of the Thebans, in support of their allies, had excited disgust; and possibly a party adverse to the Theban connection, and holding communication with Phocis, was powerful. But a capitulation, little common as it was among the Greeks, and especially considering all the circumstances of the sacred war, would imply confidence in the conqueror's faith. From Amphissa Onomarchus turned upon Doris, and plundered great part of the country.

Ch. 28. s. 4.
of this Hist.

The remissness and unpopularity of the Theban government, together with the conciliating conduct of the Phocian general autocrat, seem to have produced the opportunities, which now occurred, for attempts within Eæotia itself. Orchomenus, so cruelly desolated by the Thebans, about three years before the battle of Mantinea, had been repeopled; under what circumstances we are uninformed, but certainly under Theban patronage; and probably the new population was mixed, of antient Orchomenians, and new settlers from other parts of Greece. But whatever preventive care may have been taken, aversion to the Theban government grew: communication was held with the Phocians; Onomarchus, turning suddenly from Doris, arrived unexpectedly; and the Theban party was so surprized and awed that, whether any contest in arms intervened is not said, Orchomenus became a member of the Phocian alliance. Under similar incouragement, apparently, Onomarchus then proceeded to Charoneia; but, the Thebans having hastily collected their forces, he was there disappointed. The historian's expression rather implies a defeat in battle; but it could be little important, for he was presently after in circumstances for new and great enterprize.

But the contest between Phocis and Thebes, in its progress, more
 13 involving

involving the other states of Greece, it will be necessary now to advert to what had been passing among the principal of those states, and observe the circumstances in which at this time they stood.

SECTION VI.

Politics of Athens. Circumstances of Macedonia: Marriage of Philip: Disposition to Peace thwarted by a Party in Athens: Confederacy against Macedonia: Accumulated Successes of Philip.

THE sacred war, with the command of the temple and treasury of Delphi its object, was a concern of such magnitude for the Greek nation, and especially the two great republics of Athens and Lacedæmon, that the very permission of the contest, and the allowance for such an obscure people as the Phocians to take the leading part, strongly indicate decay and beginning decrepitude, the result of long and almost ceaseless divisions. Athens, however, tho weak in landforce, slow to put forward armies of citizens, and having among her citizens few practised soldiers, like those which had fought her battles under Miltiades and Aristides, was powerful still by sea, ambitious, not less than formerly, of command over other states, and, even more than formerly, active and deep in policy. Among those who contended for the lead in public affairs, from the great Cimon's time downward, there had always been some who held it for the republic's interest to maintain a constant friendly connection with Lacedæmon. But the party of Chares, which of late had been mostly the ruling party, admitted the Lacedæmonian alliance, even when most necessary, with reluctance; nor had they ever ceased to support the enemies of the Lacedæmonians, so as to frustrate their great purpose, the recovery of the dominion of Messenia. In joining such an ally, or any ally, for the critical purpose of defending the Delphian treasury, some jealous care might become every Athenian statesman. But the party of Chares, while they thwarted all separate interests of their ally, would press any separate interest of their own, to the injury of their ally:

ally: not satisfied with obviating the preponderance of Lacedæmon, they would make Phocis their instrument for purposes adverse to the interest of Lacedæmon. Hence, tho the two governments concurred in the general purpose of supporting the Phocians, and opposing the Thebans, yet they coöperated little. The several distractions of each also prevented vigorous interference from either. Lacedæmon was perplexed by the necessity of constantly watching enemies on all her borders, and even within them; and Athens, after abandoning the contest with her confederates, was still implicated in war, maintained with purposes of ambition and revenge, against Macedonia.

The Macedonian kingdom meanwhile was become, at least in comparison of former times, settled within itself, powerful among states around, and secure in its increased possessions. Any considerable preponderancy it had not yet attained. Able administration was wanted, much for its improvement, but much also even for any permanence of its existing fortunate circumstances: the Thessalian connection, so advantageous for its power, the Olynthian, so necessary to its daily safety, might be in a moment lost. In this state of things, the king, strongly inclined to literature, the fine arts, cultivated society, and perhaps in general to pleasure, seems, notwithstanding the consciousness of military talents, and the stimulation of military successes, to have proposed rather to emulate his great predecessor Archelaus in the injoyment and improvement of what he possessed, than hazard all in contest for farther acquisitions, and to place his farther glory in cultivating the arts of peace.

B. C. 354. Soon after his return from his successful expedition into Thessaly, a
Ol. 106. 3. year or more before the beginning of the sacred war, Philip married
Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemus king of Epirus. That country,
Strab. 1. 7. occupied, from earliest tradition, by a people of kindred blood with the
p. 526, 527. Greeks, and speaking a dialect of the Greek language, hardly differing
Ch. 34. c. 2. from the Macedonian, had preserved also, as we have seen of the neigh-
of this Hist. boring country of Lyncestis a form of government nearly resembling
the Macedonian. Moreover the royal race, like the Macedonian and
Lyncestian, boasted a Grecian origin; highly illustrious, but not, in
remaining

remaining accounts, equally authenticated: they claimed however descent from Neoptolemus, called also Pyrrhus, son of Homer's great hero Achilles, who is said to have settled in Epirus on returning from the Trojan war. The country consisted of vales, of considerable extent and great fertility, among mountains of uncommon height and roughness: as a land of husbandmen, it was well peopled, and wealthy. Altogether these kingdoms and principalities, held by people of Grecian race, under mixed monarchal government, were perhaps in extent, and in free population, nearly equal to that held by the republics. Like their neighbors the Thessalians, these people were fond of show, and the courts of the princes were not without some elegance of splendor. The magnificence, with which the nuptials of Philip with the Epirot princess were solemnized, has been celebrated by antient writers. Thenceforward, even more than before under Archelaus, the Macedonian court became the principal seat of polite gaiety, and the greatest and safest resort of cultivated society, perhaps then in the world.

Amid the deficiency of materials for the history of these times, we find unequivocal indication that, after all Philip's successes against the Athenians, he not only was always ready to admit negotiation, upon liberal terms, but used every opportunity to invite it; nor is it left doubtful that the greatest and most respectable men of the republic were anxious to meet his purpose. But it was not least because peace, and friendly connection with Macedonia, were desired by one party in Athens, that the other opposed them; and they so opposed, that tho the esteem, which the king of Macedonia had acquired, did not cease, yet it became dangerous to own esteem for him. The party which had produced the unfortunate war of the republic with its republican confederates; excited revolt against its very beneficial ally, the king of Macedonia; rewarded and honored the assassination of another ally, its citizen, the king of Thrace; which avowed, as principles, that to foment disturbance among neighboring states, and to be itself always at war with some of them, was the just and necessary policy of every democracy, but especially the Athenian; that, tho truces might, from momentary pressure, become necessary, yet to make a perpetual

Plut. v. Alex. init.

Demosth. Olynth. 1. p. 15, de legat. p. 358, 372, & 442.

Demosth. de legat. p. 358.

Esch. de
legat. p. 198.

Demosth.
Olynth. 2.
p. 22.

peace was treason against the people, inasmuch as it denied the use of future opportunities against other people; this party opposed every step toward peace with Macedonia: the endeavor to lead the people to allow negotiation appears to have been frequently repeated by the most respectable citizens, but it was always ineffectual. At length, finally to check it, a moment of popular passion was taken for procuring a decree, by which communication from the Macedonian government, even by a herald, was forbidden. The policy of such a measure, unexplained by ancient writers, seems, with any view to any common interest of the Athenian people, the less readily imaginable as, since the loss of so many towns on the Macedonian and Thracian shores, the means of Athens to injure Macedonia, farther than by depredation on its commerce, were greatly narrowed. But the particular interest of the war-party, the party of Chares, in such a decree, is not obscure. Peace with Macedonia not only must have produced arrangements adverse to the views of those, of whose policy war and troubles were the very foundation, but would probably have replaced the administration of the republic in the hands of others, who had always professed a peaceful policy. The two objects, which especially engaged the ambition and cupidity of the party of Chares, were perhaps objects of desire for the Athenians very generally, the sovereignty of the Thracian Chersonese, and the command of the passage into the Euxine sea by the Bosphorus; the former held by the king of Thrace, the ally of Athens, the latter surrendered to Byzantium, by the treaty of peace which ended the confederate war. Both were great objects, for revenue and for commerce; for commerce especially in two principal articles of the Attic market, corn and slaves. If then, by peace concluded with Macedonia under management of the friends of Isocrates, allowance might have been gained for pursuing these objects, which seems not improbable¹⁴, the war-party would have so much the deeper interest in the decree, which cut off the means of even entering into treaty with Macedonia.

What was the opportunity for so violent a measure, or when precisely

¹⁴ Its probability is especially indicated in the oration of Isocrates to Philip, where he mentions his view of the business of Amphipolis.

it took place we are uninformed; but it appears to have been nearly about the time when a formidable confederacy was raised against Macedonia, in which the king of Thrace, the king of Illyria, and a pretender to the principality of Pæonia, were engaged. How far the war-party in Athens had originally excited, or afterward promoted this league, is not indicated, but its coincidence with their views is obvious, and that their ingenuity and activity were great, and their communication extensive, is also evident. Nor is it left doubtful that, without instigation, or almost compulsion, from Athens, the king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, would not have concurred in such a measure. The combination appears very well imagined: Macedonia was to be attacked at the same time on the eastern and western side, while rebellion was excited within.

But Philip, according to the remarkable testimony of the great orator, sometimes, in the midst of violent invective, his eulogist, with all his disposition to pleasure, was never unready for business; neither labor nor danger stopped him when occasion called¹⁵. Sending Parmenio, whom he esteemed the ablest of his generals, against the Illyrians, he marched himself into Pæonia, and the pretensions of his opponent there were soon finally crushed. Turning then into Thrace, and profiting ably from the discord which the Athenians themselves had fomented in that country, one of the princes, Teres, fighting by his side against the others, he brought all to such submission that, as the great orator afterward indignantly expressed himself, he made and unmade there what kings he pleased. The successes of the Thracian expedition were just completed, when information was brought of a great victory obtained by Parmenio over the Illyrians; and, what has been thought worthy of notice by ancient writers, presently after, a messenger arrived with intelligence that his horse had won the palm in the Olympian race¹⁷. Occasion has hereto-

Diod. l. 16.
c. 22.

BC. 355.¹⁶
Cl. 106. 2.
Epist. Phil-
ipp. ad Ath.
ap. Demosth.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.
p. 12.
Plut. v. Alex.
p. 666.

Ol. 106.

¹⁵ Καὶ ὅση δυνάμει ἦν ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ δια-
σασθαι, κ. τ. λ. Dem. de Cor. p. 275.

¹⁶ Diodorus assigns this war to the first year of the 106 Olympiad. Reason for supposing that, tho it may have originated

in the first year of the 106 Olympiad, it was not concluded in that year, will be stated in a following note.

¹⁷ ——— Ὀλυμπιάσιν ἵππῳ πέληται νεικηκέσθαι.
Plut. v. Alex.

fore occurred to observe the importance which the Greeks attached to this kind of victory; likely to have been the more grateful to Philip, as it would beyond anything, in the judgement of the Many, throughout Greece, convict the adverse orators of impudent falsehood, when, at a loss for other invective equal to their malignity, they called him in their public speeches a barbarian. But he had scarcely been congratulated on these successes, when a third messenger arrived, with information that his queen had brought him a son and heir, afterward the great Alexander. Then, in consonance with the opinion, old among the Greeks, that accumulation of uninterrupted prosperity had in itself a tendency to bring signal calamity, through a disposition in the deity, as Herodotus expresses it, to envy human happiness, he is said to have exclaimed, ‘O Fortune, send some little evil, to temper all this good’¹⁸.

Demosth.

Ch. 6. c. 3.
of this Hist.

Plut. v. Alex.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 22.
Demosth.
Ol. l. p. 15,
& al.

Through these successes the Macedonian kingdom became truly great and formidable, extending from the Euxine sea to the Adriatic. Diodorus reckons both Thrace and Illyria completely reduced under the Macedonian dominion. We learn from following circumstances that it was not precisely so, but from the great cotemporary orator it appears that they were brought to no small degree of dependency. The Athenian fleets, still commanding the Ægean, could still interrupt the maritime commerce of the Macedonians and their allies; but the king applied himself diligently to obviate this evil, through the opportunities which his conquests and alliances afforded for raising a navy; and, with the advantages afforded by the Amphipolitan territory, and the zealous concurrence especially of the Thessalians, whose commercial towns were considerable, he made rapid progress.

¹⁸ Plutarch, to whom we owe this anecdote, has added that Philip was so delighted with the success of his racer, that he celebrated it by a representation of the animal and his rider, on the reverse of the golden coins from his mimes of Philippi. Perhaps the collection of coins was not equally an object of the curious in Plutarch's as in the present day, and possibly Plutarch never saw or never noticed a Macedonian coin older than Philip. It is now enough known

that a horseman unarmed, a *κάλυξ*, was the common ornament of the reverse of the Macedonian coins, many reigns before him. The story may deserve thus much notice, as one among many proofs of the carelessness and ineptitude with which writers, even of eminence, under the Roman empire, adopted or imagined remarks and anecdotes concerning the republican age of Greece, and perhaps of Rome too.

SECTION VII.

Politics of Athens. Orators. Measures for acquiring Dominion in Thrace. Areiopagitic Oration of Isocrates.

MEANWHILE at Athens, notwithstanding the disadvantage and disgrace to the republic, with which all the objects of the confederate war had been abandoned, the party of Chares maintained an ascendancy with the multitude, and notwithstanding their disappointment in the complete defeat of the confederacy of kings against Macedonia, they persisted in their purpose of prosecuting war against that country. We have formerly observed Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus concurring in the policy of supporting the Thracian monarchy, as a balance to that growing preponderance of Macedonia, which its vehement enemies, the war-party in Athens, had so much contributed to produce. Macedonia might now become a maritime power. That the Thracian monarchy would become such was not within reasonable view; and hence apparently the policy of Chabrias, in the treaty which confirmed to the king of Thrace the dominion of the Chersonese. Tho the revenue of that country thus went to another, yet the advantages of its commerce might be, without expence or hazard, all for Athens. But no sooner had the party of Chares produced the disgrace of Timotheus and Iphicrates, than they became sedulous to procure public disapprobation of the measure, which Chabrias was no longer living to support. The management appears to have been very artful. Boldly asserting, what the Many were ready, on any assertion, to believe, that the sovereignty of the Chersonese of right was theirs, and affecting a just respect for the character of Chabrias, they said, ‘that able officer
 ‘and statesman would never have so yielded to the unjust violence of
 ‘Kersobleptes and Charidemus, but that he had been improvidently
 ‘sent without a force to oppose them.’ The confederate war was yet going forward, when they brought the matter before the assembled
 people.

Demosth.
 in Aristocr.
 p. 678.

people. Glaucôn moved, that ten commissioners be sent to Thrace, to demand of Kersobleptes his accession to the terms formerly required of him by Athenodorus, and, should he refuse, to provide means of compulsion; and the people decreed accordingly. But the interest of the party seems to have failed in the nomination of commissioners; a majority of whom, as the censure of Demosthenes shows, were not disposed to forward their views in Thrace. Troubles then breaking out in Eubœa, and the alarm of the king of Persia's threatened vengeance concurring, those most disposed to ingage the republic in new wars, feared at that time to press the purpose farther.

But peace being made with the confederates, the troubles of Eubœa appeased, and the alarm of invasion from Persia subsided, the orators began again to mention the Chersonese, and the people to listen with interest. The superior powers of oratory appear to have been on the side of Chares. The name of Lysurgus, from whom an oration remains, is eminent. An oration also is extant, attributed to Hegesippus¹⁹. Of Timarchus, Cleitomachus, Polyeuctus, and, more celebrated than all, Hyperides, the fame only has been transmitted.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 294.

Nevertheless it seems questionable whether the party of Chares was indebted for its superiority on the bema, more to the talents of the men, or to their unscrupulousness in using the arbitrary powers of democratical government. Leosthenes, of the adverse party, had, at least with that party, the reputation of being the most eloquent man of his time, excepting only Callistratus. But Leosthenes was a sufferer from that common tyranny of democracy, which Isocrates has mentioned as prevailing at Athens, the denial of freedom of speech. The ostracism had fallen out of use, banishment remained, for party purposes, common, and Leosthenes was banished; apparently, like so many other illustrious Athenians, for his merit. Isocrates only wrote for his party. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, among large and warm eulogy of that distinguished patriot, has expressed admiration especially at his

¹⁹ The supposition that the oration on the third Philippic, p. 129; Hyperides has been highly celebrated by Dionysius and Cicero. Timarchus will occur for future notice. Cleitomachus and Polyeuctus, are mentioned by Demosthenes in

boldness in venturing to publish that called the Areiopagitic oration, which carries within itself evidence of its date, of this time. The object was to produce a reformation of the government, bringing it back, as nearly as might be, to the constitution of Solon, or, at least, of Cleisthenes. To open such a purpose, not only for the safety of the orator, but for a chance of success, and even to obtain a hearing, great caution was necessary. In addressing therefore his irritable sovereign, venturing but to glance at the turpitude, speaking more directly to the folly, he dwells chiefly on the danger of past conduct and actual projects²⁰.

‘The Athenians had now,’ he observed, ‘within a short space of time, lost all their possessions on the northern shores of the Ægean, from the Thracian Chersonese to the border of Thessaly, and all the islands on the Asiatic coast, with Byzantium, and the important pass of the Bosphorus: yet, in the course of these disasters, twice had the evangelical sacrifice been performed, as if thanks were due to the gods for signal victories. After all their great losses of dominion and revenue, indeed, they remained possessed of two hundred triremes, whence they were ready to exult in the ideā of being still masters of the seas; and holding also yet many allied cities dependent and tributary, and having besides friendly connection with some independent states, bound to them by a common interest, they did not cease to extend their ambition to the dominion of all Greece²¹.’ How revolting these pretensions were to the Greeks in general, how unfit a government like the Athenian was to hold extensive dominion, how much, for the Athenians themselves, it wanted reformation, and what must be the danger of prosecuting their ambitious purposes, and omitting the wanted reformation, he then proceeds to show. But, with that caution which democratical despotism required,

²⁰ Τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρειοπαγίτικὸν ἀναγνὼς οὐκ αἶνέειν κοσμιώτερος; ἢ τις οὐκ ἂν θαινώσει τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος; ὅς ἐτόλμησε διαλεχθῆναι περὶ πολιτείας Ἀθηναίους, ἀξίων μελεῖσθαι μὴ τὴν τότε καθιεῶσαν δημοκρατίαν, ὥς μεγάλα βλάπτουσιν τὴν πόλιν, ὑπὲρ ἧς τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἰνδαίς ἐπιχίρει λίγισιν. Dion. Hal. in Isocr.

The Areiopagitic carries within itself clear indication of its own date, after the conclusion of peace with the confederates, and before the measures which quickly followed. p. 96, 100, 102. t. 1. edit. Auger.

²¹ Πᾶσαι ἱλπίζετε τὴν Ἑλλάδα ταύτην τῇ δυνάμει κατασχεῖσιν. Isocr. Areiop.

he ventured to indicate the present state of things only by comparison with the past; showing the past perhaps less exactly as it really was, than as, in improved representation, it would form a completer contrast to the present. The picture however is clear, and exhibits far more fully than any other extant, the state of Athens at the time.

p. 112.

‘ The divine worship,’ says the venerable statesman, beginning with the subject of religion, ‘ was not, with our forefathers, a scene of riot and disorder: it was not sometimes, for wantonness, a sacrifice of a hundred oxen, and sometimes, through want, an omission of antient rites. Magnificent feasts were not given to the people after foreign customs; nor did the proper ceremonies of the holy temples fail, through penury of the treasury, being always regularly supplied from the proper sacred fund. Our forefathers conceived true worship to consist, not in extravagant expenditure, but in the careful observation of divine precepts, transmitted from their forefathers.’

‘ Congenial with those on the concerns of religion, were their principles of communication among one another, as inheritors of a common country. The poor were so far from being hostile to the wealthy, that they considered the fortunes of the Few as the surest sources of competence for the Many. The landowners letting farms at moderate rents, the monied men employing the poor in manufactures, or lending what enabled them to manage business on their own account, all were bound together by mutual interest. Nor did lending involve the danger that either the whole sum lent would be lost, or that, with much trouble, only a small part could be recovered. For the juries then did not prostitute lenity, but decided according to law; they did not, by warranting the wrong of others, prepare the way for themselves to profit from wrong; but, on the contrary, they showed more indignation at such wrong than even those who suffered by it: for they reckoned incouragement for faithlessness in contracts injurious to the poor, even more than to the rich. None then feared to own their riches. The wealthy saw with more satisfaction those who came to borrow, than those who came to pay: property was secure to its just owner; and a share in its advantages was diffused, in the course of things, among all ranks.’

p. 118.

‘ Such

‘ Such then was the security of the Attic territory, that better p. 130.
 ‘ houses, and better living in them²², were found about the country
 ‘ than within the fortified towns. Many Athenians did not come to
 ‘ the city even at the principal festivals; satisfied with the enjoyment
 ‘ of their private fortunes, and not desirous to prey upon the public.
 ‘ But now what reasonable man can see, without indignation, citizens
 ‘ uncertain whether they shall that day have common necessities,
 ‘ casting lots for the office of jurymen, and decreeing subsistence for
 ‘ other Greeks who will pull the oar for them; or strutting in pro-
 ‘ ceSSIONS in golden robes, furnished by the public, and then passing
 ‘ whole seasons in a way that I am ashamed to describe.

‘ The result is that, among other states, we are hated by some, and p. 152.
 ‘ by the rest despised; proof of which is open to you in the reports of
 ‘ your own generals, and in the king of Persia’s letter lately received.
 ‘ Among ourselves meanwhile we have such perpetual discord, that the
 ‘ inconvenience is daily felt by almost all; and at the same time the
 ‘ public good, and even the ordinary defence of the country, are so
 ‘ neglected that none, without pay, will attend the muster for military
 ‘ service. Some indeed are so poor, or so shameless, as to disgrace the
 ‘ city by becoming common beggars.’

In his oration on peace, published during the confederate war, lamenting the changes in the constitution of the republic as the principal causes of its evil condition, he had proposed generally the restoration of the government as established by Solon. We find no intimation that any reform followed. He now offered a less extensive but more specific proposition; to restore to the court of Areiopagus, formerly so much venerated, its antient dignity and authority, and especially its censorial power. Thus, he said, best the malversation of magistrates might be restrained, frauds upon the revenue prevented, sober conduct enforced among the wealthy, industry revived among the poor, and relief duly administered to the wants of those unable to maintain themselves. His object evidently was to establish a check upon the wildness of popular despotism, to prevent the administration from falling into hands so unworthy as those which had too commonly

²² Ἐπισυνῶς, festa. Auger. Amblemus. Mably, rech. sur les Grecs. p. 17.

directed it, and to provide a steddiess for the government altogether, to which it had been long a stranger. But so much it would have been dangerous to declare. That the people in assembly should hold an uncontrouled despotism, was a maxim so instilled by the flattery of candidates for popular favor, and so maintained by demagogues in power, that he seems not to have known how to be cautious enough in proposing any balance to it, or mixture with it. He ventures hardly more than a hint, referring to the constitution of Solon, who of all legislators of any fame, he says, had most favored democracy, and yet had established the Areiopagus in all the power, to which he himself proposed now to restore it. Fearing, however, this might not be accepted as sufficient apology, he concluded with what could not apparently but have the most direct tendency to overthrow his own work: 'It was a maxim with him,' he said, 'equally as with their 'ancestors, who had instituted and supported the venerable court of 'Areiopagus, that the PEOPLE, as a TYRANT,' for that precisely is his term, 'should hold absolute sovereignty, the legislative power, the 'judicial, and the executive; and that nothing should be committed 'to others but offices merely ministerial'²³.'

In truth the censorial power which Isocrates proposed to revive, was but a species of the very defective and very hazardous general resource of the antient republican legislators; not a concurrent authority; nothing that could harmonize with the other powers; but, like the college of ephors at Lacedæmon, and the tribunate of Rome, merely another despotism, to war against that already existing, rather than to temper and accord with it.

²³ Διὶ τὸν μὲν Δῆμον, ὡς περ τυραννός, καθιστά-
ται τὰς ἀρχάς, κ. τ. λ. p. 112. The use of the
word *τύραννος*, in this place, by so late a
writer as Isocrates, will assist to indicate its

just import when applied, by himself and
others, to those who, according to our law-
phrases, may be termed *tyrants sole*, in con-
tradistinction to *tyrants aggregate*.

SECTION VIII.

Purpose of the War-party to carry War into Asia. Circumstances of Methonë and of Thrace. Chares General-Autocrator in Thrace. Massacre of the Sestians. Conquest of the Thracian Chersonese; and Partition of the Thracian Monarchy.

THE arguments of Isocrates produced no reformation of the government. The party of Chares, though checked by repeated failure of public measures under their direction, maintained yet a general superiority. On the conclusion of peace with the revolted allies, the mercenary army should have been disbanded, and the fleet at least reduced. But Chares would be unwilling to return from a lucrative command abroad with princely power, to the situation of a simple citizen of Athens, most uneasy for those most distinguished; and numbers, at home as well as abroad, had a share of common interest with him. The disbanding accordingly was delayed; on what pretence we do not learn; but we find indication that it was not without some oppression of the remaining allies of the republic.

Demosth.
περὶ συμφορῶν.

Meanwhile the satrap of Bithynia, Artabazus, who had been relieved, as we have seen, by Chares, in his war with the loyal satraps, again pressed by royal armies, negotiated again among the Grecian republics for assistance; and it was now that he engaged the Theban Pammenes, whose service we have also seen highly advantageous to him. But service in Asia, as Xenophon's account of himself shows, might offer allure-ment for an adventuring commander, even without a satrap's pay. Whether with any view to promote such a project, the rumor was revived at Athens, that a large fleet was preparing in the ports of Phenicia, to bring a Persian army to Greece. The people were assembled to consider of measures to be taken, in circumstances asserted to be highly critical. The leading orators of the war-party evinced a feeling of a strong interest on the occasion. They warmly urged, 'that attack should not be waited for; that the

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.
Ch. 37. s. 5.
of this Hist.

‘ best and safest way to obviate the threatened evil was to invade the
 ‘ enemy’s country ; that the incouragement to this, from past experi-
 ‘ ence, was abundant ; the successes of the late king of Lacedæmon,
 ‘ Agesilaus, the return of the Greeks who had penetrated as far as
 ‘ Babylonia with Cyrus, and, above all, the heroic deeds of their own
 ‘ forefathers, in Greece and in Asia, against the same enemy, when far
 ‘ more warlike than now, all invited.’

Demosth.

περὶ συμμορίας
 27.

With any view of advantage to the Athenian commonwealth, this project, especially when such an enemy as Macedonia was to be left behind, appears utterly preposterous ; but for ambitious individuals, whose situation was uneasy or precarious at home, with only a change of hazard, it may have offered lofty hopes. The peace-party however obtained on this occasion new assistance. Demosthenes, afterward so celebrated, made now the first of his speeches on political subjects that has been transmitted, and probably the first ever published. When an oration, spoken from the bema, obtained applause, the orator, if decidedly connected with a party, would publish it to promote the purposes of his party ; if of undecided connection, he would publish it to acquire fame and clients ; which would give him importance with any party, and otherwise lead to wealth. Demosthenes spoke in opposition, and the opposition succeeded. The war-party abandoned their measure, and no hostility being committed by Athens, none followed from Persia.

Disappointed of Asiatic plunder, the party turned their view to a field of far inferior, but still of considerable promise, and which they had long held in view, the Thracian Chersonese. But, for reasonable hope of success there now, it would be necessary to provide some distraction for the Macedonian arms, which otherwise might too effectually interfere. The circumstances of the little republic of Methonë, on the Macedonian shore, offered opportunity whence able politicians could profit. Methonë was the place whence we have seen the Athenian arms directed against Philip, amid the difficulties of his first contest for his paternal throne. Its situation, opportune beyond others for offensive war against Macedonia, would expose it of course more to the jealousy and to the coercion of the Macedonian government. In weakness
 therefore

therefore its leaders would be cautious of offence to Macedonia; and hence probably the forbearance of the Macedonian government, through which it remained a republic, when others, less obnoxiously situated, had been reduced by the Macedonian arms. It was now become very populous and strong, having been probably the resort of the Athenian party, flying from the conquered places, Pydna, Potidæa, Toronë, Amphipolis and others. Being then, from Attica to the Hellespont, or at least as far as Athos, the only seaport continuing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Athenian people, it would be the only one whose commerce, more secure than others against smaller pirates, would be little liable to depredation from Athenian commanders. Under such circumstances flourishing, its connection with Athens would be intimate, and its dependency unavoidable.

It is no light indication of great moderation in the Macedonian government, that, under such circumstances, offensive measures against Methonë were so forborne, that even the Athenian orators, with all their invective against Philip, have imputed none. On the other hand the testimony of the historian is direct to aggression from Methonë against Macedonia, and even to actual war, concerted with Athens, previous to any hostility from Macedonia against Methonë. The Methonæans then, having so taken their part with the Athenian government, which was engaged in a war with Macedonia of such rancor that all communication even by heralds was denied, vigorous exertion against them became indispensable. Their territory probably was small and of little value: the sea was the element to which they looked for wealth and plenty. On the approach of the Macedonian army therefore they shut themselves within their walls, which were so strong, and the defenders so numerous, that the siege was likely to be lasting, and success uncertain.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.

While measures thus were taken for employing the Macedonian arms, without expence or risk to the Athenian people, intrigue was managed with equal success in Thrace. Were the sovereign of that country, Kersobleptes, involved in no trouble, to prevent his effectual interference with the purposed measures of his allies and fellowcitizens against him (for we have seen he was a citizen of Athens, as well as an

ally)

ally) their purposes, if practicable, would have been difficult. The princes Berisades and Amadocus, however, their instruments formerly, were ready, for the reward in prospect, to become their instruments again. Rebellion was provided against Kersobleptes, while incouragement was held out to the discontented in every Grecian town of the Chersonese.

Demost. in
Aristocr.
p. 678.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.
B. C. 353.
Ol. 106. $\frac{1}{4}$.

Matters appear to have been thus prepared, when at length Chares returned to Peiræus, with the fleet and mercenary troops which had been employed in the confederate war. The people being then assembled, the question was put, 'whether the ships should be laid up to decay 'uselessly, the seamen turned to idleness, and the troops dismissed, 'when all might be employed most advantageously for the republic?' The war-party prevailed; Chares was appointed general autocrator for command in Thrace; and, with the plenitude of power commonly attached to that title, the fleet and army were again committed to his orders.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.
B. C. 353.
Ol. 106. $\frac{1}{4}$.²⁴

Arriving in the Hellespont, Chares summoned the city of Sestus. The people refusing to abandon their existing engagements, and become tributary subjects of the Athenian people, he laid siege to it. Far more known, for ages past, in history and in song, Sestus was not now defended like Methonë. Whether its walls were deficient, or its population, or military discipline, or able conduct, or concord among its people failed, it yielded apparently with little contest. Chares then added to the numerous instances of sanguinary cruelty in democratical government, and of disregard for the Grecian name among the Athenian people, by putting all the adult males of that antient Grecian city to the sword, and selling the women and children to slavery. The terror of this example, in the failure of support from the Thracian monarch, produced the submission of all the towns of the peninsula, Cardia alone excepted.

The important conquest of the Chersonese being thus easily made, Chares proceeded to give law to its former sovereign, the king of Thrace, Kersobleptes. By the deficiency of his understanding, the decay of

²⁴ Diodorus has related all the transactions of Chares in Thrace under the fourth year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad.

Possibly, as well as the war of Methonë, they were begun in the preceding year.

respect among his people, the opposition of the princes of his family, and the failure, however happening, of the assistance of his brother-in-law Charidemus, that weak prince seems to have been almost helpless. We have no information of his attempting any opposition in the field. By treaty he surrendered to the Athenians the sovereignty of the Chersonese, and to his kinsmen, Berisades and Amadocus, portions of his remaining dominion, so large that, equally with himself, thenceforward they bore the title of kings. Nor did this effectual humiliation of the unfortunate monarch satisfy democratical arrogance. The two kings, whom it had created, were required to be present as witnesses to the cession of dominion by the successor of their common ancestors Teres and Sitalces to the Athenian people; and to complete the offensiveness of a ceremony, in itself degrading enough, his former less successful oppressor, Athenodorus, as if to make him appear to admit the breach of a contract which he had publicly declared he never made, presided at the ceremony.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
ut aut.

But history seems nowhere to show democracy more lenient to subjects than to princes. To provide security for the new acquisition, and opening for further conquest, would be among the purposes in thus dividing the Thracian kingdom. But the Chersonese itself was not thought by that alone secure: the ready submission of its people was not esteemed a sufficient pledge of their fidelity. Tho the Athenians would not be persuaded either to serve in garrison or to pay garrisons, yet numbers among them, troublesome to the government at home by their poverty and their arrogance, would emigrate to a fine country in a fine climate, to take possession of houses and lands and slaves, and from the lowest of their old, become the first men of a new community. The succinct account of Diodorus indicates a violent and extensive seizure of property; justifiable by nothing but the democratical principle, always asserted by Demosthenes, of right for whatever is profitable to the sovereign people. New colonists, sent from Athens, appear to have become the principal proprietors of the lands and houses, as well as rulers of the towns of the Chersonese²⁵.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.

²⁵ Ἀπέστειλεν ὁ δῆμος κληρούχους εἰς τὰς πόλεις; Diod. l. 16. c. 34.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Affairs of GREECE during the second Period of the Sacred War, when MACEDONIA was implicated.

SECTION I.

New Views of the War-party in Athens. Trespass on the Delphian Treasury. Methonë taken by Philip. Invasion of Thessaly by the Phocians, assisted by Athens, opposed by Macedonia: Victory of Onomarchus and Distress of Philip: Death of Onomarchus, and liberal use of Victory by Philip.

THE conquest of the rich territory of the Chersonese, and the reduction of the once formidable monarchy of Thrace to receive law from the Athenian people, were, with whatever uncreditable circumstances accompanied, great and splendid advantages, balancing, in no small degree, the losses in the wars with the allies and with Macedonia, and powerfully promoting among the Athenian people the credit of the party which had put them forward. But the Macedonian war remained, and the Phocian war; in the former of which Athens was a principal party, and in the other had a deep interest. The difficulties and dangers hence arising, one party in Athens, had they had power, would easily have obviated. By negotiation with Macedonia, for which its king at every opportunity showed himself ready, they would have made peace for the republic, and by a sincere union with Lacedæmon, for settling the affairs of Phocis, they would have given quiet to distracted Greece. But neither measure suited the professors of war and trouble. The maintenance of the sacred war they considered as especially favorable to their views; and, from the circumstances of Phocis and of Thessaly, their ingenuity drew means for making others fight their battles.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 442.
& al.

Demosth.
de legat.
p. 207.

In Thessaly there had long existed an Athenian interest in opposi-
tion

tion to the Macedonian: the tagus Lycophron, commonly styled tyrant of Phæræ, or of Thessaly, successor of the tyrant Alexander, was the ally of the Athenian people. The Thessalian allies of Thebes, by inheritance inveterate enemies of the Phocians, were of the Macedonian interest. Lycophron therefore would of course concur with Athens in favoring the Phocian cause; and Phocis, as well as Athens, would desire to promote the cause of Lycophron. On this ground the Athenian leaders formed an extensive plan, for the execution of which however they wanted armies. The Athenian people would not serve, nor willingly pay; and armies of mercenaries were not so easily to be maintained by plunder and contributions in Greece as in Asia. To have armies therefore they must raise money, and to obtain it they hazarded their interest among the people in a very bold attempt. The whole, nearly, of the ordinary revenue of the republic, as we have seen, was under the sanction of most severe laws, appropriated to matters of gratification for the Many; religious ceremonies, sacrifices, theatrical exhibitions, payment for attendance on the general assemblies and courts of justice, or distributions of money. The leaders of the war-party endeavored to persuade the people to concede, for purposes of war, some part of their accustomed indulgencies. Demosthenes again on this occasion came forward in opposition. 'Instead of Athenian citizens,' he said, 'it was proposed to give the money to an army of foreign mercenaries, with which the generals might enrich themselves at the republic's expence.' The prejudices of the people, more strongly perhaps than their reason, would favor his argument, and his opposition was again successful¹.

Æsch. de legat.

Demosth.
περὶ συντάξεως.

This measure failing, a resource, hardly requiring more boldness in the Athenian leaders, who would not appear as principals in it, was to use the Delphian treasury. Circumstances at this time favored Lacedæmon, always troubled with hostile neighbors in Peloponnesus, was

Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.

¹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus has not noticed the time of delivery of the oration intitled, *περὶ συντάξεως*. The most judicious modern critics have ascribed it to the time with which we are now engaged. It appears to me to carry very sufficient evidence in itself, that they must be nearly right, and that it cannot belong to the later period, after the delivery of all the Philippics, to which Leland, apparently to accommodate his own purpose in narration, would give it.

now

now at actual war with Argos ; and, tho carrying it with advantage into the enemy's country, would thus be less able to interfere in more distant concerns. Onomarchus, new yet in his arduous situation at the head of the affairs of Phocis, and, tho hitherto successful, surrounded still with difficulties, could not hope to maintain himself without support from some of the principal republics. The connection of the Athenian government with the Phocian accordingly became of the closest kind. It is described by Demosthenes, 'friendship, fellowship in arms, mutual support'.² The connection with Lacedæmon of course slackened. But it seems probable that the Lacedæmonian government also had begun to give sanction to some drawing on the sacred treasury ; nor does it appear easy to say where positive crime in such drawing would begin. Every considerable state of Greece had its separate treasury, or chamber in the treasury at Delphi ; and, tho we are very little exactly informed, every state had clearly some right over its own. A nice question might arise concerning those principal riches of the temple, deposited ages ago by Cræsus king of Lydia. The subject, however, will recur in the sequel. What requires observation now is, that the means afforded by the sacred treasury growing daily more necessary to supply the expences of the war, the use of them appears to have been daily less scrupled. Nevertheless it seems doubtful if the Phocian government had ever yet ventured upon it, without some sanction from the states of their alliance, especially Lacedæmon and Athens. But it was afterward the boast of Demosthenes that, at this time, 'neither Greek nor barbarian gave any assistance to the Phocians but the Athenians only ;' and we find him avowing the importance of the pecuniary resources of Phocis for the measures of Athens in the war with Macedonia. That there was henceforward little confidential intercourse between Lacedæmon and Athens being then evident in all accounts, the command of the Delphian treasury must have rested with the Phocian government and the Athenian.

With such powerful means, and opportunity to use them, so that the first danger and the first scandal would belong to the Phocians, the Athenian leaders resolved upon great attempts. The mercenary

Demosth. de
legat. p. 413.
Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 39.

² Φιλία, συμμαχία, βοήθεια. Demosth. de legat. p. 360.

force which had recently conquered the Chersonese, and enabled the Athenian people to dispose of kingdoms, was not yet dismissed; and hence it seems to have been that, presently after what the historian has called the defeat of Onomarchus at Chæroneia, the army under that general was so powerful that he could detach seven thousand men (should the same historian be trusted for numbers) to coöperate with Lycophron in Thessaly³. Nor may this be exaggeration, the Athenian government zealously coöperating with the Phocian; for, on a following occasion, in circumstances very similar, we find the transfer of a still greater mercenary force, from the Athenian service to that of allies of the Athenian people, attested by the cotemporary orators.

The obstinate defence of Methonë afforded encouragement, and provided opportunity, for the great stroke proposed in Thessaly. Philip was induced, by the importance of that place, for its critical situation and its close connection with enemies so irreconcilable and so restless as the war-party in Athens, to postpone some other interests, of no small consequence, to the prosecution of his measures against it. The employment of the Macedonian arms there had left the field open for Chares to make his highly valuable, yet easy, conquest of the Chersonese. The siege was protracted through the winter⁴. In the course of it Philip, who superintended much in person, and often incurred the blame of an over prodigal courage, received a wound

Ch. 37. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Strab. l. 8.
p. 374.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 34.
Demosth. or.
in ep. Phil.

³ Diodorus says that Onomarchus at this time bribed extensively among the Grecian republics, l. 16. c. 33. Occasion has already occurred to remark on the uncertainty of this kind of imputation, and more will occur hereafter. Whatever author Diodorus followed, in his simplicity, he seems to have mistaken the fact, where he says (l. 16. c. 33.) that Onomarchus, by bribes among the Thessalians, produced a cessation of their exertions against Thebes. The sequel of his own narrative shows that, if money went, as is probable, from Delphi into Thessaly, it was not to enrich the party there hostile to Phocis, by bribes, which could have but a very uncertain and temporary effect, but

to subsidize the tagus, the ally of Phocis and Athens, and enable him to make those exertions against the other Thessalians, the common enemies of Phocis, Athens, and the tagus, which the historian proceeds to relate. So also levy-money for mercenary troops might probably go to some of the smaller republics, allies of Phocis.

⁴ Diodorus relates the taking of Methonë among events of the third year of the hundred and sixth Olympiad, and then repeats the story, with added circumstances, among events of the following year. No other antient writer has at all marked the year. All accounts however being compared, there

B. C. 355.
Ol. 106. 4.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 34.

wound which deprived him of the sight of an eye⁵. The place at length became severely pressed; but depending upon the promised relief of an Athenian fleet, the people persevered to extremity. A decree of the Athenian assembly directed that a fleet should go; but, as would be likely, and, according to Demosthenes, was common, where the whole people directed administration, what was decreed was not always executed; the equipment was dilatory, and the fleet sailed too late. The Methonæans, unable to withstand the pressure longer, capitulated. Their town and its independent sovereignty they would not expect to retain; but mercy for their persons was not denied, as by the general of the Athenian people to the wretched Sestians. To withdraw in safety was allowed for men, women, and children, carrying only the clothes they wore. The town was dismantled, and, with its territory, added to the Macedonian kingdom.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 35.

Meanwhile Lycophron, apparently assisted by a subsidy from Delphi, had so increased his forces, that the Larissæans, Pharsalians, and other Thessalians, allies of Macedonia and Thebes, unable to meet him in the field, and apprehensive of siege to their towns, applied to Philip for support. But that prince had scarcely entered Thessaly on one side, when Phayllus, brother of Onomarchus, came with the great detachment, already mentioned, from the Phocian army, to assist the tagus on the other. Philip, however, joined by the collected strength of his adherents in Thessaly, defeated the united forces of Lycophron and the Phocian general.

This blow following that of the loss of Methonë, placed both Onomarchus, and the war-party at Athens, in circumstances highly critical.

seems no reason to doubt that the siege, or at least the war with Methone, begun in one year, was continued into the next; and the annalist intending, in his succinct way, only one mention of this little war, in which the beginning and the end should be related at once, has, through forgetfulness, left the same story, and it is not a singular instance in his work, twice told.

⁵ Thus simply the geographer and the annalist have related the fact, which De-

mosthenes also has noticed, and in a style of eulogy more creditable to him than his illiberal invective, which has had such warm admirers. The improvements in the story, given by writers later than the geographer and annalist, who themselves wrote three centuries after the event, improvements calculated for delighters in the marvellous, seem unworthy even of a note on history.

If means were not found to repair them, Thessalian forces, and even Macedonian, might be expected to join the Theban. The war might then, with more effect than ever yet, be brought home to Phocis; and instead of new means acquired to annoy Macedonia, the way might be opened for the Macedonians to invade Attica. Either the exertion then was extraordinary, or the previous preparations had been great; for before even Philip's activity could draw any considerable advantage from his victory, beyond the immediate relief to his allies, Onomarchus marched into Thessaly at the head of such a force, that, on joining the defeated tagus, their united numbers exceeded those of the combined Macedonians and Thessalians. This force then he conducted with such skill, that he defeated the king of Macedonia in two successive battles, and reduced him to such difficulty and danger, that his retreat, at length effected into his own country, was reckoned among the most masterly military operations known to antiquity. All Thessaly, except some of the strongest towns, fell under the power of the tagus and the Phocian general.

Frontin.
Polyæn.

The exertion of the Thebans had not gone so far as to send assistance to their Thessalian allies, yet they did not wholly neglect the opportunity afforded by the absence of the army from Phocis. Onomarchus, amid the joy of victory in Thessaly, was alarmed with information that the force of Bœotia was collected, and Phocis threatened. The Thebans seem to have been slow; for before they had passed the Bœotian frontier, Onomarchus was within it. Reduced thus to defend their own fields, they ventured a battle, but were defeated; and the important acquisition of the Bœotian town of Coroneia, to the Phocian alliance, was among the fruits of this new success of the Phocian arms.

But the king of Macedonia was not of a temper to be dismayed by defeat, or slow in measures for repairing it. Every consideration indeed of his own welfare, and of his people's welfare, as well as of his own and his kingdom's honor, would require exertion to prevent the destruction, or subjection under the tagus, of that large proportion of the Thessalian people, connected with him and with Macedonia by mutual and deep interest. While Onomarchus was on the other side of

Thermopylæ, he entered Thessaly again with fresh troops: the Thessalians rallied around his standard; and quickly his force amounted to twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse⁶. Lycophron, unable to keep the field against him, expected siege in Pheræ.

B. C. 353.
Ol. 106. 4.

It was, according to the historian's arrangement of events and dates, in the autumn still of the same year, that Onomarchus returned into Thessaly with more than twenty thousand foot: his horse are stated at only five hundred; but even that number among the establishments of the southern republics, was considerable. The tagus would add to his cavalry, proportionally more than to his infantry; Thessaly being indeed almost the only part of Greece where horses and horsemen abounded. Athens was now free from other engagements requiring any great proportion of her navy, so that she could afford large coöperation, of that kind which a fleet might afford to an army; and, in the ancient system of war, as we have already often seen, this was very important. A powerful fleet accordingly, under the command of Chares, took its station in the Pagasæan bay.

Philip, with inferior numbers, did not fear to seek action again with the general from whom he had recently suffered defeat. Onomarchus probably was sensible that, with advantage of numbers, his army, a large part of which had been hastily collected, was inferior in discipline. He had to apprehend also the use which a skilful adversary would make of his superiority in cavalry. Unable perhaps, under all circumstances, to avoid, or much delay a battle, he chose his field near the shore of the Pagasæan bay, with the Athenian fleet at hand⁷. The contest was severe. But the victory, the Thessalian cavalry, it is said, largely contributing to it, was at length complete on the Macedonian

Demosth. de
legat. p. 444.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 35.

⁶ The tenor of Diodorus's account, and especially his phrase *βασάν τοῖς Θησάλοις*, mark that he considered the body of the Thessalian nation as disposed to the Macedonian party; and this receives confirmation from the orators, even Demosthenes.

⁷ Diodorus says the Athenian fleet under Chares was accidentally sailing by. It is not unlikely that a bold orator, whom

the compiler may have taken for his authority, would venture to tell such a story to the Athenian Many. But it remains indicated by Demosthenes that an Athenian naval force, greater or less, had been constantly, or at least commonly, kept on the Thessalian coast, coöperating with the tagus.

side. The routed Phocians mostly fled toward the friendly ships, and the refuge was important; but, being pursued, even into the sea, by the best horse of Greece, their loss was very great. Onomarchus himself fell: those who perished by the sword or the water are said to have been together six thousand, and the prisoners full three thousand. Excepting those who reached the ships, hardly any unmounted could escape⁸.

Through this great victory, Thessaly came intire into the power of the conquerors. Lycophron, flying from the field of battle to Pheræ, and despairing of means to maintain himself there, surrendered the city, under a capitulation, to the king of Macedonia. Pagasæ, the immediate seaport of Pheræ, and Magnesia, another principal emporium of Thessaly, dependent on the Pheræan government, presently followed the example of the capital.

Strab. 1. 9.
p. 436.
Diod. 1. 16.
c. 35.

Intelligence of these great events conveyed to Athens, excited alarm there, among the war-party extreme, but perhaps not little even among those unconnected with that party. It was apprehended that the united army of Macedonia and Thessaly might penetrate through the strait of Thermopylæ, and being joined by the Thebans, nothing within Greece could resist them. The people were hastily summoned. The command of the sea, it was observed, which Athens still possessed, gave facility for sending troops to guard the pass, by which the dreaded evil might yet be prevented, if measures were diligently taken. A force accordingly sailed under the orders of Diophantus, who took possession of the commanding posts, nothing being there to oppose.

Had it been Philip's own purpose to carry war into southern Greece, unquestionably he would have been rapid, and it seems hardly to be doubted but he might have occupied the strait, before the Athenians could reach it. But the inveterate enmity among the Thessalians against the Phocians, sharpened by the invasion of their country with the purpose of reducing it under the power of a hated tyrant, would

⁸ The stories of the destruction of Onomarchus by his own people, and of the crucifixion of his dead body by Philip's order, could surely not have passed unnoticed by Demosthenes, had they had in his time the least credit, or even had they been invented so early.

lead them to desire and urge the measure. Philip at length marched to Thermopylæ. A small movement of the Theban forces would have placed Diophantus as between two fires: his only safety would have been in retreat by sea. Nevertheless on his refusal to allow passage, Philip, without any attempt to force it, withdrew; and, staying in Thessaly no longer than to make some requisite arrangements, returned into Macedonia.

To those leading men among the Athenians, who were adverse to the system of war and trouble, circumstances appeared now altogether advantageous for renewing their instances to the people to allow negotiation for peace. War, it was observed, had been enough tried, and constantly to their disadvantage. Every measure yet, against Macedonia, had produced aggrandizement to the enemy and loss to themselves. At the same time the moderation of the king, and especially his disposition to peace with the Athenian people, had been largely shown in his recent conduct; when, to the dissatisfaction of some of his allies, he had yielded to the first remonstrance of an Athenian general, objecting to his passing in arms through the strait of Thermopylæ. But the ingenuity of the war-party was ready with an answer. 'Not Philip's moderation,' they said, 'or desire of peace with Athens, but his fear, the formidable aspect of their troops, and the patriotic firmness of the general Diophantus, who commanded them, prevented Greece from being overrun by an army of Macedonians and Thessalians.' They did not scruple the extravagance of describing what they called 'the dismay of the king of Macedonia, and his flight from Thermopylæ,' at the head of an army, flushed with victory; and they finished with proposing, and the people voted, honors and rewards to Diophantus, for his bloodless and uncontested success, equal to what had ever been given by the republic to any general for the greatest victory, under the severest trial. What failed of real triumph over the king of Macedonia, and of fame, which they would have equalled with that of Miltiades and Themistocles, for their general, was compensated for them in triumph over their fellow-citizens of the peaceful party, which, for the time was complete.

This

This however was confined to Athens. Over the rest of Greece other sentiments, and over a great part, directly contrary sentiments prevailed. A worse opinion of the Phocian cause grew, as Athens, under the direction of the war-party, superseded Lacedæmon in its patronage, and, at the same time trespass upon the Delphian treasury became more notorious, or stronger grounds were afforded for suspecting its large extent. The ingenuity of the Athenian politicians, and the advantage they possessed in the circumstance, that their city was the capital of the literature of the world, were diligently used to divert outcry from themselves, toward those whose protection they had undertaken; and the zeal, with which the historian Diodorus has inveighed against the unfortunate Phocians, indicates that they had considerable success. But to a large part of Greece their influence could not reach. Thebes and other states produced historians, to transmit what was said against Athens; and a late antient writer, who, among much ineptitude, has some good things, may apparently deserve credit for his report of it. ‘Absurdly the Athenians,’ he says it was observed, ‘would compare their recent measure at Thermopylæ, with the glorious exploit of Leonidas there formerly. Then indeed the freedom of Greece was to be vindicated; but now a sacrilegious injury to the nation: then the object was to defend the temples against the rapine of foreign enemies; now to defend the plunderers of those temples against their proper judges. If those who claim to have the best constitution, who certainly have a system of law universally admired, who lead the world in philosophy and all learning, will admit and support such enormities, with what, hereafter, can we reasonably reproach barbarians?’

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60.
Justin. l. 8.
c. 1.

Nor was it in the power of the Athenian leaders to prevent great and extensive credit accruing to the king of Macedonia. On the contrary, their opposition and obloquy sharpened the zeal of his partizans, and contributed to excite panegyric and attachment, in Greece and beyond it, in some parts even to excess. ‘It is incredible,’ says the same writer, still apparently reporting common fame not unfaithfully, ‘what glory the victory over Onomarchus earned to Philip among all nations. “He was the avenger of sacrilege,” it was said, “he was the protector of the religion of Greece. For expiation of a crime, which ought to
“ have

Justin. l. 8.
c. 2.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60.

“ have called out the united strength of the world to oppose and
 “ punish, he alone was seen worthy to take the direction. Next to
 “ the immortal gods is he by whom the majesty of the gods is vindi-
 “ cated?” Diodorus, less oratorical, and perhaps less exactly giving
 the popular expression of the day, is however more pointed and precise
 in his eulogy. ‘ Philip,’ he says, ‘ having abolished the tyranny in
 ‘ Pheræ, and given liberty to the city, returned into Macedonia with
 ‘ the credit of having advanced the power and estimation of his king-
 ‘ dom, by his achievements, and by his reverence for the deity.’ And
 indeed so his popularity was now established in Thessaly, that, whether
 regularly elected to the situation of tagus, or under what other descrip-
 tion vested with the power, he seems to have been henceforward con-
 sidered, by the Thessalian nation, as the constitutional chief of their
 confederacy¹².

* Wesseling has been struck enough with this passage to quote it at length in a note of the 60th chapter of the 16th book of Diodorus, introducing it with the phrase, ‘ Pulcre Justinus.’

¹⁰ Τὴν ἐν Φεραῖς τυραννίδα καθελὼν, καὶ τῇ πόλει τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοὺς, ἰσαγγέλλει εἰς Μακεδονίαν, ἥξηκώς τὴν βασιλείαν ταῖς πράξεσι, πᾶσι τῇ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἰσισθεία. Diod. l. 16. c. 38.

We find even Demosthenes bearing testimony to Philip's merit with the Thessalians in assisting them against their tyrants,— ἐπὶ τὴν τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν ἰσοθήσῃ. Olynth. 2. p. 22. Yet in the same oration, a little before, he had spoken of the Thessalians as held in unworthy subjection, and sighing for liberty: οἱ παρὰ τῇ αὐτῶν ἀξίαν δεδουλωμένοι Θετταλοὶ οὗν οὐκ ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ γίνονται ἄσμενοι; p. 20. Present impression, being often, in the Athenian assembly, of great power, an orator might, in speaking, sometimes risk contradictions, to produce wayfaring effects. But if he committed his speech to writing, with a view to publication, he would propose

to do away what might not bear reflection. The apparent contradiction here, however, is perhaps nothing more than Demosthenes might deliberately risk, even in writing. It was the body of the Thessalian nation that Philip assisted against the τυραννικὴν οἰκίαν. If among his auditors many would believe, nevertheless, that the body of the Thessalian nation were held in unworthy subjection, and anxious for a change of government, his purpose would be best answered. But were the inconsistency objected to him, or to any of his more informed friends, it would be answered, ‘ you misunderstood
 ‘ the orator: he did not say the Thessa-
 ‘ lians universally or generally were held in
 ‘ subjection; but that those Thessalians,
 ‘ who were reduced to unworthy subjection,’
 (namely the party which had befriended the tyrants, and were now deprived of their superiority of power and privileges,) ‘ desired
 ‘ to recover their former advantages, and
 ‘ no longer to see the government of the
 ‘ country held by their adversaries.’

SECTION II.

Phayllus Successor to Onomarchus: Large Assistance to Phocis: Boeotia invaded, and Epicnemidian Locris conquered: Phaleucus Successor to Phayllus.

THE overthrow of the great army under Onomarchus, and the reduction of all Thessaly under the power of the party connected with Macedonia and Thebes, were blows requiring the utmost exertion of the supporters of the Phocian cause to repair, if by any exertions they could be repaired, which, if Macedonia should engage earnestly on the opposite side, might seem hardly possible. Hitherto however, notwithstanding provocation given, no symptom had appeared of a disposition in Macedonia to take any forward part. Nevertheless those blows were alarming, perhaps in some degree to the Athenian people generally, but highly to the party which had been directing the administration. The opposition, before powerful, would of course be strengthened by them; yet the superiority still of the war-party having been proved in the extravagant reward procured for its general Diophrantus, it was resolved to maintain the connection with Phocis, and to pursue the hostile line taken against Macedonia. In Phocis Phayllus was raised to the dignity of general-autocrator, in the room of his deceased brother Onomarchus. The intimacy of the connection of the Athenian government with the Phocian, appears not to have been slackened by the change, and Lacedæmon saw still its interest in supporting Phocis against Thebes.

Trespass upon the sacred treasury seems now to have been carried on with some degree of system, by the Phocians in concert with their allies, and with no other reserve than their own views of their own interests dictated. The resource being yet good, to collect another great army would not be difficult. Not only professed mercenaries might be readily obtained, but citizens of allied states, if pay were ready, might be persuaded to take arms. Accordingly in the spring following

Diod. l. 16.
c. 36.

the death of Onomarchus, for the first time since the death of Philomelus, large succours from friendly states are noticed by the historian, as joining the Phocian army. Athens furnished, according to his report, no less than five thousand foot and five hundred horse, apparently all mercenaries; and yet, he says, the Athenian government received pay from the Delphian treasury for more. Lacedæmon sent one thousand men; Achaia, from various towns, two thousand; and the ejected tyrant of Phæræ himself joined with two thousand. Of these forces, serving in the name of states formerly so jealously arrogating military command, the new general-autocrator of the little province of Phocis was allowed to hold the command-in-chief.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 37.

With preparation so expensive, considerable enterprize no doubt was in view. It may have been disappointed by some failure in the projected combination; some jealousy of the purposes of Athens, especially among the Lacedæmonians, might be not unreasonable. Boeotia was invaded: but, according to the historian, Phaëllus was thrice defeated by the Thebans. It is however evident that he suffered little; the defeats having been perhaps little more than disappointment of attempts to take some towns through intelligence among the people. Failing, however, of his object, he turned into the Epicnemidian Locris; and the Thebans, whatever may have been their success in their own country, not following to protect their allies, every town yielded to him except Aryca. A party everywhere seems to have favored the Phocian cause: even at Aryca a gate was opened for him, and some of his troops entered, but for want of due previous concert, they were driven out again.

The Thebans at length, excited by the loss which earlier exertion perhaps might have prevented, sent their forces into Locris. Phaëllus, leaving a part of his army to blockade Aryca, led the rest to meet them. But so was the pride of the Theban prowess sunk, that, even after advantage gained over a body of Phocians, by night, near Abæ, they avoided a battle; and leaving Aryca to its fate, turned into Phocis for plunder. Phaëllus followed, and put them to flight. Aryca soon after yielded, and thus all the Epicnemidian Locris was gained to the Phocian alliance.

Soon

Soon after this conquest, in the third year only yet of the war, the Phocians had the misfortune to lose the third of that extraordinary brotherhood, which had so supported their affairs and raised their fame. Phayllus fell, not, as his predecessors, by the sword, but by a consumptive disorder, which destroyed him at an age when his faculties of body as well as mind should have been in their fullest vigor. Of the three brothers, Onomarchus only left a son, Phalæcus, and he was under age; yet he was raised to the first dignity, civil and military, with the continued title of general-autocrat. To provide assistance for his deficient experience being however indispensable, Mnaseas, one of the most confidential friends of the former generals, was appointed his colleague. In a state otherwise situated, such appointments might mark only the ascendancy of family interest, or the power of a party, or the favor of the soldiery. All these probably concurred to produce the elevation of Phalæcus. Yet, in the circumstances of Phocis, all these would have been insufficient without high esteem of the family of these autocrats, not only among the Phocian people, but also among all the allied republics of various constitutions; the continuance of whose support was essential to enable any general to hold command, or even existence, in Phocis.

B. C. 352.
Ol. 107. 1.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 37.
Pausan. l. 10.
c. 2.

To support that popular estimation which had raised Mnaseas and his youthful colleague to their arduous situation, as well as to assist the maintenance of their mercenary force, early exertion in enterprize probably was necessary. Mnaseas, very soon after his elevation, lost his life in action. His young colleague nevertheless ventured an incursion into Bœotia with a body of horse, but, near Chæroneia, he received a check, which the historian calls a defeat. The consequences however appear to have been little important, except that the acquisition of Chæroneia to the Phocian alliance, the apparent object of the expedition, was prevented. Little enterprizes thus were engaging the Phocian arms, while the Thebans remained inert or on the defensive, when movements elsewhere called the attention of both, together with that of all the principal states of Greece.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 38.

SECTION III.

State of Parties in Athens: Isocrates; Phocion; Æschines; Demosthenes: Grecian Settlements in Scythia. Politics of Demosthenes before he acquired a share in the Administration.

THE war of oratory at Athens, always of weight in Grecian affairs, had, at this critical period, more than common importance; when, fortunately for history, it becomes also more known to us, through the preserved orations. At this time that party of which Chares was the ostensible chief, and which, for its measures, may be intitled either the high democratical party or the war-party, held still a general ascendancy; yet not unbalanced by the party of better men, who, tho compelled to profess great reverence for the purest democracy, may perhaps not improperly be named the aristocratical party: their opponents affected to call them the Macedonian.

M. T. Cic.

Plut. vit.
Phocion.

This party had, for its leaders, all the men whom antient writers, with remarkable concurrence, have described as the most respectable of their time, or, almost of any time. Isocrates, toward the age of ninety, without having ever held or sought political office, was as the father of the band. Timotheus, now in banishment, if yet living, had been the favorite scholar of Isocrates, and remained always his intimate friend. Iphicrates and Chabrias (the latter we have seen losing his life in his country's service) however differing about inferior political interests or private concerns, concurred nearly with Isocrates and Timotheus and each other, in general political principles, and on the leading interests of the republic. Phocion, not ill selected by Plutarch, from among all the worthies of all the republics of Greece, as a model of inflexible integrity in a corrupt age, the fittest parallel to the celebrated Utican Cato, had been coming forward under those three great men, but more particularly attached to Chabrias.

Phocion appears to have been of no family eminence, but of wealth
that

that enabled him to attend the philosophical school of Academus, under Plato, and afterward under Xenocrates. His temper was particular; he is said to have been scarcely ever seen either to weep or laugh: with an aspect singularly sour, his manners were mild and pleasant. He chose the military line, and rose early to considerable command under Chabrias, who discerned his superior claim to confidence. Before the Confederate war, when so many syndedrian allies paid tribute to Athens. Chabrias, being commander-in chief, committed to Phocion the office of collecting the tribute, and placed under his orders, for the purpose, a squadron of twenty triremes. Phocion remonstrated: 'To meet enemies,' he said, 'the force was insufficient; to visit friends, it was needlessly great.' At his own choice Chabrias allowed him to go with a single trireme. Probably he was contented with smaller presents for himself than the Athenian naval commanders were wont to exact from maritime states; and the appetites of those under him in one ship were of course more easily satisfied than those of the crews of twenty. He made his mission altogether so acceptable, as to afford demonstration that, for that time at least, he had rightly estimated the necessary force. Numerous vessels of the allies voluntarily attended his return to Attica, bearing the full amount of the customary tribute.

The circumstances of the times, the state of parties, and the perils of the republic, rather than his inclination, seem to have led Phocion to engage in civil contest, and become a public speaker; for which, however, he had great and singular talents. Not a flowing orator, no speeches have been preserved from him; but he excelled in quickness of perception and readiness of words, for reply and debate. None equalled him in detecting the fallacy of specious argument, which would make the worse appear the better cause, or in the cutting sententiousness with which he exposed it; whence Demosthenes, who feared him more than any other speaker, is said to have called him the Hatchet. Expectation was thus always kept alive by his speeches; and hence, curiosity being a prevailing passion of the Athenian Many,

¹¹ These words rest only on Plutarch's authority; but they relate to a public transaction, and are in consonance with it; whence they may perhaps derive somewhat a higher title to credit than accounts of words passing in private or confidential communication.

tho he showed scorn, as no other dared, of the common flattery of the orators to them, yet, unless when an adverse party was violent enough and strong enough to overbear all contradiction, he was always well heard.

Opposed to these, in the high democratical cause, the name of most eminence is that of Chares; whose early promise, in military command, which earned him the good report of Xenophon, and whose abandonment of himself afterward to every vice, equally by which a corrupt people might be courted, and for which a corrupt people would allow indulgence, have been already noticed. His eloquence was of the kind for communicating with persons of all ranks and descriptions in conversation, but not for impressing attentive numbers from the bema. To hold high situation, therefore, either political or military, under the Athenian government, it was necessary for him to have able orators for his associates; and he was skilful and fortunate enough to gain support from most of those most eminent in his age. Lysias, Lysurgus, Hegesippus, Hyperides, and others of considerable note, spoke mostly in the high democratical cause, and were of his party. But of the numbers who contended for public favor, in the general assembly and in the multitudinary courts of justice, two now became distinguished for a superiority of talent, whence one has been esteemed the greatest orator Greece, or perhaps the world, ever produced, and the other second only to him, Demosthenes and Æschines.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 313.

Æschin. de
leg. . p. 313.
Demosth. ut
aut.

It is remarkable, and proves a great change in the character of the Athenian government, and the habits and prejudices of the people, that neither of these men, who so rose to the head of the republic, was regularly born an Athenian citizen. Æschines, by some years the elder, is said to have been the son of a slave, Tromes, the domestic of a schoolmaster of Athens. During the tyranny of the Thirty, whether attending the flight of his master, or profiting from the confusion of the times to escape from slavery, Tromes passed into Asia, and there entered as a soldier into a band of Grecian mercenaries. It was perhaps then that he took opportunity to change the servile appellation of Tromes, for a name of more respectable sound to Grecian ears, Atrometus. On the invitation held out by Thrasybulus for associates
in

in war against the Thirty, returning to Attica, he joined the standard of freedom; and, carrying probably some recommendation, earned in service in Asia, was appointed, by that great and discerning man, to a situation of some command. In the restored commonwealth, in which, by his service he had earned the rank of a citizen, he took himself the profession of a schoolmaster¹². He had married a woman of proper Athenian birth, and sister of a man who rose to considerable military rank, but of an occupation highly disreputable, tho required for what the Greeks called religion, a bacchanalian dancer and teacher of bacchanalian ceremonies.

Æsch. ut aut.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 415
& 431.Æsch. de
leg. p. 256.
Demosth.
de cor.

Æschines was one of a numerous progeny from this match. An Athenian citizen, as the son of an Athenian citizen, he was, at the usual age, eighteen, inrolled of the ward into which his father had been admitted, the Pandionid; and during the next two years he fulfilled the duty of military service within Attica, as required by law for all youths of that age; a duty however, in the growing licentiousness of the people, and neglect of the old constitution, so commonly avoided, that the performance appears to have been considered as ground for claiming merit. On reaching the age of military manhood, twenty, he joined the Athenian troops, auxiliaries to the Lacedæmonian, in Peloponnesus; and he earned the commendation of his general, in the battle of the Nemæan glen, defending a convoy going to Phlius, then suffering, as we have formerly seen, for its faithful attachment to Lacedæmon. He continued to serve with the Athenian troops through that war, and was engaged in the great concluding battle of Mantinea.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 331,
2, 3.

But military service in Greece rarely led to fortune, and carried no constant pay. After the peace, therefore, which followed the battle of

¹² Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, speaks contemptuously of the father of Æschines as Atrometus the schoolmaster, but not as having ever been a slave, nor does he mention his servile name Tromes. These circumstances are brought forward only in his oration on the crown, spoken twenty years after, and to which we have no reply from Æschines. Nevertheless the evident lameness of Æschines's ac-

count of his family, avoiding all notice of his father's origin and early age, leave us at least at full liberty to believe what Demosthenes would hardly have ventured to assert, could the falsehood of it have been maintained. *Tromes* bears analogy to the English word *Quaker*; *Atrometus* to *Unquaking*, *Unshaken*, *Fearless*, *Stedfast*, *Dreadnought*.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 313.
& 403.
p. 449.

Mantineia, Æschines took the place of clerk to the council of five hundred¹³, and at one time he was an actor on the public stage. He was there, as Demosthenes repeatedly mentions, remarked for his fine voice. When, and how introduced, he first began to avail himself of his talents as an orator in the general assembly, we do not learn. This however, now in Athens truly a trade, became at length the trade of Æschines.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 17.

Demosthenes had so far advantage of birth, that his father was an Athenian born; but his mother was of half blood, being the produce of an illicit marriage with a Scythian woman. It is moreover remarkable that these two great orators, who became two of the most eminent men, not of Athens only, but of Greece and the civilized world, giving an account each of the other's family and of his own, have both avoided to own a grandfather. Of the maternal grandfather of Demosthenes only any report remains, and that from his rival; but authenticated by his own omission, when occasion offered and required, if it might be done, to contradict it; and the story is interesting enough with a view to public as well as to private history, to deserve some notice here.

Strab. l. 7.
p. 307.

The thorny situation of wealthy and eminent men, in the actual state of the Athenian government, not only induced those who had means, as we are told of Iphicrates, Chabrias, and others, to provide foreign retreats, but would operate as temptation to betray the republic for the acquisition of an advantageous retreat. In the failure of Grecian harvests, through continual wars and the political circumstances of the country, to supply food for the population, the singularly productive peninsula, on the northern side of the Euxine sea, called by the Greeks the Tauric Chersonese, and by us the Crimea, attracted the attention of Grecian merchants. The country was held by a Scythian lord, acknowledging a king, whose authority extended far on the northern shore of

¹³ The situation of Æschines in public office is thus described by Demosthenes: Ὑπογραμματίων ἑὸν (τῷ δήμῳ) καὶ ὑπηρέτῳ τῇ βουλῇ. αὐτὸς ἔρχετο τὸν νόμον τῶν τῷ πόλει. Demosth. de legat. p. 363. The office seems nearly to have resembled that of the clerks of the houses of Parliament

with us, and to have been less creditable only because, as Demosthenes a little further intimates, it was so ill paid, that from eighteen pence to half-a-crown was a bribe for those who held it: Ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπογραμματευσίας, καὶ δοτὶν ἢ τριῶν δραχμῶν ποσὶν. Demosth. de legat. p. 403.

the Euxine. But, the Scythians caring little for land and less for trade, the Greeks proceeded from commerce to settlements; which seem to have been made nearly in the manner of the modern European settlements in India. The merchants obtained leave to establish factories, paying a tribute. They fortified the factory; and then, paying still the tribute, for the sake of security for their trade, they would however defend their possession against any claim of the sovereign. In this country the Athenians had a settlement, called Nymphæum. The town was considerable, the harbour commodious, the adjacent territory highly fruitful. Gylon, an Athenian, was, under appointment of the Athenian people, governor of this colony, when the sovereign of the country desired to recover possession of it. Powerful in the field, the prince was probably aware that, against Grecian fortification, Scythian science in the war of sieges might fail. He therefore entered into negotiation with the governor; who, for the town and territory of Kepi, on the same shore, as a lordship for himself, with a rich Scythian heiress in marriage, betrayed the trust committed to him by his country, and surrendered Nymphæum to the Scythian king. Cited then to take his trial at Athens, he of course avoided to appear; and, in consequence, according to the practice of the Athenian courts, in his absence he was condemned to death. As a feudatory lord, under a Scythian prince, he was probably secure enough against Athenian vengeance: his return to his native country only was precluded. But when two daughters, born of his irregular marriage, approached womanhood, whether less satisfied with the private manners of the people among whom he was established, or with the existing political circumstances about him, he sent them to Athens. Having acquired wealth in his distant lordship, he offered fortunes with them, of an amount esteemed inviting; perhaps hoping, through the connections he might so make, to procure his own pardon from the people. We have seen some of the most illustrious Athenians marrying the daughters of Thracian princes, with no detriment to their progeny; but possibly those princes might have received the freedom of the city, which would obviate legal objection. Only one of Gylon's daughters obtained a man of eminence, Demochares; and the match seems to have been

Æsch. de
cor. p. 561.
Strab. l. 7.
p. 309.

considered as derogatory to him. The other took for her husband Demosthenes, a citizen of the Pæanian ward, by trade a sword-cutler ¹⁴.

The only child of the latter of these matches, born in the fourth year of the ninety-ninth Olympiad, and, from his father, named Demosthenes, was left an orphan of seven years old, with property which ranked him among the wealthy of Athens: Educated as became his fortune, and introduced into life advantageously, through his connection with Demochares, he was of course to take his share of the combined evils and honors, which the Athenian constitution made the lot of the wealthy. In earliest manhood he was appointed to the expensive but honorable offices of choregus, or president of theatrical entertainments, and trierarc, or director of the equipment of a ship of war. To the burden of this office was annexed the honor of the command of the ship equipped. But while none of the wealthy were legally excusable from the one, many would be very unfit for the other, which therefore was not so rigorously imposed. Demosthenes, tho apparently little of a seaman, acted, however, at one time, as a naval captain in the Athenian service. He contributed also to the treasury, as we find him boasting, by gift, called free, but no more to be avoided than the office of trierarc. Nothing however beyond common pressure seems to have been put upon him; yet, through his disposition to luxury and ostentation, his fortune was quickly dissipated ¹⁵. Want thus drove

Dion. Hal.
ad Amm.

Demosth. de
cor.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 312.
Æsch. de
cor. p. 563
vel 78.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 563
vel 78. & in
Timarch.
p. 167 vel
24.
Athen. l. 13.
c. 7.

¹⁴ Æschines, avoiding specific mention of Demochares, speaks of Gylon's daughters thus: 'One married—let it be anybody, that I may not say what may be unpleasant to many: the other, Demosthenes the Pæanian, in contempt of the laws of his country, took for his wife.' We owe the name of Demochares to the son of this match, the celebrated orator, who seems to have been proud of the connection. (Demosth. de cor.) Demosthenes was no favorite character with Plutarch, who has yet shown himself unwilling to allow, tho unable to deny, that the most renowned of Grecian orators was, as Æschines calls him, a semibarbarian. The care with which De-

mosthenes himself has avoided the subject, where, in his reply to Æschines, he has strained to represent his birth and connections in the most advantageous light, amounts to an admission, proving the story of Gylon and his daughters true beyond controversy.

¹⁵ Plutarch, in his preface to his life of Demosthenes, well observes that a village-life altogether cannot suit one whose purpose is to write general history, because such a purpose requires opportunity for extensive communication among books and among men, without which the work, whatever may be the writer's talents, will be very defective. For himself, he adds, it was his lot to pass the greater part of his life in a little

drove him to apply his talents to business; and, at the age of five and twenty, he began with that employment which had raised Isocrates to fortune, consequence and fame, composing speeches for suitors in the courts of justice.

Dion. ad
Amm.

Æschines, to balance the disadvantage of his birth, possessed, with great mental abilities, a superior figure, a voice uncommonly melodious and powerful, a reputation for courage repeatedly shown in his country's cause, a private character without stain, and manners that made him generally acceptable¹⁶. Demosthenes had nothing of all these.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 320
& 329. & de
legat. p. 449
& al.

A weak

little town; preferring such residence, for his attachment to the place, and desirous, through his services, to obviate its otherwise threatened decay. Thus the sad inaccuracy of the general history, which his lives of great men necessarily involved, may be in large part accounted for; and yet there are some things that we may still wonder at. Few anecdotes of private life remain, from all antiquity, so authenticated as those which have come out in the controversy between Demosthenes and Æschines. If then Plutarch had any library at Chæroneia, it might be supposed the works of Demosthenes would have been found in it. Were they not there, or in any library in the place, it might be thought, when he was writing the life of Demosthenes, extracts the most necessary for his purpose might have been obtained from Athens, if not from some nearer place. But, in his life of Demosthenes, he has utterly neglected the great orator's account of himself, given in the most celebrated of his orations, that on the crown. Demosthenes there boasts of his education: Ἐμοὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ ῥέξει, παῖδι μὲν ὄντι, φοιτᾶν εἰς τὰ προσήκοντα διδασκαλεῖα, καὶ ἔχιν ὅσα χρὴ, κ. τ. ε. Demosth. de cor. p. 312. But Plutarch has not scrupled to say he was absolutely without liberal education:—τῶν ἑμῶν καὶ προσήκοντων ἐλευθερῶν παιδῶν μαθημάτων ἀπαιδευτὸς δοκεῖ γενέσθαι. Vit. Demosth. p. 847. Again we find Demosthenes proceeding to boast of the figure he

made on coming of age, for which considerable wealth was necessary:—Ἐξελθόντι δὲ ἐκ παιδῶν, τ' ἀκολουθεῖν τούτοις πράττειν, χορηγεῖν, τριηραρχεῖν, ἐισφέρειν, μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας μήτε ἰδίας μήτε δημοσίας ἀπολειπόμεθα. Ibid. Yet Plutarch represents him, on coming of age, as absolutely penniless: ἐκπράττει μὲν οὐδὲ πολλὰς οὐκ ἡδυνήθη μέρος τῶν πατρῶων. It seems probable that Plutarch made notes from books as he had opportunity, in his residence at Rome and elsewhere; whence, and from his small library at Chæroneia, his occasional references to books for historical matters. In composing then his great work, in his little native city, when both his library and his notes failed him, he would recur to the uncertain store of his recollection; and when all these did not suffice to complete his picture to his mind, a striking effect being necessary in every one of his lives, he seems, judging from other remaining accounts, and some of the highest authority, to have been very little scrupulous of adding from his own invention. It follows, by no means, that his assistance is to be wholly rejected; but, as observed heretofore in the text, that his word is not to be taken without considerable circumspection and caution.

¹⁶ Demosthenes has ingeniously attempted to make even the advantageous person of his rival an object of ridicule, calling him 'that fine statue,' τὸν καλὸν ἀνδριάντα. Demosth. de cor. p. 270. His uncommon power of melody of voice he repeatedly mentions.

Plut. v.
Demosth.

A weak habit of body and an embarrassed manner seemed to deny him, equally as Isocrates, the hope of becoming a speaker to win the attention of listening thousands, and he had the farther great disadvantage of a defective utterance. With this, a sour, irritable temper was repelling to friendship, and an extraordinary deficiency, not only of personal courage, but of all that constitutes dignity of soul, made respect difficult and esteem apparently impossible. Nor were these defects shown only among familiar acquaintance; they were exhibited in public, and made extensively notorious. In earliest youth he earned an opprobrious nickname by the effeminacy of his dress and manner. On emerging from minority, by the Athenian law at five and twenty, he earned another opprobrious nickname by a prosecution of his guardians, which was considered as a dishonorable attempt to extort money from them. Not long after, in the office of choregus, which carried high dignity, he took blows publicly in the theater from a petulant youth of rank, named Meidias; brought his action for the assault, and compounded it, for, it was said, thirty mines, about a hundred pounds. His cowardice in the field became afterward notorious. Even his admirers seem to have acknowledged that his temper was uncertain, his manners awkward; that he was extravagant in expence, and greedy of gain; an unpleasant companion, a faithless friend, a contemptible soldier, and of notorious dishonesty, even in his profession of an advocate. Yet so transcendent were the faculties of his mind and the powers of his eloquence, that after having, by great assiduity judiciously directed, overcome the defects of his utterance, he quickly made himself mighty among the multitude, terrible to his enemies, and necessary to his party.

Æsch. de
cor.
Plut. v.
Demosth.
p. 847.
Æsch. de
cor. p. 441.
Plut. v.
Demosth.
p. 851, & v.
dec. or. p.
844.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 314.
de cor.
p. 440, 441.
Plut. v.
Demosth.
p. 852.

In all governments, free enough to give opportunity for fortune to be made by speaking, the young adventurer finds the widest field for displaying talent and catching popular favor, and far least requiring care and circumspection and scruple, in opposing the existing administration; unless where, in a democracy, the opposition wants to restrain popular tyranny, while the administration finds an interest in

the purpose of cautioning the hearers against their effect. Against his manners, his military merit, or even his private character, he seems not to have had an insinuation to op-

pose. The charge so often reciprocally made, by contending politicians among the Greeks, of corruption in public business, will come under notice hereafter.

supporting

supporting it. But any administration must want occasionally to moderate the extravagancies of popular sovereignty; so that, in taking the side of opposition, the opportunity for invective, the easiest and readiest artillery of the orator, will always be surest. Of the political outset of Æschines, no information remains. He was already, when first noticed as a public character, eminent in that party of which Chares, if not the principal director, was the most eminent person, the man who had most filled high situations, and who bore the most extensive influence among the sovereign Many.

Demosthenes was yet but a candidate for that party-connection which might lead to power, when, in the second year of the Phocian war, Chares and his partizans, after peace made with the revolted allies, wanting a field for military adventure, desired to lead the republic into a war with Persia. Then, at the age of nine and twenty, he delivered a speech, already noticed, in treating of the circumstances of the times, the first that seems to have attracted public attention enough to induce its publication; and he spoke in opposition. The orators of the war-party, who had spoken before him, had been endeavoring, by strained panegyric of the heroic deeds of their forefathers against the Persians, to incite the Many to concurrence in their purposes. Demosthenes, in an opening of singular art, elegance, and conciseness, admitting the deeds of their forefathers to have been above all praise, turned their panegyric, and argument founded on it, most successfully into ridicule. He then proceeded to say, 'that he considered the king' (for, as usual among the Greeks, he called the king of Persia simply **THE KING**) 'as the common enemy of Greece; but then he wholly doubted any intention of the Persian court to proceed to actual war. It would therefore,' he contended, 'be rashness for Athens to provoke hostility from so mighty a foe. As for that union of the Greeks, proposed on the other side, it was obviously not to be effected. Many Grecian states, it was well enough known, were much more disposed to trust the king of Persia than oneanother. Nevertheless preparation was advisable, against hostility from Persia, and from all others.' The whole speech is temperate in style, clear and powerful in argument, and

B. C. 354.
Ol. 106. 3.

Ch. 38. s. 1.
of this Hist.

Demosth.
περὶ συμμαχίας
ω.

apparently

apparently was successful in effect, for the project of carrying war into Asia failed.

Nevertheless the war-party, with unabated diligence looking around
 B. C. 353. for opportunities, proceeded to engage the republic in projects of
 Ol. 106. 4. complex hostility; conquest in Thrace, conquest in Macedonia through support to Methonë, conquest in Thessaly with the arms of Phocis, and conquest, or what would be equivalent to important conquest, in Greece itself, through the establishment of a commanding influence in Phocis. To avow these projects beforehand, to their sovereign the Athenian people, would be to proclaim them to all the world, which would be to prepare their defeat; yet from their sovereign the Athenian people they must obtain the means for carrying them into execution. Under this difficulty they ventured upon the bold attempt, formerly noticed, to persuade the people to surrender, for the purposes of war, some of those gratifications, which, under the sanction of severe laws, consumed almost the whole of the public revenue.

Demosth.
 περί συντάξεως,
 p. 169.

Demosthenes now again spoke in opposition. He had, as his speech indicates, already made himself conspicuous, so as to be confident of popular attention, while he gave to invective against Chares and his associates a stronger tone. He objected to the proposed abolition of distributions from the treasury; the purpose being, he said, to raise a mercenary force for the generals of their party to command, more for their private interest than any public good. If war must be made, if troops were wanted, the citizens themselves should serve, as in good times of old. ‘Were your armies composed of citizens,’ he says, ‘your
 ‘generals would not, as now, plunder allies without seeing enemies;
 ‘on the contrary, they would do that by your enemies, which they do
 ‘now by your allies. But those, whom you now support in the highest
 ‘situations, are ceaselessly employed in canvassing for those situations;
 ‘slaves to the favor of the voter, sedulous to procure advancement to
 ‘the dignity of general, and careless of every deed becoming a man.—

Thus, in our assemblies, an orator is commander in chief, a general
 ‘under him, and the wealthy in array under both: you, the citizens,

‘ are divided, some under one leader, some under another; and what
 ‘ you gain at last, by your contention, is, that one leading man is
 ‘ honored with a brazen statue; another acquires wealth and conside-
 ‘ ration; one or two rule the republic; and you look on with habitual
 ‘ indifference, abandoning to them, to use for their own purposes, what
 ‘ should make a whole people respectable and happy.’

But, in thus opposing those who had risen as leaders of the democratical cause, and held their power by their credit as its supporters, Demosthenes had no view to concur with Isocrates and Phocion in imposing legal restraints upon popular despotism. He already saw his line. For the favorite of an individual sovereign to have the greatest means of wealth and power, the power of the sovereign himself must be unlimited; and so for the favorite of a people to have the greatest means, the despotism of the people must be complete. After therefore representing the Athenian democracy such as every democracy must be, if it settles into any order, the Many nominally, but one or two really ruling, he proceeds to recommend a jealous vindication of the most unbalanced democratical tyranny. ‘ The cause,’ he says, ‘ of
 ‘ the superior condition of the republic, in former times, was, that then
 ‘ the people was despot and lord of all’: honor, authority, good of
 ‘ every kind, all depended upon the people.’ While he asserted this, the impossibility that the people could hold and exercise such power, the necessity that they must employ some favorite, who would be the real ruler, was no secret to him.

For preventing the abolition of the distributions, the passions and prejudices of the Many would be ready assistants; and so far the orator seems to have succeeded. But he was not equally successful in persuading the people to take foreign service upon themselves, or in preventing new and cruel oppression, in the old course, with armies of foreign mercenaries. It was in the same summer that Chares, with a mercenary force, destroyed the Sestians, and, providing means for Athenian citizens to take possession of the best lands of the Thracian Chersonese, earned favor with the Athenian people.

⁸⁷ Τότε μὲν ὁ δῆμος ἦν δεσπότης καὶ κύριος πάντων. Demosth. περὶ συνάξεως. p. 175.

SECTION IV.

Project of the Lacedæmonian Government for an extensive Arrangement of Interests in Greece: Constitution of the new Arcadian City of Megalopolis. Oration of Demosthenes against the Project: War in Peloponnesus: Imperfect Accommodation: Continuation of the Sacred War between Phocis and Thebes.

AFTER the defeat of the ambitious purposes of the war-party at Athens by the victory of the Pagasæan bay, with the insuing expulsion of the tagus of Thessaly and subjection of his party in that country, the victorious king of Macedonia avoiding interference in the disputes of the republics, and not even pushing his advantages against Athens, Greece was left to its own discord. A chance of amended lot seemed offered, in the very weakness to which the principal republics were reduced by the consequences of their ambition. The recent check to the means of the war-party in Athens was great. Thebes, beside the whole Epicnemidian Locris, and part of the Ozolian, had lost some considerable towns of Bœotia itself: but, what was perhaps more important still, her failing energy in war, and failing wisdom in politics, were become notorious, whence followed a rapid decay of the high estimation acquired under Epameinondas, so that she was verging fast toward her old condition of a subordinate power. Lacedæmon, risen somewhat from the brink of ruin, but not yet in circumstances to entertain extensive views of ambition, looked nevertheless unceasingly to the recovery of Messenia, for which the situation of Greece seemed to offer now some improved hope.

It was too ordinary, as we have seen, among the Grecian republics, and most among the most democratical, to avoid a liberal communion of interest with other Grecian states, and, in prosecuting purposes of ambition each for itself, to deny all share in advantages to all others. But, under the admonition which Lacedæmon had derived from sufferings, the king, Archidamus, being the principal mover, a plan was put forward

forward not unworthy of his character for wisdom, moderation, and liberality. The recovery of the dominion of Messenia for Lacedæmon, was of course the first object; but benefit was proposed to other commonwealths, as widely and equitably, perhaps, as the divided state of Greece, where some one generally must lose what another gained, would easily admit. Restitution was the principle: Athens was to regain her frontier town and territory of Oropus, now under the dominion of Thebes. The unfortunate people of the Boeotian towns, desolated by the Thebans, Orchomenus, Thespie and Plateæ, were to be restored: Tricranum, unjustly withheld by the Argians, was to be recovered for the Phliasians: a part of Triphylia, apparently that conquered by the Arcadians, was to return under the dominion of the Elcians: ‘some of the Arcadians,’ such is the phrase of Demosthenes, ‘were to have again their own proper territories.’ The import of this cautious expression would be hardly now to be gathered, but for the account, remaining from Xenophon, of the founding of the new Arcadian city of Megalopolis. From the tenor of the oration of Demosthenes, compared with that account, and with the narrative of Diodorus, it becomes evident that ‘the Arcadians to be restored’ were those unfortunate men, who had been forced, by democratical tyranny, from residence on their estates, and, with the destruction of their houses and villages, compelled to live, under the jealous eye of democratical rulers, in Megalopolis, as the capital of Arcadia.

Demosth.
Pro Mega-
lop. p. 203
& 206.

Ch. 28. s. 8.
of this Hist.

For success in this extensive arrangement, which could not be carried into effect but by force or terror of arms, the concurrence of the Athenian government was especially necessary; and it seems probable that concert was early held on it with that party in Athens, which desired that arms should be used only to procure justice to the injured, repression for the turbulent, and repose for Greece. There remains from Isocrates a political pamphlet, in the form of a speech of the king of Lacedæmon, Archidamus, which has been published with the evident purpose of preparing the Greeks generally for the measure, but especially the Athenian people. The state of the Athenian government, and Athenian parties, required cautious expression about popular interests, and very delicate treatment of popular prejudices. Hence apparently

Isocr. Archid.

Isocrates has referred so much to old and even fabulous times, venturing little on the actual state of things. He has however enough indicated that he, and those who concurred on political subjects with him, reckoned the revival of the Messenian state, such as it was under Theban patronage, no way beneficial to Athens, no way tending to the general independency of Greece, no way an act of justice even to the persons put in possession of the country, unless perhaps to a very small proportion of them, but really a transfer only of the sovereignty of the country from the Lacedæmonians to the Thebans, whose purpose was to subdue Lacedæmon, Athens, and all Greece¹⁸. Hopeless as was, what all true patriots would most desire, a political union of the whole Greek nation, they considered the proposed arrangement as the most extensively beneficial for the present, and affording the best hope of opportunity for an improved state of things in future, that, with the consideration, necessary for them, of the particular interest of the Athenian commonwealth, could, in existing circumstances, be reasonably attempted; an arrangement by which the numerous little states, anxious for independency, and unable severally to maintain it, might best avoid the tyranny of one republic, which they had learned from experience, of all things, to dread, and subjection under a monarch, of which alarm was now industriously circulated. Thebes being depressed, Athens would remain the unrivalled head of the democratical cause. Lacedæmon would be raised, no more than might be necessary to hold the lead of the aristocratical. Northward of the isthmus democracy, within Peloponnesus aristocracy would preponderate; and, between the two, more than at any former time, would be established the balance, which had always been found the best protection for the smaller republics, and altogether most beneficial for the nation.

But the party of Chares, having, as the extant orations of Demosthenes show, and even not obscurely avow, the same view to the sovereignty of Greece for themselves, in the name of the Athenian

¹⁸ This transfer of the dominion of Messenia from Lacedæmon to Thebes, and the purpose of the Thebans, have been noticed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who, tho more an elegant scholar than a deep politician,

saw farther than most other writers, under the Roman empire, into the real character of the republican times of Greece. Dion. Hal. de Isocr.

people, as the Theban leaders in the name of the Theban people, would, for no general advantage of Greece, or even separate advantage of Athens, allow an increase of power to Lacedæmon, which might be efficacious to obstruct that view. On the contrary, seeing, in the circumstances of the moment, opportunity for promoting their great purpose, by contesting with Thebes the lead of the democratical interest in Peloponnesus, they resolved to use it, at whatever risk of offence to Lacedæmon; whose alliance, should they succeed, they might perhaps despise.

In opposing the project of Lacedæmon, what they selected, as a principal matter to contest, in the assembly of the people, was the change proposed at Megalopolis. The founding of the new city had been a measure ingeniously conceived, and ably executed, it is said by Epameinondas, for a lasting curb upon Lacedæmon, and it had proved singularly efficacious for securing the new state of Messenia against the superiority of the Lacedæmonian arms. The site was chosen for the command it held of the principal pass from Arcadia into Laconia. The population was compounded with a view to make it always hostile to Lacedæmon, and necessarily dependent on Thebes. The greater part of the Arcadian landowners, compelled to migrate thither, were warmly attached to aristocratical government and to the Lacedæmonian connection. The democratical party, under whose rule they were placed in Megalopolis, adverse of course to Lacedæmon, wanted the support of some powerful state the more, as their aristocratical fellowcitizens were always ready to join their enemies. Argos was of their confederacy; but Argos could not always protect itself, and of course could not be depended upon alone for protecting them. Thus Megalopolis was as an outpost for Thebes against Laconia, whence, if Messenia were attacked, inroad upon the Lacedæmonian lands was ready. But were the aristocratical landholders allowed to return to their villages, and live, under their former constitution, with arms in their hands, independent of the government of Megalopolis, they would be a check upon the democratical population there, to prevent inroad into Laconia, as Megalopolis itself was upon Lacedæmon, to prevent the employment of its force in Messenia. This therefore was what the

Lacedæmonians desired; and it was so just in itself, and so little obviously interfering with any just interest of Athens, that when proposed in the Athenian assembly, as the desire equally of Lacedæmon, now so long the necessary and beneficial ally of Athens, and of the Arcadian landowners themselves, accompanied with the offer of the strength of Lacedæmon to assist Athens in recovering Oropus from the Thebans, it might seem difficult to find arguments likely to be popular in support of the denial of it.

The purpose of Lacedæmon however no sooner became known, than the democratical Megalopolitans carried their complaints to every state in Greece, where they could hope to interest a party; and tho' virtually at war with Athens, since Athens had quitted the Theban alliance for the Lacedæmonian, they did not scruple, as apparently they did not fail of encouragement, to solicit the favor of the Athenian people to their cause. Ministers being sent from Lacedæmon to negotiate the proposed arrangement with the Athenian government, ministers also attended from Megalopolis; and both were equally allowed to address the assembly of the people, which was to decide on the measure.

The superior talents of Demosthenes for public speaking had now raised him to importance, and he appears to have been already engaged in the party of Chares. Having always professed zeal for the most unlimited democracy, he was secure against any charge of inconsistency in taking, with that party, the patronage of the democratical Megalopolitans. His speech on the occasion, which has fortunately been preserved, is among the most striking examples, not of his fire, which he always knew how and when to suppress, but of his art, which the occasion especially required, and in which perhaps he not less excelled. What however principally gives it importance for history, is the politics it unfolds. The existing alliance of Athens with Lacedæmon, and war with Thebes, made the business of the advocate for Megalopolis, the ally of Thebes, difficult and delicate before the Athenian people. His resource was in the popular disposition to that narrow and dishonest patriotism, which would scruple nothing to promote the interest of the Athenian people, at the expence of all the rest of Greece and the world. That profligate principle, which the party of Chares

appears always to have asserted, Demosthenes is found directly avowing, among his published works, first in the oration for the Megalopolitans. There he urges, that the interest of the Athenian people required the depression of their allies the Lacedæmonians, not less than that of their enemies the Thebans. The interest of the democratical Megalopolitans then he most artfully put forward by affecting contempt for them, and representing them as worthy any regard of the Athenian people, only as, through any favor to them, the interest of the Athenian people might be promoted. The result of the contest is not reported; but it remains among antient writers to be gathered, that, tho the Athenian people were not prevailed upon directly and openly to oppose their allies the Lacedæmonians, yet the associates of Isocrates could procure no concurrence in the arrangement proposed by Lacedæmon.

Failing thus at Athens, the Lacedæmonians resolved nevertheless to use the opportunities, otherwise favoring, for prosecuting their purpose. Their hope seems to have been founded, on one side, on the weakness which Thebes had shown in the sacred war, and the decay of Theban influence over the extensive confederacy which Epamcinondas had led: on the other it rested much on the abhorrence, in which the Arcadian landowners held their democratical government, and the Theban patronage which supported it, and on their desire of the restoration of that Lacedæmonian patronage, under which they and their forefathers had been accustomed to hold their estates in better freedom and more security, and which they considered as an inherited right and privilege. To give encouragement and opportunity then for these men to declare themselves, a Lacedæmonian army marched into the Megalopolitan territory.

B. C. 352.
Ol. 107. 1.
Diod. l. 16,
c. 39.

This measure excited an interest through Greece, such as to produce a kind of transfer of the sacred war into Peloponnesus. The states of the Theban confederacy seem to have considered the support of the democratical cause in Peloponnesus as more their interest than the oppression of Phocis; and those who would not hearken to the call of the Amphictyons, when they suspected the result might be to place the Delphian treasury at the mercy of Thebes, would march, at the cry of the democratical Megalopolitans, to defend them against the Lacedæmonians

dæmonians and aristocracy. The Theban general, Cephision, for here again (what has never yet occurred in the war with Phocis) a Theban general is designated by his name, Cephision led four thousand foot with five hundred horse into Peloponnesus; the whole force of Sicyon, of Messenia, and of the democratical Arcadians presently arranged themselves under his orders, and the Argians were preparing to join him.

Soon after the death of Phaëllus, or perhaps before it, the policy of the war-party in Athens toward Phocis was changed: the connection with the autocrator-general and the executive government of Phocis slackened, and some democratical party-leaders were encouraged in opposition to them. Hence, to cultivate again the Lacedæmonian connection became highly important for the Phocian government, and on this the Lacedæmonian government seems to have had some reliance, in taking its measures against Megalopolis. Under these circumstances, when the Theban army moved into Peloponnesus, the Phocians did not take any advantage of it for measures directly against Thebes, but sent three thousand foot, with a hundred and fifty horse, to join the Lacedæmonians.

The utmost force however, that Archidamus could collect, was so inferior to the united numbers of the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies, that the aspect of things was threatening for Lacedæmon. But Argians were yet only moving to join their confederates, and had not passed the bounds of their own territory, when Archidamus, by an unexpected movement, with the Lacedæmonian forces only, attacked and dispersed them. The town of Orncæ presently after yielded to his arms; and, by that acquisition, at the same time he gave increased security to Laconia, and provided new means for checking the exertions of Argos. Proceeding then to join the Phocian army, their united force amounted still scarcely to half the numbers already under the Theban general's orders.

Nevertheless, aware of the difference since the ability of Epameinondas no longer directed the Theban arms, Archidamus did not fear to meet the ill-compounded mass. A battle ensued, which was of doubtful issue, and both sides claimed the victory. But many of the Peloponnesian

nesian allies of Thebes, to enjoy the fruit of their claim, went directly home; a kind of desertion which, as we have formerly seen, even the influence of Epameinondas could not always prevent. Archidamus meanwhile, being fortunately able to keep his army together, gained essential advantage by taking the Arcadian town of Elissus.

Ch. 27. s. 3.
of this Hist.

The Theban leaders, however, after their Peloponnesian confederates had indulged themselves with a short visit to their families, found means to collect their strength again, with added numbers; and, Cephision still commanding, they defeated the Lacedæmonian forces commanded by Anaxander, and made the general prisoner. They were superior also in two following actions, but apparently little important; for the Lacedæmonians afterward gained a complete victory.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 39.

What then led to negotiation we are not informed, nor why the Lacedæmonians, after their success, consented to the terms on which a partial peace was concluded. There are some grounds for conjecture only that the king of Macedonia, solicited by the Thebans and Peloponnesians for assistance, interfered as mediator. Peace was made between the Lacedæmonians and Megalopolitans, leaving things nearly as they stood before the war, and the Theban forces withdrew from Peloponnesus.

The unfortunate country, the seat of the Sacred war, thus had but a short respite. Whether in the autumn of the same year, or in the following spring, Phalæcus invaded Bœotia; encouraged apparently by a party in Chæroneia, and made his way into that town, but was driven out again. The Thebans then collecting their forces, revenged themselves by invading Phocis; and finding no effectual opposition, they carried off much booty. But both parties were now so exhausted, that neither could prosecute offensive war, longer than plunder would afford means and encouragement. Incursion for plunder, and waste was occasionally repeated on both; and, with this destructive kind of warfare, the hostile spirit remained, as when the war began.

B. C. $\frac{452}{337}$.
Ol. 107. 1.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 39.

Diod. l. 10.
c. 10.

Thus, tho Athens had no share in the business of arms, all the advantage of this new Peloponnesian war was for the Athenian war-party, and for them it was complete. The result of the complex contest was precisely what Demosthenes stated, in his speech for the

Megalopolitans,

Megalopolitans, as what the Athenians should most desire: Lacedæmon was confined to a state of depression, Thebes nearly exhausted, and Greece more than ever divided¹⁹.

¹⁹ The French translator of the orators, Auger, has given a very different account of the result of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans. 'Ce discours,' he says, 'prononcé dans la quatrième année de la civ. Olympiade, fit sur les Athéniens l'impression qu'il devoit faire: ils envoyèrent à Megalopolis une armée, sous la conduite d'un de leurs généraux, qui remit les choses dans leur premier état, et rappella les familles qui avoient commencé à retourner dans leurs anciennes patries.' Where he found authority for this he has not said; nor can I guess what may have led him to the imagination, unless some imperfect recollection of the account given by Diodorus of interference in the affairs of Megalopolis twelve years before, by an error apparently of the transcriber, attributed to the Athenians instead of the Thebans. But Auger's reputation as an editor and translator may require that, on some convenient occasion, further notice be taken of his boldness in assertion on historical subjects, and extreme negligence of investigation.

Meanwhile I know not that anywhere, more conveniently than here, notice can be taken of a matter hardly to be passed wholly without observation. Modern writers of ancient history have mostly followed some of the later antients in reporting an expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. Among the cotemporary orators no mention is found of it, nor in the annals of Diodorus. The modern learned, who have most studied the matter, have differed much in conjecture, having only conjecture, concerning the time when it happened; some placing it before, others after the war of which we have been treating. It seems to me difficult to assign for it any time in which it

might not be shown from the cotemporary orators that it could not be; and it is therefore principally for the support it may appear to derive from so early and so very respectable a historian as Polybius, that I think it worthy of any discussion. With regard to Polybius then it is to be observed that he does not, in his own person, at all mention the matter, but he introduces two contending orators, an Acarnanian and an Ætolian, speaking of it. The expressions which he puts into the mouths of these orators may imply, and probably will at first impress the reader with the idea, that Philip, in person made war in Peloponnesus; but they do not necessarily imply it. With ourselves the phrase is familiar, that Lewis XIV. made war in Spain, and Lewis XV. made war in America; not meaning to say that those princes were ever in those countries. On the other side then it is to be observed that, from Demosthenes, we have repeated notice of Philip's speculating in Peloponnesus. In the oration on the crown his first speculation there is noticed; *ὅτι πρῶτον ἐκείνος ἐς Πελοπόννησον παρῆλθε*, p. 252. In the second Philippic we are told, that he required the Lacedæmonians to resign their claim to the dominions of Messenia, and threatened that otherwise a great force should march against them, p. 69. In the third Philippic his speculations in Peloponnesus are again mentioned, p. 115. In the oration on the letter, delivered after every assigned and imaginable time of the expedition, embassies from the Peloponnesians to Philip are mentioned, and alliances with him, but no war made by him. Finally then, in the oration on the crown again, delivered several years after Philip's death, the zeal with which many Peloponnesian states sought his alliance, and the civil war between the

SECTION V.

Sedition at Rhodes: Speech of Demosthenes for the Rhodians. Troubles of Eubœa: Phocion Commander of the Athenian Forces in Eubœa: Battle of Tamynæ. Embassy from Thebes to the Court of Persia. Treaties of Subsidy between the Persian Court and the Grecian Republics.

WHILE the democratical cause, fostered by the two hostile governments of Thebes and Athens, was thus gaining ground in Greece, the embers of its fire, nearly smothered by the event of the confederate war, broke out afresh on the eastern side of the Ægean. In Rhodes, renowned for the liberality of its aristocracy, and the prosperity of its people under a mixed constitution, the contention of adverse factions became violent. A common evil of civil contest ensued; foreign aid

the Macedonian and Anti-Macedonian parties in Eleia, are mentioned, but no war made by Philip. This seems to me conclusive against his having ever interfered either in person, or by any Macedonian force, in any war in Peloponnesus. But we find Æschines mentioning that the Megalopolitans, and other Peloponnesians, hostile to Lacedæmon, took offence at Athens for her connection with Lacedæmon; tho the connection of Athens with Lacedæmon was never very friendly. The same Peloponnesian states were those so zealous in the Macedonian connection; and tho we find no mention of Macedonia from Diodorus, in his account of the war under the Theban Cephision in Peloponnesus, yet, if Philip did at all interfere, it would be against Lacedæmon; nor does it seem improbable but that some threats, such as Demosthenes has mentioned, without noticing the precise occasion, may have assisted to produce the final accommodation, on terms perhaps better so accounted for than under any

other consideration. Possibly then such may have been the grounds, on which the orators mentioned by Polybius, and Polybius himself, may have considered the king of Macedonia as principally contributing to the effects which the war produced.

Pausanias mentions a military station which he saw near Mantinea, called Philip's camp. The ignorance of the country people, in his age, would be likely enough to attribute this to the more celebrated Philip, tho it were really, as it is likely to have been, the work of the later king of Macedonia of that name, who did command armies in Peloponnesus. As for such writers as Frontinus, whose books are but bundles of stories, when they have found a good one they must find good names for the principal personages; and all will not be so honest as Ælian, whom we find sometimes confessing that he cannot decide to which of two or three great men a remarkable deed or a pithy saying should be attributed.

was sought by the weaker, and, in turn, by each party. Alliance had been antient, and probably of mutual benefit, between the Rhodians, under their aristocratical government, and the people of the neighboring continent of Caria, whose constitution was monarchal; being a kind of feudal principality under the Persian empire, whence the sovereign, or first magistrate, was called sometimes king or prince, sometimes satrap. In that principality, Artemisia had recently succeeded to the authority of her deceased husband Mausolus. The aristocratical Rhodians, unable to withstand the democratical party, and fearing, from its sovereignty, worse oppression than from any foreign power, applied to that princess; and, to prevent the evil they most dreaded, received a Carian garrison into their citadel. Their superiority being, by this dangerous expedient, insured, what had been their fear became that of their adversaries, the chief of whom fled^a.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.

In the war of the allies against Athens, in which we have seen Rhodes taking a principal share, the Rhodian Many had been forward and zealous; all parties concurring in aversion to the dominion of the Athenian people, of which experience was then recent. Whether incouragement from Athens had promoted the sedition, which at length produced the flight of the democratical chiefs, does not appear, but there was a disposition ready, in the war-party, to forgive their former offences, for the sake of advantage to be derived from their future services. Not probably without some assurance of the existence of such a disposition, they addressed supplication to the Athenian

^a Such are the plain and probable facts to be gathered from Demosthenes. But some embellishing circumstances, of apparently the same story, have been given by the great teacher of antient architecture, Vitruvius. The democratical leaders, he says, having obtained complete possession of the government of Rhodes, sent a fleet to Halicarnassus, the capital of Caria, with the purpose of extending the democratical interest, by exciting revolt against Artemisia. The princess, apprized of the purpose, captured the whole, and putting her own seamen into the ships, sent them immediately back. The Rhodians, receiving their re-

turning fleet without suspicion, were overpowered, and the Carians became masters of the city.

Possibly there may have been circumstances to afford some foundation for this report. Such a stratagem, however, producing consequences so important, would hardly have escaped all notice from the contemporary orator, whose account they yet in no respect contradict. According to both authors, the democratical party, at first superior, were afterward, with Carian assistance to their opponents, overpowered.

people, for assistance against their aristocratical fellowcitizens, who now held Rhodes. Demosthenes undertook to be their advocate, and his speech on the occasion remains to us; interesting especially for its farther display of the great orator's political principles.

The business was of considerable nicety; for prejudice was strong in the minds of the Athenian Many against the Rhodians, whom they had been taught, by those who now desired favor for them, to consider as rebellious subjects; and to reckon the democratical party, under those circumstances, as more especially objects of indignation. Fearing directly to meet this prejudice, the orator's art to obviate its opposition to his purpose is remarkable. 'It was not the cause of the Rhodians' he was pleading,' he said, 'but the common cause of democracy. Such was the universal connection of the democratical cause, so readily, if variance arose between democratical governments, they fell into concord again, that it would be better for Athens to be at war with all the states of Greece together, if all were under democratical government, than to have peace and alliance with all under oligarchy; for no peace could be sincere between men who desire to rule others, and men anxious for universal equality.' Those among his audience who reflected at all, would wonder why the stone-quarries of Syracuse formerly had been the graves of so many Athenians, why the hatred was so rancorous now between Athens and Thebes, and how the democracy of Rhodes itself became so hostile in the confederate war. Such explanation the orator prudently avoided, and, proceeding to catch at the passions of his audience, he mentioned it as a lamentable state of things that, 'not the Rhodians only, but the Chians, Lesbians, in short almost all mankind, were living under a form of government different from the Athenian. The danger insuing to the Athenian democracy was alarming, and those who establish any other form of government ought to be esteemed the common enemies of freedom²¹.' The Athenians therefore, he contended, ought to lay aside all other considerations, and esteem it sufficient cause for assisting the suppliants, that they were the democratical party.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.
p. 196.

²¹ The orator's phrase is 'those who establish oligarchy;' but the tenor of his discourse shows that he uses that term to imply all governments other than democracy.

But he was aware that notorious and celebrated facts, which had been repeatedly urged by more liberal politicians, against the intolerance of the high democratical party, would be recollected as strongly contradicting this branch of his argument. In the extreme distress of Athens, at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when completely at the mercy of her enemies, and afterward, in the weakness of her first convalescency, when the republic was restored by Thrasybulus, the generosity of some aristocratical governments had saved and supported her, when the rancor of democratical enemies would have doomed her to utter destruction. To obviate this he relates a story of democratical generosity. 'I would not have you,' he says, 'holding, as you do, the reputation of universal protectors of the unfortunate, appear inferior to the Argians. When the Lacedæmonians, after the Peloponnesian war, were lords of Greece, they sent a requisition, it is said, to Argos, for some Athenians, who had taken refuge there, to be surrendered. But the Argians, far from yielding to a power so formidable, so persevered in friendship to you, that they ordered the Lacedæmonian ministers to leave the city before the sun should set.'

Hence the orator proceeds to an avowal of political principles that will deserve notice. To subdue others, to grasp at dominion on all sides, in terms more or less direct, he is found frequently urging to the Athenian people as their proper policy; but he constantly denies equal right to other people. Chalcedon, on the Bosphorus, subjected, in common with other Asian Greek cities, to the first empire of Athens, had passed, after the battle of Aigospotami, under that of Lacedæmon, and, after the seafight of Cnidus, had yielded to Persia. The Byzantines had now conquered it from the Persians. This, it might seem, should be esteemed creditable and praiseworthy, among those who reckoned the Persians, as we have seen Demosthenes declaring he reckoned them, common enemies of Greece. But now, on the contrary, he considers the conquest of Chalcedon by the Byzantines, as a crime, a robbery; not against the Persians, from whom they took it, not against the Chalcedonians themselves, Greeks whom they held in subjection, but against the Athenians; as if Athenians, and Athenians alone, had a right to hold all others in subjection.

It appears to have been contended, on the other side, that Athens had now long held peace and friendly intercourse with Rhodes, under treaty with its aristocratical government, and that to support rebellion against that government would be unjust, and contrary to the oaths which sanctioned the treaty. In answer to this we have some more remarkable political principles. 'I reckon,' says Demosthenes, 'it would be just to restore the democratical government in Rhodes: but, even, were it not just, still, observing what other states do, I should think it advisable for its expediency. If all indeed would be just, then it would be shameful for the Athenians to be otherwise. But when all others are providing themselves with means to injure, for us alone to abide by justice, and scruple to use advantages offered, I consider not as uprightness but weakness; and in fact I see all states regulating their rights by their power²².' He proceeds then to confirm this curious argument by a remark, showing the miserably precarious state of the boasted liberties of the Greek nation. 'Political rights, among the Grecian states,' he says, 'are decided for the smaller by the will of the more powerful.' An analogous justice seems to have pervaded the democracies. If persuasion failed, an orator, sufficiently powerful in popularity, would resort to threats and violence; nor did those indowed with the greatest powers of persuasion scruple to use a resource, which their policy apparently, not less than their liberality and every consideration of public good, should have reprobated. But Demosthenes concludes this oration for the Rhodians in the way of the ordinary popular railers, endeavoring to intimidate those who differed from him,

Demosth.
pro Rhod.
p. 198.

²² Very much, in such arguments, depending upon the force of particular words, I will give the original passage at large, that the learned reader may judge for himself, without the trouble of turning to another book, whether I have rendered it to his mind. 'Εγὼ δὲ δίκαιοι εἶναι νομίζω κατάγειν τοὺς Ῥοδίων δῆμον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μὴ δίκαιοι ἦν, ἴταντες ἃ ποιοῦσιν οὗτοι (Byzantines and others) βλέψω, προσήκειν οἷμαι παραινέσαι καταγεῖν. Διὰ τί; Ὅτι πάντων μὲν, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν ὁρμηκότερον, ἀσχερόν ἡμᾶς μόνους μὴ εἶναι. Ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὅπως ἀδίκειν

δυνήσονται παρασκευαζομένων, μόνους ἡμᾶς τὰ δίκαια προτείνεισθαι, μηδενὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένους, οὐ δικαιοσύνην, ἀλλὰ ἀνανδρίαν ἡγοῦμαι. Ὅρῳ γὰρ ἅπαντας πρὸς τὴν παρόυσαν δύναιμι καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ἀξιουμένους. Demosth. pro Rhod. p. 198, 199. The French translator Auger, tho generally a warm admirer of Demosthenes's democratical politics, exclaims, in a note on this passage, 'Voilà donc les principes d'équité de la politique!—Comme si la justice n'étoit pas toujours la justice quand tous les hommes en negligeroient la pratique!'

by

by imputing all opposition to a spirit of disaffection to the government, and purposed treason. What decree followed we are not informed, but no measures, or none effectual, were taken to support the Rhodian petitioners²¹; perhaps because the attention of the Athenian government was, as we shall see, forcibly called another way.

Among the complicated circumstances of Greece, in this eventful period, some occurrences of no small importance remain indicated by the orators, of which not the smallest mention is made by our only historical guide; the failure of whose assistance for arrangement and dates, notwithstanding his frequent inaccuracy, is here felt as a loss. Nearly however to the time we are engaged with must be attributed some transactions in Eubœa, which may have assisted to prevent any effectual interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Rhodes.

By the expulsion of Timotheus from Athens, the connection established by him, between the Athenian administration and the Eubœan towns, would of course be shaken: the confidence which the Eubœans had in his probity, liberality, and wisdom, would not be readily transferred to his oppressors, and those would not be disposed particularly to respect his arrangements. Nevertheless we have no information of oppression exercised against the Eubœans; on the contrary, the event of the confederate war seems to have been taken as a lesson, by Chares and his associates, for their conduct toward a subject country, so nearly under the eye of every citizen, the importance of which was so highly rated by all: they did not here, as generally in more distant dependencies, establish democracy by violence: every town seems to have retained its constitution, as under the compact with Timotheus; and

Æschin. de
cor. p. 494.

²¹ Auger, at the conclusion of his summary of the oration for the Rhodians, meekly enough observes, 'Il y a toute apparence qu' Artemise étant morte cette même année, les Rhodiens furent remis en liberté.' There is no appearance whatever that the democracy could be restored in Rhodes without the interference of Athens; and democracy restored by Athenian interference would have brought the Rhodian

people again under subjection to Athens: they must have sworn, as Demosthenes shows in this very oration, to have the same friends and enemies as the Athenian people; they must have marched and sailed and paid tribute at the pleasure of the Athenian people or the Athenian tribute-gathering admiral, and thus they would have been 'remis en liberté.' There is no appearance that anything of this happened.

among

among proofs of ease and security in the island may perhaps be reckoned that Timotheus chose it for his exile. Probably he had ended a life neither short nor inglorious, when the Eubœan cities come presented to our view, by the orators, in circumstances that appear extraordinary. They were under the rule each of a chief, who bore the title of tyrant; if not regularly and as a legal description, yet commonly, and as an accepted designation. Thus Charigenes was tyrant of Oreus, Mnesarchus of Chalcis, and Plutarchus had succeeded Themison in the tyranny of Eretria²⁴. But neither do we learn that these tyrants excited complaint among the people under them; on the contrary, they appear to have been the most popular men of their respective cities. Their eminence among their fellowcitizens for property and popularity, seems to have recommended them to the Athenian government; and, the favor of that government confirming and increasing their importance among their fellowcitizens, they became in reality common agents, for the Athenian government equally and for their fellowcitizens, for the management of all their common concerns²⁵.

Probably the party which, before the intervention of Timotheus, had, with Theban assistance, nearly obtained complete command of the island, was not intirely crushed or converted by his arms or his policy. But among so many independent townships of various constitutions within one island grounds of disagreement, such as had given occasion to the former wars, could hardly fail to abound. If then better or more favorite assistance was not immediately in view, all, of course, would vie for the support of Athens. But the Athenian government seems to have been disposed to its former policy, of letting the Eubœans fight their own battles after their own way, so only that the interference of forein powers was avoided.

In this neglect of the interests of the Eubœans, and of their just

²⁴ The title of tyrant is given by Æschines to Mnesarchus, and by Plutarch to his own namesake the chief of Eretria. Charigenes is called by Æschines *dynast*, which is not exactly a convertible term; but, as titles, tyrant and *dynast* were often used indifferently. The constitution of Oreus was democratical, and, as such, indicated by

Æschines to have differed from that of the other towns.

²⁵ The transaction of Demosthenes with Gnosidemas of Oreus son of Changenes, shows that this was their real character, and all that we farther learn of them is consonant to it. Æsch. de cor. p. 494.

Æschin. de
cor.

claim of protection, as subjects and tributaries, the people of Chalcis, the most populous town of the island, under the lead of Callias and Taurosthenes, sons of the late tyrant Mnesarchus, proposed a general assembly of deputies from the several towns, to be holden at Chalcis, for the purpose of composing the present differences, and regulating in future the general affairs of the whole island. They appear to have been able men, and not very scrupulous: they negotiated with the king of Macedonia, while they professed all fidelity to the old engagements of their city with Athens. What those engagements were indeed we have no information; and considering Callias and Taurosthenes simply as Eubœans, if their final object was not their own power rather than their country's good, their measure would seem truly patriotic. Their final purpose however certainly was to place themselves at the head of the affairs of the whole island. Plutarchus of Eretria therefore saw, in their success, the ruin of his own authority in his own city, with no small danger probably for his property, his liberty, and even his life. His resource therefore was to address solicitation and remonstrance to Athens.

Demosth.
Phil. 3.
p. 125.
p. 126.

Tho the Macedonian interest was advancing rapidly in the island, and Philip had gone so far as to send his general Parmenio to assist in the regulation of its affairs, yet the party of Chares, as it appears from both the orators, were backward in public measures for supporting the interest of Athens. The reason of this political phenomenon is however to be gathered from Demosthenes. Callias and Taurosthenes became afterward his confidential friends, and associates in the most important political business. Whether the connection was already in any degree formed, or how far circumstances were prepared or negotiation begun for it, does not appear, but the orator shows ground enough for the refusal of his party to interfere in favor of Plutarchus. As formerly in Rhodes, so now in Eubœa, the Many were adverse to the Athenian democratical leaders: in Eretria they banished those whom Demosthenes calls their own best friends, the orators who pretended most zeal in the democratical cause²⁶; and it seems pro-

²⁶ Demosthenes's hypocritical phrases on the occasion cannot be misunderstood: 'Οι ἐπειθισαν τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λόγουλας ἐκβαλεῖν. Philipp. 3. p. 125.
παλαίπαροι καὶ δυσχερεῖς Ἐρετριεῖς τελευτῶντες

bable that the only opening which the Athenian democratical party saw for recovering their influence in Eubœa, was by forming connection with Callias and Taurosthenes. The other party would, on that very account, be the more earnest to support Plutarchus. An earnestness arose, however, not unlike that formerly excited by Timotheus, for maintaining the Athenian interest in the island. Not only for the navy but for the army also, personal service was extensively offered; and now first, it is said, within memory or tradition, the expence of equipping ships of war was voluntarily undertaken by individuals. This arose from a general disposition of the higher ranks to the measure; and all the circumstances together indicate that, on this occasion, the aristocratical leaders carried the popular favor. Demosthenes alone, of the democratical orators, ventured to speak; and he, as he has himself confessed, was ill heard and roughly treated. The command of the armament, rapidly raised, was committed, not to Chares or any of his faction, but to Phocion, their stern opponent.

Meanwhile Callias and Taurosthenes had so gained favor to their project, for a union of all the towns of the island under one liberal system of independent government, that, except in Eretria, their party everywhere prevailed. They did not however rest their cause intirely upon the attachment of their fellow-ilanders. They engaged a considerable body of mercenaries, which had been in the Phocian service, and were dismissed probably on account of the near failure of resources from the Delphian treasury. But they continued always to profess the purpose of maintaining peace and friendship with Athens. Such was the involution of party interests, some avowed and some concealed, that when Phocion arrived with the Athenian armament at Eretria, he seems hardly to have known what enemy he had to contend with. But, advancing into the country, and incamping near the town of Tamynæ, in a deep valley, the heights about him were occupied by hostile troops, in such force, that he found himself in effect besieged, and in extreme danger. An express was hastened to Athens with information of the circumstances; and the result again marks the favor of the higher ranks of citizens to the cause of Phocion: all the remaining cavalry of the republic immediately embarked. Not however without a severe action the distressed

Æsch. de
cor. p. 481.

Demosth.
Phil. 2.

army was relieved, and a victory of some splendor gained. The orator Æschines, serving in the cavalry, so distinguished himself, that he was selected by the general to carry report of the victory to the council and people, and for his meritorious service was rewarded, by a decree of the general assembly, with the honor of a crown. What however the consequence of the victory was, beyond the deliverance of the besieged army, does not appear. We find Demosthenes afterward imputing hostility and treachery toward Athens to Plutarchus, for whose support Phocion was sent; and, on the contrary, Æschines attributing the whole opposition against the Athenian interest in Eubœa to the measures of Callias and Taurosthenes. But it is remarkable that, much as we find Demosthenes complaining of Macedonian interference, and even Macedonian troops, in Eubœa, no mention is made of either on this occasion: when the party of Phocion directed measures, it appears, the hostility of Macedonia instantly ceased. But the scrupulousness of that virtuous statesman seems to have made little effectual use of the advantages, placed in his hands by his victory, and by the zealous attachment of his triumphant party. Whatever was the immediate arrangement, which seems indeed to have been but incomplete, sufficient opening was left for the future intrigues of Callias and Taurosthenes.

B. C. 351.
Ol. 107. 2.
Died. 1. 16.
c. 40.

About the time when these things, unnoticed by the historian, must have happened, a matter occurred, of extraordinary appearance in his account, for which we find no assistance from the orators. The Thebans, wearied and exhausted by the protraction of the Sacred war, found final success in it, with their own means, hopeless. Distressed thus, they sent an embassy to Artaxerxes, king of Persia, with the sole purpose, according to the historian, of begging money. What claim to favor they had acquired since, only two years ago, their general Pammenes, in the service of a rebel satrap, Artabazus, had defeated the king's armies, is not said. Perhaps those actually ruling in Thebes disowned Pammenes. But it appears, from the sequel, that the court of Persia desired, at this time, to cultivate a good understanding generally with the Grecian republics. The recovery of Egypt had been, for half a century, its anxious purpose, unsuccessfully pursued; Artabazus

still

still maintained his rebellion in Bithynia; and Phenicia, forming close connection with Egypt, had recently shown itself in revolt. All these things together pressing, the Persian court was driven to that policy, which had been so successfully used by the leaders of revolt against it, employing mercenary Grecian troops. It was probably intelligence of such a purpose that encouraged the mission from the Theban government to Susa. Their ambassadors obtained, according to the historian, three hundred talents, about sixty thousand pounds, which were however not probably given for nothing. Agents were sent soon after to all the principal republics. Athens and Lacedæmon, professing a desire to hold friendship with the king, stated the necessity of their own affairs in excuse for not parting with any of their native military force; but the Thebans sent their general Lacrates, with a thousand heavy-armed. Argos furnished three thousand, under a general specially desired by the Persian court, Nicostratus; whose fame, which led to the distinction, probably had been acquired, not in Peloponnesus, but in previous service, in the command of mercenaries, among the warring powers of Asia. Diod. 1. 16.
c. 44.

But, whatever assistance the Thebans obtained for their treasury, from the liberality or the necessities of the Persian court, no considerable exertion followed in the war against Phocis. Predatory incursion only, and small skirmishes are mentioned among the operations of the year, and no important result.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Affairs of GREECE, during the Third Period of the Sacred War, when ATHENS and MACEDONIA became principal Parties.

SECTION I.

Chronology of the Times. Naval Successes of Macedonia against Athens: Opening for Negotiation alarming to the War-party at Athens: Philip's Popularity alarming: Measures of the War-party: Olynthus gained from the Macedonian to the Athenian Alliance: Embassy of Æschines to Peloponnesus: Philippics of Demosthenes.

THE imperfection of antient chronology makes continual difficulty for the investigator of antient history. For supplying the deficiencies, and correcting the errors, of Diodorus and the Arundel Marbles, which alone offer any extent of chronological clue, it behoves him to seek assistance wherever it may be found; and, for the times with which we are now engaged, a very valuable subsidiary remains, in the remarks of Dionysius of Halicarnassus upon the orations of Demosthenes. It is therefore very satisfactory to find these confirming Diodorus, so far as to show that his chronology does not, probably, err, for these times, more than for those for which we have opportunity to compare it with the higher authorities of Thucydides and Xenophon. The beginning of the Olympian year, about midsummer, long after the beginning of the common season for the action of Grecian armies, would be likely often to make confusion of two military seasons, for writers who did not, with the accuracy of Thucydides, divide

divide the year into summer and winter, the season of military action, and the season of military rest; especially for compilers like Diodorus, unversed in either political or military business, and writing not till some centuries after the times in question. For perfect exactness his chronology cannot claim credit; but as a general guide it will require attention, and even respect.

After the battle of the Pagasæan bay and its immediate consequences, the abdication of the tagus Lycophron, the settlement of all Thessaly in the Macedonian interest, the march of the combined Macedonian and Thessalian forces to Thermopylæ, and contest declined with the Athenian army there, the annals of Diodorus exhibit a remarkable void in Grecian history. Of the republics nothing is mentioned but the embassy of Thebes to Persia, and the faint prosecution of the Sacred war, already noticed. Of Macedonian affairs not a syllable appears. Nevertheless it may be gathered from the orators that, in that interval, occurred the contest of parties in Rhodes, and the war in Eubœa. B. C. 352.
Ol. 107. 1, 2.

For the business of the Eubœan war, as we have seen, or, at least, for the conduct of military operations, the party of Phocion prevailed in Athens. But they acquired no lasting lead in the general assembly. Through the abilities and the diligence of the opposing orators, stimulated by the strong interest they had in their system of war and trouble, all approaches to peace with Macedonia were checked, tho Philip showed himself always ready and even forward to meet them. Meanwhile Macedonia, and the allies of Macedonia, not liable to injury by land from the power of Athens, were suffering continually in their maritime commerce. Not Athenian fleets only, or cruizers regularly commissioned by the Athenian governments, but many little piratical republics, paying the Athenian commanders for licence, annoyed the Grecian seas.

To obviate these evils, Philip directed his attention to the establishment of a marine. The recovery of the seaports of Macedonia to his kingdom, the possession of the peculiar advantages of the Amphipolitan territory, and, perhaps more than both these, the close connection formed with Thessaly, and the consequent command of the means of

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Demosth.
Phil. I.
p. 49.

its commercial towns Pagasæ and Magnesia, gave him altogether considerable means. His insuing successes, tho without decisive contest, or splendid victory, appear to have astonished, while they not a little troubled his enemies. The islands of Imbrus and Lemnus were invaded and plundered, and, what made more impression than any other loss, some Athenian citizens were made prisoners. Nearer then to Athens, the port of Geræstus in Eubœa was forced, and a fleet of merchant-ships, richly laden, was carried off. But, what would still more perhaps affect the public mind, the coast of Attica itself was insulted, and the sacred ship Paralus was taken from the harbour of Marathon. It seems probable that the naval force of Olynthus assisted toward these successes; tho, in remaining mention of them all is attributed to Macedonia.

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 36.

But beyond the naval successes, or any other advantage, the growing popularity of the king of Macedonia, among the Grecian republics, disturbed the war-party. The state of Greece, always uneasy and threatening, for men who, with or without ambition, desired domestic security, was now uncommonly alarming. For the smaller states, always, the best safety had arisen from a balance of power between the larger; so that equally the democratical, under Athens or Thebes, and the oligarchal, under Lacedæmon, were most at ease, when the democratical interest and the oligarchal were most nearly balanced throughout the nation; because then the imperial states had the stronger and more obvious inducement to give protection and avoid oppression. But now, and Demosthenes himself furnishes the picture, Thebes could hardly support herself in a contest perfidiously undertaken and ill conducted, and Lacedæmon, long ago depressed, had been lately checked in an effort to rise, while Athens, having repaired in large degree her great loss of valuable dominion in the Confederate war and the war with Macedonia, by recent conquest in Thrace, and maintaining still her empire of the sea, was in spirit and in circumstances the most aspiring among the republics, almost alone able to undertake protection and to require submission¹. Sober men everywhere trembled

Isocr.
Arciop.

¹ Περὶ τῶν περσιῶν ἀντιτάσσεται. Isocr. Arciop.

at the view of an imperial democracy. The dominion of a multitude, even led by a Pericles, was an object of anxious fear: led by a Chares it was an object of decided horror. In looking around the cheerless prospect then, the rising power of Macedonia, as a resource, if supposed offering but a choice of evils, could not fail to attract consideration.

A remark occurring in Sicilian history presents itself again here, that it may prove less disadvantageous to a great character, than on first view might be expected, to remain transmitted to posterity only by enemies. Of whatever has dropped from Demosthenes to Philip's advantage, no question can be entertained; but whatever ill remains reported by others, whose authority is not of itself high, unconfirmed by the ingenuity and earnest diligence of the great cotemporary orator in seeking and spreading evil report, will be at least liable to just suspicion. The superior talents then, the indefatigable activity, and the personal courage of the king of Macedonia, are clearly and repeatedly attested by Demosthenes: even his liberality and generosity are largely shown; and his popularity throughout Greece, occurring for necessary mention, could hardly by words be more strongly painted than by the consummate speaker, using his utmost art to decry and bear it down. To obviate this popularity, and to substitute for it suspicion, fear, and, if possible, hatred, in Athens especially, but over Greece as far as might be, was a primary object of the war-party; and the task was assigned principally to the extraordinary abilities of Demosthenes. Hence those speeches, through whose celebrity their title of Philippic became at Rome, and thence through modern Europe, a common term for orations abounding with acrimonious invective*. Nor was the task light,

Demosth.
Philipp. I.
p. 41, 42.
de cor.
p. 245.
de legat.
p. 424, 426.

* If the earlier date, the first year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad, were assigned to the first Philippic on less high authority than that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the present year, the third of the same Olympiad, or perhaps the spring, concluding the second year, might rather seem to have been the season of its delivery. Indeed it has been observed that facts are mentioned in it, which appear to have been posterior to its assigned date; whence it has been supposed not one, but two orations of different dates. But, for my unwillingness, on any occasion, to controvert high authority, I should be inclined to propose a compromise, reckoning it a single oration, of the date already mentioned, toward the end of the second or beginning of the third year of the hundred and seventh Olympiad; thus placing it between the date of Dionysius, and the later date, which some eminent modern critics would assign to the latter part of the speech.

nor was it little that Demosthenes did for his party. Foiled successively in the Confederate war, in the war of Amphipolis, in the war of Thessaly, and overborne, for a time, on occasion of the disturbances in Eubœa, by the party with which Phocion acted, they must have sunk but for the singular talents which he brought to their support. Democracy itself, as we have lately observed him complaining, had at this time a falling cause. Advantages however remained, of which talents like those of Demosthenes might avail themselves. In every Grecian state was a relic or a germ of a democratical party, which might be excited to vigorous growth, or effort to grow, by any prospect of that boundless field, afforded by democracy, for ambition, excluding no individual from any extravagance of hope. Through the same animating power, activity, and boldness, and perseverance are common virtues of democratical parties. These it was the business of Demosthenes to excite to energy everywhere. But the favorable opportunity occurred at Olynthus, whither also the late naval successes of Macedonia would contribute to direct the view.

Demosth.
de legat.

We have seen the revived Olynthian confederacy brought, by the combined arms of Athens and Macedonia, to the brink of ruin, and saved only through the treachery and injustice of the Athenian government, alienating its own beneficial ally. In the short period since the connection that insued between Olynthus and Macedonia, the Olynthians had so prospered again, that their military force is said to have been greater than when formerly it balanced for a time the united arms of Macedonia and Lacedæmon. The citizens capable of bearing arms, according to Demosthenes, exceeded ten thousand; the cavalry amounted to one thousand; and the fleet was of fifty triremes. But, political prosperity having commonly the evil tendency to produce and sharpen contest for power, those who could not be first in Olynthus connected with Macedonia, were ready to break with Macedonia, at any risk to their country, for the chance of attaining the lead in it, through connection with any other power. Whether intrigue began from Olynthus or from Athens, it is evident that communication was held between a party among the Olynthians and the war-party in Athens, and that, between them, a plan was concerted for producing a
revolution

revolution in Olynthus. Peace was the plea of the Olynthian opposition. Considered by itself, without a view to circumstances and consequences, it was a plea that would of course weigh with a maritime and commercial people, engaged in war with those whose fleets commanded the sea. The Athenian government, it would be observed, and repeated proof might be appealed to, would not make any peace with Macedonia: all approach to it was denied by the decree forbidding communication by heralds. But there was no such repugnancy to peace with Olynthus; and the Olynthian confederacy was not so bound to Macedonia, that it should preclude itself forever from a good so much to be desired. It might indeed be remembered that, in the last preceding communication of the Olynthian government with the Athenian, the Olynthian ministers, sent to treat of peace, had met with only insult. Now however the tone of the insulting party in Athens was altered; they were ready not only to meet but to invite friendly communication from Olynthus. So matters were managed, that a majority was obtained, in the Olynthian assembly, for entering into engagements with Athens, contrary to engagements with Macedonia; and a peace, accommodating the interests of the two republics exclusively, or rather of the leading party in each, was concluded.

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 30. & in
Aristocr.
p. 656.

B. C. 350.
Ol. 107. 3.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia, after settling the affairs of Thessaly advantageously, through the means afforded by the victory over the Phocian army, had been called to new exertion by the motions of the restless barbarians, whose trade was war, by whom his kingdom was nearly surrounded. In arms and in negotiation he had been engaged with Illyrians, Thracians, Scythians, almost all the various hords who occupied the country from the Adriatic sea to the Euxine, and from the Ægean to the Danube. Of any particulars of the achievements, either of his valor or his policy, no information remains from cotemporary, and none of any value from later writers. The result only is so far attested, that he extended both dominion and influence, his authority and his popularity, gloriously for himself, and beneficially for his people. Especially he gave new secu-

Demosth.
Phil. I.
p. 41, 42.
Olynth. I.
p. 12.
Strab. I. 7.
p. 307.
Justin.

rity to the Macedonian frontier, which had been hitherto subject, like our Scottish and Welsh borders of old, to ceaseless war¹.

Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 113.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1.
p. 10, 11, &
Philipp. 3.
p. 113.

Philip was yet in Thrace, when information reached him of the prevalence acquired by the Athenian party in Olynthus, and the threatened defection of that state from the Macedonian alliance. Immediately he directed his earnest endeavors to have complaints explained and grievances removed, if any really existed, and to restore the shaken connection between the two governments, without which peace would be impossible. 'This therefore,' says Demosthenes, 'it was the business of Athens to prevent;' and the managers of that business succeeded. Hardly thirty years ago Olynthus had nearly overwhelmed the Macedonian kingdom, and afterward maintained a contest against Lacedæmon, then at the height of her power, assisted by all the remaining strength of Macedonia. The hope therefore might not unready be entertained among the Olynthians, that, strong in themselves now as then, with the advantage of support from Athens, they might assuredly withstand, and perhaps overbear Macedonia alone. One step gained by the Athenian party led to another, and from peace with Athens the progress was rapid to war with Macedonia.

Demosth.
Olynth. 1 &
2. init.

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 656.

The exultation of the Athenian war-party, on the arrival of intelligence of this result of their measures, appears to have been great. Demosthenes, speaking of it to the assembled people, told them it was the more gratifying, and of higher promise, as it was purely an Olynthian measure, not promoted by any interference from Athens. But another speech of the same orator remains in evidence, that a party in Olynthus was previously pledged, to the war-party in Athens, for promoting a breach with Macedonia, and that expectation was already

¹ Historians and biographers have spoken only of military expeditions, which some indeed have extended rather romantically; but the adverse orator shows there were advantages, apparently in not less proportion, procured for Macedonia in another way. It is of Thrace and the northern continent he is speaking, where he says, Πάντα κατέστρεψε καὶ ἔχει, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἱλὼν τις ἔχει πολέμου νόμος,

τὰ δὲ σύμμαχα καὶ φίλα ποιησάμενος. With provident ingenuity then he endeavors to obviate the impression this might make on the Athenian Many, in favor of Philip or of peace: Καὶ γὰρ συμμαχεῖν καὶ προσεχὲν τὸν νῦν τεύτοισι ἰθὺλουσιν ἀπαλὲς, οὕς ἂν ἑρῶσι παρισκινουμένους, καὶ πράττειν ἰθὺλοντας ἅ χρεῖ. Philipp. I. p. 41, 42.

entertained

entertained of complete success to the intrigue. The real character and complexion of the measure are indeed largely shown, among his extant orations. It was by carrying this measure, in the general assembly of Olynthus, that the party there, connected with the war-party of Athens, obtained possession of the administration. No cause of complaint against the Macedonian government gave ground for it. On the contrary it was a direct breach of faith with the Macedonian government, attempted to be justified only on the pretence of expediency. The interest of the Olynthian people, it was contended, so required it as to overbear all other considerations. Macedonia, the orator says, was so advanced in power, that she might chuse how far she would respect her engagements, and therefore the Olynthians did well to begin with breaking theirs. But even this argument, if his assertion to the Athenian people should pass for his opinion, he has in another speech overthrown. 'The power of Olynthus,' he says, 'might balance that of Macedonia, and Philip feared the Olynthians not less than they feared him*.'

Demosth.
in Aristocr.
p. 656.

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.

But tho, in the assembly of the Olynthian people, the Athenian party carried their measure for concurrence with Athens in war against Macedonia, yet most of the other cities of the confederacy were averse to it. Nor, in Olynthus itself, does the majority seem to have been such that decrees of banishment, or any strong coercion could be ventured against opponents. They obtained however complete possession of the administration. The stroke was great for the war-party at Athens: it gave them new credit with the Athenian Many; new ground on which to found proposals of warlike measures; and they proceeded most diligently to profit from it: 'Now was the favorable moment,' they said, 'to ingage all Greece in a league against the threatening ambition of the Macedonian king.' The utmost ingenuity was exerted to excite, among the Athenian people especially, but generally over Greece, apprehension of evils awaiting them, from the falsest and cruellest of tyrants, if they neglected the existing opportunity, and to raise hope of incalculable advantage if they exerted

Demosth.
Olynth. &
Philipp. var.
in loc.

* A story told by Justin of the rebellion of three natural brothers of Philip, and their connection with Olynthus, unmentioned by other antient writers, and evidently unknown to Demosthenes, seems, like many other stories of that author, hardly requiring even this notice in a note.

Ch. 26. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 425.

p. 344.

Æsch. de
legat.
Demosth. de
legat.

themselves to use it. Of the falshood that, to support such arguments, might be ventured in assertion to the Athenian Many, Demosthenes has left a curious example. Hardly anything in Grecian history is better authenticated than the fate of Olynthus, in its contest with Lacedæmon; the complete dissolution of the confederacy of which it had been the head, and its own complete subjection under the Lacedæmonian empire. Demosthenes nevertheless, within thirty years of the event, did not fear to aver to the Athenian multitude that, in that contest, the Olynthians were completely successful, that they lost no fortress (meaning apparently to have it believed that they lost neither territory nor command) and that at last they made peace on their own terms. The Athenians, stimulated thus at once by hopes and fears, gave themselves now to the war-party, and ministers were sent throughout Greece, wherever it might be thought a favorable disposition could be found or excited.

The embassy to Peloponnesus was committed to Æschines. It was a great point to gain the democratical Arcadians. The apprehended obstacle was their alliance with Thebes; against which however it might be hoped that the liberal friendliness, shown by Athens, among the late disturbances in Peloponnesus, at the risk of alienating Lacedæmon, its ally, would be considerably availing. The Arcadian general council, intitled the Ten Thousand, or the Numberless, was assembled at Megalopolis. Æschines, admitted to audience by it, inveighed strongly against the king of Macedonia, as aiming at the tyranny of Greece, and did not scruple, with the usual arrogance of ministers of the imperial republics, and the common illiberality of democratical orators, to impute corruption to those who should not support the propositions he recommended. But his persuasion and his menaces, as we find in his own confession, were ineffectual. The Arcadians persevered in their alliance with Thebes; nor had any of the Athenian ministers, sent to other states on the same business, any better success⁵.

It was meanwhile committed to Demosthenes to excite the people at home; and his abilities shone, with new splendor, in the orations remaining to us, distinguished, among the Philippics, by the title of

⁵ See the end of this section, p. 422, for a note on the subject of this embassy.

Olynthiac. In these orations he engaged in the bold attempt which, before his connection with Chares he had opposed, to persuade the Many to concede, for the purpose of war, that part of the public revenue, being the greatest part, which, with the title of theoric, was appropriated to the expences of theatrical entertainments, or distributions that might enable the poorest to find leisure for such entertainments. Much art was necessary to bring such a proposition before the people, so as to elude the law, denouncing death against any, who should move for the diversion of any part of the theoric revenue, to any other purpose than that to which it stood by law appropriated. But in such art, among other qualifications of a republican orator, Demosthenes excelled. Here however the question may occur, how it was that the party of the profligate Chares, the courtiers of the multitude, were those to put forward such a measure, and the party of the stern and virtuous Phocion to oppose it. The solution of the apparent prodigy is not difficult, tho, in the deficiency of history, our principal assistance is from the orator himself. Money, at any rate, was necessary to the purposes of the war-party. But, to those earnest for peace abroad and quiet at home, it was rather desirable that, while the professors of war and trouble could lead measures, they should want the means of war and trouble. These then, could they have money to maintain armaments, proposed to raise tribute, with which they might gratify the people, and have credit for the gratification: whereas the credit of gratification from the theoric money had gone all to the spendthrift orators, who had put forward the decrees for its appropriation; and thus deprived their successors of all means of popularity.

Another thing remarkable occurs in those orations. If the spirit of domination, the purpose of governing Greece, of making neighboring states tributary, should in prudence have been anywhere concealed among the great orator's speeches, in the Olynthiacs apparently it should especially have been so; yet it is prominent even there. Insult to the Macedonians, prince and people, should perhaps be expected from a democratical orator, before a democratical audience. 'The

Demosth.
Olynth. 3.
p. 36.

p. 45.

'Greeks'

Olynth.
p. 18.

'Greeks.' But he has not scrupled to hold out to the Olynthians themselves, Greeks unquestioned, from enemies recently become allies of Athens, what they were to expect: 'You,' he says to the Athenian people, 'were formerly lords of Olynthus, and of the country and cities 'around it.' Apparently the able orator and politician reckoned, that the advantage of the instigation to the Athenian Many would overbalance any inconvenience of disgust and offence to the Olynthians, who had placed themselves in circumstances so to want the support, which Athens alone could give.

* * The French translator Auger, in a note to Demosthenes's oration on the embassy, has given an account of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, and especially of his success, thus: 'Le peuple d'Athènes nomma des députés pour soulever la Grèce contre Philippe. Æschine, entr'autres, partit en Arcadie. Il assembla dix mille Arcadiens, & leur fit promettre de porter les armes contre le roi de Macédoine.' Where the learned translator found this promise reported I know not. Demosthenes says nothing of it, and the declaration of Æschines himself is explicit, that he had no success.

The assembling of the ten thousand Arcadians to make the promise, however, may (for the reason mentioned in a former note, the reputation of the writer) deserve some remark. Demosthenes, speaking of the mission of Æschines to Arcadia, has these words:—*τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ μακροὺς λόγους, οἷς ἐν ταῖς ΜΥΡΙΑΙΣ, ἐν Μεγάλῃ πόλει, ἐπὶ ὑμῶν ἔφη (ὁ Ἀισχίνης) διδημηγορηκέναι.* p. 344. which Auger has translated thus:—'les longs et beaux discours qu'il disoit avoir débités pour vous à Megalopolis, dans une assemblée nombreuse.' What is here, in the text of his translation, *une assemblée nombreuse*, is what is rendered, in his note before-mentioned, given for explanation of historical circumstances requisite for understanding the oration, the *dix mille Arcadiens*, who were made to promise to

carry arms against the king of Macedonia. One, more attentive to historical matter than Auger, having read Xenophon's Hellenics, if not intent upon the political institutions of the Grecian republics, might possibly have failed in recollection of what he would find there, that *οἱ Μύριοι* was the title of the sovereign assembly of the Arcadian democracy, whose seat of government was Megalopolis. But one, translating, and giving explanation in notes, like Auger, who could hardly be without recollection of many analogous titles occurring in Grecian history, the ten, the eleven, the thirty, the four hundred, the five hundred, and others, should apparently have gathered admonition from them to look about him a little for the import of *οἱ Μύριοι*.

This however is far from being so important as some other errors of the same learned translator and commentator, resulting apparently from rash carelessness. In Æschines's oration on the embassy is a catalogue of principal events in Athenian history, from the battle of Salamis to the orator's time. On this Auger says, 'Je voulois donner un récit abrégé des faits principaux, depuis la bataille de Salamine, jusqu' après la destruction de la tyrannie des Trente mais, en consultant l'histoire de ce temps là, j'ai vu si peu de conformité entre ce que rapportent les historiens, et ce que dit l'orateur, que j'ai renoncé à
à mon

'mon projet. Je n'ai pas entrepris de les concilier, ce qui seroit peut être impossible, & ce qui est d'ailleurs étranger à mon ouvrage.' The learned critic often speaks of *l'histoire*, as if that single word was a specific description of something with which all his readers should be acquainted; but I must own myself generally at a loss to know what he means by it. In the letter of Philip to the Athenians, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes, intitled 'On the Letter,' mention is made of the conquest of Amphipolis from the Persians, by Alexander son of Amyntas king of Macedonia, after the battle of Platæa. Auger, in his remarks on that letter, says very boldly to this: 'Philippe avance un fait qui n'a point de vraisemblance.—Aucun historien ne parle de victoire remportée sur les Perses par cet ancien Alexandre.—Il paroît qu'il profite de l'éloignement des temps pour avancer un fait des plus douteux, pour ne pas dire des plus faux.' Now it is remarkable enough that mention of that fact remains from Demosthenes, in two several orations, that against Aristocrates and that intitled *περὶ συντάξεως*, with these differences indeed from the account of the prince, to whom Auger has so boldly attributed falsehood, that the orator gives the principal merit to Perdicas, son of Alexander, and does not mention the place or places where the Persians were defeated, whereas Philip ascribes the command of the Macedonian forces to Alexander himself, and adds, that the territory of Amphipolis then fell under his power; which is also in every view probable, tho the name Amphipolis was not yet in use. Now translations of both these orations are found in Auger's publication, with passages relating the victory over the Persians fully and fairly rendered.

Auger indeed, with all his disposition to adventurous assertion, seems no pretender to learning that he has not. He makes light of the authority of Polybius, confessing that

he never read Polybius. If he ever read Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon with any attention, he would there, I am confident, find no deficiency of conformity with the summary of Æschines. I think he would have difficulty to find any in Diodorus. What may have been the historians then that deterred him from his projected abridgement of Grecian history, I must own myself at a loss to guess.

It has been a favorite fashion, among the French historical writers, to paint the characters of eminent men, without referring the reader to their actions. Opportunity is thus ready for saying smart things with little trouble. Whether the portrait resembles the prototype will be discovered only by those who will undertake laborious investigation. In this easy line Auger has shown himself ambitious of the reputation of fine writing. Among other characters, dispersed among his observations on the orators, he has given that of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, in his summary of the oration of Demosthenes for the Megalopolitans, thus: 'Archidame, roi de Sparte, étoit d'un caractère sombre, fourbe, intrigant, & brouillon.' The best authorities I am aware of to refer to for that prince's character, are Xenophon, Isocrates, and Diodorus; who concur, the two former in strong indication, the latter in express assertion, that it was completely the reverse of what the learned translator has asserted.

Nevertheless, while I warn against the errors, I desire to do justice to the merits of Auger. His translation, in general, as far as my experience of it goes, has deserved its reputation: even in remark he often shows candor; and, where knowledge already acquired has qualified him, he often shows judgement. But he has been too careless, very much too careless, of historical investigation, and not less over bold in hazarding remark.

SECTION II.

Olynthian War: Macedonian Olympic Festival: Apology for the Conduct of Chares: Macedonian Bribes.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 426.

THE eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares, the blazoned importance of the acquisition of Olynthus to the Athenian alliance, and the promise of great advantages to insure riches and glory to those of higher rank, and incalculable indulgencies to those of the lowest, appear to have produced an extraordinary zeal, among the Athenian people, for the prosecution of war against Macedonia. A force was decreed, such as never, since the fatal Sicilian expedition, had been sent on foreign service. Demosthenes states the army at fourteen thousand men, of whom four thousand were to be Athenian citizens. The amount of the naval force is not specified; but there seems to have been no limit proposed upon the utmost that the state could furnish and the service require. Some squadrons were already on foreign stations; one of thirty triremes, under the orders of Chares, lay in the ports of Athens. The equipment of many more was put forward, and to Chares was committed the command in chief, by sea and land.

Philoch. ap.
Dion. Hal.
in ep. ad
Amm.
B. C. 349.
Ch. 167. 4.

The promise of vigorous exertion, by Athens, appears to have led the Olynthians to hope that they should make the war, on their part, intirely offensive: invasion of the Macedonian provinces, before Philip could be duly prepared to oppose it, would, they trusted, secure their territory against the evils of becoming the seat of hostilities. The promptitude of Chares to sail with his ready squadron, went to confirm that hope. But they were greatly disappointed, on his arrival, to find that the troops he brought were only middle-armed mercenaries, in number two thousand; a force well enough suited to his usual purpose of plunder, but not to meet the Macedonian phalanx for the protection of the Olynthian territory. In much apprehension of the consequences
they

they sent remonstrance to Athens. Promises of native Athenian troops, heavy-armed and cavalry, were repeated. Charidemus, meanwhile, with eighteen triremes and four thousand men, joined Chares, but, excepting the small yet valuable force of a hundred and fifty horse, they were still only middle and light-armed.

The army thus collected, however, was ample for the kind of war which Chares desired to wage; and if it was the purpose, through predatory expeditions, to provide pay, or plunder, which might make foreign service palatable to the four thousand citizens voted for it, the plan seems to have been well concerted. The king of Macedonia was not prepared for this new war. His country was open on the side of the Olynthian territory; and Chares overran and plundered the bordering province of Bottiæa, with little or no opposition. It was late in the season before the Macedonian forces could be collected, at a point whence operations might be advantageously begun. Chares was already withdrawn. Philip then entered the Olynthian territory. He advanced into the peninsula of Sithonia, where many of the towns, tho of the Olynthian confederacy, were more disposed to the Macedonian alliance than the Athenian. As he proceeded through the country their ready allegiance was accepted. The fortress of Zeira, resisting, was taken by storm. Diod. l. 16.

Chares meanwhile, with a fleet that commanded the sea, and a light landforce, could chuse his point of attack, and make his retreat sure. In the fruitful peninsula of Pallênë, the richest territory of the Olynthian confederacy, the disposition prevailed, hardly less than in Sithonia, to prefer the Macedonian alliance. Not unskilfully then pursuing his plan, he landed where about eight hundred men in arms only could be collected to oppose him, and yet were rash enough, for the protection of their property, to stand an action. Overbearing them with superior force, killing some, putting the rest to flight, he raised his trophy in assertion of victory. Contributions were then raised or booty taken in considerable amount, and a large distribution to the armament made all highly satisfied with the success of the campaign.

*Philoc. ut
ant. & Theo-
pomp. ap.
Athen. l. 12.
p. 534.*

Chares returning to Athens, the people were assembled, as usual, to hear the general's report. He delivered an account of an expedition of uninterrupted success, and of a glorious battle, in which the troops had shown the greatest valor. Confirming testimony did not fail from those who had served and profited under him. But to make his interest with the Many sure, he gave a feast to the whole people. The expence is said to have been sixty talents, about twelve thousand pounds sterling; not furnished from his private purse, or from the profits of his command, or from the Athenian treasury, but from the Delphian treasury; being extorted from the Phocians, to whom the favor of men powerful among the sovereign Many of Athens was at this time very important. But, if neither the cost of the feast, nor the manner of supplying it, have been exactly known to the cotemporary author, from whom we have the account, yet he was in a situation to know what was reported on best authority, and all is consistent with the most authoritative remaining accounts, indeed to all remaining, of the conduct and character of Chares⁶.

While the armament was gratified, and the Athenian people cajoled, the Olynthians remained very uneasy. The wintery season would afford a temporary relief, but the war had been hitherto not prosperous. A part of the enemy's country indeed had been plundered. Far however from succeeding in their hope of confining hostilities to the enemy's territory, far even from compelling the refractory members of their confederacy to join them in the Athenian alliance, many of those before wavering, had been confirmed in the Macedonian cause by the ready protection of the Macedonian arms; and, with the return of spring, stronger exertion must be expected from the known activity and vigor of Philip. In much anxiety therefore they sent a third remonstrance and petition to Athens, urging the early supply of the better kind of

⁶ The word of Theopompus alone is not very high authority. But the account of Philochorus has evidently been selected by Dionysius as that which he esteemed the most authentic and exact in his time extant; and tho the extract preserved to us from Philochorus by Dionysius, does not give the particulars in the extract from Theopompus by Athenæus, yet the two harmonize.

auxiliary force, which had been promised, and deprecating that neglect and tardiness, through which those faithful allies of Athens, the Me-
Philoch. ut ant.
 thonæans, had been ruined.

The war-party would not be wanting in disposition to support the Olynthians against Macedonia; but so to support them that, at the conclusion of the war, they should remain strong enough to refuse tribute and obedience to Athens, would have been against their principles of policy, which their great orator has clearly and repeatedly indicated. Nevertheless, as the approaching exertion of Macedonia would probably far overmatch the unassisted strength of Olynthus, divided as it was within itself, the eloquence of Demosthenes and the influence of Chares were exerted, to excite the Athenian people to energy. So they succeeded, that two thousand heavy-armed, and three hundred horse, all Athenian citizens, or passing for such, embarked to reinforce the army before employed, and Chares remained
B. C. 348.
 Cl. 108. 1.
 commander-in-chief⁷.

Meanwhile Philip had brought together, on the Olynthian border, an army that Chares, with perhaps no more than reasonable prudence avoided to meet. A knowledge of the inclination toward the Macedonian connection and aversion to the Athenian, which we find Demosthenes himself avowing to have prevailed among all ranks, in the towns of the Olynthian confederacy, appears to have decided the king of Macedonia's course, which was again directed into Sithonia. Mecyberna, within a few miles of Olynthus, opened its
Demosth. de legat. p. 426.
 Diocl. l. 16. c. 53.
 gates to him, and Toronë, at the farther end of the peninsula, declared for his cause. Two principal places, so situated, being gained, the whole came easily under his power.

The Olynthians then, apprehending not only farther defection of their confederate towns, but the usual destruction of Grecian warfare to their own property, even to the walls of Olynthus, unless they took the field in its defence, resolved to risk a battle. Some reinforcement

⁷ This expedition is referred by Diodorus to the same archonship of Athens as that before reported; but probably the winter passed between them, the new archons entering on office about midsummer.

of Athenian troops, perhaps all the heavy-armed and horse, had joined them; but Chares persevered in his usual employment, with his fleet and large force of light troops. Nor indeed might this be wholly unnecessary toward the subsistence of all. Nevertheless a single defeat did not deter the Olynthians and their Athenian associates: they ventured upon a second battle; but, being again defeated, their walls became, of severe necessity, their refuge. The remaining towns of their confederacy then so hastened to make terms with the conqueror, that, in the complaining phrase of Demosthenes, he was at a loss whither to give his first attention⁸.

The situation of those who held the lead in Olynthus, always dangerous from the strength of the adverse party among their fellow-citizens, became, through this rapid defection of the confederate towns, together with the successes of the foreign enemy, precarious in extreme. Philip, master of nearly their whole territory, approached the city with the purpose of laying siege to it, and incamped at the distance of five miles. Ruin now so nearly threatening, they sent to him, expressing their desire to enter into treaty. He gave for answer 'that it was too late: he had before abundantly and repeatedly expressed his earnestness to treat; but now it was become too evident that there was but one alternative; they must quit Olynthus, or he Macedonia.'

Demosth.
Philip. p. 3.
p. 113.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 426.

According to Demosthenes, the whole force voted by the Athenian people for the Olynthian war, four thousand citizens, and ten thousand hired troops, was now actually employed on that service. The Olynthians therefore, tho no more venturing to keep the field, resolved to defend their walls. What proportion of the Athenian army was in the garrison we do not learn. But the force that might have sufficed to make the siege tedious, or its issue doubtful, had there been unanimity among the Olynthians, did not suffice to restrain the disaffected, but possibly contributed to increase and sharpen the disaffection. Five hundred Olynthian horse, perhaps nearly the whole of the effective cavalry of the state, went off in a body, with their arms, and surrendered themselves to the king of Macedo-

Demosth. de
legat. p. 426.

⁸ 'Οὐδ' ἔρχομαι εἰς τὴν πρῶτον λέξιν. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

nia⁹. So far was the Athenian party, with all the assistance of the Athenian troops in the garrison, from being able to take measures for preventing farther desertion of the same kind, that Apollonides, who, for his zeal in the Athenian cause had received the honor of the freedom of Athens, and, for the same zeal, had been raised to the chief command of the very cavalry that had deserted, was obliged to seek his own safety by flight from Olynthus. Euthycrates and Lasthenes, men zealous in the Macedonian cause, were then raised, by the popular vote, to the chief command in military, and chief direction in civil affairs; apparently for the very purpose of surrendering the place to the king of Macedonia. It was trusted that they would obtain terms more favorable for the numerous citizens always well disposed to the Macedonian connection, or little forward against it, than their predecessors were either able to obtain, or desirous that those citizens should receive.

Demosth.
or. in Nær.
p. 1376.

The surrender of the place quickly following, the king of Macedonia proceeded immediately to the measure which the interest of his kingdom, not less than his own interest, imperiously required, the abolition of a republic on its coast, balancing between dependency upon Macedonia for protection against the claimed dominion of Athens, and subjection to Athens, which would involve extreme hazard for the independency of Macedonia. Support wholly fails, among the orators of the day, for the report of the annalist of three centuries after, that he plundered the town and sold the inhabitants for slaves. But if there was some condemnation to slavery, or confiscation of property, of persons who had made themselves obnoxious, by treachery or violence toward the order of things existing before the connection with Athens,

Diod. l. 16.
c. 53.

⁹ Πειλοκοῦντες ἰππίας προδοῦντας ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων, ἔλαβεν αὐτοῖς ὅπλας ὁ Φίλιππος, ὅσους οὐκ εἶς πώποτε ἄλλος ἔειδεν. Demosth. de legat. p. 426. That the interpretation of this, given in the text, is the truth, what follows in the text, let out by the same orator, in another oration, clearly proves. The complex story which Leland, in his life of Philip, has wound out of this short passage of Demosthenes, is a curious instance whether of indulgence to his own ingenuity,

or deference to his more ingenious French guide, having never met with Olivier's work, I cannot tell. Leland appears to have been a man of learning; and, where he would exercise his own judgement, he has sometimes shown judgement; but his deference to his French predecessor is extravagant. The name of Olivier, frequently quoted by him as authority with Thucydides, Xenophon and Demosthenes, is even ridiculous.

the cotemporary orators possibly may have omitted notice of it, because it was so familiar among the Athenians, who would certainly have done as much or more against a town surrendered to their arms, under similar circumstances. We find indeed Demosthenes endeavoring to persuade the Athenian Many, that the very persons, who, in the phrase of the party, betrayed the city to the king of Macedonia, were those whom he particularly ill treated; nor is this said of Olynthus only, but Amphipolis also and other places. That those who had once served him well may afterward have grossly-abused his confidence, and merited his resentment, is certainly possible, tho no account of it remains. But to represent a prince as the deepest politician of his own or any other age, gaining more by intrigue and bribery than any other ever gained, and yet commonly ill using his agents, is an extravagance which Demosthenes has evidently feared to offer in direct terms even to the Athenian multitude. With consummate art he has indeed so thrown it out, that whether his words were taken for more or less, he could not be convicted of any positive falsehood; and whatever were his success at the time, with posterity it has been great; following writers have made the most of it¹⁰.

So very important an acquisition as Olynthus, with all the towns of its confederacy and their territories, by which all the coast, from Thessaly to Athos, was restored or added to the Macedonian kingdom, long nearly excluded from the sea by numerous republican settlements, was thought an advantage, for prince and people, deserving peculiar celebration. Philip revived, on the occasion, and celebrated with increased splendor, the Olympian festival, instituted or restored by his great predecessor Archelaus. Theatrical performances seem to have been eminent among the entertainments, and for these he collected the most eminent actors and artists throughout Greece. His hospitality was

Ch. 34. .
of this Hist.

¹⁰ Possibly the story told by Diodorus may have been meerly a licentious paraphrase of an expression of Demosthenes in his second Philippic, *προδοθέντες ὑπ' ἀλλήλων (ἢ οὐκ ἴδιαι) καὶ πρᾶθεντες*. The orator has meant here to maintain no more than that the Olynthians sold one another; that is,

betrayed the public cause for private interest. But if any of his hearers, or readers, might chuse to take it that the Olynthians were sold to actual slavery by Philip, he would not probably have objected, provided he were not himself to answer for the falsehood.

magnificent,

magnificent, and amid this, his singular talent for conversation and behavior, ingaging at the same time and dignified, greatly extended his popularity.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 401.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 55.

Meanwhile, at Athens, it was the pressing business of Chares and his party to reconcile the people, if possible, to so disappointing and distressing a result of measures from which so much advantage had been promised. Chares was, in usual course, to report to the assembled people the circumstances of his command, and, with the assistance of friends, to represent them so that he might obtain the requisite vote of Euthynë, acquittal from blame, or, in our law-phrase, his quietus. His friends, however, could not venture to contend that there was no misconduct. Demosthenes, in general terms, imputed the inefficiency of the great force under his command, to nameless inferiors. Under such a commander-in-chief probably there would be misconduct among inferiors. Numerous, and perhaps powerful families would thus be interested in having those obnoxious to the imputation remain unnamed; and of course interested in having the commander-in-chief escape the prosecution, to which so many of his betters, in various ages of the republic, had been victims. Possibly it was to this that another general, Cephisodotus, adverted, when, as Aristotle reports, he said, ‘Chares and his friends begin with putting the people in a state of suffocation, and then desire their votes.’

Demosth. de
legat. p. 447.

Aristot.
Rhet. l. 3.
c. 10.

The warmest partizans of Chares, indeed, must have found cause for much dissatisfaction with his conduct. But they appear to have seen all remaining hope of success for their ambition depending upon his support; and perhaps no small danger for their fortunes, and even their persons, involved with his fall. Their exertions for him therefore were neither faint, nor ill-imagined, nor ineffectual. To divert the public mind from the conduct of their own officers, they sedulously directed it to that of the Olynthians, concerning which fiction might be better ventured. Endeavoring to conceal that a large part of the Olynthian people was always adverse to the Athenian connection, they imputed mismanagement of the Olynthian affairs, and at length the surrender of the city, intirely to the treachery of the chiefs, and the effect

effect of Macedonian bribes¹¹. And such was the fascination of their eloquence, but eminently that of Demosthenes, which, even in the dead letter has remained, not only the admiration of all posterity, but the persuasive of a large proportion, that Macedonian gold has become a kind of classical phrase for successful bribery. For, after the establishment of the Roman empire, when literature shone with the brightest midday lustre, while the sun of freedom sunk to lasting night, and discussion and animadversion on existing political interests were denied to the whole civilized world, men of letters, when they desired to interest the feelings of the prostrate nations in the political state of things, resorted to materials furnished by Greece; and the poets especially used the poetical licence, for dressing these in a way to suit the purpose before them. If then bribery was the subject, gold was to be the material. But Demosthenes, tho we find him sometimes venturing far, did not hope for success in such imposition, even upon the Athenian multitude. It was enough known that Macedonia, tho greatly raised in power, and rapidly thriving in circumstances, was yet a poor country, and to talk of Macedonian gold, as all-powerful, would have been considered as irony. Necessarily speaking of things as they were in his day, his enumeration of bribes, to which the loss of Olynthus was to be attributed, can hardly fail now to excite wonder; cows, horses, sheep, timber! ‘Lasthenes,’ he says, ‘repaired his house with timber, given ‘from Macedonia; Euthycrates had a large herd of cattle, for which ‘he never paid anybody; another got sheep, another horses¹².’

It

¹¹ Where the same object was not in view, Demosthenes has acknowledged that, in Olynthus and throughout the confederacy, the body, even of the lower people, were suspicious of the Athenians, and inclined to confide in the Macedonians: ‘Οι

πολλοὶ τούτους πισοτέρους ἡγήσαντο. De legat. p. 425.

¹² Λαοβίους μὲν ἤρπει τὴν οὐκίαν τοῖς ἐκ Μακεδονίας διδουσι ξύλοις, Εὐθυκράτης δὲ βοῦς ἔτριφε πολλὰς, τιμὴν αὐτὸν δοῦς, ἕτερος δὲ τις ἔκειν ἔχων προβάτα, ἄλλος δὲ τις ἵππους. Demosth. de legat. p. 426.

Oh that such bulky bribes as all might see,
Still, as of old, incumber'd villainy!
Could France or Rome divert our brave designs
With all their brandies, or with all their wines?

A states-

It cannot be doubted but that, if it was an object for Philip to purchase goodwill anywhere, it was singularly so at Olynthus, and there evidently he did think it an object. His cession of the city of Anthemus, when he first formed alliance with Olynthus, was, in some sort, a bribe to the whole Olynthian people, a mode of purchasing their goodwill: but it differed from proper bribery; it was not a clandestine transaction, but open and avowed; nor was it disgraceful on either side; on the contrary it was creditable to both. So it is possible that Lasthenes, Euthykrates, and other Olynthians, may have received favors openly from Philip, and the very favors stated by Demosthenes. The Olynthian territory being probably cleared, like the country on the coast of North America, grants of timber from the Macedonian forests, nearest to Olynthus, may have been made to more than one person. But if bribery, in the stricter sense, was the common weapon of the Macedonian court, and a weapon that could be certainly effectual, for any great purpose, apparently it should have been so to prevent the revolution in Olynthus; nor, had it been applied in the amount,

A statesman's slumber how this speech would spoil!
 Sir, Spain has sent a thousand jars of oil;
 Huge bales of British cloth blockade the door;
 A hundred oxen at your levy roar.

Pope's Moral Essays, Ep. 3.

It has been said that the poet and the romance-writer are, in one point, restricted within narrower bounds than the historian: he may relate any truth, however prodigious, but they must confine themselves to probability. Our moral bard might seem to have had this rule, and Demosthenes's account of Macedonian bribes, together in view; and so, timber appearing too extra-

vagant for poetry, in modern times, he has substituted oil and cloth. But then the romance-writer and the poet have a great advantage on the other side; for they may relate anything which, according to the ideas of their age, may pass for probable, putting truth wholly out of the question. Hence then it is that we have Horace's

Diffidit urbium

*Portas vir Macedo, et subruit æmulos
 Reges numeribus.* Od. 16.

And Juvenal's

Callidus emptor Olynthi. sat. 12.

It is remarkable that all Dacier's learning could lead him to no older authority for his poet's assertion, of a kind to satisfy him, than Valerius Maximus. He drops then

down to Plutarch, Justin, Orosius. The advocate's speeches probably he did not, with his fellowcountryman Rollin, think evidence quite conclusive in the cause.

and with the skill and unscrupulousness, indicated by later writers, does it appear what, but higher bribery, more skilfully or unscrupulously managed on the other side, should so effectually have counterwrought it. We may then perhaps reasonably give credit to Demosthenes for the bribery practised at Olynthus, as far as his statement of facts goes: we may allow that Lasthenes had a present of timber, and Eurysthenes of cows, and that some other persons, too obscure to be named, or, for the value of the present, or whatever other reason, not suiting the orator's purpose to name, received sheep and horses. We may go farther; for all accounts indicate that Philip's liberality was universal, his generosity bordering upon extravagance; that he desired to found both his power and his fame upon his philanthropy, and his talent for conciliating the minds of men. Taking this under the description of bribery, indeed his whole course was a system of bribery. That, among a people so corrupt as Demosthenes himself has described those of the Grecian republics universally, bribery, in the proper sense of the word, bribery and corruption would be occasionally practised on all sides, may perhaps reasonably enough be supposed; but no remaining authority will warrant the modern historian in imputing the fall of Olynthus to dishonorable conduct of Philip, or of his partizans.

SECTION III.

New Measures of the War-party at Athens: Revolution in Phocis: Licentiousness of Chares in military Command: Uneasiness of the public Mind at Athens: Disposition of the War-party to treat for Peace: Mission of the player Aristodemus to Macedonia: Counter-revolution in Phocis: Coalition of Parties at Athens: Embassy of Ten from Athens to Macedonia.

THE annihilation of such a state as Olynthus, with its confederacy, on the Macedonian coast, and the annexation of its cultivated peninsulas and commercial towns to the Macedonian kingdom, under a wise prince, and a free and beneficent constitution, made a great change in the
relative

relative weight of that kingdom, and in the balance of power among the states around the Ægean sea. The circumstances were of deep concern for all Greece; but the immediate blow was only to the war-party at Athens, and for them it was great and alarming. Not only the valued and boasted opportunity, acquired by the alliance of Olynthus, for offensive, perhaps destructive, measures against Macedonia, was undone, but opportunity was greatly increased for Macedonia to attack all the Athenian dependencies in Thrace. The miserable pageant, therefore, of a successor to the once great monarchs of that country, Kersobleptes, holding his curtailed dominion in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, and compelled to join them in the war against Macedonia, trembled for the small share of sovereignty remaining to him. The Athenian colonists in the Chersonese, tho promised effectual support, nevertheless saw the situation of things around them with much anxiety. What were the circumstances of that most interesting appendage of the antient dominion of Athens, Eubœa, is hardly at all indicated, farther than that its troubles, if ever composed through the expedition of Phocion, had broken out afresh. But when the party of Chares recovered a decisive preponderance in Athens, those adverse to it in Eubœa would of course endeavor again to obtain the patronage of Macedonia; for which the disposition was such that the Athenian interest was again overthrown. Philip, however, it is evident, did not propose to use these advantages against Athens, if in Athens might be found a disposition to peace with him. On the contrary, he not only did not interfere to prevent the party friendly to him, in the Eubœan cities, from coming to an accommodation with Athens, but he authorized their deputies, going to Athens to negotiate for themselves, to declare his readiness also to make peace with the Athenian people. The Eubœan ministers executed their commission; but the war-party, still prevailing, were not yet so disposed that any treaty resulted.

Æsch. de legat. p. 196.

Shortly after, however, a private interest produced what had been on public considerations, or the pretence of them, denied. Phrynnon, an Athenian of eminence, having been made prisoner by a Macedonian cruizer, had purchased his dismissal. Returning to Athens, he complained that, against the common law of the Greeks, he had been taken during the Olympian armistice. Were the insulting language of the

Ol. 108.

war-party orators, and especially Demosthenes, calling the Macedonians, and Philip himself, barbarians, warranted by the practice or avowed tenets of the Athenian government, the Athenians could have apparently little right to claim from them any respect for the Olympian armistice. The savage decree, forbidding the entrance of a herald from Macedonia upon the Athenian territory, remained in force; yet such was the confidence of Phrynon in the liberality of the Macedonian government, that he desired to go himself to Pella to claim repayment of his ransom. For this, however, leave from his jealous sovereign, the people, must be solicited; and, to put forward with more authority and effect his private business, he desired to be vested with a public character. The people granted his request; but democratical jealousy rarely trusting a single minister to a foreign government, Ctesiphon, a friend of Demosthenes, was joined in the commission with him. Whether the party began to apprehend difficulties insuperable in their project of building their greatness on opposition to Macedonia, and already entertained the opposite project of supplanting the party of Phocion and Isocrates in favor with the Macedonian court, or whether their purpose was merely speculation and the acquisition of information for ground of farther measures, in any case to have a minister, in whom they confided, go to Macedonia, would be desirable for them. The embassy however was instructed to inquire concerning the king of Macedonia's disposition toward peace. On their return, Ctesiphon, reporting the transactions to the council and people, said that Philip declared it had been against his inclination that he had gone to war, and he was ready immediately to treat of peace; and this assurance the ambassador strengthened, by speaking largely of the king's liberal disposition and manners¹³. Great satisfaction being manifested by the people, Philocrates, a man eminent and zealous in the peace-party, seized the opportunity for proposing a decree, to rescind that which forbade the admission of heralds from Macedonia; and it was carried without a dissentient voice. What were the considerations which induced the war-party, almost immediately after, so

¹³ It has been a question among the critics whether Phrynon and Ctesiphon were commissioned together, or Ctesiphon alone very little important; but it appears to me that the combined phrases *πρεσβύτες δ' ἑμῶν* and *προσέλασθ' αὐτῷ* clearly indicate that they were joined in the commission.

to exert themselves for the prevention of all treaty, that not a step was taken in consequence of the opening, so studiously procured, and without opposition voted, is nowhere said, but apparently may be gathered from the circumstances quickly following.

Æschin. de
legat. p. 198.

Peace with Macedonia, however necessary for the republic, however necessary for the war-party themselves, would bring ruin to their power, unless they might be the peace-makers, and afterward hold such consideration with the Macedonian government, that its communication with the sovereign, the people, for the mutual concerns of the two states, should pass through them. But Philip was stedly in his preference of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and therefore the war-party persevered in obstructing all accommodation with him. Among the complicated politics of Greece, then, their keen sight discovered opportunity, little discernible to the common eye. In Phocis, through the overbearing weight of the standing army, of which the autocrator-generals had now so long held the command, an effectual change had been wrought in the civil constitution of the country; whence we find those great officers sometimes qualified with the title of tyrant. When the change took place is not indicated, farther than as we find Onomarchus raising the mercenary force to an amount unknown, either before or after him, and engaging in projects of ambition, far beyond the strength, and not very evidently adapted to promote the interest, of the Phocian people. The present youthful autocrator, Phalæcus, equal perhaps in courage, and perhaps in talents, wanted the authority of years, and the advantage of experience, which had inabled his father and uncles to hold their arduous situation so advantageously. Hence, rather than from any misconduct, of which information has reached us, a party was inabled to rear its head against him. That party then in Athens, the party of Chares, which had held intimate connection, and been deeply engaged in politics, with his father Onomarchus, gave encouragement and support, now, to the party adverse to the son. Apparently he declined engaging in their views, to the extent they required: possibly he had connection with their adversaries, and preferred that connection. He had certainly connection with Lacedæmon, which would tend to render him less dependent than they desired

p. 300.

desired upon themselves. If then they could raise his opponents to the supreme power in Phocis, as Phocis could not maintain itself without forein connections, those men, so raised, must afterward be dependent upon them, for means to hold their power. Of particulars of the revolution we have no information; but Phalæcus was deposed, the supreme authority in Phocis was committed to a triumvirate, and the new government immediately sent an embassy to Athens. The party of Chares and Demosthenes received these ambassadors favorably, and they were introduced to the general assembly, to declare the object of their mission; which was to obtain the authority of the Athenian people for a transfer, to the new Phocian government, of the friendship and alliance which had subsisted with that recently overthrown. The people were accustomed to hear, and very ready to believe, that, in political morality, whatever was profitable was becoming. A bribe therefore was ready: it was proposed that three Phocian towns, Nicæa, Thronium, and Alponus, small and of little value otherwise, but highly important for their critical situation, commanding the way from the pass of Thermopylæ into the country southward, should receive Athenian garrisons. This was most important for the purposes of the war-party leaders, but little inviting for the Many; as revenue to arise from this new dominion could not be pretended. Motives for desire therefore being deficient, another passion was resorted to. Greece was represented in danger of subjugation, from the arms of Macedonia, if Athens did not prevent. The result shows that arguments were ably adapted to the temper of those, on whom it was proposed to work. The offer of the new Phocian government was accepted; and such was the zeal excited, that fifty triremes were directed, by a decree, to be immediately manned, and all citizens under thirty to be ready in arms, to march or imbark, at the command of Proxenus, who was appointed general for the occasion. Some of the more intemperate then went so far as to institute a prosecution against Philocrates, for the crime of proposing the decree, which abrogated that forbidding the admission of heralds from Macedonia; and the penalty was set at a hundred talents, near twenty thousand pounds. It appears however to have been judged, by the more discreet, not to have been a season for

Æsch. de legat. p. 301.

p. 198.

such violent party-measures. Demosthenes himself undertook the defence of Philocrates; and the prosecutor not obtaining a fifth of the voices of the court, became liable himself to the penalty decreed against frivolous and vexatious accusation. The account however rather implies that this was not insisted upon by Philocrates and his friends, so that, in fact, the matter was compromised; and some reason for this moderation of the war-party seems to appear in what followed.

The general-autocrator, Chares, was absent, with the fleet and mercenary army, supposed on the Thracian station; where it was particularly expected of him to protect the valuable colony of the Chersonese. But deputies arrived from that colony, charged to express the extreme uneasiness of the settlers, at the defenceless state in which they were left, when it was understood a Macedonian army was approaching; and the great armament under Chares, on which they had depended for protection, not only had not been seen, but could not be heard of. The terror, less perhaps of subjection to Macedonia, than of the vengeance of the late proprietors of their lands and houses, for which the approach of a Macedonian army might give encouragement, had been such, that some of them had already embarked, to seek, with the loss of their landed estates, better safety for their persons and portable property.

Æsch. de legat. p. 251.

These circumstances excited indignation, which the friends of Chares had difficulty to meet. The people assembled; and while, with much anger demonstrated, no specific proposition found any extensive concurrence, one of the intimates of Chares, Cephisophon, moved that a small squadron, under the command of Antiochus, kept in the harbour of Piræus purposely for emergencies, should go in quest of the autocrator and his fleet, and bring an account of them. This was adopted as the fittest measure in the moment, and the public effervescence was thus suspended.

It appears extraordinary, in the deficiency of our information, that men so able, so daring, so indefatigable, and so unscrupulous as those who now principally directed the political business of Athens, should have judged it expedient to support, in so high a situation, one whose glaring misconduct was so continually thwarting their purposes. But Chares, with all his vices and extravagances, was evidently not without considerable

considerable talents, peculiarly adapted to hold that paramount influence which, according to all accounts, he did long hold, among such a military, and such a populace as the Athenian; whence he was necessary to those to whom the goodwill of the army and the multitude was necessary. But in addition to this we have the concurring testimonies of the two great rival orators, Demosthenes and Æschines, to other considerations. Contributions were collected by the officers of the fleet, regularly assessed on the islanders, not with public authority, or for public purposes; amounting, according to Æschines, to sixty talents, near twelve thousand pounds yearly; and the trade of all Greece was subjected to plunder, and the persons of Grecian navigators to violence, from those officers. There were those even who undertook to prove, that, in the course of his various commands, Chares raised, in various ways, no less than fifteen hundred talents, near three hundred thousand pounds, not accounted for in the maintenance of the armament, but distributed among his favorite officers and supporting orators. Where or how Chares was employed when Antiochus was sent to seek him, we have no other information than may be implied in these reports of the two great orators.

Demosth. de
Cherson.
Æsch. de le-
gat. p. 250.

But circumstances were, in too many points, critical and threatening, for the public mind to rest in the calm produced, for the moment, by the decree of Cephisophon. Æschines marks the trouble and indecision of the time, by observing, that the extraordinary assemblies convened were more numerous than the ordinary, required for the whole business of the commonwealth. In the midst of this agitation, suddenly, a surprising disposition appeared, among those hitherto most violent against Macedonia, to relax in their opposition, and admit accommodation. Readily as this was met by the other party, difficulties occurred about the manner and means of opening a negotiation. The savage decree, indeed, forbidding all communication by heralds was repealed: but the king of Macedonia's overtures, made through the Eubœan ministers, had been answered only with invective, by the leading orators in the assembly, and with neglect by the administration; and the following mission of Phrynon and Ctesiphon had produced nothing. A direct proposal of peace therefore was avoided; but it

Æsch. de le-
gat. p. 251.

was

was resolved to use opportunity, accidentally offering, for learning the disposition of the Macedonian court. Among many Athenians, made prisoners at Olynthus, were two of eminence, Everatus and Stratocles. Æsch. de legat. p. 200. It was proposed to negotiate specially for their ransom: but for this the authority of the sovereign people must be obtained. Philocrates, the mover of the repeal of the decree forbidding communication with Macedonia, now moved a decree to authorize a mission for negotiating the ransom of the prisoners. Against all common expectation, Demosthenes exerted his eloquence in support of the motion, which was thus readily successful.

The person chosen, for the delicate office of sounding the king of Macedonia, was a player, named Aristodemus. His profession, even in Athens, amid the singular passion there for the entertainment it afforded, is indicated by Demosthenes to have been esteemed degrading. Demosth. de cor. p. 288. & al. Aristodemus however was recommended, not simply by his talents, tho above the common, but by having, through his talents, recommended himself to the notice and favor of the king of Macedonia, when exercising his profession formerly at Pella. He was not long absent on his mission; but his report to the council, which should have been made immediately on his return, was irregularly delayed. Æsch. de legat. p. 201. Meanwhile Stratocles, liberally dismissed without ransom, coming home, reported publicly, that the king of Macedonia had freely assured him of his desire of peace, and that he was ready even to confirm peace by alliance. The council then, in some anger, sent for their loitering minister; who, after a lame apology for his delay, made his report of Philip's professions, perfectly coinciding with what had been related by Stratocles. He was afterward, according to the usual form, introduced by the council to the assembled people, to whom he gave the same account. Some ill humor was manifested, there also, at the irregular delay of information, for which the public mind was so anxious; yet Demosthenes did not fear to move, that the honor of a crown, to be presented by the people, should reward the able and successful execution of the important mission; and it was accordingly decreed to Aristodemus.

The disposition of the Macedonian king, toward an accommodation, being thus authenticated, a day was appointed for an assembly to take

Æsch. de legat. p. 303.

the matter into consideration. On that very day dispatches arrived from the general Proxenus, or not till that day were acknowledged, informing the council, ' that the Phocians refused to deliver the places ' of which he was sent to take possession ; that Phalæcus and his party, ' again predominant in Phocis, had imprisoned the ambassadors of the ' new government of that country, who had conducted the treaty at ' Athens, and so resented the conduct of the Athenian government, ' that they had gone to the extremity of denying hospitality to the ' heralds, sent from Athens, according to antient custom, to proclaim ' the season of the Eleusinian mysteries, and even refused the truce, ' offered to all, on that solemn occasion.'

The cause of the new disposition of the party of Chares to peace was now explained. They had not been without information that the new government of Phocis would probably be unable to support itself; and yet they would not, while a chance of success remained, forego the advantages of the measures they had taken. The ill-excused delay of Aristodemus, in reporting to the council, the zeal shown in his favor by Demosthenes, who was a member of the council, the critical arrival of the dispatches from Proxenus, the general of their choice, combined with the unremitted vehemence of their former opposition to Macedonia, and the suddenness of the change, indicated enough that the party were temporizing; nor could it be doubted but, had the Phocian plot been finally successful, they would have opposed, not less than formerly, all proposal of peace. When therefore not only the failure of all advantage, expected from their measures, was complete, but the great and threatening disadvantage accrued to Athens, that Phocis, from a steadily and zealous ally, was become an incensed enemy, accommodation, if yet possible, with Macedonia, seems to have been the only resource for either the party or the republic¹⁴.

Ordinary men would have been overwhelmed by the failure of a plot of such scandalous perfidy, involving such disaster and danger to the

¹⁴ The caution and shifts of Demosthenes afterward to avoid argument on such important transactions, so connected with his main argument, especially in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, strongly corroborate all that has been asserted by Æschines. See particularly Demosth. de legat. p. 362.

commonwealth. But the party of Chares, men certainly of no ordinary talents, were also fortunate, in that their principal opponents were remarkable for moderation, as they for boldness in politics. To forward their anxious purpose of peace, the friends of Phocion and Isocrates did not refuse a degree of coalition with the party of Chares; and treaty with Macedonia became the object of all.

Æsch. de legat. ant. & de cor. p. 450.

Some degree of concert was evidently already established between the leaders of the contending parties, when, on the motion of Philocrates, a decree was made for sending an embassy of ten to Macedonia. The commission comprized persons of both parties, and appears to have been altogether respectably filled. Six of the names have already occurred for notice, Ctesiphon, Philocrates, Phrynon, Aristodemus, Æschines, Demosthenes; the three former eminent by birth and fortune, the others by talents. To these were added Cimon, head of the illustrious house of Miltiades, with Iatrocles, Nausicles, and Dercyllus, who had held high situations. But a difficulty arose with regard to Aristodemus: he was engaged, after the manner of theatrical management in modern Europe, under a penalty, to perform at public festivals in different cities. Such however was the estimation of the man, notwithstanding the disrepute of his profession, that Demosthenes did not scruple to be the mover of a decree for a mission to the several states, to which he had bound himself, to solicit, in the name of the Athenian people, a release from his engagements. An eleventh ambassador was added, Aglaocreon of Tenedos, for all the subject-allies of Athens, whose interests were to be implicated in the proposed negotiation; not chosen by themselves, but appointed by the imperial people.

Æsch. de legat. p. 202.

p. 204.

SECTION IV.

Progress of the Embassy to Pella: Audience: Return and Report to the Council and People. Policy of the War-party: Condition of Synedrian or Subject-Allies. Embassy of Three from Macedonia to Athens. Decree for Peace and Alliance with Macedonia. Treatment of the King of Thrace. Departure of the Macedonian Ministers from Athens.

B. C. 347. THE circumstances of the embassy being decreed, a herald was sent
 Ol. 108. 2. into Macedonia for a passport, for which however the ambassadors did not wait to begin their journey. In Thessaly a Macedonian army was blockading Halus; whose people, whether more through attachment to the party of the late tyrants, or incitement from Athens, or meer enmity to the Pharsalians, who asserted some claim of dominion over them, had rebelled against the common government of the country. Such however was the confidence of the Athenian ambassadors in the liberality and honor of the Macedonian government, that they did not scruple to pass through the Macedonian camp. Respected, as they had promised themselves, there, they proceeded to Larissa, a city zealous in the Macedonian alliance, where they met their herald, bearing the requisite authority, with which they proceeded to Pella.

Demosth.
de legat.

Æsch. de le-
gat. p. 207.
Isocr. or. ad
Phil.

Immediate deputies of a multitude, they appear to have received no precise instructions: under terror of their despotic and wayward sovereign, they were to be careful to promote, at every opportunity, the interest of the Athenian people. Among matters, however, which they seem to have considered as most particularly expected of them, was to use their endeavors for obtaining the cession of Amphipolis. To offer any advantage for Macedonia, in return, appears to have been out of question; only, as a supposed private gratification for the prince, they might ingage for the restoration of Leosthenes, an illustrious Athenian exile, esteemed among the most eloquent men of the age, who had been kindly entertained at the Macedonian court. Altogether they were
 expected

expected to demand so much and to concede so little, that Cimon declared, among his colleagues, 'he feared Philip would have the advantage of them in fair reasoning'¹⁵.'

Negotiation was yet managed in the manner of antient times, much by conference, little in writing. Introduced to audience, the ambassadors all spoke in turn, the elder beginning. Demosthenes, as youngest, spoke last. He was apparently most depended upon by the war-party for watching its separate interests and maintaining its importance. But, whether through consciousness of the illiberality of his invectives, in the Athenian assemblies, against the prince he was addressing, or apprehension of his deficiency in a situation so new to him, or both together, with perhaps other feelings, his nerves failing, his voice and memory faltered. Philip, with ready politeness, endeavored to encourage him; but, after two or three vain attempts, in which, through his confusion, he dropped some very awkward expressions, he concluded abruptly.

The ambassadors were then conducted into an adjoining apartment. After no long delay they were again introduced into the chamber of audience. They were seated, and the king addressing them, replied severally to the arguments used by each, with a perspicuity and elegance, which forced admiration from all. Stating strongly his sentiments of his own and his people's rights, he expressed, in terms the most obliging to the embassy, a disposition the most friendly toward the Athenian commonwealth. They were then invited to sup with him. Hilarity prevailed; and they found themselves compelled to acknowledge Philip's talent for conviviality, equally as for business.

After a day or two, proposals for a treaty were delivered to them in writing, in the form of a letter to the Athenian people. In this communication the king expressed his desire, that the peace, which it was hoped would follow between Macedonia and Athens, might be assured by an alliance. In farther conference then with the ambassadors, he frankly told them his purpose immediately to join his army in Thrace, where he was at war with some Thracian princes and some Grecian towns; but he gave them his word that, as long as might be necessary for deliberation in the Athenian assembly, concerning the peace and

Æsch. de legat. p. 222, 225, 226.

p. 227.

Demosth. de legat. p. 354.

Æsch. de legat. p. 259.

¹⁵ — Φοβείτο μὴ δικαιολογούμενος περιγίνοιτο ἡμῶν ὁ Φίλιππος. Æsch. de legat. p. 205.

alliance proposed, nothing hostile should be attempted against the Athenian possessions in the Chersonese. The business of the mission thus ended, and the ambassadors returned to Athens.

Æsch. de legat. p. 223, & seq.

Immediately on their arrival, in regular course, they reported their proceedings, and delivered the king of Macedonia's written proposals, to the council of five hundred. Demosthenes, who was a member of that council, spoke very favorably of his colleagues generally, and moved that, according to custom, when the conduct of an embassy was approved, they should be honored, for their able and faithful services, with a public supper in the prytaneium; and, as the business of peace was so successfully begun, that they should wear, on the occasion, crowns of the sacred olive. The council approved, and the honor was paid.

In course they were then to be introduced, by the council, to make their report to the assembled people. Demosthenes, as youngest of the embassy, again spoke last, but he spoke with a tone considerably altered. 'All that his colleagues had been relating,' he said, 'was little to the purpose. Let the decree of the people, directing the embassy, be red.' It was red accordingly. 'Let the king of Macedonia's letter, which we have delivered, be red.' That also was recited. 'Now,' he said, 'it is for the people to decide what is to be done.' He paused, and a murmuring conversation arose among the people. 'I then,' he resumed, 'will propose a decree: Let it be directed "that the herald expected from Philip be received, and that the ambassadors to follow him be received: that, within two days after the arrival of the ambassadors, the prytanes assemble the people, to consult on peace with Macedonia; and that we, your ambassadors, if we are thought worthy, receive the approbation of this assembly, and be treated in the prytaneium tomorrow." His motions were approved, and his decree passed.

The inflexible Phocion and his friends were not politicians to contend, in a government like the Athenian, with the time-serving party of Chares. These, compelled, after all their struggles against it, to allow and even press for peace, and successful, through the coöperation of those before their opponents, in putting the matter thus far in train, thought things sufficiently

sufficiently ripe now for separating themselves from their new associates, and making the administration of the republic again exclusively their own. They would begin with even making the business of the negotiation with Macedonia exclusively their own. To effect this they would go beyond what the strict principles of their opponents would permit, in demonstration of zeal for peace, and of consideration for the king of Macedonia; trusting, for their verbal justification, in the declared will of the sovereign Many, that peace with Macedonia should be negotiated, and for their real security, in maintaining through their policy, their command of a majority of votes.

Ministers had been dispatched to all the allies of the Athenian people, inviting a general congress at Athens. The purpose stated was, to consult on the terms of a general peace, which might provide for the interests of all, or on means for making common war with Macedonia, if it should be found necessary for the defence of their common liberties. The peace-party could not readily conceive that this measure, in which all seem, at the time, to have concurred, would prove ungrateful to the war-party, who had admitted the necessity or expediency of negotiation. But, to their surprise, Demosthenes was the orator to assert the inconvenience of it: the discussion of so many various interests, he contended, would interfere with the desired conclusion of peace and alliance with Macedonia. He proposed, therefore, a decree for taking the alliance into consideration on the same early day, which was already, on his motion, appointed for the debate on peace; and for farther security against the delay that discussion might produce, his decree required that the votes should be taken on the following day, when no speaking should be allowed. The party of Phocion remonstrated in vain, that it would be highly insulting, as well as injurious, to their allies, not to allow them that participation in the negotiation, to which they had been formally invited by Athenian ministers, who were not yet even themselves returned from their mission. The people however had caught the impatience, without knowing the motives of those whose lead they had been accustomed to follow, and the decree proposed by Demosthenes was carried.

This measure had precisely the effect apparently proposed. Phocion and his friends, the original earnest promoters of peace, were thrown
into

Æsch. de legat. p. 237 & 240. & de cor. p. 454 & 460.

Æsch. de legat. p. 243.

Ch. 35. s. 1.
of this Hist.

into a situation, in which they found themselves under necessity of holding the language and conduct of opposition; and Chares and his friends were become the peace-makers, with the voice of the people supporting them. But the insult was gross to all the foreign connections of the republic. The Lacedæmonians, and other independent allies, if there were others independent, could not but revolt at it. The Synedrians, resident deputies of the subject states, in great uneasiness, met to take the matter into consideration. The result of their debate was a decree or resolution, to be offered to the Athenian people, in their first assembly appointed to consider of peace and alliance with Macedonia. It has been preserved by Æschines, and is indeed an interesting memorial; marking strongly the servile state of the Synedrians, who imply in it a sense of injury which they dared not express, and atone even for the implication, by declaring, in a solemn act, the most unreserved resignation of themselves and their constituents to the will of the Athenians, as the sovereign people. It runs thus: 'Since the Athenian people are
' taking into consideration a treaty of peace with Philip, tho the
' ministers are not returned, whom they sent through Greece to exhort
' the cities concerning the liberty of the Greeks, it is resolved by the
' allies, that, when the ministers return, and have made their report to
' the Athenians and their allies, and two assemblies appointed by the
' prytanes, according to the laws, shall have been held, in which the
' Athenians may declare their will about the peace, whatever the Athenian
' people may decree shall be binding, as a measure taken in common with the allies.'

Æsch. delegat. p. 282.

Demosth. delegat. p. 414.

The expected Macedonian herald soon arrived, and shortly after the ambassadors, Parmenio, Antipater and Eurylochus; men eminent then in their own country, and afterward over the world¹⁶. It was observed, not without surprize, that Demosthenes was singularly forward in civility toward them. He entertained them in his house¹⁷, and we have his own boast that he entertained them splendidly. He was forward to be the mover of a decree of the people, which apparently passed, as matter

¹⁶ Parmenio and Antipater are very respectfully mentioned by Demosthenes in his oration on the embassy, p. 362.

¹⁷ *Ἐξῆς*. This has been generally in-

terpreted to mean that he lodged them. I apprehend it does not necessarily mean so much.

of course, unopposed, assigning them places of honor at the theatrical and other exhibitions of the Dionysian festival, or feast of Bacchus, of which it was then the season. Wherever they appeared in public, but especially in the theaters, where most eyes might be upon them, defying all the invidious observations of the wondering crowd, he was ostentatiously officious in his attention.

It was not probably the purpose of Chares and Demosthenes to injure or offend the Synedrian allies, or not to extend to them all the advantages of the treaty; but it was evidently now their great object to make the alliance of Macedonia exclusively their own, shutting out from it, as much as possible, Lacedæmon and all other independent Grecian states. It appears also to have been their anxious desire to obviate all discussion of the late business in Phocis. Without regard therefore to speeches of the adverse orators, or decrees of the Synedrians, the assemblies were held according to the decree of Demosthenes; and peace and alliance with Macedonia, which had been years contended for by the party of Phocion and Isocrates, was in two days concluded, by those hitherto bitter opponents of everything tending to such a measure. The allies of both parties were comprized; but those, to be considered as intitled to the benefit of the treaty, were named; and, among the allies of Athens, neither Phocis was mentioned, nor Lacedæmon.

Another omission, less important among the general interests of Greece, was noticed at the time as more extraordinary: the unfortunate king of Thrace, Kersobleptes, tho not only an ally, but in the situation nearly of a Synedrian or vassal of Athens, was unnamed in the treaty, and of course excluded from its advantages. Within a day or two a minister arrived from him, Critobulus, a Greek of Lampsacus, dispatched purposely to attend the negotiation. Astonished to find all already settled, Critobulus claimed nevertheless that his prince's name (ill omitted, he contended, as he was unquestionably an ally of the Athenian people) should be inserted in the treaty, and that himself, being duly authorized, should take the prescribed oath before the Macedonian ambassadors. This demand was urged in the assembly of the people; when Demosthenes, in his turn, as a member of the council

Æsch. de leg.
gal. p. 259.

of Fivehundred, was one of the presidents. The petition of the unfortunate prince found favor with the Many, and Aleximachus moved that Critobulus should be admitted to take the oaths for him. But Demosthenes, rising from the seat of presidency, declared 'that he would not put the motion for any such decree, as it would be a violation of the treaty already sanctioned by the people. If the requisition of the Thracian prince was to be taken into consideration, it could now be properly done only on a day to be named for the purpose.' Indeed regularity of proceeding, and a just respect both for the power they had been treating with, and for the consistency and faith of their own conduct, seem clearly to have required what Demosthenes insisted on. But he, who so often successfully excited, could not always stem the popular passion: his own doctrine, the too common doctrine of popular orators, that all considerations should give way to popular utility, and even to the popular will, would tend to blind the Many to the reasonableness of his zeal for order; his own frequent lessons of disregard for foreign powers, would weigh against his arguments now for respect to them. The Many were vociferous for the question. The presidents, far from able to enforce order in such an assembly, when once disposed to tumult, could not command respect for themselves. They were called upon by name to ascend the bema, and thence declare their reasons for refusing to put the question which the popular voice required. At length they yielded to the tumultuous manifestation of the sovereign will, and the decree passed.

The king of Macedonia, however, had already provided against any trouble which might be apprehended, by his new friends in Athens, from the contradiction in which the government was thus involved. Joining his army in Thrace, as he had told the Athenian embassy, when at Pella, was his intention, he marched immediately against Kersobleptes. That weak prince withdrew into the peninsula of Athos; and being followed thither, was soon compelled to accede to the king of Macedonia's terms, and deliver his son as a hostage for observance of them. The few remaining little Grecian cities, westward of the Chersonese, of which Doriscus, a place of some note formerly in the Persian wars, appears to have been the most important, were then no
difficult

difficult or tedious conquest for the Macedonian arms. The object of the expedition, as far as may be gathered from writers not having in view to give a regular account of it, was principally to obviate piracy. What were the measures taken we have no information; but, from what was common among the Greeks, it seems not improbable that the population of some conquered towns was removed; and this seems to have been the foundation of the assertion of Demosthenes, afterward to the Athenian people, that Philip cruelly destroyed thirty-two towns in Thrace. Chares commanded an armament which should have protected the allies of Athens in those parts. Of what he did no account remains, farther than that he sent home intelligence of the Thracian prince's submission to the king of Macedonia. This having taken place before the conclusion of the peace between Macedonia and Athens, all farther question about his admission as a party to the treaty was of course obviated.

Æsch. de legat. p. 259.

When, the business of the mission being completed, the Macedonian ambassadors were to return home, the assiduity of Demosthenes, in civility toward them, was, if possible, even increased. He took upon himself to hire carriages for their departure, he attended them on horseback in their way through Attica, and paid his last compliments to them not till they reached the Bœotian border.

P. 287.

Æsch. de cor.
Plut. v. Demosth.

SECTION V.

Judicial Inquiry into Dilapidation of the Delphian Treasury. Continuation of War between Phocis and Thebes. Distress of Thebes and Solicitation for Support from Macedonia: Alarm of Phocis and Lacedæmon: Alarm of the War-party in Athens.

THE Grecian republics, now again without an external enemy, were left to their own always abounding grounds of discord. Among these the question, who should hold command in Delphi, stood yet foremost; and tho the means of exertion of the Thebans and Phocians, between whom the contest began, were nearly exhausted, yet the Sacred war still held a very threatening aspect for the nation.

B. C. 347.
OL. 108. 2.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

In the short interval between the deposition of the young autocrator-general, Phalæcus, and his restoration, a judicial inquiry was instituted, by the Phocian government, concerning the dilapidation of the Delphian treasury, of which Diodorus has given a report, bearing the appearance of being founded on authentic documents. The great objects of the new government, in such an inquiry, would of course be to justify the recent revolution; and not only to their own people but to all Greece, so as to obtain not only excuse, as widely as might be, but favor and support. Much then it would behove them to avoid offence to all, but especially to those who led the councils of Athens; formerly holding close alliance with the government of the autocrator-generals, and now the main stay of that which had risen by its fall. Accordingly the tribunal, to which the inquiry was referred, avoided to impute implication in the guilt to any foreign state. They moreover completely acquitted the memory of Philomelus, declaring that his administration was found pure. This would amount to acknowledge-ment that the principles, on which Lacedæmon and Athens had originally concurred with the Phocians, to secure the Delphian temple and treasury against the appropriation of them by the Thebans, were also pure. They stated the sacrilegious robbery to have been begun under Onomarchus, and continued under his successors; till Phalæcus (whom, being at direct variance with Athens, they were by no interest bound to respect) unable to discover any more valuables to satisfy the demands of his followers in arms, allowed them even to break up the pavement of the sacred place, under a notion, excited by two lines of Homer, that, from very antient times, it had been a practice to deposit treasure there¹⁸. Philon, accused of being the principal agent in the sacrilegious business, was put to the torture; and having, amid his sufferings, acknowledged himself guilty (at least so his torturers said) and indicated others, was delivered over to an ignominious death. Many then, for being concerned in it, (or perhaps more really for attachment to the party of the autocrator-generals,) were also sent to the executioner, and many more found safety only in flight.

The narrative of Diodorus is sometimes not least valuable when

¹⁸ 'Οὐδ' ἔσα λείπεις οὐδὲς ἀφῆτορος ἱπλὸς ἱέργει
Φοῖβου Ἀπολλωνίου, Πυθοὶ ἐνὶ πετρήσση.

contradicting

contradicting itself, because it so indicates that he reported faithfully from writers of different parties. After having stated the judgement on the sacrilege, as if he supposed it perfectly just, he has proceeded nevertheless to assert what involves some invalidation of its justice. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, he says, did partake in the sacrilegious plunder, 'inasmuch as they received pay for more troops than they actually furnished for the Sacred war.' But, in looking to analogous circumstances, mentioned in Grecian history, it appears not easy to decide what amount of criminality should be imputed to any taking and using of the treasure, called sacred, for important public purposes. So long ago as the revolt of the Asian Greeks against Darius, a man of high estimation among them, Hecatæus of Miletus, recommended the employment of the treasure deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia, in the temple of Apollo at Branchidæ, the great bank of that side of the Ægean sea, in measures for public defence. His proposal was overruled; but the purpose is not marked by the historian with any reprobation, otherwise than as the measure was not thought fit for immediate adoption by those to whom it was proposed. In the preparation for the Peloponnesian war, Pericles reckoned the golden ornaments of the statue of Minerva, the most venerated in Athens, a resource, placed there with a direct view to use in public need; being so formed that they could be readily removed and restored. And indeed, in the licentiousness of democracy, amid the frequent clamors of the Many for distributions of public property, it may have been often a useful measure of policy to consecrate the precious metals, with the view to preserve them for public purposes. It is to be observed then that there was, at Delphi, an Athenian, a Corinthian, a Lacedæmonian treasury, or separate apartment in the treasury; and so for all the principal republics which had treasure there. The question then occurs, What right, in what circumstances, for what purposes, and with what formalities, had the several republics to draw treasure from their several treasuries? But that it was understood some such right existed, seems fully indicated in the expression of Diodorus, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had partaken in the sacrilege, inasmuch as (not that they had received money for the pay of troops employed in supporting the

Ch. 7. s. 2.
of this Hist.
Herod. l. 5.
c. 36.

Phocians,

Phocians, but) that they had received beyond the proper pay of those actually employed¹⁹; so that the guilt was incurred, not by opposing in arms the Amphictyons and others, pretended avengers of sacrilege, but for failing of due exertion against them. The same right then which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might have for pay for troops employed in the Sacred war, the Phocians themselves might have; drawing treasure only belonging to the republics of their alliance, from which they might have regular authority. Possibly so far Philomelus might have received support from the Delphian treasury, and yet have been justly intitled to the honorable acquittal which his memory received; and this may have made the real distinction between his conduct and that of his successors. Perhaps Onomarchus began in the same creditable course; but after ingaging with the party of Chares, at Athens, in ambitious projects, of which the conquest of Thessaly was to be the leading step, neither the treasure of Cræsus, nor the treasure of the Thebans and their allies, were likely to be spared. But the Thebans and their allies, who insisted that the cause of the Phocians was impious in its origin, were only consistent when they insisted that all concurrence in it was impious; and so of course they would involve Philomelus in one charge of sacrilege with those who, after him, went to extremities which he had carefully avoided.

Diodorus reckons the whole treasure at Delphi, when the war broke out, not less than two millions sterling; of which that deposited by Cræsus king of Lydia was much the largest part. We find it afterward satisfactorily indicated by him that, tho, when Phalaecus and his principal associates found it necessary to retire from Delphi, they might probably search every recess before untried, even to the soil under the sacred pavement, for more treasure, yet it was far from being through absolute want; for they carried away, in their military chest, no inconsiderable store, with which they were enabled to keep a powerful force still about them. This is what the new government of Phocis, and their Athenian friends, had certainly not intended to allow. They were disappointed by it, and the defeat of their project, on whose success

¹⁹ Μιτίσχει τῆς ἀρέσσεως Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οἱ συμμαχίσεσσι τοῖς Φωκίταις, καὶ ὡς κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον τῶν ἐκπιπραμένων στρατιωτῶν τοὺς μισθοὺς λαβόντες. Diod. l. 16. c. 57.

they seem to have proposed to found far more extensive projects, quickly followed.

Without funds, the new government of Phocis was weak, and little able to prosecute the war against Thebes. Of this the Thebans proposed to take advantage; but neither their councils nor their arms were ably directed. Apparently their first object should have been to recover those towns of Bœotia itself, which had withdrawn themselves from the Theban alliance, or, in the phrase of the imperial republics, had rebelled against the Theban people. But the first measure of their arms was to invade Phocis for plunder. This was successfully executed, and, the Phocians, under their new leaders, venturing a battle near Hyampolis, were defeated. Thus the weakness of the government, and the want of union among themselves, and the need of a mercenary army, such as that attached to Phalæcus, becoming manifest, that restoration of the general-autocrator, which we have had occasion already to notice, quickly followed. The Thebans, then too late, attempting the revolted towns, were unable to do more than ravage the country, and, in withdrawing with the plunder, they suffered a defeat.

But the Phocians, strong with their restored mercenary force, and possessing advantageous opportunities, through their alliance with the revolted Bœotians, proceeded now to retaliate, by carrying ravage extensively over the lands of the Theban alliance. Some actions were undertaken in defence of them, but the Phocians were victorious. The cavalry of the Grecian republics was generally composed, as we have formerly observed, of persons wealthy enough each to maintain a horse, and serve with it at his own expence, attended by at least one slave afoot. Its business, on home-service, was especially to watch the motions of an invading enemy, and protect the lands against ravagers and plunderers. Thebes, with its command of Bœotia, was stronger in cavalry than any other Grecian state, southward of Thermopylae. Nevertheless the Phocians, coming to action with the Theban cavalry, near Hedylium, obtained a victory, which is mentioned by the contemporary orator as of much importance, both in itself, and for the impression it made in Thebes, and extensively over Greece.

Approaching winter gave the Thebans that relief, which was common
in

B. C. 347.
Ol. 103. 2.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 56.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 58.

Demosth. de
legat.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

B. C. 346.
Ol. 108. $\frac{2}{2}$.

in Grecian warfare. But their treasury was exhausted. The pressure, from the Boeotian towns connected with Phocis, was severe; farther revolt was apprehended, and in Thebes itself much discontent was brooding. Remaining hope, for those who held the administration, rested on the support of allies interested in their cause. The Thessalians were principal; but so was Thessaly now connected with Macedonia, that, to obtain their assistance, negotiation would probably best be directed to the court of Pella. Thither accordingly a Theban embassy was sent.

Meanwhile at Athens, whether the established practice of former times, or only the proud and jealous temper of the democracy of the day required, tho the treaty of peace and alliance with Macedonia had been sworn to, before the Macedonian ambassadors, by Athenian commissioners appointed by a decree of the people, yet it was held that the ratification was incomplete, till commissioners from the Athenian people had received an oath, to the observance of the treaty, from the king of Macedonia in person. An embassy of five therefore was appointed, Eubulus, Cephisophon, Democrates, Cleon, and Æschines; and to administer the oath seems to have been the only original object.

But information of the mission from Thebes to Pella excited interest deeply and extensively through Greece. The Phocians were first to show alarm. Always unequal alone to the maintenance of their own independency, they had recently lost the support of Athens. The Athenians indeed were divided, as the Phocians themselves were divided. The party of Phocion, friendly to the general-autocrat and his friends, were not so to the party which had deposed him. But the powerful party of Chares, disposed still to favor that party, could not be on good terms with Phalæcus and his supporters; and, in negotiation with Macedonia, how far both parties concurring does not very clearly appear, the Athenians had abandoned the cause of Phocis. Lacedæmon therefore remained the only power to which, in the existing crisis, the Phocian government could look for any effectual assistance.

But the state of things was threatening for Lacedæmon itself. Should the Thebans obtain the support of Macedonia for the overthrow of Phocis, its support might follow for the overthrow of Lacedæmon, the supporter

supporter of Phocis, implicated in the same imputed crimes, condemned under the same judgement, and devoted under the same curses. On the other hand, should assistance to Macedonia be denied to Thebes, and, what appeared not impossible, should an accommodation follow between the Thebans and Phocians, extensive as was the hostile disposition in Peloponnesus toward Lacedæmon, another Theban invasion might be expected there. The sense, which the Lacedæmonian government had of the crisis, is marked in the exertion which followed. While an embassy was sent to the Macedonian court, a body of a thousand Lacedæmonians, under the orders of the king, Archidamus, marched to Phocis. A thousand Lacedæmonians, if attended by the antient proportion of inferior troops, would be no inconsiderable force among Grecian armies. Since the fatal battle of Leuctra, neither a Lacedæmonian king, nor such a Lacedæmonian force, had been seen beyond the isthmus. Phalæcus with an army of Phocians and mercenaries, said to amount together to eight thousand, occupied the important posts near Thermopylæ, which his Phocian adversaries had proposed to surrender to the Athenians²⁰. At the same time negotiation, such as opportunity might be obtained for, was attempted both with Macedonia and Thebes.

Isocr. or
ad Philip.
p. 110.

Æsch.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

Demosth. de
legat.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

Isocr. ut ant.

In this state of things, the turn that negotiation might take at Pella, important for all, was not least so for the Athenian people. But the favor of the Macedonian court was important severally to both the parties at Athens; to the party of Chares, especially, for whom peace and alliance with Macedonia would operate as a political overthrow, unless they could hold that favor eminently, if not even exclusively. In the new crisis, therefore, they were unsatisfied with the composition of the appointed embassy; and they appear to have been, not unreasonably, jealous especially of Æschines; who, having concurred in the coalition,

²⁰ The expression of Demosthenes is, that 'the Phocians held the pass;' clearly marking that Phalæcus commanded the Phocians as their constitutional general, and that he was not reduced to be the meer leader of a band of mercenaries. When Æschines, in his defence of himself afterward, called Phalæcus tyrant of the Phocians, or included him with others of their leading men under the title of tyrants, in the plural, he seems to have done it only in deference to the prejudices of the multitude, whom it behooved him to soothe and court. De legat. p. 300, 301 & 303.

formed with Phocion's party, for the important public purpose of making peace, would not afterward, for any separate interest of his former party, abandon his new connection. It appears however to have been judged inexpedient to risk alarm, either among the Athenian people, or in foreign states, by avowing any political object, in adding to the number of the embassy, or to its instructions. But a resource was open: precedents were numerous of granting to eminent men, soliciting it from the sovereign Many, a public commission for the professed purpose of putting forward a private business; whence benefit might accrue, perhaps sometimes to the commonwealth, but oftener only to a party; the private business serving as a veil, under which a political purpose might be prosecuted, either for public benefit, or party advantage. The release of many Athenian citizens, prisoners of war in Macedonia, waited yet for the ratification of the treaty of peace, which was the object of the embassy.

Æsch. de
leg. p. 274.

It was well known that Philip had never taken ransom for any Athenian prisoners of war; and, among the informed, no doubt was entertained but that all Athenian citizens, now prisoners in Macedonia, would be freely dismissed as soon as the ratification was completed. Nevertheless Demosthenes did not fear to make the pretence of the patriotic and charitable purpose of ransoming, at his own expence, some Athenian prisoners, the ground of a request to the people, that he might be added to the number of the embassy then on its way to Macedonia. He was accordingly appointed, apparently with four others; for we find the number of this, as of the former embassy, was finally eleven; ten representatives of the Athenian people, and one of all their allies.

p. 272.

SECTION VI.

Congress of Grecian Embassies at the Macedonian Court. Proceedings of the Athenian Embassy. Report to the Council and People.

THE Macedonian court now became the focus of negotiation for the Grecian republics. The Athenian embassy arriving, found the Theban already there, waiting for the king, who was not yet returned from Thrace.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 276.

Thrace. The Lacedæmonian came soon after; and, before Philip's arrival, others were assembled, in the expression of Æschines, from almost all Greece. Æsch. de
legat. p. 282.

In this numerous assemblage of missions, from so many republics of one nation, all had different interests to prosecute. They had indeed mostly together in view to put an end to the Sacred war, and provide better security for the temple and treasury of Delphi. But even to this there were exceptions; for we find Demosthenes afterward not scrupling to declare, that the interest of Athens required interminable war in Greece, and especially the continuation of the Sacred war; that the permanency of such a contest, among the Grecian republics, was highly desirable for the Athenian people. But even where the missions agreed about the object, they differed widely as to the means of attaining it, and the consequences to be desired. Thebes, Athens, and Lacedæmon, tho unable to command, as sometimes formerly, remained yet leading republics, under which the others, with more or less submission or attachment, arranged themselves. The Thebans, to provide for the future security of Delphi, and peace of the Greek nation, insisted upon the full restoration of the authority of the Amphictyons, and the full execution of the utmost vengeance of the Amphictyonic law against the sacrilegious Phocians. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians looked to such a result of the contest as big with ruin to their state and to Grecian independency. The Athenians, differing from both, yet differed hardly less among themselves.

The Athenian embassy was compounded from the adverse parties. Specially commissioned only for the ceremony of receiving the king's oath to the treaty already concluded, it was however required, in general terms, to act, as opportunity might occur, in every way for the benefit of the commonwealth. The field thus before it was large, Æsch. de
legat. p. 276. and abounding with objects; among which each member, according to his views of public, or party, or private interest, somewhat indeed at his peril, might select his object of pursuit. Even forms for their proceedings were little settled, either by regulation, or precedent. Demosthenes had early shown a disposition to disagree with his colleagues; but his first material difference was about a matter of form. He ob-
jected

jected to the rule, which seems to have been general at Athens, in common with most or all of the republican governments, giving precedence according to age, and which had been followed by the former embassy. Why his colleagues would concede such a point to him, and why Æschines would omit to state their inducement, seems not easily imaginable; unless it was a dread, more reasonable perhaps in itself than creditable in any declaration that could be made of it, of the use to which an orator, powerful among the despotic Many, might turn the clause in their instructions, commanding them to act, in all things, as the good of the people might require²¹. We shall here-

Demosth. de
legat.

after see Demosthenes, without alledging any breach of instructions, without specifying fact of any kind, stating, in general terms only, impediment to him in the prosecution, or rather only purpose, of public service, as a ground of capital crimination.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 280.

Audience was given to the Athenian embassy, in presence of all the others, and Demosthenes, according to his own requisition, spoke first. He began with avowing a difference from his colleagues in political opinions; and he proceeded then to endeavor to show, that it was not because he was ill-disposed toward the prince he was addressing, but very much the contrary. He related his services to the Macedonian interest in the Athenian assemblies; he mentioned his defence of Philocrates, when criminated for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding the admission of heralds from Macedonia; he specified the decrees moved by himself for facilitating and promoting the negotiation for peace and alliance with Macedonia, and he did not scruple to detail his attention to the Macedonian ambassadors, at Athens, and to mention the aspersions he had suffered in consequence. Aware then of the recollection, that could not fail among all who heard him, of the long course and extreme violence of his contrary conduct, he hazarded an attempt to extenuate the grossness of his frequent invectives, adding much flattery, and strong professions of attachment to Philip. In this, it is said, probably with truth, tho the account, coming from his adversary, would probably be highly charged, that he succeeded very ill. In an unusual situa-

²¹ Περὶ τῶν δὲ τοῦς πρίστας καὶ 'ΑΛΛ' ὅτι αὐτὸν δὴν αὐτὸν ἀγαθόν. Æsch. de legat. p. 276.

tion,

tion, to which also his temper and habits were adverse, his extensive genius failed him. The awkwardness of his mixture of apology and flattery, the absurdity even of some of his compliments, and the embarrassed and uncouth manner in which he delivered them, were so striking, that, tho Philip himself preserved a decent gravity, the bystanders could not refrain from laughing aloud²².

Æschines, following, began his speech to the king, with a reply to that part of the speech of Demosthenes, which was directed against his colleagues. 'He had not been sent,' said Æschines, 'nor had his colleagues, he apprehended, been sent, to apologize in Macedonia for their conduct in Athens, but they had been chosen to transact the business of the republic, at the Macedonian court, for their supposed fitness for the office, proved on former occasions.' He proceeded then, to what Demosthenes apparently had avoided, to plead the cause of the Phocians, in consonance with the sentiments maintained by the Lacedæmonians, and in opposition to the Thebans. 'The first principle,' he said, 'of the Amphictyonic institution was beneficence: its object was not the destruction of men, still less the destruction of whole communities, but, on the contrary, the prevention of such destruction. The Amphictyonic law expressly declared that, on no account should any Amphictyonic community be overthrown, or town destroyed; it forbade the implication of the innocent in punishment with the guilty; and to the benefit of this law the Bœotian townships, which had quitted the Theban for the Phocian alliance, were intitled equally with the Phocians themselves.'

Where sentiments and interests differed so widely, and were maintained with so much heat, as now among the hostile republics, and beside the differences between republic and republic, there was such contention of parties within each, with so much uncertainty which might next day preponderate, arrangement adapted to general satisfaction, or general good, would be, the former clearly impossible, the other of great difficulty. Among the allies of Macedonia, the

²² This was a transaction, not in the dark, but so public, that had not the rival orator's report of it been largely founded on truth, the shame must have recoiled on the narrator, with great injury to his cause, which evidently was not so injured. He has gone so far as to report some of the phrases which excited the laughter, appealing to others, who had been present, for the exactness of his account.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 441.

p. 352.

Thessalians, whether for antiquity of connection, steddi-ness of attachment, services rendered to his family, or power, through wealth, strength, and situation, to render farther services, had certainly the first claim to Philip's consideration. But the mildness of the measures, against the adherents of the late tyrants, had left, in Pheræ, a party strong enough, and bold enough, to deny the contingent of troops of that city, for a purpose for which a preponderant portion of the Thessalian people was perhaps more than moderately earnest, the war against Phocis. At the same time the town of Halus (blockaded by a Macedonian army, or an army under a Macedonian general, when the first embassy of which Æschines and Demosthenes were together members, passed to Macedonia) persevered yet in its contumacy, and especially in its hostile disposition toward the people of Pharsalus, who were among the oldest and most zealous of the Thessalians in the Macedonian interest. This civil war, in a country whose alliance was so important to Macedonia, forcibly required Philip's attention. What he did, then, seems to have been what could be done most respectful to the embassies and the states they represented, and most consonant to the best principles of confederacy among the Grecian republics; he desired the assistance of their mediation, to compose the differences between the Halians and Pharsalians; and for this purpose he proposed that the congress should move to Pheræ. He would thus accompany them so far in their direct way home: all the embassies would be nearer the principal objects of negotiation, as well as nearer their constituents. No objection therefore appearing to have been alledged, or indeed to have existed, Pheræ became the seat of the congress, and of the Macedonian king²³.

What

²³ We find Demosthenes, in a speech of many years after, venturing to tell his sovereign, the Athenian Many, that the king of Macedonia bribed the embassies to stay with him, till his preparations for the expedition against Phocis were completed, adding this curious reason, 'Lest,' he says, 'your ambassadors returning, and reporting his measures, you might have embarked, and occupying the strait of Thermopylae, stopped his passage.' De cor. p. 236. Hardly,

in modern times, could such an impudent imposition be attempted upon the Many of London in Common-hall, or of Westminster in Palace-yard, or of the most uninformed part of England in county-meeting. Everywhere there would be those able to inform the more ignorant, that nothing could so effectually check the hostile preparation of a power, desiring that its preparation should remain a secret, as the presence of embassies from powers interested to oppose the

What were the adverse claims of Halus and Pharsalus does not appear, but the mediation of the congress was unsuccessful. Halus persevered in opposition to the common government of Thessaly, and the army under Parmenio continued the blockade. Decision on this subject was necessary toward the conclusion of business with, perhaps all, but particularly the Athenian embassy. Previously to the ratification of the treaty of peace and alliance, between Athens and Macedonia, by the king's oath, it was to be determined what states were to be included, as allies of the contracting parties. It was agreed that Halus should be excluded. A decree of the Athenian people, at the instigation apparently of the war-party, hostile to the autocrator-general and his party, had already declared Phocis no longer the ally of Athens. Philip concurred with the party of Phocion, in desiring to provide protection for that unfortunate people, and their Bœotian friends. At the violence of the Thebans against both, he did not scruple to express dissatisfaction strongly, but he judged it expedient to temporize with the prejudices of the Thessalians. The Athenian ministers of Phocion's party, therefore, rested on assurance from him, that he would do his best in favor of both Phocians and Bœotians; and, in conformity with the decree of the Athenian people, the Phocians not only were omitted in the catalogue of allies of Athens, but they were expressly declared excluded from participation in any benefit of the treaty between Athens and Macedonia²⁴. The claims of the contracting parties in Thrace were next discussed and settled. The dominion of the Chersonese was confirmed to the Athenian people, with just exception of the brave Cardians, who were numbered among the allies of Macedonia. Over the rest of Thrace Athens asserted no claim, of either dominion, or alliance, leaving

Æsch. de
legat. p. 304.

the purpose of the preparation. But, should it even be found difficult to penetrate the mass of ignorance with such information, yet the observation could not fail to be ready, and of easy conception for all understandings, 'Were not you, Demosthenes, 'one of the embassy? And did you take the 'bribe? Or, if you did not, what prevented 'you from sending home information of

'proceedings adverse to the interest of
'your country?'

²⁴ The decree declared the Phocians *ἑκσπονδοί*. That this term implied exclusion from alliance, and all benefit of the treaty concluded with Macedonia, can be no doubt. What more it may have implied may be difficult to determine.

it thus open to the arms or the mercy of Philip. Matters being so agreed upon, Philip took the oaths, and the Athenian embassy returned home.

The omission of Isocrates, among his proposals for reforming the Athenian constitution, to speak with any respect of the council of Fivehundred, while he was urging the restoration of power to the almost abolished council of Areiopagus, indicates no favorable opinion of the former. Indeed we find the appointment of the members by lot, out of all the citizens, considered, even among the antients, as an absurd mode of constituting a body to direct executive government. But this election by lot seems to have been very commonly eluded; so that some men of superior education and qualifications always obtained seats. Demosthenes, according to the assertion made, in his presence, to the Athenian people, by Æschines, became a member 'not according to law, but through bribery.' If one man such as Demosthenes succeeded in so obtaining a seat, it might best suit the purposes of his party if his colleagues were of the lowest of the people. Of what description, however, or what various descriptions of men, the council was actually constituted, we have no precise information, when Demosthenes, as a member of it, was to report the proceedings of the embassy.

Æsch. de
legat.

Demosth. de
legat.

In doing this, he spoke very unfavorably of his colleagues; and the council, whether persuaded by his speech, or before prepared, put a singular slight upon the embassy; the customary decree, which had never failed before on any such occasion within memory, for honoring it with a public supper in the Prytaneium, was omitted.

Demosth. de
legat.

In the assembly of the people then, to which the proceedings of the embassy were, in course, next to be reported, Demosthenes also took the lead in speaking. He now affected to be the advocate of the Phocians, and bewail their unhappy lot²⁵: the king of Macedonia, whom he had been grossly courting, he now again grossly reviled; and, as disposed to friendship with Macedonia, he reviled all his colleagues.

²⁵ We find him acknowledging that the interest of the Phocians was totally unprovided for in the treaty with Macedonia, and this he justifies so far as to avow that he imputed no ill even to Æschines on that account: *οὐδὲν γὰρ καὶ ἱκανὸν ἔστι*: 'it was very well to be silent about it and let it alone.' Demosth. de legat. p. 354.

But

But the Athenian Many were not yet duly prepared for this change. A large proportion had been indulging in prospect of those advantages, from peace and alliance with Macedonia, which the orator himself had been before teaching them to look for; and accordingly, as we find himself confessing, he was heard with marked disapprobation.

Æschines, following, obtained favorable attention, while he defended the embassy, and the peace concluded by it. With regard to the Phocians, he said, ‘it was notorious the king of Macedonia could not admit any stipulations for them, in the treaty, without breaking with his old allies the Thessalians and Thebans. But he had given ample assurance that he would exert himself to avert, or soften, the severities proposed by their inveterate enemies, which no other could avert or soften. That the treaty concluded with Macedonia was otherwise advantageous, could not be doubted; especially for the affairs of Eubœa, where the Athenian people were in danger of losing everything, had the war continued. Nevertheless it would depend upon themselves to draw the full benefits, which were laid open to them. If the disposition became general to revile, with the orator who had preceded, the power with which they had just concluded peace and alliance, any very cordial friendship ought not to be expected in return²⁶.’

Demosth.
de legat.

SECTION VII.

*New Measures of the War-party in Athens hostile to Macedonia.
Oration of Isocrates to Philip.*

AFTER the ratification of the peace with Macedonia, a decree had been passed, on the motion of Philocrates, declaring that, ‘if the Phocians did not duly surrender the temple of Delphi to the Amphictyons,

²⁶ We have an account of the speech of Æschines only from his bitter adversary. That the text above is a fair representation of the tenor of his argument, seems enough to be gathered from Demosthenes, exerting his powers to give everything the most in-

vidious appearance; and it receives strong confirmation from the first epistle of Isocrates to Philip, and the tract intitled his oration to Philip, which show that such was the approved tenor of argument among Phocion’s party.

‘ the Athenian people would join in arms against them, and against
 ‘ all who should support them in their contumacy.’ Phocion’s
 party yet held the principal direction of the government, when the
 king of Macedonia, who had been preparing for the Phocian war
 openly and avowedly, before all the Grecian embassies in Thessaly,
 addressed the Athenian people in the usual manner, by a letter in his
 own name, inviting them as allies, and as Amphictyonic people, to
 join his other allies, and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy, in a
 just community in arms and in council, for ending an evil already
 so extensively destructive, and still extensively threatening. The party
 of Phocion, in conformity with the decree already made, were anxious
 to concur in this measure for the common good of Greece, and they
 reckoned the opportunity particularly advantageous also for asserting
 the dignity of the republic, and advancing its importance among the
 Grecian states; nor, if to soften the threatened lot of the Phocians
 and their Bœotian allies was desirable, could Athens in any other way
 or at any other time, they reckoned, interfere so efficaciously. For a
 powerful party in Thebes, by the arrogance with which they de-
 manded support for the pretension of the Theban people to sovereignty
 over all the other people of Bœotia, and the vehemence with which
 they pressed for vengeance against the Phocians, had already notori-
 ously disgusted Philip, and the disposition, prevailing among the Thes-
 salians, to concur with the Thebans, distressed him. The vote therefore
 of a state, hostile to Thebes, in the Amphictyonic assembly, and its
 contingent in the Amphictyonic army, were particularly desirable for
 him; and, in such circumstances, the sentiments of the government of
 such a state must command respect.

But this was a measure which, in promoting at the same time the
 power of Athens and the good of Greece, would have tended to
 fix the superiority of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and there-
 fore was to be opposed by the party of Demosthenes and Chares.
 Nor did they want for arguments to weigh with the Many. ‘ Where
 ‘ was the advantage,’ they said, ‘ of peace with Macedonia, if it was to
 ‘ involve the republic in a new war? They did not approve the peace;
 ‘ but, peace being made, the people should rest in peace. What benefit

‘ was

Æsch. de
 legat. p. 276.
 & seq.

Demosth. de
 legat. p. 337.
 Æsch. de
 legat. p. 304.

Isocr. ep. ad
 Philipp. I.
 p. 418.
 Æsch. de
 legat. p. 305.

Æsch. de
 legat. p. 305.

‘ was to result, either to the republic or individuals, from the service of
 ‘ Athenian citizens in the Amphictyonic army? Would it be more
 ‘ profitable than service, under the orders of the people, in Thrace,
 ‘ or in Asia? Was it certainly safe for Athenian troops to join over-
 ‘ bearing numbers of Thessalians and Macedonians? Might they not
 ‘ be overpowered and detained as hostages, till conditions, disadvan-
 ‘ tageous to the republic, were obtained for their release?’ Aversion
 to military service thus encouraged, and suspicion excited, produced a
 delay of answer, and Philip sent a second letter. But meanwhile the
 party of war and trouble, now advocates for peace and quiet, had
 gained farther hold of the popular mind; the party of Phocion, after
 having prevailed to stop mischievous exertion, were unable to procure
 beneficial exertion, and the king of Macedonia’s requisition was
 finally answered with a denial.

Thus a necessary previous step was gained, toward the execution
 of a project for leading the republic immediately again into war with
 Macedonia, and beginning with a blow which, if not at once even
 decisive, would place the party in circumstances of great advantage for
 farther measures. They had observed that, through the ordinary waste
 of Grecian warfare, in the long continued hostilities, the country, to a
 wide extent southward of the strait of Thermopylæ, could afford little
 for an army coming into it. Whether the deficient interest, or the
 not uncommon extreme of scruple, of the party of Phocion, had pre-
 vented the recall of Proxenus, he remained, with a fleet of fifty triremes,
 in the neighborhood of the strait. The nautic multitude was of course
 always ill-pleased with peace, and ready for war; and of the officers, a
 large proportion, under influence of the same interests, were always
 disposed to the views of the war-party. If then the Lacedæmonians
 and Phocians could be kept firm and united, and the Athenians could
 be brought to coöperate with them, Philip’s supplies by sea being in-
 tercepted, he might, if he ventured southward of the strait, be ruined
 without the hazard of a battle. The great obstacle, to this scheme of
 profound policy, seems to have been what the war-party had made for
 themselves, by so alienating the autocrator-general, and his party in
 Phocis, that they would hold no communication with them. Hence

Demosth. de
 legat. p. 379.

de legat.
 p. 357.

seems to have arisen the proposal, that the three critical posts for commanding the pass, Nicæa, Thronium and Alponus, which the late new government of Phocis had promised, and the restored government refused, to surrender to Athens, should be committed to the custody of the Lacedæmonians. Archidamus gave into this project, so far as to declare himself ready to undertake the garrisoning of the three towns. But the Phocians, who had found large cause for mistrusting the Athenians, began to mistrust the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they found them connected in policy with the Athenians; and chose rather to depend upon the king of Macedonia's disposition to favor them. Refusing therefore to surrender the places, yet desirous of avoiding offence to the Lacedæmonians, they excused themselves, saying, 'They feared Sparta had too much occasion to 'look to her own dangers'²⁷.'

This transaction could not be secret. The disposition of the war-party to produce a new breach with Macedonia had been amply manifested: the peace of Athens and of Greece, and especially the welfare of the party of Phocion, in Athens, and of that large part of the Grecian people concurring in political sentiments with them, were in danger. In these critical circumstances, Isocrates published his much admired oration to Philip; which, under the form indicated by the title, is really an appeal, from himself and his party, to the Athenian people, and to the whole Greek nation²⁸. The war-party, when they found their power

²⁷ Τὰ τῆς Σπάρτης διὰ δεινῶν, καὶ μὴ παρ' αὐτῶν. Arch. de legat. p. 302. All the critics seem to have seen difficulty, and to have supposed omission or corruption, in this passage, except Taylor, whose explanation is by a paraphrase only, and to me, I must own, not satisfactory. Reiske translates διὰ 'fraudes,' and Auger, 'mauvaise foi.' Why they have chosen that uncommon sense of the word, seems not obvious. If authority be desired for application of it in its ordinary sense, Isocrates furnishes abundance, where, in his oration to Philip, he describes the troubles of Sparta and the dangers continually surrounding her. Considering it as referring to them then, Wolf's

correction of the passage, καὶ μὴ τὰ παρ' αὐτῶν, authorized by the manuscript, Cod. Reg. 3. makes the whole of easy construction.

²⁸ The oration to Philip marks its own date, after the conclusion of peace between Athens and Macedonia, and before the conclusion of the Sacred war. Between these two points then it farther marks its time, after symptoms of a disposition toward a new breach with Macedonia had been manifested by a party in Athens, and while the Lacedæmonians were apprehensive of an accommodation between the Thebans and Phocians; thus fixing almost its moment.

falling,

falling, through the failure of their measures against Macedonia, it appears, would have allowed to Philip the supreme situation in Greece, that command of armies, and presidency of councils, for which Athens, Lacedæmon and Thebes had been so long contending, provided they might hold the lead in Athens. This imputation of Æschines seems virtually admitted by Demosthenes, through his failure to meet it. How far they might have in view to betray him afterward, cannot be known. But no sooner had they ascertained that, tho interfering no way in the interior of the republic, yet for all the common concerns of Athens and Macedonia, and all the common politics of Greece which interested both governments, he would give his confidence still to the party of Phocion, and would not be allured by any promises or any flattery, or driven by any alarms, to favor their opponents, then the orators of the war-party, disappointed in their measures, and vexed at their own work, applied their utmost diligence to make him, and the peace themselves had negotiated with him, suspicious and odious in Athens, and to disturb, as extensively as might be, those arrangements and that plan of policy, through which Phocion and Isocrates had hoped to provide tranquility for Greece. In this they had now succeeded, so that Isocrates, evidently in concurrence with his party, but with his party in a degree of despair, resorted to the bold and hazardous expedient, of proposing to Philip to assume the authority, by which the disturbers of the general tranquility might be repressed, and to persuade the Grecian people to approve the measure.

Isocrates was in the habit of epistolary correspondence with Philip; and, of his extant epistles to that prince, the first carries indication of having been written for the public eye, to try the popular mind upon the subject of the oration, intended to follow. He could use, it appears, more freedom toward the prince, than he thought prudent to venture toward his own sovereign, the people; and, in the very outset of his oration, he does not scruple to impute a faulty ambition to Philip, in the beginning of the war; apparently alluding to his extensive and rapid conquests, made while the Athenians were implicated with their revolted allies, and reckoning them more than moderate reprisal for the injurious aggression at Pydna. Faults, however, he allows there
were

Isocr. or.
ad Phil.
p. 308.

were on both sides. To prevent the war then, he says, had been his anxious desire: from the moment it began he had been earnest to restore peace; and now peace was made, he was most anxious to provide that it should be lasting. But, for this, observing how eager some among the Athenian people already were, after short repose, for new hostilities, he feared nothing could be effectual, but what he had recommended, many years ago, to unite the whole nation in war against Asia. Hence he takes occasion to address the king of Macedonia, as the only person capable of holding the lead in so great a business. Already the ally of Athens, he says, Philip should bring all the Grecian states to concord with one another and alliance with himself, and then lead the armies of all against the barbarians.

p. 328.

Representing the king of Macedonia then in a way to recommend him to the confidence of the republics, and to obviate the ill opinions which the war-party were so diligent in impressing, he proceeds, after some ingenious turns, adapted to his purpose of winning attention, and obviating irritation and jealousy, to give a picture of Greece itself. 'Without neglecting any of those great interests,' he says to Philip, 'in managing which you have been already so successful, your endeavors should be directed to bring Argos, Lacedæmon, Thebes and Athens to concord. That being effected, for the rest no difficulty will remain; because all are habituated, in any danger, to look to one of these for support; so that, bringing only those four states to harmony, you will deliver all the others from many evils.' Adverting then to the origin of the Macedonian royal family from Argos, to its common descent with the Lacedæmonian kings from Hercules, to the particular veneration for that deity at Thebes, and to the traditions of the support given by the Athenians to his posterity, as arguments for a friendly disposition in Philip to all the four states, he takes objections to his proposal into consideration. 'I know,' he says, 'it is reckoned by some a vain idea that I am offering; for they will not believe it possible to bring the Argians to concord with the Lacedæmonians, nor these with the Thebans: in short, they maintain that no republic, long habituated to the ambition of commanding others, will rest in equality. And while either Athens or Lacedæmon

‘ dæmon held their former power, I am well aware that the objection
 ‘ would be complete: for the predominating state would have the
 ‘ disposition, with the means, to prevent the desired concord. But now Isocr. or.
ad Phil.
p. 332.
 ‘ I know it is otherwise. The principal states are disabled by wars,
 ‘ not unlike individuals long contending in single combat: their
 ‘ fury, while their strength holds, resists all attempts to part them;
 ‘ yet at length wounds and weariness effect it, without other me-
 ‘ diators.

‘ Let us observe then first the Lacedæmonians, who, not long ago,
 ‘ commanded Greece by land and sea. Such is now the alteration,
 ‘ that the Peloponnesians, formerly all ready at their command to
 ‘ march anywhere, have been seen mostly joining the Thebans to
 ‘ invade their territory. Nor have the evils of the change ceased
 ‘ with that invasion. They are still troubled with the adverse dispo-
 ‘ sition of their own people of the country towns, the Periœcians. At
 ‘ the same time all the other Peloponnesians mistrust them; most
 ‘ of the Greeks dislike them; and even from their own slaves they
 ‘ are daily and nightly suffering depredations, so that there is no relief
 ‘ for them from the necessity of watching in arms. But, what now
 ‘ presses beyond anything, they are apprehensive of an accommodation
 ‘ between the Thebans and Phocians; whence might follow a new
 ‘ invasion of their country, more destructive than what they have
 ‘ already suffered. In such circumstances, how can they but gladly
 ‘ see a person ready, with power and with all qualifications, to under-
 ‘ take the mediation, which may end the existing hostilities.

‘ The Argians are in circumstances partly similar, and partly worse.
 ‘ From their first possession of their present country, they have had,
 ‘ like the Lacedæmonians, continual wars with neighboring states.
 ‘ But the contests of the Lacedæmonians have generally been with
 ‘ weaker powers, those of the Argians with stronger; whence it is
 ‘ habitual to them to expect yearly the destruction of their harvest.
 ‘ And in every intermission of the evils of foreign war, civil strife has
 ‘ never failed among them; so violent, that in Argos has been seen p. 342.
 ‘ more exultation in the massacre of the best of the citizens, than else-
 ‘ where commonly in the slaughter of enemies.

‘ To come then to the Thebans ; they, by a splendid victory, acquired great reputation and high fortune : yet by an intemperate use of their advantages, they have brought themselves to the situation now, of a people defeated in war, and worn by calamity. Instantly as they had obtained a superiority over their enemies, they began to excite troubles in Peloponnesus ; they proposed to conquer Thessaly ; they threatened Megara ; they deprived Attica of Oropus and its territory, wasted Eubœa, and sent triremes to Byzantium : as if they were taken with the extravagant ambition to command by sea as well as by land. At length they made war on Phocis ; expecting quickly to subdue its towns, to hold the country under their dominion, and to become masters of the Delphian treasury. In all these hopes they have been disappointed. They have killed a few Phocian mercenaries, fitter to die than live ; and they have lost many of the best of their own citizens. Proposing to bring all the Greeks under their dominion, they are now reduced to hope in you for their own safety.’

Thus far the able painter incurred no hazard in representing the truth. But there remained a business of extreme difficulty and delicacy, to portray his own country ; to exhibit the odious features in its constitution and politics, so that they might be acknowledged, and excite attention, without exciting a dangerous irritation. He therefore begins with feigning to consider notice of Athens as needless, because, he says, Athens had been wise enough already, and before any other state, to make peace. Taking a wide circuit then through matters apparently little to the purpose, unless as they might conciliate by amusing, and so prepare patient attention among the Many, he proceeds, at length, but with remarkable precaution, to describe the party of Chares without naming it : ‘ I have omitted one matter,’ he says, ‘ not forgetting it, but hesitating to open upon it ; which yet I think ought to be done : for I reckon it will be advantageous to you to hear of it, and becoming me to proceed, in treating the subject before me, with all my wonted freedom.’

This apology, addressed to the prince, has evidently had, for its purpose, to draw the minds of the irritable multitude to an idea, that his
resentment

Isocr. or.
ad Phil.
p. 344.

p. 334.

resentment, at what was to follow, might be expected, when only theirs was really apprehended. He proceeds then, ‘I know there are men who, envying your great fortune, practised in exciting trouble in their several republics, and reckoning the common peace of others war against themselves, speak ill of you. These men, passing by all other things to comment on your power, represent it as raised, and now growing, not for the benefit, but for the subjection of Greece, which they say has long been your secret purpose. You have promised to support the Messenians, if you succeed in settling the affairs of Phocis; but your object, they contend, is to reduce Peloponnesus under your dominion. The Thessalians, Thebans, and all the states of the Amphictyonic confederacy are fully prepared to follow you in any measures, and the Argians, Messenians, Megalopolitans, and many others, are ready to place themselves under your orders for the conquest of Lacedæmon. This then being effected, the rest of Greece, they observe, will remain too weak for resistance.’ That this formidable picture was a true one, seems unquestionable: the fate of Greece was in Philip’s hands, and all depended upon his disposition to use his power well or ill²⁹. Avoiding therefore any direct examination of it, the orator proceeds to tell the Many of what kind of men they should beware: all bold pretenders to knowledge of the secret counsels of other powers; all those, from highest to lowest, who were greedy of the profits of war and trouble; and not less those, who, as we find Demosthenes continually, claimed the merit of a solicitude for the public good, beyond what the public felt for itself. In regard to Philip’s purposes, then at last he adds, ‘What is reasonably to be apprehended from one power, is not always reasonably to be apprehended from another, in different circumstances. Were the king of Asia to prepare war against Greece, the purpose might even do him honor: but for one of the progeny of Hercules, the benefactor of all Greece, to do so, cannot be equally for his interest, and, instead of honor, would involve him in the deepest infamy.’

Isocr. or. ad
Phil. p. 336.

p. 338

He proceeds then to the bold proposal for Philip to take upon him-

²⁹ Thus Æschines observes of this crisis, Ἡ μὲν Τύχη καὶ Φίλιππος ἦσαν τῶν ἱγέρων κέραι. De legat. p. 288.

self to be the peacemaker of Greece, and its commander in war against the barbarians. The manner of introducing this proposal has been admirably studied for obviating surprize and indignation among the Many, for softening adverse and ingaging favorable prejudices. ‘Possibly,’ says the orator, still addressing Philip, ‘you may reckon it beneath you, to regard the slanders and absurdities that are vented about you; satisfied with your own consciousness of integrity. But you ought not to despise the opinion of the Many, nor reckon it a little matter to hold universal esteem. You may indeed reckon that you have attained a fair and great reputation, becoming yourself and your forefathers, and the deeds of both, if you bring all the Greeks to be so affected toward you as we see the Lacedæmonians toward their kings, and those in immediate familiarity with you toward yourself. Nor will this be difficult, if you will show yourself the common friend of all, and no longer distinguish some cities with favor, and others with the reverse; and if moreover you will prosecute measures for gaining the confidence of the Greeks, by being formidable to the barbarians.’

Isocr. Or.
ad Phil.
p. 360.

Hence he passes to animadvert upon the reasonableness of hope for success in war against Persia; founded on former successes of the Grecian arms, and the actually distracted state of the Persian empire: adding the remarkable assertion, that, for troops, there could be no difficulty to have them in any number; because such was the state of Greece, that a greater, and better army, might be more easily raised of exiles from the several republics, than of acknowledged citizens.

p. 370.

Hence again, under pretence of example and admonition to the prince, he passes to what might reconcile those among the Greeks, yet prejudiced against a Macedonian leader, and obviate the aversion and fear of those bred, whether in democratical or oligarchal principles, to look with horror upon royalty. ‘Three great examples to the point,’ he says, ‘are before you: your father, your great ancestor, the founder of the Macedonian monarchy, and your greater ancestor, the god Hercules, founder of your race. If the two former could, and the latter would speak, they would surely advise as I do. Your father was the friend of all those states whose friendship I recommend to you.’

p. 379.

‘ you. The founder of the Macedonian monarchy sought command,
 ‘ not as many have done, by sedition, massacre, and tumult in their
 ‘ own cities: with a more liberal spirit, leaving Greece, he acquired
 ‘ a kingdom in Macedonia; knowing that the Greeks were unaccus-
 ‘ tomed to bear monarchy, while other nations could not be satisfied
 ‘ under any other form of government. As thus in principles and
 ‘ practice, so in the successful result, he differed widely from others.
 ‘ They, when they have sought empire, not only have perished gene-
 ‘ rally themselves, but their race has been extirpated; whereas he,
 ‘ after a fortunate life, has transmitted his honors to a late posterity.’
 Much, following about Hercules, adapted, no doubt, to the Greeks of
 the time, cannot be equally felt by the modern reader. From the tra-
 ditionary deeds of that hero, the orator takes occasion again to dwell
 on the consideration of war with Persia, on the allurements of which,
 for the very large unsettled part of the Greek nation, and the party of
 war and trouble everywhere, he appears much to have relied. He
 concludes then thus: ‘ The sum of what I advise is this: that you
 ‘ act beneficially toward the Greeks; that you reign constitutionally
 ‘ over the Macedonians; that you extend your command, as widely as
 ‘ may be, over the barbarians. And thus you will earn the gratitude
 ‘ of all; of the Greeks for the good you will do them; of the Macedo-
 ‘ nonians, if you will preside over them constitutionally and not tyran-
 ‘ nically; and of all others, as far as you relieve them from barbaric
 ‘ despotism, and place them under the mildness of a Grecian admini-
 ‘ stration. Others must have their opinions of what the times want,
 ‘ and will judge for themselves how far what is here written may be
 ‘ adapted to them; but I am fully confident that no one will give you
 ‘ better advice, nor more accommodated to the existing state of
 ‘ things.’

Isocr. or.
 ad Phil.
 p. 410.

SECTION VIII.

Effect of the Oration of Isocrates. Measures of the King of Macedonia. Measures of the Phocians. Negotiation of all Parties with Macedonia. End of the Sacred War. Judgement on the Phocians committed to the Amphictyons. Credit acquired by the King of Macedonia.

THIS appeal of Isocrates, addressed to the reason of his fellowcountrymen, was weak against the measures of his opponents, who ingaged them by their passions. The temperance of style, in public speaking and writing, and the uniform moderation in political contest, of the party of Phocion, gave occasion for the saying, attributed to Philip, that 'Isocrates contended with a foil, against Demosthenes with a sword.' Nevertheless the sober remonstrance, in the oration to Philip, seems not to have been wholly wasted, even in Athens; and where, over the greater part of Greece, neither similar passions, nor equal powers of eloquence opposed, it appears to have had still more efficacy. The disposition, among the republics, to coöperate with the king of Macedonia, toward the establishment of peace throughout the country, and to put themselves under his lead for the purpose, was very extensive, and yet was put forward with nothing of the usual republican violence. His own conduct marked the completest respect for the venerable orator's admonition, and yet exhortation urging him to the undertaking seems not to have been unwanted. So little solicitous, as it is indicated by Demosthenes himself, was Philip to take the lead in settling the troublesome and invidious business of the Sacred war, that he invited the Lacedæmonian government to assume it, offering to leave the arrangement wholly to them. Why this was declined, both Macedonian and Lacedæmonian history failing, we are uninformed³⁰. But

Philip

Demosth. de
legat. p. 305.

³⁰ Λακεδαιμονίους μετέτιμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἰκίνοις ὑποσχομένῳ πράξειν. Demosth. de legat. p. 305. The orator proceeds to

say that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but he has totally avoided to say how; for which it is difficult to assign a reason,

Philip still delayed moving, while the siege of Halus, continuing, might afford him excuse to his impatient allies. That town at length surrendered upon terms; what we are not informed: but it is evinced by the very invective of Demosthenes, that nothing of ordinary republican cruelty followed. The population was removed. It appears to have been rumored that, pretending to take the place for the Pharsalians, he would garrison it with his own troops, for a check upon the Pharsalians; but he gave it up to them with a strict adherence to promise, or a liberality beyond promise, which still increased his popularity. The whole military force of Thessaly then, according to Diodorus, putting itself under his orders, he marched to Thermopylæ. Diod. l. 16.

Thus the Sacred war was at length brought to a crisis, when the treasury of Delphi, originally the great object, was no longer worth contention. Still, however, various and great concerns remained; the possession of the temple itself, with its oracle and sacred precinct, the place of meeting of the Amphictyonic council, and the seat of the Pythian games; with the decision of this possession would be determined the fate of the Phocian people, and the dominion of the Phocian territory; and, what was the sum of all, the supremacy among the states of Greece could scarcely fail to be theirs who should finally prevail in this great contest. But while the enemies of Phocis had obtained the advantage of the Macedonian alliance, the powerful confederacy which had so long enabled her to withstand, and often nearly overbear her opponents, was distracted, and almost dissolved, through mutual mistrust, produced by the measures of the war-party at Athens. Phalæcus and his partizans could have no confidence in the Athenian government, while there was reason to apprehend that the party of Demosthenes and Chares might obtain a superiority in the general assembly. They were also become jealous of Archidamus and Lacedæmon, apparently in consequence of new connection, formed or apprehended, between the Athenian war-party and the Lacedæmonian government³¹. The

reason, but that he was unable. On the contrary, what he and his rival together

have made known, rather indicates that the snare, or ambush, *ῥέδρα*, of which he speaks, as deciding the final measure of Archidamus, was his own work, or that of

his party, in the business of the Phocian garrisons.

³¹ This is indicated by Demosthenes, in what he reports of the proposal for surrendering the Phocian garrisons, and by Æschines.

Jesch. de le-
gat. p. 307.
Eccr. or. ad
Philipp.

Theban forces joined the army under Philip. Meanwhile more than three-fourths of Peloponnesus was ready, on any encouragement from him, to fall upon Laconia itself. In this state of things resistance to the confederacy, of which Philip was the head, could hardly, with any reasonable hope of success, be attempted.

Jesch. de le-
gat. p. 307,
308.

Nevertheless, even in this state of things, Philip did not cease to show a desire to bring the Grecian republics to conciliation, rather than proceed to the violences, for which his allies were urgent. Of this disposition Phalæcus hastened to avail himself. It was not to be hoped that, under any arrangement which the actual circumstances would allow, he and his principal partizans could continue to live in Phocia. They were therefore glad to stipulate for leave to emigrate in safety, carrying with them their portable effects. On these conditions the critical posts of Nicæa, Thronium and Alponus were surrendered to the king of Macedonia, and Phalæcus marched toward Peloponnesus. Greece was now open to the king of Macedonia and the Thessalians. The most vehement alarm immediately seized the inhabitants of those

Jesch. ut ant.

Boeotian towns, which had ingaged in the Phocian cause. They feared, not Macedonian sovereignty, but Theban vengeance. They hastened therefore to address supplication to Philip, praying that they, like the adherents of Phalæcus, might have permission, abandoning their houses and lauds, to seek safety for their lives by flight. Nor was the aspect of things much less unfavorable for the Phocians of the party adverse to Phalæcus; if they had fled on his restoration, they could not hope to return; or if any had remained, they could little hope longer to remain in safety, obnoxious as they were to the Thebans for their connection with Athens. It is indeed indicated by Demosthenes,

Demosth. de
legat. p. 360
& 366.

that the principal Phocians very generally emigrated. Philip, interesting himself for all these, so differed with the Thebans and Thessalians, who were vehement for vengeance against them, that a coolness between them became apparent. Nevertheless he succeeded in procuring personal safety for all. The remaining Phocians, being the principal part of the lower classes, participated in the common horror of subjection to the power of the Thessalians and Thebans, but they declared their readiness to surrender themselves to the king of Macedonia. This was allowed them, and in his name, exclusively, possession was taken

Jesch. de
legat.

Jesch. de le-
gat. p. 303,
304.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 360.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 59.

of

of all their towns. What passed between Archidamus and Philip, after the proposal to submit the Phocian business to the arbitration of Lacedæmon, we find no account. Demosthenes indeed says that Philip deceived the Lacedæmonians, but without adding the least intimation how; and had there been anything in any transaction really uncreditable to Philip, he would not so have failed to mention the facts, which should have supported the imputation. Nor is it likely that, had there been anything very uncreditable to Archidamus, notice of it would have wholly failed; unless either public negotiation, or private intrigue, from Athens, was implicated. Complete arrangement indeed between the two kings, seems not to have been effected; or not such as to obviate future misunderstanding. Archidamus, however, clearly unable to interfere farther with any effect, withdrew, and was unmo-
lested in his march homeward. Phalæcus and his principal followers found a temporary refuge in Peloponnesus. The mercenary force under him divided. A part, following his fortune, engaged in new adventure, where, among the widely spread settlements of the Greeks, in Crete, it is said, and in Italy, a demand for such troops occurred. Some had found service among the troubles of Eubœa. All quitted the former scene of action, and thus, after so many bloody struggles, during more than ten years, the Sacred war quietly ended³².

Diod. l. 16.
Æsch. de
cor. p. 481.

By

³² Demosthenes, in his oration on the embassy, spoken within two years after the end of the Phocian war, says expressly that Philip took no Phocian town by siege or assault, but that all were surrendered to him by capitulation: *Μηδμίαν τῶν πόλεων τῶν ἐν Φωκίᾳ ἀλῶναι πολιορκίᾳ, μηδ' ἐκ προσβολῆς κατὰ κράτος; ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ σπείσασθαι πάντας*—Demosth. de legat. p. 360. In another part of the same oration, speaking of the demolition of the walls of the Phocian towns, he attributes that work expressly to the Thebans: *τὰ τῶν Φωκίων τείχη καὶ σκαπείτο· Οἰεῖται δ' ἦσαν οἱ καὶ σκαπείοντες*. p. 445. What then are we to think when we find the same orator, in a speech of twenty years after, and with another purpose in view, producing from among the records of the republic, a

letter purporting to have been sent by Philip to the Athenian people, immediately after the surrender of Phocis, in these terms: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Athenian council and people greeting: Know that we have passed Thermopylæ, and subdued Phocia: that we have placed garrisons in the towns that voluntarily submitted, and that, having taken by force those that resisted, we have destroyed them, and reduced the people to slavery.' Demosth. de cor. p. 238, 239. Did he, in the former speech, hazard falsehoods concerning public and notorious facts, then recent, speaking then also in accusation, so that his adversary, in his reply, which is extant, might have brought forward the recorded letter, had it existed.

and

By these events the fate of Greece certainly was placed very much in the king of Macedonia's power. But through all the invective of the adverse orator, it is evident that he proceeded to use the power with a moderation unexampled among the republics, and with a consideration for the general constitution of the country, and for the several constitutions of all its various states, as if he would teach every one how to respect itself, and all how to support the independency and dignity of the nation. He came attended with a very small body of Macedonian troops: the Thessalians were in considerable force about him: the whole strength of Bœotia was at hand. It was expected and demanded of him by his allies, that the Amphictyonic law should be carried into execution against the prostrate people: and it appears much implied by the orators, that, if he would have assumed judgement to himself, little exception would have been taken; unless that the Thebans and Thessalians would have been dissatisfied with mild sentences. According to that constitution, which all Greece had for centuries acknowledged in theory, tho very little admitted in practice, the judgement should rest with the Amphictyons. But, apparently with a just consideration for equity, as well as a just deference to those states which had professed resistance to the decrees of the Amphictyons, on the ground that they acted under controul, Philip invited a congress of deputies from all the states of Greece³¹.

Demosth.
Philipp. II.
p. 69. &
Philipp. III.
p. 123.
Demosth. de
legat.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 37 l.
Demosth. de
legat. p. 37 8,
379.

At Athens this appears to have been, at the time, generally acceptable, and the former ambassadors were mostly reappointed by the people. Æschines and Demosthenes were of the number; but Æschines

and which, had it existed, must then have been generally in memory? or was the letter, or the part of it above quoted, one of those forgeries or falsifications of public records, said to have been not unknown at Athens, which the orator might venture in the latter speech, when he was himself speaking in reply, and perhaps could not be answered till after the decision of the cause? or how otherwise is the contradiction to be accounted for?

³¹ Diodorus, (l. 16. c. 59.) with his too ordinary deficiency, says that Philip con-

sulted with the Bœotians and Thessalians. It is obvious that he could not avoid consulting with the Bœotians and Thessalians. But the assertion of Æschines, that ambassadors or deputies were invited from the republics generally, is corroborated by the account of Demosthenes, who says, the Athenian people named ambassadors for the occasion: 'Ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν πόλεων ἀνέστησαν ἀπὸ τῶν πλείων πρεσβυται, ὡς τὸν Φίλιππον, — ἐχρηματούμενοι καὶ τοῖς ἑτέροις, καὶ ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοῖς πλείοσι τοῖς ἀντιπάλαισι. Demosth. de legat. p. 37 8.

obtaining excuse for sickness, testified by the oath of his physician before the council of Fivehundred, Demosthenes refused the office³⁴. For Æschines his brother was substituted.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 378.
Æsch. de
legat. p. 271.

As the breach widened between the parties of Phocion and Chares, the secession of Æschines from the latter, and addiction to the former, became decided and avowed. Being the most powerful speaker of his new party, he stood of course in the most direct opposition to the leading orator of the other party, Demosthenes; and hence the violence of political enmity between them, to which, of all the celebrated orations transmitted from antiquity, we owe four the most celebrated, and with them, the fullest and best information of the transactions, and especially of the politics of the times. Æschines's change of party furnished opportunity for invective, which Demosthenes did not fail to use. With the licentiousness of democratical oratory, he continually imputed it to bribes from the Macedonian court. Æschines was less addicted to foul language, yet we find him sometimes retorting with it, in a way that the licentiousness of democracy only would allow. 'Demosthenes,' he says, 'mind and body, and every limb, was continually up at auction.' These mutual imputations, of the utmost familiarity in the political oratory of their day, prove nothing, nor have any tendency to prove anything. Æschines might have his views to private advantage in quitting, as Demosthenes in adhering to the profligate party he was engaged with. But the secret ways of corruption are rarely open to the historian; nor is it necessary here to go beyond obvious and tangible matter, for ground for the conduct of either orator. Envy at the superiority acquired by a younger, in the favor of Chares, in the favor of the multitude, and in consequent weight and importance, may have affected the mind of Æschines. But more creditable motives are also obvious; a foresight of the evils which the projects of Chares and Demosthenes, if unsuccessful, would bring upon Athens, and, if prosperous, upon all the rest of Greece; a dislike to continue in political society with those, however eminent for talents, who had already been disgraced by disappointment in numerous

Ch. 39. s. 5.
of this Hist.

³⁴ The expression of Demosthenes, in giving his account of this refusal, is, ἱερμεοσάμην, literally, 'I swore off.' On what ground he swore off is not indicated by either orator.

uncreditable projects; a preference of the ready friendship of such men as Isocrates, Phocion, and Niceratus, and those with whom Isocrates and Phocion and Niceratus held friendship. On the other hand, what would lead Demosthenes to decline the office, to which the popular voice had appointed him, was the fear of leaving the assemblies, in a critical moment, to the unbalanced eloquence of Æschines, supporting the wisdom and approved integrity of Niceratus, Isocrates, and Phocion.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 515
& 517.

The business referred to the congress, which met at Thermopylæ³⁵, was of extreme complication and difficulty. The first object, presenting itself, was judgement on the Phocians; and this abounded with embarrassment. The Thebans, Thessalians, and some others, it was well known, were disposed to press severity: on the other hand that large part of Greece, which had more or less supported or approved the opposition to Thebes and the Amphictyons, would feel involved, in censure at least, by any sentence against them. The restoration of the credit of the Delphian treasury then was what all would desire; but on the important question how it should be managed, there would be much doubt and little agreement. Indemnification, for the states interested in the treasure which had been wasted, was also called for; but how this should be provided would not be readily agreed³⁶. The views of true Grecian patriots indeed would go still much farther; to provide for the future peace and union of Greece, without which the independency of each republic, and of all, must be utterly precarious. And here adverse prejudices, conflicting interests, difficulties of all kinds presented themselves. But the matters on which early decision was most imperiously required, were judgement on the Phocians, and arrangement of the business of the Delphian treasury. Perhaps it was no more than necessary, for the purpose of coming to any conclu-

³⁵ That the meeting was at Thermopylæ is marked by Æschines, in his oration on the crown, p. 515 & 517, ed. Reiske. On what ground Auger has given 'Delphes,' for Πύλαι, I cannot pretend to guess, nor how he could suppose Eubœa in the way from Delphi to Athens. From Thermopylæ the voyage by the Eubœan coast to the Attic

was perhaps, at any time, the most commodious way of making the journey; and when Bœotia was hostile, and the season of the Pylæan or other truce did not give security, it would be almost the only way.

³⁶ That these were objects is shown by Demosthenes, de legat. p. 347.

sion, and making any progress, that, after short deliberation, the congress resolved to refer ~~these~~ to the Amphictyons.

Regularity of proceeding, and respect for the antient constitution of the nation, could hardly any other way be so well consulted, as in committing the judgement to that formerly venerated national court of judicature. But to make it an impartial court, and to procure any general confidence in it, some more than usual balance, against the old preponderance of Thessalian votes, and the recent acquisition of Theban influence, was necessary. Nor was this unprovided for. The ministers returned to their several homes, to report past, and obtain instructions for future proceedings. At Athens no objection seems to have been made to the resolution of the congress: none however obtained the sanction of the sovereign assembly. The same embassy was reappointed, as an embassy to the Amphictyons³⁷. The means of the Amphictyonic body, to enforce their decrees, depended upon the support which the republics they represented were able and willing to give. It was in the practice of the Amphictyons, we find, in critical emergencies, to call all Greeks, at the time at Delphi, on whatever authorized business, to assist with their advice, making, in *epitonē*, a kind of general assembly of the nation. But a congress of embassies would have more regular authority; it would be as a second house of national assembly; and would far more either controul, or add weight to, the decrees of an assembly, so partially constituted as the Amphictyons. Esch. de legat.
Esch. decor.

The contending orators, each giving an account of this interesting meeting, do not give the clear and full information which might be expected³⁸. Whether in the council, however, or rather in the congress,

³⁷ Eschines calls both the missions, appointed to consider of judgement on the Phocians, embassies to the Amphictyons. The former of them is called, by Demosthenes, an embassy to Philip.

³⁸ Demosthenes, ingeniously throwing out hints to his adversary's disadvantage, where he could venture nothing in plain terms, that might not be in plain terms contradicted, describes things in half-sentences; and Eschines, always tending to excite pas-

sion, among the Many, that his conduct had been directed by a disposition adverse to their democratical despotism (to which, in common with Phocion and Isocrates, and all the best men of Athens, he certainly was adverse) often avoids to give any account, where much might be expected from him. It is remarkable, in the orations on the embassy and on the crown, that there is more eulogy of Philip from Demosthenes, his virulent enemy, than from Eschines.

congress, or perhaps between the council and the embassies composing the congress, questions, it appears, were warmly debated. According to Æschines, some of the Amphictyons, from some of the smaller republics, were very rude, uneducated men. The animosity, even of the Thebans against the Phocians, was exceeded by the barbarous fanaticism of the rough highlanders of Ceta; who contended that, to appease the anger of the gods against the Greek nation, nothing of the full punishment, directed by the Amphictyonic law for sacrilege, should be remitted; the whole Phocian people, they insisted, should be destroyed, by precipitation from the cliffs of the sacred mountain. Against such extreme intemperance, however, the measures already taken would, in a great degree, provide. The most obnoxious of the Phocians were already out of easy reach; some, as we have seen, with Phalæcus in Peloponnesus, some in other parts. But the more liberal, in the council and among the embassies, appear to have been a clear majority. The decree finally given, as it remains reported by Diodorus, seemingly neither unfairly, nor very defectively, tho in these times it may appear severe, yet placed by the side of republican judgements, will show rather moderation, humanity, and clemency. It began regularly with laying a foundation for what was to follow, by declaring all the Amphictyonic rights of the Phocians forfeited. It directed then that the three principal cities of Phocis be dismantled, and all the other towns destroyed; that the people live in villages, not less than a furlong one from the other, and none consisting of more than fifty houses; that they surrender all heavy armour and all horses, and possess none till the debt to the god be paid; for the liquidation of which a yearly rent of sixty talents, nearly twelve thousand pounds sterling, was assessed on the Phocian lands.

With as little severity thus, as, considering the state of Greece, it seems easy to imagine possible, all the principal objects of the congress,

his friend. In his oration on the crown, especially, Æschines seems to have feared that every syllable, which might be construed into justification of Philip, would operate toward his own ruin; and even the panegyric that he has hazarded in his oration on the embassy, when he was supported

by Phocian and all the principal men of his party, is not given as from himself, but put into the mouths of others. To such a degree was that true, when Isocrates ventured to declare, that democracy did now allow freedom of speech.

those

Æsch. de
legat. p. 310.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60.

those which most interested the Greek nation, were provided for. The most eminent of the Phocians, as we are informed by Demosthenes, including probably most of the principal landowners, had already emigrated. That frequent lot of Grecian freemen, exile, was evidently for them unavoidable. Their country was in course to be held subordinate, and deprived of means to renew the former violences against the temple and treasury, and the dangers insuing to the conquerors. For them to live in the country then, surrounded by Thebans, Locrians, and Cithæans, with arms in their hands, if possible, could not be desirable. The deprivation of heavy armour and horses, for those allowed to retain possession of the lands, was no more than an ordinary precaution, among the republics, against a defeated party of their own fellowcitizens. To move the inhabitants of one town to another, we have seen also a common measure of policy; and to move the Phocians, mostly of the lower ranks only, from towns to villages, would probably, be less felt, as a severity, than the forced migration of the principal Arcadian landowners to a city; which the boasted vindicator of Grecian freedom, Epameinondas, is said first to have commanded, and the Athenian republic, claiming to be the great patroness of democracy, afterward supported. For the remaining population then to pay the rent required, holding lands not before their own, was a mode of restoring the credit of the Delphian treasury, and doing justice to those who had suffered from the contest for it, apparently as little exceptionable as any which the circumstances of the times would have admitted. This remaining population must live so far in dependency, as it was without means to defend itself against foreign invasion. But all the neighboring states had an interest in defending it, while their jealousies would prevent any one from commanding it; so that the Phocian people, in their villages, possessed perhaps a better independency than the Bœotian towns under Theban rule, or the aristocratical Arcadians under their democratical sovereigns.

It remained to dispose of the right of double vote in the Amphictyonic assembly, which had been held by the Phocian people. Among those then whose cause the king of Macedonia had assisted, among the large part of the Greek nation, which reckoned that by him the
national

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60 & 64.
Justin.

national religion was vindicated, the political as well as the religious constitution maintained, the rights of the great national council asserted, and themselves preserved from subjugation, it could appear no immoderate compliment to give it to a prince, the acknowledged descendant of Hercules, who had done so much for them. It was accordingly decreed, that the forfeited double vote of the Phocians should belong to the king of Macedonia, and his posterity.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 359
& 378.
Æsch. de
legat.

About 17
August.

Demosth. de
Pacr. p. 62.
& Philipp. 2.
p. 60.
& de cor.
p. 238.

As soon as judgement was declared against the Phocians, Dercyllus, one of the Athenian embassy, a friend of Chares, hastened home, leaving the rest of the embassy to deliberate on measures, farther to be taken, for establishing the tranquillity of Greece. It happened that he arrived when an assembly of the people was, in regular course, held in Peiræus, on the business of the naval arsenals. Alarm was infused among the multitude, as if the combined forces of Macedonia, Thessaly, and Thebes were on full march against Athens. The panic was such, that a decree, proposed to the sovereign crowd, was instantly voted, commanding all free inhabitants of Attica, without delay, to move their families from the country into one of the fortified towns, Athens, Peiræus, Eleusis, Phylæ, Aphidna, Rhamnus, or Sunium: it directed farther, that all those places be put into the best state for defence; and, the more to impress the popular mind, it was proposed, and the decree directed, that the sacrifice to Hercules, according to the established ceremonial for the beginning of a war, be performed in the city.

These measures appear, on first view, democratical extravagancies, unfit even for any serious party purposes. But the explanation remains from Demosthenes himself, in his account of the measures of his party, which have been already related; the negotiation for placing the towns, commanding the pass of Thermopylæ, in the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and the plan for starving the Amphictyonic army, by stopping its supplies. How far, and how timely, Philip may have had information of the extent of this hostile purpose, and of the preparation for its execution, we are not informed; but intelligence of transactions, so public as those which followed the return of Dercyllus, would of course quickly reach him. It produced a communication from him, in the

Demosth. de
cor. p. 238.

usual form of a letter, to the Athenian people, testifying his surprize at their proceedings, and complaining of them, as measures indicating the purpose of hostility, the most unprovoked and unjustifiable³⁹. What answer was given to this letter is nowhere said; but circumstances enough indicate that it was such as the party of Chares, and not the party of Phocion, would suggest. Confidence between the Macedonian and Athenian governments must of course cease; and the Athenian embassy to the Amphictyons (whether at Thermopylæ still, or rather removed to Delphi) if before authorized, as Æschines indicates, to concur with Philip in lenient measures toward Phocis and the Boeotian allies of Phocis, and to support propositions of that tendency against the violence of the Thebans and Thessalians, would now be utterly uncertain what to expect from their own government; sure only that, if the party of Chares finally prevailed, they should be criminated for any concurrence in Macedonian counsels.

Nevertheless the congress, as the historian assures us, proceeded, in the line recommended by Isocrates, taking into consideration what was wanting for the general benefit of Greece (toward which an extension of pacification would be a principal matter) and passing decrees for the purpose. But Athenian support failing (not perhaps that which the Athenian embassy might be disposed to give, but that which it could undertake that the government it represented would support) it became necessary to yield much to the Thebans and Thessalians. Philip could not, without certain rupture with Thebes, and injury to his interest in Thessaly, procure the restoration of Plataea and Thespiae, the towns from of old connected with Athens; nor could he obviate the exile of the Orchomenians and other Boeotians, who had taken part with the Phocians. It was even said that, so small was the Macedonian force attending him, compared with the Theban and Thessalian, and so violent a powerful party in Thebes, that even his person might not have been safe, had he urged favor to those unfortunate people farther. On his part no violence was used or threatened. Bloodshed

³⁹ This is the letter mentioned in note 32. ance of falsification, similar to that which of this section. In the latter part of it, Demosthenes himself has given reason to stating the complaint, there is no appearance in the former.

even, what law might have warranted, was completely obviated. Returning to his kingdom, he left the decrees, which had been constitutionally passed, to be constitutionally executed, under the direction of the Amphictyons. What then his own generosity could do, to make amends to the unfortunate outcasts, it is acknowledged was done. As many as would take refuge in his kingdom were kindly relieved, and provided with settlements. Nor did the invective of the Athenian orators avail over the greater part of Greece. On the contrary, wherever the Athenian war-party interest did not predominate, its purposes were observed with aversion and apprehension, and its invective rather excited opposition in panegyric, even to extravagance. To this the testimony of Demosthenes himself is so strong and so direct, that it may perhaps outweigh all others. Even at Thebes, he says, the voice of those at the time prevailed, who joined the Thessalians, extolling Philip as their friend, benefactor, and preserver; and, throughout Greece, the people rejoiced in the peace, for which they readily acknowledged themselves indebted to him⁴⁰. Thus warranted, the historian's large, yet sober praise, will command credit: 'Philip,' says Diodorus, 'having concurred with the Amphictyons, in their decrees for the common welfare of Greece, having provided means for carrying them into execution, and having conciliated goodwill, on all sides, by his humanity and affability, returned into his kingdom, bearing with him the glory of piety, added to that of military talents and bravery, and in possession of a popularity that gave him great advantage for future extension of his power.'

Demosth. de
cor. p. 238.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 60.

⁴⁰ The foul words, with which the orator has studiously stained his eulogy, sufficiently shows that he meant no flattery: "Οι μὲν κατόπισθεν Θεσσαλοὶ καὶ ἀσπίδατοι Θεῖται, φίλοι, ἰσχυρίτην, σωτῆρα τῶν Φιλίππων ἡγήσαντο παῖν' ἑαυτοῦς ἢ αὐτοῦ. 'Οι Ἕλληες δὲ Ἕλληες, ἡμεῖς

ἐμὲ περισπασμένοι καὶ διαμαρτυρήτες, ὡς ἤλπισαν, ἔχοντες τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄσμενοι. Demosth. de cor. p. 240. The sense, in which Demosthenes commonly uses the term *παρακίζω*, seems most nearly, to be represented, in English, by the cant word, 'to hum.'

CHAPTER XL.

Affairs of GREECE, from the End of the Sacred War, to the Acquisition of the Lead of the War-party of ATHENS, and the Authority of First Minister of the Republic, by DEMOSTHENES.

SECTION I.

Change in the political State of Greece produced by the Sacred War. Policy of the Party of Chares at Athens: Popular Interest favoring the Party: Prosecution of hostile Purpose against Macedonia: Oration of Demosthenes on the Peace.

THAT contest among the Grecian republics, commonly intitled the Sacred War, terminated with far less calamity, far less subversion of the former state of things, than was apprehended if either Thebes or Phocis might have commanded the use of victory, nevertheless produced a revolution in the political circumstances of Greece, very important and wholly unforeseen. The empire, as it was called, of Thebes, which had shone like a meteor under Epameinondas, but, from the moment of his death, had held only a sickly existence, was annihilated; except as the Theban people were confirmed in their command, truly imperial, over the people of all the other towns within the narrow bounds of Bœotia. Lacedæmon, with many struggles, had risen little from the low state to which Epameinondas had reduced her. On the depression of Thebes and Lacedæmon, Athens had exulted in fair hope of command over her sister republics, more unrivalled than in her former greatest prosperity. But that hope was thwarted by the new power, and still more by the spreading popularity of the Macedonian government; forced, by the invasion of Thessaly, after much war with Athens alone, into contest and connec-

tion among other states south of Thermopylæ. It was comparatively little that, on the Thracian shore, Amphipolis and Methonë had been lost, and, with Olynthus and its dependencies, added to a rival dominion. Macedonia was now the power to which, far more than to Thebes, Lacedæmon, and Athens together, the Grecian people were become extensively disposed to commit that protecting and combining supremacy, which had so long been the object of ambition and contest for all.

A large party in Athens, as we have seen, was disposed to rest under these circumstances, considering them as altogether even desirable; affording the best prospect, for ages offered, of means for harmonizing the jarring interests of the several republics, and establishing for their people, upon the broad basis of a liberal community in rights, a quiet and security hitherto unknown, and now more than ever wanted. But the obstacles, in the political state of the country, remained yet many and great. Every republic having views, not simply to its own good, but, through habitual jealousy, adverse to its neighbors, and every republic being divided within itself, so that fellowcitizens were more jealous of each other than of any foreigners, thus, in the very advantages of the Macedonian connection, new sources of contention arose.

In such a state of things, to set civil discord again extensively in flame, it would suffice that a rival patronizing power was ready. This the party of Chares saw, and on it rested the policy which, after so many failures, with unwearied diligence, and unabated ardor, they persevered in pursuing. On a union of the democratical interest throughout Greece, under their patronage, they hoped to found a power, capable of balancing still and even overwhelming the Macedonian kingdom. That they had ever wholly abandoned this purpose, that they had ever intended to keep peace with Macedonia, longer than the pressure of circumstances required, the whole tenor of the orations of Demosthenes shows highly doubtful, if indeed it does not rather absolutely disprove. But they had hoped that they might maintain their commanding influence in the sovereign assembly, even during peace, till their policy might bring them means for again resorting to war with advantage. Here however they had a new disappointment. All their flattery to the
king

king of Macedonia, and all the ability with which, in the first negotiation for peace, they had outwitted their domestic opponents, could not induce him to give his confidence to them, or withdraw it from Phocion's party.

The form of the Athenian government afforded frequent opportunity for foreign powers to interfere in its concerns, in a way highly dangerous. The jealousy of democracy would little allow a regular minister for foreign affairs, with sufficient powers; a jealousy perhaps not altogether unreasonable, because the impotence of democracy could hardly allow it with safety. The resource was to divide the authority among numbers: at Athens the council of Fivehundred was the proper board for communicating with foreign states. But that body was too unwieldy to be properly competent for the business. From one extreme then, as was not uncommon among the democracies, the transition was immediate to another. If matters pressed, and a decided favorite of the sovereign many was ready, all authority was committed to an autocrat-general. Thus a Pericles and a Cleon, an Alcibiades and a Chares, by turns ruled with dictatorial powers. But in the intervals of such decisive partiality for one man, any orator, who could gain the popular ear, might be the effectual agent of any foreign state; as we have seen Demosthenes for Rhodes and for Megalopolis. Macedonia was now become the foreign power of most consideration, for Athens especially, but for every other Grecian republic also with which Athens had affairs to transact. If then one party in Athens could communicate with the Macedonian government readily and upon friendly terms, and the other not so, the former would have great advantage for holding the administration; and the other, while peace with Macedonia lasted, could not hold it but under great disadvantages. Accordingly, after the conclusion of the peace, the party of Phocion, tho much impeded, and sometimes interrupted, yet mostly directed the administration and disposed of the principal offices¹. In these circumstances, for the party of Chares and Demosthenes to recover the lead, new troubles were necessary, and especially a breach with Macedonia.

Demosth.
Phil. 2. &
de Cherson.
Æsch. de
legat. sub
fine.

¹ This is shown by the complaints of the oration of Æschines on the embassy, Demosthenes in the second Philippic, and toward the conclusion.
in the Chersonese, and more expressly by

The actual state of the Athenian republic then afforded them invitation and even incitement. Not Chares only and the leading men of his party, orators and principal officers, but all who had acted in any favor under him, to the lowest juryman and the last rower of a trireme, together a large proportion of the Athenian citizens, were feeling, in peace, the loss of numerous advantages and larger hopes, to which in war they had been accustomed. In war every Athenian citizen, on a foreign station, was a great man. The consideration he held, the authority conceded to him, the profit insuing, the prospect of adventure ever before him, with endless hope of new advantages, were, through the peace, ended, to the great regret of numbers. The orators also found their principal source of gain and of hope in war. No officer could long hold foreign command without an orator ready, on all occasions, at home, to undertake the defence of his conduct. An orator, not yet eminent enough to be paid for defending a general, might hope to rise by attacking a general; and often he obtained pay for abstaining from attack, when, for undertaking defence, he could not get employment. To increase the foreign dependencies of Athens, to have disturbance arise in those dependencies, to have complaints come to the courts of Athens, from foreign republics against one another, or against Athenian officers, all tended to the advantage of the orators. Nor did their cause, thus bad, stand unsupported; it rested on the broad basis of the interest of thousands of citizens, who lived by the pay for attending the assemblies and courts of justice, and the feasts or other bribes given to obtain their votes. Beginning then, at Athens, to promote a breach of the peace and alliance just concluded with Macedonia, the war-party proposed to acquire power equal to their ambition, by patronizing, throughout Greece, the party opposite to that which, for the sake of peace external and internal, might form or desire connection with Macedonia.

B. C. 346.
Cl. 108.3.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 374.
& de Pace, vel
Philipp. 5.

The hostile purpose, already, on many occasions, shown, became soon more directly avowed. The right of representation in the council of Amphietyons being given to the reigning family of Macedonia, Philip, with just deference to his co-estates, sent them severally notice of it. A Thessalian embassy accompanied Philip's ministers, to announce it to the new ally of Thessaly, the Athenian people, and to desire the formal

formal acknowledgement of him, as an Amphictyon, by a decree for the purpose. In the assembly held, to give audience to those ministers, some violent speeches were made in opposition to the demand. Constitutional objection to it, apparently was not to be found. The adverse orators therefore, passing over all consideration of the Amphictyonic decree, endeavored to excite indignation among the proud and irritable multitude, by speaking of the king of Macedonia's message as a requisition, resting on his own authority: 'It was unfit,' they said, 'that the Athenian people should receive commands from any king;' and some went so far as to assert that they should prefer war to an acknowledgement of the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon.

The speech of Demosthenes on the occasion remains to us, and it abounds with art². Pretending to reprove the violence of others, he effectually stimulates it. 'He never,' he said, 'believed Philip's professions of friendship for the Athenian people.' Calling his own party only, in the ordinary party-style, the Athenian people, he was perhaps right. 'From that friendship,' he proceeded, 'he looked for none of the benefits, which others so freely promised. He did not admire the treaty concluded: he did not think it such as the republic should have made. And yet he must caution the people against giving provocation for the states, now calling themselves Amphictyonic, to combine in war against the republic; of which there might be danger, if the Athenian people opposed what the Amphictyonic council had decreed. If indeed they would go to war again with Philip for Amphipolis, or whatever else, in which the Thessalians, Argians and Thebans had no common interest, the objection would not hold; because he did not believe these would join Philip, and least of all the Thebans.' Already, it may seem, the keensighted politician had discovered, in the popular passions and state of factions

Demosth. de
Pace, vel
Philipp. 5.

² The objections of Libanius and Photius to the authenticity of this oration, mischievous in the too common way of critics under the Roman empire, are yet almost too futile to deserve the formal refutation of the learned author of the note on the subject, in the ancient universal history. For those curious on the subject however, that note may deserve attention. But I would invert the added argument, ascribing the oration to Demosthenes, 'because he is worthy of it,' and rather say I ascribe it to Demosthenes, 'because it is worthy of him;' and to warrant this I would refer to the next following note in the same work.

at Thebes, the rising opportunity for leading the republic, of all Greece actually the most hostilely disposed toward Athens, to coöperate in the purposes of his party. But some stir and murmuring, among the people, admonished him that he must yet be cautious in speaking of Thebes. Proceeding, therefore, he said, ‘Let there not be tumult before I am heard: I repeat, least of all the Thebans. Not that they bear us any friendship; not that they are not enough disposed to court Philip; but because, however stupid any among you may suppose them, they know perfectly that their country lies between us and their allies; whence, if they were to join with Macedonia in war against us, the pressure would fall upon them, while another, the principal director of measures, would profit most from any success.’ With consummate art then he directed the conclusion of his speech, through an argument professing the purpose of peace, to prepare among the people, for ready use, the fuel of war, ambition, cupidity, and resentment. ‘We allow the Thebans,’ he said, ‘to hold Oropus: we have, by the late treaty, surrendered Amphipolis to Philip; we have consented that Cardia shall be separated from our dominion of the Chersonese; that the prince of Caria shall be the protecting power of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes; and that the Byzantines may stop our ships.’ (The Byzantines, independent since the Confederate war, and holding the command of the Bosphorus, took that toll from all ships passing to and from the Black Sea, which the Athenian government had exacted while Byzantium was under its dominion.) ‘Would it not then,’ he proceeded, ‘be absurd, conceding thus, to these powers, important advantages properly our own,’ (as if the people of Cardia, Chios, Cos, Rhodes and Byzantium were born to live under the dominion of the people of Athens,) ‘to engage in war with all together for a shadow at Delphi?’ The hostile mind is certainly enough exhibited in this speech for peace. What decision immediately followed we have no precise information; but, in the end, the advice of the more violent orators prevailed, and it was, by a decree, declared, that the Athenian people did not admit the claim of the king of Macedonia to be an Amphictyon.

SECTION II.

Short Cessation of Arms throughout Greece. Contest of Factions at Megara: Animosities in Peloponnesus: Propensity to desire Patronage of Macedonia. Invective at Athens against Macedonia: Accusation of Philocrates: Decree concerning Amphipolis. Accusation of Æschines by Timarchus. Second Philippic of Demosthenes. Accusation of Æschines by Demosthenes.

FULL of the spirit of discord as all Greece at this time remained, every republic hostile to many others, and each divided within itself, yet the conclusion of the Sacred war brought repose to the country, so far that contest in arms seems everywhere to have ceased. According to the avowal of Demosthenes himself, the Greeks very generally rejoiced in the peace, and were disposed to maintain it. Conformably to this testimony of the cotemporary orator, the next year, the fourth of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, is remarkable, in the narrative of the annalist, for a void in Grecian affairs; excepting for, what little concerned Greece generally, the expedition, formerly related, of Timoleon from Corinth to Sicily: the very name of Macedonia is unmentioned.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 240.

B. C. 345.
Ol. 108. 4.

But the fire of faction did not long remain so smothered. In the little republic of Megara, which we have formerly observed flourishing through industry in manufacture, the high democratical party, supported by the high democratical party in Athens, held the sway. As then that party in Athens was hostile to Macedonia, the party dependent on it in Megara would also be hostile to Macedonia; and thence the views of the adverse party would be the more directed to Macedonian patronage, which was becoming so extensively an object of desire. Accordingly Ptoeodorus, head of the noblest and wealthiest family of that little state, went to Pella. Of course he would be civilly received; but whether he obtained assistance, or reason to hope for assistance, appears uncertain. His principal encouragement seems rather to have been derived from the circumstances of Athens; the party of Chares, patrons of his opponents, no longer,

Ch. 28. s. 9.
of this Hist.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 436.

longer,

longer holding their former commanding influence there. The danger of their interference thus being, tho not removed, yet rendered less imminent, he ventured upon that which had enabled Hermocrates to return to Sicily, and Dion to acquire command in Syracuse, and so many other chiefs of parties to obtain a superiority in their republics; he introduced into Megara a body of mercenary troops. But, whether the more respectable of those, within or without his own state, otherwise disposed to support him, disapproved this measure, or pecuniary means failed him, or for whatever other cause, the mercenaries were soon dismissed; civil contest was renewed, and the democratical party appears to have recovered the ascendancy¹.

The troubles of Megara however seem little to have affected any state beyond the mountains, which pressed upon its small territory on one side, and the sea on the other. But Peloponnesus meanwhile was disturbed with contention more extensively threatening. The Lacedæmonians persevered in their purpose of recovering the dominion of Messenia, while the Argians, a majority of the Arcadians, and a party among the Eleians, were scarcely less zealous in opposition to it than the Messenians themselves. Unfortunately for Lacedæmon, its government, through extreme peculiarities, could associate intimately with none. The institutions of Lycurgus were scarcely less adverse to any close connection with a king of Macedonia, than with the democracies of Athens, Argos, or Megalopolis; nor were the deviations from his system, the pretensions of the ephors, the extravagant privileges of the Spartans, or any others of which we are informed, of a kind to render it more accommodating. Inflexibility remained the inconvenient virtue of the Lacedæmonian government, as extreme pliability was the commodious vice of the Athenian. The Athenian democracy seems to have formed alliance with tyrannies, as readily and intimately as with any other government, and adopted kings, and satraps, and

¹ Leland seems to have thought himself warranted, by loose expressions of Demosthenes, unless he was rather led by his French conductor, to assert (what Demosthenes would not venture to assert, tho he might desire it should be believed) that the

mercenaries under Ptæodorus were secretly paid by the king of Macedonia. It were endless to notice all instances of this kind among modern writers of Macedonian history. The translator Auger's introductions and notes abound with them.

tyrants, in Cyprus, in Thessaly, in Eubœa, in Sicily, of good character or bad, with apparent indifference, as its citizens.

The inferior Peloponnesian states then, accustomed for ages to look to some one powerful government for patronage, would be little likely now, wretched as they were through their divisions, to revolt at the idea of the patronage of a prince of the advantageous character of Philip, the renowned and beloved sovereign of a free people. It is then very remarkable, that a zeal for Macedonian patronage, an earnestness for Macedonian interference in the affairs of their peninsula, was particularly vehement among the people most vehemently democratical; and the testimony to this comes to us from no suspicious quarter, but from the great leader of the democratical cause in Greece, Demosthenes. The Argians and Megalopolians, spurning at the obtruded patronage of Athens, but feeling keenly the want of a superintending power, tho they had received no favor from Philip, had scarcely had any intercourse with him, yet for the meer popularity of his reputation, sent him golden crowns, erected brazen statues of him in their cities, and passed decrees, providing that, should he come into Peloponnesus, hospitality should everywhere await him. In Eleia, parties being more balanced, arms were taken, and much blood was shed; but the Macedonian party was finally victorious.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 424,
425.

Far beyond the power of the Macedonian arms, this spreading popularity of Philip's conduct and character was alarming and distressing to the war-party at Athens; the extravagance of it, in some places, indeed appearing to have been what might perhaps justly excite apprehension in men of better purposes. This therefore it was their first object to obviate and bear down; and the extravagance itself would assist to furnish them with ground for exciting jealousy of it. If they could raise suspicion and jealousy of Macedonia, the progress would be ready to suspicion and jealousy of their opponents of the party of Phocion. They did not spare the common-place invective of the democratical orators, imputing, in the grossest terms, without care of proof, corruption against all their opponents. But Philip especially, and Philip's family, and all Macedonia together they were sedulous to vilify. In a council of limited numbers, uncertainly composed even

Æsch. in
Timarch.

as that of the Fivehundred of Athens, more gravity and decency might be expected than in the assembly of the whole people. Nevertheless Demosthenes there, not contented with gross invective against the king of Macedonia, indulged himself in scandalous insinuations against the boy Alexander his son. Æschines, relating before the assembled people what he had witnessed in the council, of which he, as well as Demosthenes, was a member, justly admonished them that, if such injurious and base aspersion passed unreprieved, the Athenian character would be estimated, among foreigners, by that of their calumnious orator.

But, notwithstanding the success of the war-party, in procuring the refusal to acknowledge the king of Macedonia as an Amphictyon, they could not yet drive the party of Phocion from the administration. Their next resource therefore was impeachment. They threatened all those who had been colleagues of Demosthenes in that embassy to Macedonia, which became distinguished by the title of the embassy for the oaths. But while they involved all in imputed guilt, they selected one for their first attack, and their choice was evidently judicious. Philocrates, who had moved the repeal of the decree forbidding intercourse of heralds with Macedonia, and afterward became one of the most zealous promoters of the peace and alliance, appears to have been of some eminence by birth and wealth, and sometimes useful to the party of Phocion, by his zeal, activity and fearlessness, tho without great talents, or dignity of character. When it was the object of the party of Chares to reconcile and recommend itself to the Macedonian court, Demosthenes seems to have considered Philocrates as a man whose friendship might be gained and would be useful; and hence apparently he became his advocate, when prosecuted for moving the repeal of the decree forbidding communication by heralds. When afterward the party became anxious, on the failure of the Phocian plot, to hasten a separate peace and alliance between Athens and Macedonia, the zeal of Philocrates was a ready instrument, which Demosthenes used with much dexterity. But when, shortly after, the purpose of the party, with regard to Macedonia, was wholly changed, and a breach with that power became again as a first principle of its policy,

then

Æsch. de
legat.

then the intimacy of Demosthenes with Philocrates of course would cease, and the change could hardly stop short of enmity. Not Demosthenes, however, but Hyperides, an orator of considerable eminence, undertook the management of the prosecution. Whether Philocrates had implicated himself imprudently with Demosthenes, or for whatever other cause, there appears to have been no general disposition in the party of Phocion to give him effectual support. To avoid therefore the danger of a trial, he withdrew from Attica; possibly having, after the example of men of higher character, provided a retreat, which might make banishment from the turbulence of Athens little a punishment. His flight being taken, after the manner of the Athenian courts, as a confession of guilt, sentence was pronounced against him.

Æsch. de
legat. p. 192.

This victory, through the ingenuity and diligence of the party in using it, was not a little important. Hegesippus, a coarse but popular orator, vehement in the cause of Chares and democracy, proposed a decree, declaring that the cession of the dominion of Amphipolis, by the treaty of peace lately concluded with Macedonia, was injurious to the republic, and that the people, in giving sentence against Philocrates who proposed it, had effectually decided so; wherefore the right to that dominion remained still intire in the Athenian people. This receiving the sanction of the popular vote, the orator proceeded to state, that, in the treaty, was an article providing that, with the consent of both parties, any alterations might be made. It would, therefore, he contended be proper to announce to the Macedonian court the decree of the people, asserting their right to the dominion of Amphipolis, notwithstanding anything now in the treaty to the contrary, and to require that the treaty should be rectified accordingly. This also being approved by a majority of votes, Hegesippus himself was appointed ambassador from the republic for the occasion. Coming on so ungracious an errand, it appears indicated that, being nevertheless received with Philip's usual civility, his conduct was offensive and even treacherous. Demosthenes, in a speech of two or three years after, mentions that Xenocleides, a poet, who had been entertained at the Macedonian court, was ordered to leave the kingdom for his practices with the Athenian embassy. Demosthenes has enough shown that fearfulness and illiberality were no features in Philip's

Demosth. de
Halon. p. 82.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 447.

character; and desiring, on this occasion, to impress the people with an opinion that he had treated their ambassadors with incivility, he had nothing to impute but the dismissal of the poet Xenocleides⁴.

B. C. 345.
Ol. 108. 4.

Demosth.
Philipp. 2.
p. 70.

About the time of the mission of Hegesippus to Macedonia, the convulsed state of Peloponnesus produced there a congress of delegates from all or many of its governments. Demosthenes, in what character, or on what pretence, does not clearly appear, attended this congress, and spoke in it. His purpose was to obviate the growing propensity to the Macedonian alliance, and to persuade the Peloponnesians, especially the Messenians and Argians, to accept in preference the patronage of the Athenian democracy. His eloquence was applauded, but his arguments, as himself confesses, produced in no degree the effect he desired.

Failing thus abroad, the party nevertheless so felt their strength at home, that they resolved to proceed with impeachment, and to make Æschines, the most powerful speaker of the opposing party, their next object. But they were not judicious or not fortunate in committing the management to Timarchus, tho an orator of considerable eminence; for his scandalous immorality afforded opportunity, under the old law, after the manner of all the old Grecian constitutions, regulating the morals, for accusation against himself. This Æschines used so ably, that all the influence of the party, and all the eloquence of Demosthenes were unable to save him; he was obliged to follow Philocharès in flight. Party interest, no doubt, operated powerfully to promote, as well as to oppose, this decision; for which nevertheless, in justice, some credit may be due to the Athenian character of this corrupt age; when the multitudinous tribunal so supported the principles, and gave efficacy to the laws, of elder times (for the law of the case was much and ably argued by the accuser) as to supply the place of the great censorial court of Areiopagus, whose power Isocrates had been so anxious to restore.

The advantage gained by the war-party, in the triumph over Philocrates, was lost by this defeat. A sense of the failure of public favor,

⁴ The conduct of ministers under the late French democracy, and the present empire, will afford, for future commentators on the Greek orators, illustration which the learned of former times very much wanted.

and a consequent uncertainty of preponderance in the general assembly, are strongly marked in that exquisite piece of oratory, soon after delivered by Demosthenes, commonly called the Second Philippic. The exordium, expressly complaining of them, is singularly soothing and insinuating. With admirable art then, winding through a great variety of matter in short space, all proposed to conciliate the popular mind to himself and his friends, and to irritate it against the king of Macedonia, and those who would maintain the treaty of peace made with him, not till the conclusion at length the orator intimates the purpose of his party, for the disclosure of which all that had preceded was preparation, to institute a prosecution for high treason against Æschines, now to be conducted by himself.

To the war of oratory that followed, between Æschines and Demosthenes, we owe not only the orations the most admired that have been transmitted from antiquity, but also the most copious and most authentic information of the political circumstances and transactions of this interesting era, and the best insight especially into the civil circumstances of Athens, the constitution, the administration, and the party contests; with the advantage, uncommon for antient history, of means often for verification, by confronting the assertions of opposite interests. Demosthenes seems to have depended much upon the power of his party, and the influence of party interest in the multitudinous courts of Athens, for the success of his accusation; which was such as otherwise there could hardly be a hope of supporting. It applied to the conduct of Æschines in the second embassy to Macedonia, called the embassy for the oaths; stating ‘that he made a false report of the transactions of the embassy, and of various matters deeply interesting the republic, and that he prevented the people from hearing the true representation, which Demosthenes would have given; that he persuaded the people in assembly to measures adverse to their interest; that he disobeyed his instructions; that he occasioned a waste of time for the embassy, whence great opportunities were lost; and that the whole of his conduct was influenced by bribes, which he, together with Philocrates, took from the king of Macedonia.’ The proof offered, on all these heads, was what, in an English court of justice, would

would excite indignation against the accuser rather than induce conviction of the accused. Nor will the political principles, occasionally declared, find general approbation, tho they will deserve notice. ‘To make eternal peace,’ says Demosthenes, ‘with a mortal man, whose utmost greatness must be transient; to bind up all posterity from the right to use advantageous opportunities that fortune might offer, is most hainous.’ In conformity to this principle he proceeds, ‘the Phocian war was a great source of security to Athens, and the conclusion of such lasting hostilities was among great advantages lost to the republic, for which Æschines is accountable.’ And again, ‘Had the war been successful, you would not have borne the name of peace.’ At the same time he acknowledges that Philip was always desirous of peace, which, he also intimates, was among reasons why peace should not have been made with him.

Demosth.
Philipp. 2.
p. 358.

p. 367.

p. 372.

p. 412.

These principles Demosthenes seems never to have scrupled avowing. But in the accusation he appears to have felt that he had a bad cause to support. The disorder, which critics have observed in his arrangement, has been evidently the result, not of unskilfulness or negligence, but of design. It has been ingeniously imagined, to bewilder the judgement of his hearers, and draw away attention from the inconclusiveness of the arguments relating to the several points; while the object was to impress a general idea of disaffection to the popular cause, injury to the public interest, and corruption from the Macedonian court. But some of the arguments and some of the assertions of facts, seem beneath a great orator and statesman, even in addressing a multitude and putting forward a party cause.

In the reply of Æschines there is far more general dignity of manner, as well as more regularity of arrangement; mixed indeed with some very coarse personal abuse of the accuser, for which his private life appears to have afforded opportunity, and the practice of republican courts furnished continual precedents. Every point of the accusation he seems to have so repelled, that no conscientious jury could have given a verdict against him. Among the circumstances, not least remarkable, is the offer of his slaves to be examined under torture; and yet not less remarkable perhaps is the refusal of it by the accuser,

Æsch. de legat. p. 290.

with

with no motive of humanity alledged, but the consideration of his own dignity only, as unfit to be compromised by taking the evidence of slaves against his assertion; tho he had himself brought forward a slave as a witness for the accusation. The confidence of the accused in the fidelity and fortitude of his slaves, at the same time may excite our admiration; while the evident familiarity of the practice of putting them to the torture will hardly excuse his proposal of it⁵. To weaken the purpose of justice, through the influence of popular respect and pity, the father, at the great age of ninety-four years, and the brothers and the children of the accused were, as usual in the Athenian courts, brought forward. For this measure however he alledges a worthier object; to show the improbability that, bound to the commonwealth by such pledges, he could be false to its interest. Demosthenes, in his accusation, to excite indignation, at the same time against the accused, and against the king of Macedonia, gave an affecting account of the miserable state of the Phocian people, and the desolation of their country, which, in traversing it lately, he had seen. To obviate the effect of this, some of the principal Phocian and Bœotian refugees, attending as witnesses, confirmed the account, which remains to us in the speech of Æschines, of the exertions of the king of Macedonia, and of Æschines himself, as a member of the Athenian embassy to the Amphictyons, in favor of both people. The speech of the accused being concluded, some of the most respectable men of the commonwealth, Eubulus, Nausicles, and above all, Phocion, came forward and spoke in favor of his cause. So supported he was acquitted⁶.

Demosth.
de legat.

⁵ A similar offer and refusal of the evidence of slaves under torture has been noticed in the first section of the twenty-second chapter of this History.

⁶ From the licentiousness of the Greek historical writers, of the later times of the republics, in asserting without authority, whence Juvenal's '*Græcia mendax*,' those under the Roman empire proceeded to licentiousness in denying, or in questioning, what had been largely authorized. An example from Juvenal himself has been for-

merly noticed. It may not be unnecessary here to remark an instance from Plutarch. Till his time it seems to have remained undoubted, through more than four enlightened centuries, that the prosecution of Æschines by Demosthenes was brought to issue, and that the celebrated speeches on the subject, by the two great orators, were actually spoken by them. Plutarch, admitting the authenticity of the orations, has asserted his doubt if they were really spoken, on the negative ground only, that no mention is found

SECTION III.

Peace of Macedonia : Illyrian War : Troubles in Thessaly : Confirmation of Macedonian Interest in Thessaly : Extension of Macedonian Interest in Greece.

By the peace with Athens, and the insuing conclusion of the Sacred war, with the settlement of the affairs of Phocis and Delphi to the general satisfaction of the Greek nation, Philip acquired a leisure, which seems to have been wanted, for arranging the affairs of his increased dominions, and directing the attention of the Macedonian government toward the preservation of the quiet of its extensive border, against the numerous warlike, predatory tribes of the northern continent. Judging from the total failure of notice of Macedonian affairs among ancient writers, for the first year after the Sacred war, it seems probable that the Macedonian government, tho not free from necessity of attending to the hostile disposition of all its northern neighbors, as well as to the avowed purposes of the war-party at Athens, was mostly intent upon its internal concerns. In the following year an army was marched into Illyria. Between the people of that country and Macedonia, enmity, in the historian's words, was hereditary, and contest interminable⁷. What now particularly excited exertion we are not informed; nor is more said of the consequences, than that

B. C. 345.
Ol. 108. 4.

B. C. 344.
Ol. 109. 1.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 69.

found of them in two speeches of the same orators, delivered nearly twenty years after. The improbability that two such speeches would have been published, if the trial had not come to issue, might perhaps overbalance such an objection. But when the tradition and assent of more than four enlightened centuries had fixed the credit of their having been actually spoken, the question started by Plutarch seems as frivolous, as the spirit of putting forward such questions, on illfounded or weak surmise, is mischievous.

⁷ Φίλιππος, πατρικὴν ἔχθραν διαδεδυγμένος πρὸς Ἰλλυρίους, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἀμετάδοτον ἔχων—Diod. l. 16. c. 69. Rhodoman and Wesseling's translation of this passage exhibits remarkably the malice, already noticed as common among modern translators, commentators, and authors, on Macedonian history: 'Philippos odii Illyriorum, quod quasi hereditarium a patri acceperat, & controversiæ, quam pertinaciter fovebat, stimulus incitatus—'

the Macedonians prevailed, so far that many small towns were taken, and much booty was carried off.

While the Macedonian arms were thus engaged, the old party of the tyrants in Thessaly, allies of Athens, connected especially with the war-party, were encouraged to stir again. Philip hastened to the support of his friends there. The disturbances were soon suppressed : Diod. l. 16. c. 69.

but the former lenient conduct having been found ineffectual for the peace of the country, severer measures were taken. Still however they were far milder than those ordinary with the republican governments, whether against strangers or adverse fellowcitizens. The strength of the insurgent party lay in Pheræ, the seat of government of the late tyrants. To prevent future insurrection, without resorting to capital punishment, or even expulsion from the country, a part, and probably a large part, of the Pheræan citizens was removed only to other towns; and to obviate necessity for carrying the severity to a greater number, less able to bear the expence of removal, a garrison was put in the citadel.

The Athenian orators, who could approve, not only the assassination of a king of Thrace, their adopted fellowcitizen, but the massacre of the Sestian people, were not ashamed to exclaim against these measures, however requisite for the quiet of the established free government of Demosth. de Halon. p. 84.

Thessaly, and of a large majority of the people. Yet we find Demosthenes, on one occasion, led by his argument to acknowledge Philip's popularity among the Thessalians, and to admit that it was the result of beneficial conduct toward them, especially in ejecting their tyrants; a title which, remarkably enough, he gives the Pheræan chiefs, patronized by the Athenian people. Diodorus has described the measures of the present conjuncture thus briefly; 'Philip ejected the tyrants, and gained completely the goodwill of the Thessalians.' Nor was the advantage resulting limited to Thessaly; for the fame of his popular conduct spreading, 'the neighboring Grecian states,' proceeds the historian, 'concurring in the opinion of the Thessalians, became eager to be De Halon. p. 84. & Philipp. 3. p. 117, 119.

associated with them in the advantages of the Macedonian alliance'. Demosth. de Cherson. p. 105.

* Τοὺς τυράννους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐκβαλὼν, ἰδίους γένεσθαι. ὁμοῦς γὰρ οἱ πλησιόχουροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἐποιήσατο τοὺς Θετταλοὺς. Ἡλπίζει γὰρ, ταύτους ἔχων συμμάχους, καὶ τοὺς Ἑλλήνας προδίμως πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπειθήσασθαι. Diod. l. 16. c. 69.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 245.

On the other hand this disposition, so extensive in Greece, adverse to the ambition of Athens, is thus remarkably described by Demosthenes: 'Philip had a great advantage; for there was, among the Greeks, not some but all alike, a flood of traitors, bribe-takers, men odious to the gods, such as none ever before knew, whom Philip took for his partizans and assistants. Civil discord, and mutual malevolence prevailed enough before in Greece: but he inflamed them; cajoling some, making presents to others, corrupting in all ways.' A kind of magic in the arrangement of words, peculiar, even in the Greek language, to the powers of Demosthenes, and not to be transfused into a translation, has fixed the attention of antients and moderns upon this passage. Diodorus, more candid than either judicious or careful of consistency, taking it for historical matter, has copied it in his own work; unheeding that portrait which should be the historian's object, is forcible to the orator's business; who, like the painter of the higher classes, takes his subject indeed from nature, but arranges, compounds, diversifies, places in light or in shadow, on foreground or in distance, adds or omits, as may suit the effect desired for the design in his mind. Philip's real bribery was the security which his patronage afforded against faction within every republic, and war from close neighbors without. How he received the various applications made to him, or what connection he really formed with any of the states, we have no trustworthy and scarcely any intelligible information. We may however believe Demosthenes that, in a dispute between the Ætolians and Achaïans, about the town of Naupactus, once the refuge of the unfortunate Messenians, which seems to have been referred to his arbitration, he decided in favor of Ætolia; and that he favored the claim of his kinsman, Alexander, king of Epirus, to a territory on the border of Acarnania, against the Acarnanian people. The Acarnanians, or a strong party of them, then, through some tissue of interests unexplained to us, were among the people of Greece most disposed to the Athenian cause. Demosthenes thought their alliance of importance enough to induce him to undertake himself embassy to them, and it seems to have been the mission in which he was most successful. A decision of Philip therefore, with

Demosth.
Phil. 3.
p. 120.
Phil. 4.
p. 134. de
Halon. p. 84.
de Cherson.
p. 119.

whatever justice, adverse to their interest, would earn his unfavorable animadversion.

Meanwhile in Athens the failure in the prosecution of Æschines, B. C. 343. disappointing to the immediate hopes of the party, and visibly, even Ol. 109. 2.
now, in extant orations, checking to the great orator who conducted it, nevertheless little damped the ardor or abated the industry of those who acted with him: on the contrary, his insuing reserve leaving an opener career for the minor speakers, perhaps rather incited their zeal and industry. The little island of Halonesus, near the Thessalian coast, formerly subject to Athens, whether through negligence or connivance of the Athenian naval commanders, had been occupied by Sostratus, a chief of pirates, who acknowledged, or at least formally acknowledged, no sovereign. A Macedonian force expelled Sostratus, and reduced the island under the Macedonian dominion. The orators of the party of Chares, passive under the occupancy of the island by a pirate, urged the people to claim it from the king of Macedonia. The principle asserted by the party, that whatever, by right or wrong, the Athenian people had once possessed, must ever thereafter of right be theirs, that a surrender by a formal decree of the sovereign assembly did not bind the people, if in another assembly they voted that they had been ill-advised by the orator who moved it, had so been sanctioned in the recent decree about Amphipolis, that either to controvert the doctrine, or oppose the measure proposed as founded on it, might be hazardous. The party however so prevailed, that an embassy was sent to Macedonia, specially to assert the claim. Demosth. de Halon. Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. or. in epist. Demosth. de Halon. p. 77.

Philip answered the mission, in the way esteemed most friendly B. C. 342. and respectful on such occasions, sending an embassy to Athens, with Ol. 109. 3.
a representation in writing from himself, in the form, then usual, of a letter to the Athenian people. The letter unfortunately we know only by such extracts as an orator, of the fiercest and coarsest of the high democratical party, selected, for the purpose of a speech in the general assembly; and yet, even in these, the liberality and moderation of the prince who wrote it are conspicuous. He has evidently proposed to use the opportunity of the question, so offensively made about the little island of Halonesus, for endeavoring to settle, upon equitable and

liberal terms, some far more important affairs, which required arrangement between the two governments, to prevent the threatened disturbance of the peace so lately concluded between them. ‘About Halonesus,’ he said, ‘there should be no difficulty; he would give it to the Athenian people. Two other matters more pressed upon his consideration; to deliver the Grecian seas from the common pest of piracy, and to provide for the just settlement of disputes, frequently occurring in commercial intercourse between Macedonian and Athenian subjects.’ For the former purpose he proposed the united exertion of the Athenian and Macedonian naval forces, and for the latter, to enter upon a treaty of commerce. He complained then, in gentle terms, of the decree relating to Amphipolis; referring to the treaty of peace to evince its injustice, or as, apparently to avoid irritation, he rather termed it, mistake. The Athenian government, in sending its notices about Amphipolis and Halonesus, had added remonstrances on some other matters; promises of measures for the benefit of the republic, perhaps relating to affairs in Eubœa, they said, had not been performed: some small towns on the Thracian coast, usually acknowledging the sovereignty of the Athenian people, they asserted, had been taken by the Macedonian arms after the conclusion of the peace; and the Cardians, in some measures injurious to the antient right of the Athenian people to the dominion of the Chersonese, had been encouraged and supported by Macedonian officers. To these complaints Philip replied, ‘that he never made any such promises as those claimed of him for benefits to the Athenian people. With regard to the towns in Thrace, he did not desire to be judge in his own cause; he would refer the matter (a mode usual among the Grecian states) to the arbitration of neutral powers; and he would engage that the Cardians, who reckoned that, instead of injuring the Athenians, they had been injured by them, should also refer to similar arbitration the question of right to the lands claimed by Athenian settlers?’

* This explanation of the dispute with the Cardians is found in Philip’s letter to the Athenians, preserved with the oration of Demosthenes on the letter.

The king's letter having been read to the assembled Athenian people, his ambassadors were allowed to address them in speech. Of these Python of Byzantium was of celebrated eloquence. He seems however to have added little to the written matter, except to remonstrate on the illiberal invective and scandalous calumny against the sovereign whom he represented, in which the Athenian orators were accustomed to find indulgence from their sovereign.

Demosthenes, after his recent failure against Æschines, would not be likely to remit that caution which has been noticed in his oration commonly called the Second Philippic. Tho he spoke on the occasion, yet the more violent declamation, which the purposes of the party required, seems to have been committed to a secondary orator; and the speech, transmitted among the works of Demosthenes, intitled the Oration on Halonesus, has, by antient and modern critics, on probable ground, been attributed to Hegesippus, already mentioned as mover of the decree about Amphipolis, and afterward ambassador to Macedonia. That oration differs widely in character, not only from the second Philippic, but from everything remaining from Demosthenes. Not only it is inferior, as the critics have observed, in style, but wholly wants the neatness of delusive reasoning, the subtilty of insinuation avoiding assertion, the wonderfully ingenious texture of phrase, calculated to infuse falsehood into the hearer's belief without pledging the speaker, the whole art, in which Demosthenes has so singularly excelled, of making the worse appear the better cause, disguising with fair colors the foulest forms, and recommending monsters by the grace and splendor of the robes with which he could veil their hideousness¹⁰. The oration on Halonesus marks no purpose of even imitating Demosthenes. It carries

Æsch. d.
cor.

Liban. arg.
or. de
Halon.

¹⁰ Ὁ Ἰσαίος. Ἦν δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ δοξα, παρὰ τοῖς τότε, γοητείας καὶ ἀπάτης, ὥς διενεῖς ἀνὴρ τεχνιτῆσαι λόγους ἐπὶ τὰ ποιηρότερα, καὶ εἰς τοῦτο διεβάλλετο. Δηλοὶ δὲ τοῦτο τῶν ἀρχαίων τις ῥητόρων, ἐν τῇ Δημοσθένους κατηγορίᾳ, Πυθίας, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ποιηρίαν γὰρ τῷ Δημοσθένει καὶ κακίαν τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πᾶσαν ἐνοικεῖν φῆται. Καὶ τότε τὸ μέρος ὅλον εἰς διαβολὴν ἐπιτίθησιν, ὅτι τὸν Ἰσαῖον ὅλον, καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἐκείνου τέχνας σεσίτιστα. Καὶ μὰ Δία οὐκ ἀπὸ σκόπου τῆς διαβολῆς τὰυτῆς εἶχεν ἐκάτερος. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν οἱ μὲν Ἰσαίου τε καὶ Δημοσθένους λόγοι καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀληθείας καὶ δικαίας συντάξεως αἱ ὑποδείσεις ὑποπτοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, τῆς πολλῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως ἕνεκα· οἱ δὲ Ἰσοκράτους καὶ Λυσίου πατὴρ μά- λιστα δίκαιοί τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς. Dion. Hal. in Isæo, p. 104, 105. ed. Sylberg.

every

every appearance of originality; plain and coarse in its violence, and carelessness of all decencies.

Or. de
Halon. p. 77.
p. 73.

‘ I will answer the letter,’ said the orator, ‘ article by article. Philip will give you Halonesus, he says, as if it was of any right his to give, being taken from pirates who had a right to nothing. Why did not he say he would restore it? And he has proposed reference to the arbitration of neutral powers. This is ridiculous, but it is insulting too. Truly it becomes the Athenian people, deliverers of Greece, to contend juridically, about islands, with a man of Pella! Is not your own navy able to do you justice? If you commit decision about islands to the arbitration of neutral powers, will it be less than declaring that you abandon your right to reassert your dominion over so many continental territories, of which you have been deprived?’

Having boldly thus warned the Grecian states of Asia and the islands what they must expect, from the policy of his party, should they acquire power to follow up their policy, the orator proceeds to the consideration of the proposal for a treaty of commerce; a subject interesting enough to excite regret that the passage relating to it is not throughout clearly intelligible¹¹. One part however, perfectly plain, will deserve notice. ‘ Experience,’ says the orator, ‘ shows that the proposed new jurisdiction for commercial matters is needless. Under Amyntas, father of Philip, and former Macedonian kings, none such existed, when there was more communication than now between the Mace-

¹¹ Leland has given up the passage as inexplicable, and Auger, after an attempt, far from satisfactory, to explain in translation what relates expressly to commerce, confesses himself unable to discover what the matter of Potidæa, brought in by the orator, has to do with the general question. Thus much however seems altogether clear; that Philip’s proposition was founded on his persuasion that commercial disputes, arising in the Macedonian territory, and so carried before Macedonian courts, were generally

decided with liberal justice, but that, in Athenian courts, Macedonian subjects could obtain no better justice than Xenophon and Isocrates inform us was usually obtained by the subjects of other states in alliance with Athens. One object also in the introduction of the matter of Potidæa appears obvious; to excite among the people regret for the loss of former conquests, and appetite for the dangerous struggle, to recover them, which the orator was anxious to recommend.

‘ donian

‘donian and Athenian people: for Macedonia was then subject to us, and paid us tribute.’ It is not improbable that ground for this strong assertion may have existed, so far that Amyntus found it convenient, like so many other powers around the Ægean, to compound for free navigation for his subjects.

Philip’s proposal, for combined energy of the Macedonian and Athenian navies, to abolish piracy in the Grecian seas, appears to have put the orator to most difficulty. It was very much against the interest of the Athenian naval commanders that piracy should be abolished; and it was also against the interest of the orators; not only as they were connected with the naval commanders, but as piracy contributed to bring applications to the Athenian people for protection, and litigation to the Athenian tribunals, sources both of profit to the orators. Piracy was perhaps advantageous even to the Athenian merchants, to whom trade accrued through the superior security of the Athenian flag. But these grounds of objection could not prudently be stated. The orator therefore confined his reply to the vague assertion, ‘that the king of Macedonia’s proposal was made only to obtain permission of the Athenian people for his ships to visit every island, and in short, he says, to have their assistance for making himself master of the sea.’

This however was but the refusal of a matter open for choice, no claim of right being in question. To another orator, before a different assembly, the difficulty might have appeared greater to maintain the right of the Athenian people still to the dominion of Amphipolis, after they had formally ceded it by the late treaty of peace; but of that difficulty Hegesippus made light, meeting it with arguments of a very remarkable character: ‘Philip,’ he said, ‘pretends that his right to Amphipolis is acknowledged by the late treaty. True it is that the Athenian people did, by that treaty, consent that each party should keep what at the time it held; but they did not so at all consent that Amphipolis should belong to Philip. He held it indeed, at the time, unquestionably. But a person may hold what belongs

Or. de
Halon.
p. 81. 83.

‘to

‘to another; and many do hold what belongs to others, so that ‘this wise argument of his is meer folly’¹². Do you think then he ‘has kept his word with you, professing strict attention, in all he ‘says and does, to whatever is esteemed just among men? or does he ‘not rather show that he utterly despises it? he who asserts that the ‘country belongs to him, which both the Greeks and the king of ‘Persia have declared to belong to the Athenian people!’ The reader will recollect that the country, if the meaning be confined to the territory of Amphipolis, first became Athenian property by forcible intrusion upon the Thracians; was lost again soon after by fair chance of war with the Lacedæmonians; was made free by the peace of Antalcidas through decrees of the Greeks and the king of Persia together; was associated afterward, apparently by the choice of its people, with the Olynthian confederacy; was reduced again under the power of Athens, not, seemingly, without treachery; shortly after was taken in open war by the united arms of Olynthus and Macedonia; and finally was ceded to Macedonia, by that clause in the treaty of peace, recently concluded with Athens, which declared that both parties should hold what they at the time possessed.

Or. de
Halon, p. 84.

A clause, according to the orator, had been added to the original treaty, declaring all Greeks, not partaking in its benefits as allies of either party, free and independent, and binding the parties to protect

¹² “Οὐτε τιτὸ γὰρ τὸ σοφὸν αὐτοῦ ἡλιδιὸν ἐστὶ.—p. 83. The description of the *status quo*, in the phrase of our diplomatists, is given with material difference in different parts of the orator’s argument, as if with the purpose of puzzling and misleading the mob-sovereign he was addressing. In one place it is, ‘Ἐκατίστους τὰ ἰαυτῶν ἔχουσιν’—(p. 81. l. 4.) ‘for ‘each party to have its own.’ This would rather imply restitution of all that had been taken, which most certainly was never meant on the part of Macedonia. Afterward he gives it, ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν ἂν ἰδῶν,—p. 83. l. 12. ‘for

‘him to have what he actually held,’ and this, no doubt the meaning of the treaty, he marks for nearly its expression too,—ἰψηφίζεσθαι ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν, &c. &c. The whole is worth the curious reader’s attention, as a specimen of the kind of argument that might be ventured before the sovereign people of Athens, by an eminent orator, a leading man in the assembly, and who had been employed on the most important embassies; for so much is fully indicated, whether the oration be of Hegessippus, or Demosthenes, or any other.

them

them against all aggression. This clause is of a spirit very wide of what we find prevailing in the avowed politics of Demosthenes, but perfectly conformable to that which connected Phocion's party with the king of Macedonia. To appreciate the reproach of breach of this article by Philip, in measures against three towns of Ambracia, we want what was said by the Macedonian government on the other side; unless the light and little explicit mention of that matter by Demosthenes, and the obvious futility of the charge, which the orator on Halonesus has added, of violence against the Pheræans, may be taken as sufficiently indicating that reproach to have been little founded. In the usual party style of the Greeks, the party of the tyrants of Pheræ are called exclusively the Pheræans; and the body of the Thessalian people, enemies of Athens, and their satisfaction with the king of Macedonia's conduct, and the sanction which they appear in a constitutional way to have given it, are carefully kept out of sight.

Philip, in the confession of the orator on Halonesus, confirming all other accounts, had restored all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, as it did him great and extensive credit, was far from gratifying to the orator and his party; and their ingenuity found means to make a large proportion of the Athenian Many unsatisfied with it. There remained yet in a Macedonian prison a man, not an Athenian, for he was of Carystus in Eubœa, but a public guest of the Athenian people¹³. What crime made him obnoxious in Macedonia, and what merit procured him the zealous favor of the party of Chares, the orator has equally avoided to say; but the Athenian people were persuaded to urge the Macedonian court, by three successive embassies, for his liberation. It was thus evidently not a hasty measure to send him at last to the executioner. Whether just or necessary, may best be estimated from what we learn, on best authority, of the common conduct of the Macedonian and Athenian governments; adding the consideration, that it was clearly Philip's desire to maintain the peace and alliance with Athens, and the earnest purpose of the party of Chares to lead the Athenian people to break them¹⁴.

Or. de
Halon. p. 85.

¹³ Προξένον τῆς ἐχθιτέρας πόλεως.

¹⁴ Caristien étoit probablement quelque criminel, pour qui les Athéniens s'étoient intéressés.

¹⁴ The translator Auger has been candid enough to remark, in a note, that 'Ce

Or. de
Halon. p. 86.

p. 87.

On the border of the Cardian territory, against the Athenian dominion of the Thracian Chersonese, was some land unoccupied by the Cardians, on which some Athenians, or persons under Athenian protection, had settled themselves. The Cardians appear not absolutely to have objected to this use of land, to themselves useless, provided it were not turned to their political disadvantage: they desired only that their right to the sovereignty of the territory should be acknowledged. The question was brought before the Athenian people in a favorable season, and, on the motion of Callippus, a decree passed acknowledging the right of the Cardians to the territory. This was evidently carried against the high democratical party; for the orator who led their business in the question concerning Halonesus, probably, as we have observed, Hagesippus, afterward led a prosecution against Callippus, for moving the decree, as against the interest of the commonwealth; but the people a second time gave their voices in favor of the Cardian claim, by acquitting him. If the Cardian people were not thus secured against any future claim of Athenian sovereignty over the land in question, apparently such security could not be. The orator on Halonesus nevertheless, in a season more favorable to his purpose, did not scruple to tell the people, that he had done right in accusing Callippus, and they had done wrong in acquitting him, and that their claim to the land in question, notwithstanding their formal renunciation of it, remained perfect, and ought still to be asserted. Among the extant works of the orators, instances abound of a very humble tone in addressing the sovereign people: some such remain, as we have observed, even from Demosthenes. Such a tone was used when the orator doubted the strength of his party, or the favor of the people toward himself. The oration on Halonesus is not least remarkable among instances of an opposite kind. The speaker, evidently feeling himself strong, did not fear to be arrogant. In the conclusion of his speech he assumed something nearly approaching command of the assembly. ‘There are
‘some,’ he said, ‘who contend that this letter of the King of Macedonia’s is reasonable and proper. They deserve your hatred much
‘more than Philip himself. He acquires glory and great advantages
‘by his measures against you. But those Athenians, who show more
‘goodwill

‘ goodwill toward Philip than toward their country, ought to be sent by
 ‘ you to the worst perdition, if you carry your brains within your tem-
 ‘ ples, and not trodden upon at your heels ¹⁵. It remains for me to write
 ‘ the answer which I think just and advantageous for you to return to
 ‘ this reasonable and proper letter, and to the speeches of the ambas-
 ‘ sadors.’ There is all appearance that an answer of the same temper
 with the speech was approved by a majority of the assembly, and sent
 to the king of Macedonia.

SECTION IV.

*War of Macedonia in Thrace and Scythia. Athenian Interest declining
 in Greece. Exertions of the War-party : Colony sent to the Thracian
 Chersonese : Diopceithes Athenian Commander in Thrace : Hostile
 Conduct against Macedonia.*

IN this year, the third after the conclusion of the Phocian war, Philip B. C. 343.
Ol. 109. 2.
 carried his arms to the country which, if disturbance from Greece had
 not interfered, should have most invited the ambition of a king of
 Macedonia, and still, according to the historian, his measures were Diod. l. 16.
c. 71.
 required by the ambition and injustice of others. When the king of
 Thrace, Kersobleptes, had been compelled to surrender the Chersonese
 to the Athenians, and to divide the rest of his dominions with the
 princes of his family, who had rebelled against him, his means, either
 to give protection to the Grecian towns on his shores, or to exact
 tribute from them, were of course much reduced. * Whether their re-
 fusal provoked his arms, or he was unable to restrain the licentiousness
 of his Thracian subjects, or instigation from Athens was the principal
 moving spring. (For an Athenian fleet was at hand, and there was an
 Athenian party, more or less powerful in every Grecian town of his Epist. Phi-
lippi. c. 6.
Demosten.

¹⁵ Εὐρίη ἐπὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ
 φησὶ, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀλλοτρίᾳ καταπαύσασθαι
 φρονεῖν. This phrase the French translator,
 it seems, could not venture to give in his

own language. He has certainly not done
 justice to the character of the oration in his
 rendering of the expression,—‘ j’ai vous
 ‘ resté encore quelque étincelle de raison.’

coast) the lands of some of those Grecian towns were plundered by Thracian freebooters. The Athenian commander, warm in the war-party interest, was ready to take any party anywhere under his patronage; and, confident of support at home, ready also to take any measures, for which convenient opportunity offered, adverse to Macedonia. The people of the Hellespontine towns however, like those of so many republics of Proper Greece, shunning the Athenian connection, sought Macedonian patronage.

With solicitation then from those towns, many circumstances concurred, at this time, to induce Philip to put himself at the head of a powerful army and cross the lofty mountains between his dominion and Eastern Thrace. If the desire of conquest instigated, no extension of his border could be so advantageous, whether for the opportunities of commerce, which would increase his revenue, or of a frontier to give security to his kingdom, or of a point whence to extend conquest into the country always the foremost object of Grecian appetency, the rich provinces of Lesser Asia. For so advantageous an acquisition the way had been largely prepared by the division of the Thracian monarchy, the work of the war-party of Athens, pursuing of their own purposes of ambition. While then the unfortunate and weak Persobleptes, consenting to hold his diminished kingdom in a kind of vassalage under the Athenian people, looked, with ill judging confidence, to them for protection, Teres, another of the Thracian princes, joined Philip and fought under his orders. The forces of Persobleptes were overcome, and the Grecian townships of his shores, no longer subject to Thrace, acknowledged Macedonia as their protecting power.

Epist. Philip.
ad
Athen.
Diod. l. 16.

Whether, excited by this adverse event, the activity of Athenian policy penetrated into the wild country toward the Danube, and stirred against Macedonia, at this time, the warlike lords that for ages had denied any certain quiet to its northern border, we are not informed, but that Athens had opportunity for communication with those powers, through its commercial establishments on the Euxine shores we have seen. They were however apparently serious menaces, that induced Philip to lead his army next into that inhospitable and uninviting country; no purpose being obvious but to prevent a destruc-

tive

tive invasion of his kingdom. Little distant from Greece in latitude, but widely differing in seasons, winter overtook him there unexpectedly, coming perhaps with severity uncommonly early. His way back into Macedonia was so barred by snows, that not even a messenger could pass. Much interest was excited in Greece by the various rumors circulated. Among the first authentic accounts was information of a severe illness that confined him; and report for sometime prevailed that he was dead. On the other hand, if ever the extravagant fable of the conquest of Cappadocia, which, with numerous others, no extant author earlier than Justin has noticed, was at all heard of in Philip's age, probably it was a rumor arising in this time of uncertainty. An authentic history of this war could not fail to be highly interesting. That great difficulties, hardships, and dangers were encountered, ably, firmly, and successfully, is nearly all to which we have any trustworthy testimony; tho, with such defective information of most important public transactions, some antient writers have not scrupled to give conversations, and witty sayings, and various matters the least likely to have been correctly reported. What remains therefore from the adverse orator, who would sometimes endeavor, by flashes of eulogy amid his invective, to excite, among his fellow-countrymen, emulation of the great character he slandered, is highly valuable. 'In quest of glory,' says Demosthenes, 'Philip freely met all kinds of hardship, and danger in every shape: undismayed by wounds, unappalled by sickness, patient in confinement by snow, he was contented to pass the winter, living upon millet and rye, in a Thracian cellar.' Apparently the Thracian cellar, here spoken of, was the common winter dwelling of the country, sunk in the ground, for shelter against the extreme severity of the season, such as we have seen described by Xenophon, among the Armenian highlands, in a latitude where such severity would still less be expected¹⁶.

Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 98. & Phil-
lippi. 4. p. 54.

Ch. 23, s. 4.
of this Hist.

It

¹⁶ The reader desirous of information about the countries, which were the seat of this winter campaign, may find them interestingly described in a small volume printed at Naples. Mr. Raicewick, the author, by birth a Thracian, was once ambassador from the emperor of Germany at Vienna. He had before been secretary to the imperial embassy

It is clearly indicated, by Demosthenes, that his party reckoned much upon the difficulties in which Philip was involved, in this rough and hazardous enterprize, and were busy to profit from the opportunity. But, beside opposition, still strong, from the party of Phocion, circumstances among the surrounding republics assisted to disappoint them. As their influence had risen in Athens, the credit of Athens, it appears, had declined in Greece. In Eubœa their conduct had excited universal jealousy. Those most disposed to the Athenian connection, hitherto confident of Athenian support against Thebes, were alarmed at the new connection of Athens with Macedonia, the ally of Thebes, and especially at the zeal which the war-party of Athens had so publicly demonstrated for that new connection. On the other hand, their opponents the Theban party, on the same view of things, participated in the same alarm, tho with opposite apprehensions. The general turn however was in favor of the Theban interest, now gaining the new and more favorite denomination of the Macedonian interest, and the Athenian became the waning cause. In Orcus it was completely overborne. In Chalcis with difficulty it maintained a balance. Meanwhile the little island of Sciathus, one of the nearest to the Attic shore, dared to defy the Athenian navy; and the strife of faction again shook the small neighboring republic of Megara, where the party patronized by the high democratical party in Athens, had hitherto prevailed.

*A. E. L. d.
Heg. 1. p. 290.*

*Demosth. de
Cherson. p.
91 & 98.*

p. 97, 10.

Opportunity was thus offered to the opponents of Chares and Demosthenes at home, which was not wholly neglected. It was urged, that the spreading disaffection of allies, and the ill state altogether of the republic's affairs, too glaring for denial, for it appears Demosthenes himself could not wholly deny it, arose from misconduct of the same leading men, of whose mismanagement the effects were still so severely felt in the result of the Confederate war¹⁷. The party replied by im-

embassy at the Ottoman court, and for some time resided in Walachia, as secretary to the prince of Walachia Ypselanti.

¹⁷ That the party of Chares and Demosthenes had latterly directed measures is fully implied in the charge of the adverse

party against them and their reply to it, stated by Demosthenes in the oration on the Chersonese, p. 97, where also the ill state of the republic's affairs is explicitly acknowledged.

puting

putting all adversity abroad to the hostile conduct of the restored ally of the republic, the king of Macedonia, secluded as he was among the snows of the country toward the Danube, and all disorder at home to the corruption of traitors who promoted his purposes, meaning all who opposed their own. So far their imputations appear to have been well-founded, that a preference of the king of Macedonia's patronage to theirs, did prevail extensively over Greece, and a desire to meet the king of Macedonia's peaceful professions prevailed also among the best men of Athens.

But the ingenuity of the party found means to overbear or elude the influence of the better men. To relieve the idle, petulant and craving multitude, by sending out a colony, was a resource of former times, good or bad, according as it was carried into execution. Opportunity occurred now, in the circumstances of the Thracian Chersonese, a country among the most inviting. The party of Chares, putting forward the measure, obtained the direction of it for one zealous in their interest, and formed for their purposes, Diopceithes; and to the same person was committed the Thracian command, by land and sea. A fleet then, to transport the settlers, awe opponents, and maintain respect for the Athenian dominion of the sea, was readily granted by the sovereign people, under lure of the advantages proposed. But, for the purposes of the party, a landforce also was wanted, which was a matter of more difficulty to obtain; for the people would neither serve nor pay. Diopceithes, however, to have the command in chief by sea and land, did not scruple undertaking, at his own risk, to raise a sufficient body of mercenaries, and find pay for them. Such an offer, gratifying to the short-sighted Many, was accepted. To raise the men was not difficult. To provide pay then, as soon as he arrived at his station he sent them to collect plunder from the lands, or contributions from the towns of the Greeks; and the allies, not of Macedonia only, but even of Athens suffered. His fleet was, at the same time, active in rapine against all Grecian ships within the range of his cruises.

Demosth. de
Cherson.

In pursuing these violent measures, evidently he confided in support from his party; whose disposition seems to have been as sincere, as their promises

Demosth. de
Cherson.
p. 57.

premises could be warm, for the purpose. But complaints, pouring into Athens, produced alarm among the people, such as the party saw with much uneasiness; and public indignation was particularly pointed at Chares, as the person acting in the situation of what we should call war-minister. The people were summoned to assemble. The party of Phocion came forward; and, with their usual moderation, moved only to send out another general, who might compose the affairs which Diopceithes had embroiled, and to dismiss the mercenaries, to whose licentiousness they were willing to attribute the disorders which had given cause for complaint.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 234.

But the views of the war-party were not limited to the establishment of a colony, or the defence of the actual possessions of the republic. The peace, which ended the Confederate war, having as little restored the friendship and confidence, as the subjection, of the revolted allies, Byzantium had engaged in the Macedonian alliance, and that alliance had been acknowledged, by Athens, in the recent treaty of peace. Between Byzantium and the strait of the Hellespont, the two principal towns, on the European shore, were Selymbria and Perinthus; whose people claimed a common Dorian origin with the Byzantines, and held intimate connection with them. By the loss of Byzantium the commerce of Athens with the Euxine, important especially for the essential articles of corn and slaves, was made difficult and hazardous. This difficulty would of course excite the ingenuity and diligence of the merchants, which seems to have been in a great degree successful. Friendly communication was restored with Perinthus and Selymbria; and Perinthus becoming the principal key of communication for Athens with the Euxine, the interposit of the Athenian trade, its advances in wealth and population were rapid. The busy temper of Athenian democratical policy thus getting an advantageous establishment, quickly found means to work its way into Byzantium itself. No longer ago than when Demosthenes delivered his oration on the peace, Byzantium was on no friendly terms with Athens, or however with the war-party there. Grievance from Macedonia meanwhile we hear of none; and yet already now an Athenian party had so grown, that Athenian support might produce a revolution in its government, whence would follow

Demosth. de
Pace.

Epist. Philip.
ap. Demosth.

follow renewed alliance with Athens, and breach with Macedonia. This advantage it was evidently among the purposes of the mission of Diopeithes to promote. But, were Diopeithes superseded by a commander of Phocion's party, it would be lost. On the contrary, could he be supported in what he had already done, the progress would be great; and the proof of the strength of the party would encourage their foreign friends, and make their interest at home secure.

These appear to have been the circumstances which gave occasion for one of the most studied orations remaining from Demosthenes, one in which evidently he felt his task most difficult. He was to persuade his audience that the conduct of Diopeithes, violating treaties, committing extensive rapine, against friends as well as foes, by sea and land, were what the Athenian people ought to approve; and that the king of Macedonia, notwithstanding the numerous instances of his generous and forbearing conduct, not only was actually at war with them, but was the most injurious of possible enemies. Widely different from the tone of the orator on Halonesus, as if feeling still his recent defeat in his accusation of Æschines, as well as the weakness of his cause now to be supported, he begins, and mostly proceeds, in the same complaining and insinuating strain as in the second Philippic; and yet, with wonderful ingenuity, in pressing the interests of his party, and inveying against their opponents, among the general gloom, he throws in occasional flashes of a vehemence like lightening. He did not venture to deny the facts alledged against Diopeithes; that his troops were sent to plunder the lands of Greeks at peace with the republic, and even allies of the republic, and that his ships were the pirates of the Grecian seas; nor did he deny that it was, in a general view, wrong to plunder Grecian lands and Grecian ships. But he undertook to justify it by the urgency of circumstances: 'Philip,' he said, 'had broken the peace. It was evidently Philip's object (Philip being still engaged in the northern wilds) to destroy Athens, and especially to destroy the democracy. War against him was therefore necessary for the republic's welfare. To make war against him the mercenary force must be maintained, and it was highly expedient that Diopeithes

‘ should remain to command it : for he had deserved well of the republic
 ‘ by what he had done, however objectionable in itself ; since in no
 ‘ other way could he have held together his army.’ After some complaint then, that the Athenian people would neither undertake military service themselves, nor allow taxes for paying mercenaries, there follows perhaps the most valuable passage, remaining in any author, for elucidating the Athenian history of the time, so defectively delivered by professed historians. ‘ In this dilemma of the republic,’ says the orator, ‘ I must speak openly ; and, at all risk for the consequences,
 ‘ I will assure you, that no naval commander ever sails from your
 ‘ harbours, but he receives presents. They come from the Chians, the
 ‘ Erythræans, all the commercial states likely to be within reach of
 ‘ your fleets ; I mean however the Asiatic only. If he has but one
 ‘ or two ships under his orders, he has something : if his force is
 ‘ greater, he has more in proportion. The pretence of these presents
 ‘ is goodwill to the commander : under that title they are offered.
 ‘ But those states, you may be sure, none of them give this money
 ‘ for nothing : they pay for the safety of their commerce ; that their
 ‘ ships may be, not plundered, but protected.’

Demosth. de
 Cherson.
 p. 96.

In these few sentences is discovered to us why so many leading men at Athens desired always war rather than peace for the republic, and how they found means to induce so many of the lower orders to concur with them. The remarkable fact, mentioned both by Xenophon and Isocrates, that the lowest of the Athenian people would often be ready for the service of the trireme, when they refused themselves for that, in former estimation, more honorable, of the phalanx, will no longer appear strange, and the reason why the king of Macedonia's proposal for the suppression of piracy was so thwarted by the war-party becomes evident. Were the piracy of petty freebooters suppressed, presents from the pirate, on one side, for permission of it, from the mercantile towns, on the other, for protection against it, would have ceased together ; and the greater piracy, of the Athenian commanders themselves, would have been too invidious, giving a clear and certain point for clamor and opposition.

In making this avowal, confirming only what we have formerly seen his rival orator, Æschines, tho less explicitly, asserting, Demosthenes seems to have depended upon two separate grounds for obviating danger to the numbers of his party, who must have been implicated in the charge. Perhaps he possessed proof against some of the opposite party, such as might deter prosecution from them against his friends. But he was apparently aware that there was no extensive disposition, among the people, to favor prosecution for a public crime, whence so many of them had been accustomed to profit. On the contrary, it seems evident that he touched a chord in harmony with the feelings of a large proportion of his audience; and he therefore proceeded to propose, instead of punishment for such peculation, to extend the system of plunder, under public authority, so that the public might share in its advantages: ‘The same states,’ he said, ‘which thus paid ‘tribute to the individual commanders of the republic, were the ‘proposal properly made to them, would, no doubt, readily pay contributions to the republic itself, such as might well maintain the force ‘now under Diopceithes.’

The turn of the speech, in its progress, appears to indicate that this proposal was received with marks of favor; for what the orator had just before stated as matter of complaint against the people, that they would neither undertake military service themselves, nor pay others for it, he directly proceeded to treat as a needless burthen, which his adversaries, desirous of superseding Diopceithes, would impose upon the people. Thus apparently encouraged, in conclusion, he inveighed violently against the king of Macedonia; urging war against him as the necessary enemy of Athens, and especially of democratical government; and not scrupling to tell the people, to whom he had been justifying past and recommending future plunder of other people, that they were the natural friends and protectors of the freedom of all. His speech seems to have been altogether too flattering to the passions of the Athenian Many to be resisted. Diopceithes retained his command; and neither the unfortunate Greeks, who had been robbed, appear to have received any redress, nor was any apology made to the king of Macedonia;

Macedonia; who, by the very treaty of peace lately concluded with Athens, had bound himself to protect them.

Successful so far, the war-party nevertheless could not yet obtain a decisive lead in the administration. What had passed however was encouragement for Diopceithes to proceed in his course, and it became the business of orators at home to prepare the popular mind for reports of farther violences. With this view Demosthenes spoke the oration called the Third Philippic; by some the most admired of the masterpieces of eloquence known by that title. The complaint of the ill state of the republic's affairs, with which it begins, indicates fully the inability of the party yet to hold a decisive lead. They were evidently distressed by the king of Macedonia's forbearance; who, notwithstanding the insulting injuries he had received, avoided to return them, and professed himself still desirous of that accommodation, in which the party of Phocion and Isocrates were ready to meet him. Against this conduct they could hardly carry their purpose, unless they could persuade the people that his professions were insincere, and intended only to lull them in a fatal security. To this point therefore Demosthenes directed all his art, combined with all his boldness in assertion. He went so far as to tell the people, they were deceived if they supposed Philip was not even now at war with them; and he proceeded to proof, such as might be offered to such a sovereign as the Athenian Many. To show the actual existence of war, he was not ashamed to point five years back, to that capture of some little piratical towns on the Thracian coast, the question concerning which Philip had so repeatedly offered for the arbitration of neutral powers, which the party of Demosthenes had met by persuading the people to treat such a proposal with scorn, and take justice into their own hands. Of a later date the orator's ingenuity could find nothing specific but the support given to the brave Cardians; who had so hardly earned, and creditably supported, their emancipation from the dominion of the Athenian people; and whose cause also had met only insult in being offered for the decision of impartial arbitrators. The remainder of the argument is vague assertion; calculated however

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Ol. 109. 3.

Demosth.
Philipp. 3.
p. 112.

p. 114.

to impress the Athenian Many, accustomed to hear from their orators that they had a right to interfere in all governments, and that it was grossly offensive for any power to interfere, not only in theirs, but in any other in competition with them¹⁸. ‘I maintain,’ says the orator, ‘Philip is now making war with you, by interposing in the affairs of Megara, by supporting a tyranny in Eubœa, by his speculations among the states of Peloponnesus.’ That in every republic of Greece there was a party courting Macedonian patronage, is, from Demosthenes himself, abundantly evident; but what were the measures of Macedonia to profit from this disposition, remains, in every instance, utterly problematical. Had they been of a kind to be in anyway either disgraceful to Philip, or fairly to be stated as hostile to Athens, we should, no doubt, have had farther account of them. p. 129: In conclusion the orator recommended embassies to negotiate a confederacy against Macedonia, not only wherever there might be any favoring prospect among Grecian states, but even to the court of Persia.

The third Philippic appears to have had success more proportioned to its rhetorical excellence than to the merit of the cause it recommended. As the party then advanced toward a more certain influence over a majority in the sovereign assembly, they sent positive and authoritative orders for their commander on the Thracian station to act against Macedonia, whenever convenient opportunity might be found. Accordingly Diopceithes, zealous in the cause, marched from the Chersonese, took by storm two Grecian towns of the Macedonian alliance, Crobyle and Tiristasis, and sent those of the inhabitants, who escaped the sword, prisoners into the Athenian colony. A Macedonian of rank, Amphiloehus, being commissioned to him to remonstrate on these hostile measures, with instruction to negotiate at least the ransom of the prisoners, was refused audience by the democratical general, thrown himself into prison, and released only on paying nine talents, near two thousand pounds sterling, for his ransom¹⁹.

Ep. Phil. ap.
Pom. &c.
in Ep. Phil.

The

¹⁸ See the third Philippic, p. 121 of Reiske's edition.

¹⁹ This, with the preceding circumstances stated by Philip, in his letter to the Athenian people,

The superior talents and indefatigable activity of Demosthenes had now raised him to a decisive lead in his party. Even Chares found it convenient to yield. Demosthenes was effective first minister of Athens; and under his superintending guidance, an improved steddliness, as well as evident ability, infused confidence among dependents everywhere. The party had been able to name the commanders for a fleet on the Thessalian station, Aristodemus and Callias; whose conduct perfectly harmonized with that of Diopeithes. They carried direct hostilities against the towns of the Pagasæan bay, allies of Macedonia, intitled, by treaty, to peace and friendship with Athens; and finding them, through confidence in that treaty, unprepared for resistance, they took them all. They stopped all ships bound to Macedonia, and condemning all aboard as enemies to Athens, they sold all for slaves. And so the interest of the party now prevailed, that, when complaint was made, by ministers from the king of Macedonia, of these infractions of the treaty, and the matter was brought before the assembled people, decrees were obtained, approving and even applauding, the conduct of the commanders who directed them²⁰.

Ep. Phil.
ut aut.

While Philip still avoided all reprisals, the people of the little island of Peparethus, calling themselves free, but looking to the Athenian people for protection, and effectually their subjects, surprized the neighbouring little island of Halonesus, and carried off the small Macedonian garrison. Even then redress was first sought by negotiation. This proving utterly ineffectual, a Macedonian force, sent to Peparethus, quickly compelled its people both to restore their prisoners and

Epist Philip.
p. 162.

people, transmitted with the speech of Demosthenes upon it, and not in any degree denied in that speech, must be considered as among the most authenticated facts reported from antiquity.

²⁰ Πόλις ἡμῶν πῶς ἐσθλόν, ἐπεὶ δὲ σπουδαί-
δας ὄντας. Epist. Philip, p. 159. In Philip's
epistle Callias is named as the commander.
Æschines, in his oration on the Crown

(p. 478) mentions Aristodemus as the commander principally engaged in unwarrantable hostilities on the Thessalian coast. Possibly Aristodemus was commander-in-chief, and as such obtained from the people the reward stated by Æschines; while Callias, acting under him, was the officer principally offering himself to Philip's notice.

to

to surrender Halonesus. It is not even pretended that any severity was used, beyond what was found necessary to accomplish those just purposes ; and yet the Athenian Many were taught, by their orators, to commiserate and bewail the sufferings of the unfortunate and innocent Peparethians. Demosth. de cor. p. 48.

CHAPTER XLI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Acquisition of the Situation of First Minister of ATHENS by DEMOSTHENES, to the Election of the King of MACEDONIA to the Office of General of the AMPHICTYONIC Confederacy.

SECTION I.

Character of the Office of First Minister of Athens. Ability and Diligence of Demosthenes. Negotiation with Persia. New Coalition with Phocian's Party. Embassy of Demosthenes to the Hellespontine Cities.

THE situation of first minister, or vicegerent of the sovereign assembly, for the direction of the executive government, was less connected with a particular office, in Athens, than in any other Grecian commonwealth, whose constitution has been unfolded to us. In Lacedæmon, the ephor of the year was the principal minister; at Thebes, the polemarch or the Bæotarch. Under Solon's constitution, the archon of the year seems to have been the proper first minister of Athens. But when the commonwealth became much implicated in wars, it was found convenient that the strategus, the first general, should have a discretionary power to call extraordinary assemblies of the people, which was analogous to demanding an audience of the sovereign. The general commonly acquired his situation by his abilities; the archon, at least in the constitution of Cleisthenes, if the business was legally conducted, always by lot; the communications of the general to the sovereign assembly were often most highly interesting; those of the archon seldom. Men of the extraordinary characters then of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles, holding successively the office of general, through most critical periods of many years, gave it an importance far above that of any other.

But

But still no political power was constitutionally attached to it, except that of convening the people; and to avail himself of this, the general must be an able speaker. The real character of first minister of Athens then seems best marked by Thucydides, in his account of the disgrace and restoration of Pericles, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war: 'None of the orators,' says the historian, 'could satisfy the people. After a short interval, therefore, they called for Pericles again, to mount the bema, and tell them his opinion of their affairs, and advise them what measures they should sanction with their decrees.' But when afterward the military and civil characters became more separated, than they were in the times of Themistocles and Pericles, if the general was not himself an able orator, it was indispensable for him to seek the assistance of an able orator. Hence Iphicrates, tho himself a speaker of not the lowest rank, chose an orator, not a military man, for his associate in military command; and hence what Demosthenes, in his political noviciate, described, 'an orator commander-in-chief, with a general under him;' that is, an orator doing that part of the general's business which he was unable to do for himself, speaking to the sovereign people for him, and so appearing the principal person. But Demosthenes himself seems to have been the first who ever acquired that leading situation, which he held, of effective first minister of the commonwealth, wholly without military reputation, and without any military office. He became an eminent example of what he had formerly represented as a new portent, an absurd anomaly in government, an orator commander-in-chief, with a general under him.

The Greeks, amid their deficiencies in the science of politics, held very generally, as well as justly, that the military should be subordinate to the civil power; that is, the military, as a branch of the executive, should be subordinate to the legislative. But it farther deserves remark that, in every Grecian republic, where we find any steady constitution, the executive was modelled upon the plan of regal authority. The same person (at least in times of war, which were almost continual) the chief military man held the chief civil command. Hence Æschines, on an occasion when it was of the utmost importance

*Æsch. de
cor.*

for him to avoid whatever might offend popular jealousy, did not scruple to arraign Demosthenes of unconstitutional conduct, as well as gross arrogance, in threatening that he would make the generals of the commonwealth feel the superior importance of an orator. But, throughout the Grecian republics, the civil and military character were, in theory, never separated: both equally pervaded the whole people: every man was to be a soldier, and every man a member of the sovereign assembly. Citizens however more and more avoiding military service, it became necessary for the commonwealth to entertain an overbearing body of mercenaries, while nowhere, in the constitution, existed any proper provision for such a state of things. Hence the conduct of Demosthenes, in fact irregular, was in principle perhaps good; and the reproof of *Æschines*, justly founded, as the constitution had been, yet, in the altered state of things, was of pernicious tendency. But again still it deserves observation, that, as far as the Grecian governments are laid open to us, nowhere was the civil power of the military chief magistrate more narrowly limited, nowhere so regularly, as in the Lacedæmonian constitution; where alone hereditary succession and the title of king were preserved, and where the sacredness of the royal person, as of the essence of the constitution, was most strictly sanctioned.

The situation, in which Demosthenes now stood, was arduous, but offered, to a soaring ambition, great and inviting views. As first minister of Athens, he was the leading man of the interest, throughout Greece, hardly to be properly distinguished as the Democratical, because some of the principal republics, warmest in the Macedonian alliance, were highly democratical, but of that which was opposed to the Macedonian; an interest existing, in greater or less amount, in every republic of the nation, and maintained by a disposition, not so much adverse to Macedonian patronage, as ready to oppose, in all circumstances, fellowcitizens of that party which enjoyed Macedonian patronage. This party, in every republic, wanted a patronizing power; and Athens alone, of the Grecian states, was in a situation to afford encouragement. If then Athens could give a general prevalence to the anti-Macedonian party, Athens would be, what we find Demosthenes continually

continually inciting her people to covet, the imperial republic, mistress of Greece, and himself at the head of the empire.

The numerous, and great failures, already and recently experienced, in the pursuit of this object, might have disconcerted the most ambitious politician, unless he possessed the penetration and powers of combination of Demosthenes, to find and form new ground of hope. But speculations on opportunities, some of them perhaps hardly then discernible to any other eye, are shown, by following events, to have engaged his attention; and the use he made of them marks him for one of the acutest statesmen that ever was at the head of a government. It has been well observed by a modern politician, of great acuteness and extensive experience, speculating on this part of history, that ‘haranguing was, at this time, the least part of the business of Demosthenes; and eloquence neither the sole, nor the principal talent, as the style of writers would induce us to believe, on which his success depended. He must have been master of other arts, subservient to which his eloquence was employed; and must have had a thorough knowledge of his own state, and of the other states of Greece; of their dispositions, and of their interests, relatively to one another and relatively to their neighbors, to the Persians particularly, with whom he had correspondence, not much to his honor. I say, he must have been master of many other arts, and have possessed an immense fund of knowledge, to make his eloquence in every case successful, and even pertinent and seasonable in some, as well as to direct it and furnish it with matter, whenever he thought fit to employ that weapon.’ And we find Demosthenes speaking not very differently of himself. He boasts that he was the only one who had ever undertaken singly to carry political business through all its stages: for instance, to show the people the public interest requiring that an embassy should be sent to such a state; to draw the decree, containing the instructions for the ministers to be employed; to defend it against the objections of opposing orators; and then himself to take the office, and execute all the functions of the embassy: ‘I applied myself,’ he says, ‘to every kind of public business¹.’

Lord Bolingbroke on the Spirit of Parties.

Demosth. de cor. p. 300 & 308.

From before the first Persian invasion, when the Athenians, pressed

¹ *Ἐν παντί πᾶσι τοῖς πράγμασι.* Demosth. de cor. p. 302.

by the Lacedæmonians, solicited assistance from the satrap of Sardis, there had perhaps never been a time when some of the republics were not looking for advantage from connection with the Persian court, or its officers. On the other hand, since the victories of Xanthippus and Cimon, but much more since the expedition of the younger Cyrus, and the following successes of Agesilaus, even that distant court, but much more the western satraps, had been accustomed to watch Grecian politics with a jealous eye, to fear any political union of the numerous states of that little country, to interpose in its divisions, and assist the weaker against the stronger. The prospect therefore, now appearing, of union under such a prince as Philip, whose conquests already approached the Persian provinces, would be more than commonly alarming. It seems reasonable to suppose that a politician, generally so cautious as Isocrates, had knowledge of circumstances not reported by extant writers, which led him to that provocation to Persia, contained in his oration on peace, and repeated in the orations to Archidamus and to Philip. Demosthenes himself formerly, opposing, with apparent propriety, needless or interested provocation to Persia, had however declared, that he considered the king of Persia as the common enemy of all the Greeks. With whatever good or ill judgement then Isocrates persevered in urging, as the interest of Greece, to carry war against Persia, Demosthenes did not scruple now to pursue the interest of his party in forming or improving connection with Persia. In the general assembly he contended that alliance with Persia should be cultivated, and pecuniary assistance, for war against Macedonia, solicited. An embassy to the Persian court, on his motion, was decreed, and, under his able direction, was successful. A considerable subsidy was obtained, and he became himself the agent of the Persian court for the disposal of the money.

Demosth.
pro Rhod.

Demosth.
Philipp. 4.
& or. in ep.
Philipp.

Æsch. de
cor.

The situation of the important island of Eubœa, distracted still violently by faction, but almost lost to Athens, then engaged his attention. Large experience had now taught him, that the haughtiness of democratical empire had been carried, by the Athenian government, to a pernicious extreme; not only in the violences of the former leaders of his party, which had produced the misfortunes of the Confederate war, but perhaps even in his own speeches and measures,

which

which might have contributed to the loss of Amphipolis and Olynthos. If, in the present situation of Greece, the republic would hold subjects, or support its ambitious purposes by alliances, the tone must be altered. Yet the change could not be perfectly easy : for so were the Athenian people accustomed to be flattered with the idea of their absolute sovereignty, that to profess an adverse principle, to imitate the king of Macedonia's arts of equity, liberality, and scrupulous regard for the constitution of every little patronized republic, would require great circumspection; and able as well as careful management. To obviate this difficulty, Demosthenes seems, a second time, to have used and abused the liberality of the party of Phocion. They had always recommended a liberal policy, both toward allies and toward enemies ; and there were many among the Eubœans disposed to trust them, who would not trust the party of Chares. How any accommodation was brought about, does not appear, but some degree of coalition was again formed.

During the late war between Athens and Macedonia, Callias, founder of the Eubœan general assembly, instituted to support the independency of the island, had passed to the Macedonian court. The distinction, with which he was treated there, is marked in the observation of the cotemporary orator, that he was favored with the title of ' the

Æsch. de
COR. p. 482.

' king's companion ;' a principal honor of that court, revived under the Roman empire with the Latin appellation ' comes ;' whence the modern title ' count,' so familiar now throughout Europe, and apparently the term ' companions' of the orders of knighthood has been of the same origin². The peace quickly following between Macedonia and Athens, could hardly fail to produce some disappointment to his hopes. What the circumstances were we are not informed ; nor should we perhaps trust Æschines, any more than Demosthenes, for all that his words seem to imply, which he would not venture directly to assert. Callias however engaged in measures offensive to Philip, whence he was obliged to quit Macedonia. If then there remained a state of any considerable power, whence he could hope for support in his political purposes, it was Thebes, and he went thither.

² Τῶν ἱταίων εἰς ἀρχαῖα. Æsch. de cor. p. 482.

Before this time, evidently, Demosthenes had opened that communication with a party in Thebes, with which we find Æschines reproaching him, and which he afterward turned to great account. It was a bold idea to bring the people of all Greece the most inveterately hostile, equally hating the Athenians and hated by them, to close political union with Athens. But, as the party in Thebes, which desired to maintain the connection with Macedonia, would be indisposed to favor Callias, or to receive overtures from Demosthenes, the opposite party would, on that very account, be in some degree prepared for both. Callias however soon quitted Thebes, without having carried any public purpose that has been made known to us; and returning to his own city, Chalcis, where his influence seems to have remained intire, he procured a deputation to be sent by the Chalcidian government to Athens, to treat of a new alliance. Demosthenes not only gave his support to the liberal system, which Phocion and Isocrates had been continually recommending, but, as in making the peace with Macedonia, so now again in treating with Eubœa, he surprized them with going a great deal farther than they would have ventured. Under his management a treaty was concluded, by which, all claim of dominion of the Athenian people over, not Chalcis only, but Eretria, Oreus, in effect all Eubœa, was surrendered: those cities were no longer to send deputies to the synedrium at Athens, and no more to pay tribute: they were made as completely independent, by this treaty, as Byzantium, and the allied islands, by the peace concluding the Confederate war.

Æsch. ut ant.

B. C. 341.
Ol. 109. 4.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 74.
Æsch. de
cor.

This negotiation, managed by Demosthenes, Phocion so far approved, that he took the military command requisite for carrying it into effect. Under his orders a body of Athenian troops passed into Eubœa. Theban and Macedonian troops are spoken of, as in considerable force in the island. But among the cotemporary orators, and not less among the later historical writers, we find such terms very loosely applied. It seems very unlikely that any Macedonian, or even Theban, men were among those troops: they seem rather to have been only Eubœans, who desired that support from Macedonia and Thebes which they did not obtain: for Philip, hindered by his war with Thrace and Scythia, had besides no disposition to oppose Phocion; and

and Thebes was distracted by faction, heightened by the intrigue of Demosthenes. Philistides of Oreus, and Cleitarchus of Eretria, principal men, called by their opponents tyrants of those cities, withdrew and the whole island was brought under subjection (not nominally to Athens, but to the party of Clistus, the friend of Demosthenes) with so little effort, that no account of any contest remains³.

For surrendering, by the treaty, that sovereignty of Eubœa, with the revenue attached to it, which the Athenian people had, now for ages, claimed and generally held, it might be expected that one day some opposing orator would propose to acquire profit, or credit and power, by calling the authors of the measure to a severe account. It was however much for the security of Demosthenes, that those, generally his political opponents, were, in this business, his colleagues. But he used the opportunity, while he treated them yet as political friends, to provide still farther. One of his own party, Aristonicus, moved in the general assembly, that the thanks of the people be given Æsch. de cor. him for his various services to the republic, and especially for restoring the liberty of the Eubœan cities; and that, as an acknowledgement of them, a crown of gold be presented to him in the theater, at the festival of Bacchus. No opposition seems to have been made; the decree passed, and he received the honor.

Speculations in Thrace next engaged him. The great object was to gain the important town of Byzantium, commanding the commerce of the Euxine sea. Nor would the advantage be single; for so Athens, already mistress of the Chersonese, would command the two readiest passes between Europe and Asia; and thus to the Persian court, and especially to the satraps of Lesser Asia, the importance of her alliance would be greatly increased. Four or five years before, when he delivered the oration on the peace with Macedonia, the party then ruling in Byzantium being adverse to Athens and especially to the war-party, he spoke of the Byzantine people generally in surly and threatening terms, adverting to the claim of the Athenian people

³ Plutarch, as it has been well observed by Vossliag, has omitted all notice of this expedition under Phocion; an expedition, tho' producing no brilliancy of military achieve-

ment, yet of great political importance. We might well have spared some of his strange tales of Phocion's deeds, afterward in Thrace, for a good account of it.

Demosth. de
cor. ut ant.

to dominion over them, and tribute from them. He resolved now to use the opportunity, afforded by the implication of the king of Macedonia in war with Scythia, to correct the evil of this imprudence. The new connection with Persia could not but give increased importance to Athens in the eyes of the Byzantines. Demosthenes knew the general indisposition of commercial communities to any implication of policy with a government, in which the landed was the prevailing interest. An opening for political communication was ready, through the commercial communication, already established; principally with Perinthus, but through that town with Byzantium, and all connected with Byzantium. The objects altogether appeared important enough to induce Demosthenes to leave the Athenian people, for a time, to the impression of the eloquence of others, while he undertook himself an embassy to Thrace. He visited Byzantium, Selymbria, Perinthus, and went on to the courts of the Thracian princes. In proposing his new system of liberal alliance, he seems to have had the concurrence of the party of Phocion. His success evidently was great. In Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium, a preponderance was given to the Athenian party; who quickly carried things far beyond what Phocion is likely to have approved. With those towns, as with Olynthus formerly, the term was short between alliance with Athens and war with Macedonia.

SECTION II.

*War of Macedonia with the Hellespontine Cities. Athenian Decree:
Letter of Philip: Fourth Philippic of Demosthenes.*

WE are without information of the specific provocation which induced Philip, soon after his return from the Scythian war, to lay siege to Perinthus. The historian's expression is general, that Perinthus was hostile to Macedonia*. But to Philip's common practice, of employing sedulously and most patiently, against all Grecian towns, peaceful means before he would resort to arms, we have large testimony; and

* Πίσιδος, ἡ ἀντικείμενη μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς. Diod. l. 16. c. 74.

for the encouragement to the Athenian party in Perinthus to give provocation to Macedonia, our information is ample; it was invitation from Athens, and assurance of the powerful and profitable support of Persia. The force which Philip led against a little Grecian colony, indicates that he was aware the contention would be with force beyond its own. The besieging army is said to have been of thirty thousand men. But the town, singularly strong by situation, covering a hill of conic form, nearly surrounded by the sea, was also well fortified. The art of the besiegers soon made a breach in the wall. But no sooner was a point threatened by their machines, than the besieged raised a new defence within, connected, at its extremities, with the uninjured part of the old fortification. This new defence then, tho inferior in strength to the old wall, yet being on higher ground, and flanking the ground without it, possessed great advantage against assault. Meanwhile, the port being open, supplies of every kind were largely furnished to the besieged. The satraps of all the maritime provinces of the Persian empire had received orders to support them; and not only provisions and ammunition were abundantly sent in, but a large body of those Grecian troops, always ready for hire in any service, was prepared to reinforce the garrison.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 75.
Pausan. l. 1.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 52.

Philip now perceived that a fleet, powerful enough to command the sea, was absolutely necessary to the success of his enterprize. Such a fleet accordingly he assembled. Meanwhile observing that supplies reached Perinthus principally through the Selymbrians, whom he had not before treated as enemies, he sent a body of troops to blockade their town. These measures were efficacious and threatening enough to excite new and extraordinary exertion from Demosthenes. The war-party had long been imputing to Macedonia hostile conduct against Athens: they had incited and committed hostile acts against Macedonia: yet war was not avowed between the two governments; and in the connection, which they seem to have yet maintained in some degree with the party of Phocion, it could not conveniently be proposed. But the naval commander on the Hellespontine station, Leodamas, being a man for their purpose, they sent him instructions, at their own risk, without

Epist. Phil.
lupp. ap.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 251.

authority from the sovereign assembly, to carry troops and provisions into Silymbria, conveying them in merchant-ships, under pretence of supplying the island of Lemnos. The commander of the Macedonian fleet, however, Amyntas, took all the ships, and sent them, with their commander Leodamas, into a port of Macedonia.

This event produced, as was likely, much agitation in Athens. The war-party were sedulous to excite indignation among the Many against Philip. Demosthenes, as we learn from himself, took a leading part⁵. A moderate decree however, moved by Eubulus, one of the most eminent of Phocion's party, was adopted, which may deserve to be seen complete, in a literal translation. It ran thus: 'In the archonship of Neocles, in the month Boëdromion, the generals having called an extraordinary assembly, Eubulus son of Mnesitheus, of the Cyprian ward, moved: "Whereas the generals have reported to the assembly, that the naval commander Leodamas, with twenty ships of burthen, passing under his orders to the Hellespont⁶ for corn, have been taken by Amyntas, commanding in the service of Philip, and carried into the ports of Macedonia, and there detained under guard; therefore the prytanes and the generals shall provide that the council be assembled, and proceed to the appointment of ambassadors to Philip; who shall confer with him for the release of the admiral, the ships and the soldiers; and if it shall appear that the proceedings of Amyntas have been the result of ignorance or mistake, the people will impute no blame to him; if Philip detected their officer exceeding his instructions, the Athenians will take connizance of the matter, and reprove or punish, as the fault or inadvertency may deserve; if it be neither of these, but either he who gave or he who executed the commission has committed wilful outrage, be it reported, that the people, on just information, may consider what ought to be done⁷."

An

⁵ Ταῦτα τοῖνυν ἱπολιτεύμενι τότ' ἐγώ. — Ἡναντιόμην, καὶ προλέγων, καὶ διδάσκων, μὴ προσεῖναι ταῦτα Φιλίππῳ διτιθεῖν. Demosth. de cor. p. 249. The first phrase seems to contain an acknowledgement that the irregular orders to Leodamas were from himself.

⁶ Here and elsewhere the Hellespont includes evidently the Propontis. See also Philip's letter, p. 539.

⁷ Demosthenes, in reporting this decree and that which followed it, appointing ambassadors, has shown his dissatisfaction with

An embassy was accordingly sent to the king of Macedonia, who returned by it a written answer, preserved also by the orator, apparently at length; thus: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Athenian council and people, greeting: Your ambassadors have communicated with me concerning the capture of the ships commanded by Leodamas¹. Altogether you seem very easy to be imposed upon, if you think I can be ignorant that those ships, under pretence of carrying corn from the Hellespont to Lemnos, were sent to succour the Selymbrians, besieged by me, and not intitled, under the provisions of the existing treaty, to be considered as your allies. The instructions moreover to the commander I know were not authorized by the Athenian people: they were but hazarded by some men in office, and some now in private station, who desire, by any means, to urge the people to prefer war with me to the friendship actually existing; men who have their private advantages much more in view than any benefit to the Selymbrians. I am however of opinion that this would be beneficial neither to you nor to me. I will therefore release the ships; and, for the future, if you will not allow those at the head of your affairs to manage them dishonestly and injuriously, but will duly reprove and restrain them, I also will endeavor to preserve the peace.'

This letter, like all those preserved from Philip to the Athenians, bearing nothing of that character of cunning, which has, more indeed by modern than antient writers, been imputed to him, but on the contrary dignified rather than conciliatory, yet indicates moderation in purpose as well as openness in conduct. The ships' crews, were released: complaint of the indefensible measure of the commander was dropped: but the return was not of corresponding character. Wherever an opening could be found for negotiation, Demosthenes

with them in the language of ill temper. *Τὺτο μὲν, τοιοῦτον τὸ ψήφισμα, he says, 'Εὐθουλος ἔγραψεν. ἔκ ἐγὼ. Τὸ δ' ἐφίξῃ; Ἀριστοφῶν, ἢ θ' Ἠγήσιππος, ἢ τ' Ἀριστοφῶν πάλιν, ἢ τὰ Φιλοκράτης, ἢ τὰ Κηφισοφῶν, ἢ τὰ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι· ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν περὶ τούτων λέγω τὸ ψήφισμα.* The repetition of the name Aristophon, and the introduc-

tion of that of Philocrates, who was in exile, are rather curious characteristics of temper or artifice.

⁸ It seems not easy to account for the variation of names, in the copies extant of Demosthenes, between the decree and the letter.

and the war-party were indefatigable in exciting hostility against Macedonia. Encouraged by them the Byzantines were sedulous in furnishing support to the Perinthians: the best part of their military force was actually serving in Perinthus. When therefore the siege had already been continued through the autumn and winter, and no prospect of speedy success appeared, Philip, leaving a force sufficient only to blockade the place, marched suddenly with the greater part of his army against Byzantium itself. The Byzantines, unable to defend their lands, were distressed: but their town was too strong to be suddenly taken.

In these circumstances Demosthenes pronounced that called the Fourth of his celebrated Philippic Orations². It has been observed by the literary critics that this oration is principally a repetition of former topics, but for the political observer it has important characteristics of its own. Throughout the orator shows an increased confidence in the power of his party, and in the revival of his own favor with a majority of the people: he resumes the discussion of the question of the theoric revenue, with again a change of sentiments professed on that subject; apparently the price of his revived favor with the Many, for whose gratification he now again vindicates the accustomed application of that revenue, which he had before demanded for public service. The purpose of alliance with Persia is openly avowed; and in proof of a disposition in the Persian government favorable to Athens, it is mentioned that a Macedonian minister, apparently commissioned to the court, had been arrested on his way, by one of the satraps. Among those great officers, however, we have already had occasion to observe conduct sometimes very adverse to the purposes of the court, and in some of them rays of the liberality of the great Cyrus and the first Darius, in others all the barbarism of the modern east. But finally, what will be not least important to remark, the orator, in consequence apparently of the improved prospect of the affairs of the war-party altogether, again holds out the claim of the empire of Greece for the Athenian people, and indicates the probability of attaining it. Lacedæmon, he observes, was unable to raise her head; and Argos,

Phil. 4.
p. 139.

p. 143.

² Φιλίπποι - οὗ ἐν ἐπὶ Βυζάντιον παρόδιος. Phil. 4. p. 149.

Thebes,

Thebes, Corinth, and Arcadia, formerly accustomed to arrange themselves under the lead of either Lacedæmon or Athens, now concurred only in a general competition with them and with one another. This miserably divided and consequently weak state of the nation, he then asserts to be the fortunate crisis, whence the Athenian people should profit to establish their authority over the whole.

Phil. 4.
p. 143.

SECTION III.

*Philip's Letter to the Athenian People : Oration of Demosthenes
on the Letter.*

THE threats in this celebrated oration, baffled as the Macedonian arms had been in Thrace, were alarming to Macedonia ; but still more perhaps to every republic of Greece, which desired to avoid subjection to the war-party of Athens. Toward Macedonia however the tenor was so hostile, that, coming from one who possessed a commanding influence in the sovereign assembly to which it was addressed, and who was effectually first minister of the commonwealth, it might be considered as hardly short of a declaration of war. Nevertheless Philip, knowing that a party still of great weight, whose leaders he highly esteemed and respected, was very differently disposed, resolved once more to address remonstrance to the good sense and justice of the Athenian people. He sent it in the form, then usual, of a letter ; which, tho of considerable length, has been fortunately preserved with the works of Demosthenes. Apparently with reason it has been generally supposed his own composition, since Demosthenes informs us that, on important occasions, he was his own secretary, and Æschines that he was as capable of the business as Python of Byzantium, or any other of the ablest Greeks in his service ; and the supposition receives confirmation from the striking conformity, in style and character, between this and two shorter letters from Philip to the Athenian people, preserved in the oration of Demosthenes on the crown, which have already occurred for notice. In the original it

Demosth. de
cor.

has

has been universally admired as one of the most perfect models of a state paper ever published, singularly combining dignity with simplicity, perspicuity with conciseness, civility of expression with force of representation, moderation of phrase with triumph of argument. As a historical document, it is perhaps the most curious, and certainly among the most valuable, remaining from antiquity; its value in that view being greatly increased by the preservation of the oration of Demosthenes in reply to it, which, avoiding to contest, most effectually confirms the exactness of its statements; insomuch that there is hardly such another series of important facts, throughout antient history, established by evidence so unquestionable¹⁰. In any translation it must suffer much; yet, in justice to this part of the subject, the reader should see it intire, in words the nearest to the original that may be. It runs thus:

‘ Philip, to the Athenian council and people, greeting: Having endeavored repeatedly, by my ambassadors, to induce you to adhere to
‘ to your engagements solemnly sworn to, and those endeavors having
‘ proved fruitless, I have thought it best now myself to lay before you
‘ the matters in which I reckon I am aggrieved. Be not surprized at
‘ the length of my letter; my complaints are numerous, and it appears
‘ necessary to explain all distinctly.

‘ I will begin with mentioning that, when Nicias my herald was
‘ carried off by violence from my territory, you did not call the perpetrators of that outrage to account, but you imprisoned the injured

¹⁰ Some modern writers, in vehemence of attachment to the politics of Demosthenes, have not scrupled, what Demosthenes dared not venture, to impute falsehood to Philip's statements in this letter. Thus the translator Auger, in what he calls his ‘ summary’ of the letter: ‘ Dans cette lettre, mêlant adroitement le vrai avec le faux, il tire de l’un tout le parti possible, donne à l’autre l’air de la vérité, présente avec art des faits constants ou douteux, dont il deduit à son avantage les conséquences les plus justes & les plus précises,’ &c. He has done himself and the writer credit then in notting ‘ le style simple, noble, & précis

‘ de cette lettre, la marche facile & l’enchaînement naturel des idées qui la composent.’ In his ‘ summary’ afterward of the oration of Demosthenes in reply, he says, ‘ Sans s’amuser à répondre à tous les articles de la lettre, il (Demosthene) prend le ton affirmatif.’—So equally Auger himself, and all other writers, admirers of the politics of Demosthenes, as far as my reading among them has gone, have avoided to ‘ s’amuser’ with answering any one of the articles of the letter, and all, after the great orator’s example, have taken ‘ le ton affirmatif.’

‘ person ten months; and my letters, of which he was the bearer,
 ‘ you caused to be read in your general assembly ’.

‘ Then when the Thasians, your subjects, admitted into their port
 ‘ the ships of war of the Byzantines, my enemies, and all privateers and
 ‘ pirates, besides cruizing against my subjects, that would come there,
 ‘ tho the treaty between us declares such conduct an act of hostility,
 ‘ you would take no measures to prevent it.

‘ It was about the same time that Diopithes invaded the country
 ‘ under my protection, carried off the free inhabitants of Crobyræ and
 ‘ Tiristasis, and sold them to slavery, plundered and wasted the bor-
 ‘ dering lands of Thrace, and at length proceeded to that excess of
 ‘ lawless violence, as to arrest my minister, Amphiloehus, sent to nego-
 ‘ tiate the release of the prisoners, and by treating him with extreme
 ‘ severity, forced him to pay nine talents (near eighteen hundred
 ‘ pounds) for his ransom. And this conduct received absolutely the
 ‘ approbation of the people in assembly; tho among all nations to
 ‘ violate heralds and ambassadors is held nefarious, and most among
 ‘ you. When your herald, Anthemoeritus, was put to death by the
 ‘ Megareans, you marked your sense of the crime by excluding the
 ‘ Megarean people from participation in the mysteries, and by erecting
 ‘ a monumental statue before your city-gate. What then is to be
 ‘ said of a crime committed by yourselves, which you, when com-
 ‘ mitted against you, have so resented?

‘ To proceed then; your general, Callias, took possession of all the
 ‘ towns on the Pagasæan bay, connected by close alliance with me,
 ‘ and intitled, by treaty, to peace from you: he seized all ships bound
 ‘ to Macedonia, and condemning all found aboard as enemies, sold
 ‘ them to slavery. And for these violences your decrees rewarded him
 ‘ with applause. I am really not aware what you could do more con-
 ‘ trary to habits of peace, if you were at declared war with me. When

“ Later writers have eulogized the politeness of the Athenians, on this occasion, in returning the letters of the queen Olympias unopened. They have however avowed notice of the violation of the law of nations in stopping the herald; and their eulogy is a little farther weakened by the failure of the authority of Demosthenes for the matter of politeness. It is indeed observable that Philip himself seems to have known nothing of the letters for the queen.

‘ there

‘ there was open war between us, you did so and no otherwise ; you
 ‘ sent out your ships, you sold those whom you took sailing to my
 ‘ kingdom, you assisted my enemies, you did all the ill you could to
 ‘ my people. But now, you have proceeded to such an extreme of
 ‘ unjustifiable malevolence, as to send an embassy to the Persian king,
 ‘ to persuade him to make war against me. Surely this is conduct
 ‘ most extraordinary. Before that monarch had recovered Egypt and
 ‘ Phenicia, in apprehension of attack from him, you passed decrees,
 ‘ proposing a confederacy against him, and inviting me, with all other
 ‘ Greeks, to accede to it. Now, on the contrary, such is the extrava-
 ‘ gance of your rancor toward me, you are treating with him for an
 ‘ alliance against me. Your forefathers, as I am informed, held it a
 ‘ foul reproach to the family of Peisistratus, that they led the Persians
 ‘ against the Greeks ; yet you are not ashamed to do those very things
 ‘ which, in those you call tyrants, you condemn.

‘ Among other extraordinary matters then you require, in your
 ‘ decrees, that I should allow Teres and Kersobleptes to command
 ‘ undisturbed in Thrace, because they are Athenian citizens. But I
 ‘ know they were not comprized in the treaty of peace, made by me
 ‘ with you ; their names are not to be found in the ingraven copies of
 ‘ the treaty, and they have been disowned by you as Athenian citizens :
 ‘ farther I know that Teres has borne arms with me against you, and
 ‘ that Kersobleptes, desiring to take the oaths to the treaty before my
 ‘ ambassadors, was prevented by your generals, representing him as an
 ‘ enemy to the Athenian people. How then is this fair or just ; to
 ‘ declare him an enemy to your state, if so your interest in the moment
 ‘ requires ; to claim him as your citizen, if you want to institute
 ‘ a calumnious charge against me ? Sitacees,’ (the prince already
 so often occurring for mention by the name of Cotys) ‘ it is known
 ‘ was admitted to the rights of your city : yet when he was assassinated,
 ‘ his murderer immediately found favor with you ; and nevertheless
 ‘ you would go to war with me in the cause of Kersobleptes ; knowing
 ‘ perfectly that none of those foreigners, on whom you have bestowed the
 ‘ present of citizenship, care in the least for either your laws or your
 ‘ decrees. But, omitting much that might be said on this subject, to

' come to a point, you gave the rights of your city to Evagoras the
 ' Cyprian, and Dionysius the Syracusan, and their posterity. If you
 ' will persuade those who expelled these, to restore them to the autho-
 ' rity they held when you made them Athenian citizens, you shall com-
 ' mand from me that part of Thrace over which Teres and Kersobleptes
 ' reigned. But if you take no measure of any kind in favor of those
 ' your fellowcitizens, and yet would give me trouble on a similar
 ' account, how am I not justified in resisting you ?

' Much more, which might be reasonably insisted upon, occurs on
 ' these matters, but I will omit it, and proceed to speak of the Cardians.
 ' I must maintain then that I am bound to support them; having
 ' formed alliance with them before the peace made with you; while
 ' you have constantly refused the arbitration, to which I over and
 ' over, and they not seldom, have earnestly urged a desire to have it
 ' referred. Should I not deserve to be esteemed even profligate, if
 ' I deserted my allies, and showed more regard for you, who have
 ' been, with unremitting assiduity, exciting trouble for me, than for
 ' those who have been my good and steady friends ?

' With regard to the Thracian princes and the Cardians, however, you
 ' have confined yourselves to remonstrances; but, in a recent affair,
 ' you have begun with serious violence; for upon simple complaint of
 ' the Peparethians that they had been injuriously treated, you immedi-
 ' ately commanded your general to make reprisals against me. Now
 ' the truth was that my measures against that people were less severe
 ' than they deserved. In full peace they seized Halonesus; and, on
 ' repeated application from me, refused to restore either the island or
 ' my troops, whom they had made prisoners. Of the injury done me
 ' by the Peparethians, you would take no account: you would look
 ' only to the measures I took, in justice to myself, against them. But
 ' you well know that I acquired the island, by taking it, not from them,
 ' not from you, but from the pirate Sostratus. If then you say you gave
 ' it to Sostratus, you acknowledge yourselves patrons of pirates. If he
 ' established himself there by violence, against your consent, what
 ' injury have you suffered from my taking it, and making the navi-
 ' gation of that sea safe? Nevertheless having taken it, I showed

so much regard for your state as to offer to give it you. But your orators would not allow you to accept it as a gift; they insisted upon your reclaiming it as your right; that so, if I obeyed their requisition, I might incur the disgrace of acknowledging that I had taken what I had no right to take, or, by refusing to surrender the place, I might become obnoxious to the Athenian Many. Aware of their purpose, I proposed to refer the matter to arbitration, upon the conditions that, should the island be decided to be mine, it should pass to you as a gift from me; should it be decided to be yours, then it should pass as a restitution. Frequently as I urged this, you would not consent; and meanwhile the Peparethians took the island. What became me then to do? Not to require justice of those who, in violation of their oaths, did me that wrong? Not to make reprisals against those who were so insultingly injurious? If the island belonged to the Peparethians, how can the Athenians reclaim it? If it belonged to you, how was it that you did not demand it of the Peparethians?

But so far has the hostile temper now carried you, that, by your decree, passed on the motion of Polycrates, you have warranted your colonists in the Chersonese to consider themselves as in a state of war with me; and your general on that station has sent formal notice to the Byzantines, and others in those parts, that you have authorized him to commence hostilities against me, whenever fair opportunity may offer, and that you require their coöperation. Hence, wanting to send a fleet into the Hellespont¹³, I was obliged to order an army for its escort through the strait by the Chersonese¹⁴.

Nevertheless I have abstained from reprisals against your towns, your ships, and your territories, tho it has been enough in my power to make myself master of all or most of them, and I have not ceased to solicit you to come to an amicable arbitration about all matters in question between us. And I still desire you to consider whether the trial of arms is preferable to the trial of reason, and whether it is

¹³ Εἰς Ἑλλήσποντον, p. 163. evidently meaning that afterward distinguished as the Propontis.

¹⁴ Ἡ ἀναγνώσθην ἀντὶς παπαπίμψαι διὰ χειρὸς σου τῇ στρατιᾷ. Ep. Phil. p. 163. I am

not wholly without doubt about the sense of this passage, which I submit to those who have given their attention to the naval and military affairs of the antients.

‘ really fittest that you should assume judgement in your own cause,
 ‘ or commit it to others; I desire you to reflect how utterly unrea-
 ‘ sonable it must appear, to all the world, that the Athenians, who
 ‘ compelled the Thasians and Maronites to abstain from arms, in their
 ‘ dispute for the possession of Smyrna, and commit the matter to arbi-
 ‘ tration, should themselves refuse a similar equitable discussion of
 ‘ their claims against me; with this addition to the inconsistency, that,
 ‘ if judgement goes against you, no loss of what you now possess will
 ‘ insue, and, if in your favor, you will gain what I now possess.

‘ But there remains yet to mention what appears to me more extra-
 ‘ ordinary than all the rest. When I proposed last to treat with you
 ‘ of the common interests of Greece, with a view to an accommodation,
 ‘ upon equitable terms, of common advantage, to obviate jealousy I
 ‘ procured embassies from all the Grecian states of my alliance to
 ‘ attend, as witnesses to all transactions; interested to oppose whatever
 ‘ might involve common danger, and able to convict me of being the
 ‘ unworthiest of mankind, if I proposed any deception. You refused
 ‘ my ministers audience. Nor is the ground of this conduct difficult
 ‘ to discover: for whatever benefit might have resulted to the people,
 ‘ the proposed accommodation would not have suited the purposes of
 ‘ some of your orators; those traders in politics among you¹⁵, who
 ‘ hold that war is for them peace, and peace war. If generals are
 ‘ employed, employment for the orators also is certain; for either
 ‘ promoting measures or opposing them, defending and applauding
 ‘ conduct, or arraigning it, their profits are sure. At the same time
 ‘ calumniating, from the bema, the most respectable of your citizens,
 ‘ those most known in other states and most esteemed, they acquire,
 ‘ among the Many, the credit of being friends of the people.

‘ It would be easy for me, at small expence, to stop their invective, and
 ‘ set them upon panegyric of us. But I should be ashamed of appearing
 ‘ to purchase from such men your goodwill; men who have had the as-
 ‘ surance to bring into question even my right to Amphipolis. I trust I
 ‘ can maintain that right on much juster grounds than any can dispute
 ‘ it with me. If first possession is to establish the claim, the evidence of

¹⁵ ‘Οι τῆς πολιτείας τῆς παρ’ ὑμῖν ἱμεροῦσι.

‘ the golden statue at Delphi, dedicated by my ancestor Alexander from
‘ the spoils, when he conquered the country from the Persians, what
‘ Grecian state can contest? Should the right thus acquired be con-
‘ sidered as invalidated by later possession, the latest claim that can
‘ be asserted also is mine; for I took the place by siege in open war,
‘ against the colonists established there by the Lacedæmonians, who
‘ had taken it, in fair and open war, from you. We all hold our respec-
‘ tive countries, either by inheritance from our ancestors, or by con-
‘ quest. Of Amphipolis then, you neither were the first Grecian pos-
‘ sessors, nor are the present possessors; but having held it for a very
‘ short time only, you claim it from me against your own most solemn
‘ pledge of faith in treaty made with me. Frequently I have men-
‘ tioned it to you; and, on the other hand, your acknowledgement of
‘ my right has been fully confirmed by the treaty of peace between us,
‘ leaving me in possession, and it has been farther corroborated by the
‘ treaty of alliance which followed. How then can any right be more
‘ strongly established? It was originally conquered by my ancestors:
‘ It became again mine by the acknowledged laws of war: and finally
‘ my right has been solemnly admitted by you, who are so much
‘ accustomed to claim what you have no pretension to.

‘ These are the matters of which I complain; and my past forbear-
‘ ance, it is evident, has produced only encouragement for you to be
‘ more forward in such injurious conduct, and to prosecute it unceas-
‘ ingly to the utmost of your power. You then being the aggressors,
‘ with justice on my side, and calling the gods to witness it, I will
‘ resist your aggression, and put to the trial of arms the right you
‘ deny me.’

This letter having been read, in accustomed form, to the Athenian people, Demosthenes ascended the bema. His speech on the occasion, fortunately preserved, is, even among his speeches, of singular boldness and extraordinary ingenuity. Evidently he felt the letter a refutation of all his Philippics, not to be answered by reason and argument. He came therefore prepared with another kind of artillery. Beginning with a bold assertion, adapted to excite attention, he proceeded directly to the mention of transactions foreign to the purpose of the letter, but
adapted

adapted to introduce the invective and instigation composing the rest of the speech, in which not the least notice is taken of any one of the king's complaints, or of any one of the facts stated by him as the ground of them. But the speech, tho, like the letter, it must suffer in any change of language, will deserve to be seen intire, and in words following the original the nearest that may be.

' Athenians,' said Demosthenes, ' that Philip made no peace with you, but only postponed the war, is evident to you all. For after he had given Halus to the Pharsalians, and disposed of the Phocians, and subdued all Thrace, feigning grounds which had no existence, and finding pretences founded on no justice, he immediately, in fact, made war against the republic, and now, in the letter which you have just heard, acknowleges it. That we ought not then either to fear his power, or set ourselves with any ordinary exertion to oppose it, but that with our bodies and our fortunes, with our ships, and in short with all we have, we should proceed unsparingly to vigorous war, I will endeavor to show.

' In the first place then, Athenians, it may be trusted that the greatest of the gods will be our allies and assistants, whom he has dishonored, unjustly violating the peace, sworn to in their names. Next it is to be observed, that the arts, by which he has hitherto prospered, continually deceiving some people or other with promises of great benefits from his friendship, have now lost all their effect. The Perinthians, the Byzantines, and all connected with them, are aware that his purpose is to treat them as he has treated the Olynthians. Even the Thessalians now see that he means to hold authority among his allies, not at their choice, but by his own power. The Thebans are already highly jealous of him: his garrison in Nicæa, and his surreptitiously acquired seat among the Amphictyons, are enough to hold them in alarm. The Peloponnesians he requires to attend him by their embassies, and to make their alliance with him exclusive. Thus, of those formerly his confederates, some are now at open war with him, and others are lukewarm in alliance; all suspect and complain. But there is another thing, of great importance: the satraps of Asia have compelled him, by the force of mercenaries
' thrown

‘ thrown into Perinthus, to raise the siege of that town. Hostility
‘ being thus actually begun, the consideration of the danger threaten-
‘ ing the Persian provinces, should he possess himself of Byzantium,
‘ not only will make the satraps our ready allies, but will induce the
‘ king of Persia himself to supply us with money. His power to do this,
‘ it is well known, exceeds that of all others; and such altogether are
‘ his means to interfere in all the affairs of Greece, that, formerly,
‘ in the wars between us and the Lacedæmonians, his alliance gave
‘ the superiority to either side at his pleasure. Becoming then now
‘ our ally, he will easily overbear Philip’s power.

‘ Nevertheless I will not say that Philip has not, during peace, pos-
‘ sessed himself of many towns and harbours, and various advantages
‘ of no small importance for war. But I observe that, when power
‘ is founded on goodwill, and all the states combined for war have one
‘ interest, such power is lasting. On the contrary, when it is held by
‘ intrigue, and ambition, and deceit, and violence, as now by him, a
‘ little appearance of a turn of fortune, the smallest failure of success,
‘ suffices to shake and overthrow it. And, considering often these mat-
‘ ters, Athenians, I am persuaded, that, not only among Philip’s allies
‘ there is much mistrust and ill-will toward him, but that, even within
‘ his own kingdom, there is not quite that harmony and that attach-
‘ ment to him, which some suppose. The Macedonian power is
‘ become considerable by accretion. Of itself it is weak, and utterly
‘ unproportioned to support the authority which must ultimately rest
‘ on it. Philip, by his wars and his expeditions, and everything by
‘ which any might suppose he is become great, has made it only more
‘ precarious. For you must not imagine, Athenians, that the same
‘ things delight Philip and his subjects. You must recollect that he
‘ is ardent for glory; their wish is for safety: he cannot acquire glory
‘ without danger; and they do not desire, while they have children
‘ and parents and wives at home, to perish or meet daily dangers for
‘ him. From these considerations anyone may gather how the greater
‘ part of the Macedonians stand disposed toward him. Those then
‘ called his companions, and the principal officers of his mercenaries,
‘ enjoy indeed distinction in some proportion to their merit; but they
‘ live

‘ live in more apprehension than those less distinguished. For those of
 ‘ lower degree fear only the enemy; but the man injoying high rank
 ‘ has more to apprehend from flatterers and calumniators than from
 ‘ battles. In the perils of war, high and low partake; but the dread of
 ‘ the king’s temper is peculiar to the great. Moreover, those of the
 ‘ lower ranks are punished only if they deserve punishment; but those
 ‘ of the higher often incur mortification and humiliation by merit too
 ‘ conspicuous. Nor is this to be doubted by any man of sense and in-
 ‘ formation; for Philip is so greedy of glory, as those who have lived
 ‘ with him affirm, that he shows more dissatisfaction with his generals,
 ‘ when they do anything highly praiseworthy, than when they wholly
 ‘ fail in a business committed to them. How then is it, if things are
 ‘ so, that he has been so well served so long? Because, Athenians,
 ‘ prosperity throws a veil over such things. Success is powerful to
 ‘ overshadow and hide the faults of men. Should he once fail, then
 ‘ all will be brought into clear daylight. For, as in our bodies, while
 ‘ general health prevails, ailments in particular parts are little regarded,
 ‘ but in sickness every sore is disturbed, old fractures, old strains, and
 ‘ whatever is not perfectly sound; so in kingdoms and all governments,
 ‘ while they are successful in war, defects are little observed; but, when
 ‘ failure begins, such as may be expected for him, in projects beyond
 ‘ his strength, everything that has gone wrong will become evident
 ‘ to everybody.

‘ Nevertheless, Athenians, if any of you, seeing Philip successful,
 ‘ reckon him therefore formidable, I think he judges well: for, in all
 ‘ the affairs of men, fortune is much, or rather everything. And yet,
 ‘ in a comparison of his fortune with ours, the advantage will be found,
 ‘ in many ways, with us. For we have inherited from our ancestors
 ‘ our superiority and command, transmitted from times, not only before
 ‘ this man, but before any reigned in Macedonia. They formerly paid
 ‘ tribute to the Athenians, but our commonwealth never to any. We
 ‘ have many reasons then to expect superior favor from the gods,
 ‘ inasmuch as our conduct has been more consonant to piety and
 ‘ justice. But why then was he so successful against us in the former

‘ war? Because, Athenians, for I must be open with you, he is always
 ‘ present with his army, bears all fatigue and every privation, faces
 ‘ every danger, and, regardless of seasons throughout the year, never
 ‘ misses an opportunity. On the contrary we, for the truth must be
 ‘ spoken, sit here idling, procrastinating, decreeing, and inquiring for
 ‘ news. For news! what can be stranger news than that a Macedonian
 ‘ man, holding the Athenians in contempt, should dare to send them
 ‘ such a letter as you have just heard? But he has an army of mer-
 ‘ cenaries in his pay,—and, the gods know, some of our orators besides;
 ‘ who are not ashamed to live for Philip, and seem hardly aware that
 ‘ they are selling the commonwealth, and themselves with it, for a
 ‘ little pelf. But we neither stir to excite elsewhere opposition to his
 ‘ designs, nor will furnish the expence of a mercenary army, nor have
 ‘ courage to serve ourselves. It is not therefore wonderful that he
 ‘ obtained successes against us in the late war; but rather that we,
 ‘ doing nothing that in war ought to be done, expect to prevail against
 ‘ him, who does everything that can promote his superiority.

‘ These, Athenians, are the matters you have to consider; and so to
 ‘ consider, as becomes those who cannot say they are enjoying peace;
 ‘ for now, after open acts of hostility, he has declared war. It be-
 ‘ comes you therefore to spare neither public nor private wealth; it
 ‘ becomes all to dedicate their persons zealously to the service, when
 ‘ occasion may be. Better generals than formerly should be appointed.
 ‘ For let it not be imagined that those, through whom the affairs of
 ‘ the commonwealth from better have become worse, are those who
 ‘ from worse will make them better again. Nor have the weakness to
 ‘ suppose that, if you are yourselves inactive as formerly, others will
 ‘ be zealous to fight your battles for you. But, on the contrary, con-
 ‘ sider how disgraceful it is for you, whose fathers bore so many labors
 ‘ and such extraordinary dangers, in war with Lacedæmon, to refuse
 ‘ the exertion necessary for maintaining what they, honorably and
 ‘ justly acquiring, have transmitted to you; that a man of Mace-
 ‘ donia should be so ready for danger, in his ambitious pursuits, as
 ‘ to have been wounded in battle in every part of his body, and
 ‘ Athenians

‘ Athenians, whose inheritance is independency and victory, should,
 ‘ through softness and idleness, surrender the acquisitions of their fore-
 ‘ fathers, and the interests of their country.

‘ Not however to make many words, I insist that we should all pre-
 ‘ pare for war; that we should animate the other Greeks to join in
 ‘ alliance with us, not with words, but with deeds: for all argument,
 ‘ unsupported by actions, is vain, and so much the more from our
 ‘ government, as we are known to have readier means for acting against
 ‘ him than any other Greeks.’

SECTION IV.

Defeat of Philip's Measures against the Hellespontine Cities. Difficulties remaining for Demosthenes. Measures of Demosthenes for an extensive Confederacy against Macedonia. Reversion of superior Influence to Phocion's Party, and Tranquility insuing.

As it must have been assurance of a strong party among the Many that encouraged Demosthenes to answer such a letter with such a speech, so it appears to have been good assurance of a strong combination against Macedonia, which was gathering on the eastern side of the Ægean, that encouraged him and his party in the line of politics which they followed. The Chians, and Rhodians and Coans, whose political connection with Byzantium had not ceased with the Confederate war, took a warm interest in the danger of their ally, and they were strong in marine. But, what was still more important, orders were sent from the Persian court for all the maritime satraps to use their utmost exertions for preventing the progress of the Macedonian arms, and the injury that might insue to the Persian interest. Under direction of the Athenian government, a powerful fleet was assembled in the Hellespont, and Chares took the command. Whether Demosthenes really considered him as the fittest instrument still of the purposes of the party, or, taking himself the lead in poli-

B. C. 340.
Ol. 113. 1.

Diod. l. 6.
c. 77.

Plut. v.
Phoc.

Plut. v.
Phoc.

tical business, he was unable to deny the first military situation to Chares, neither his own speeches nor any other memorials furnish satisfactory information. Chares, however, was defeated, near Byzantium, by the Macedonian fleet, under the orders of Amyntas. While his insufficiency thus against the enemies of his country made him contemptible, his rapacity against its friends, of which experience was old, made him odious; insomuch that it became necessary to recall him, and Phocion was sent to supersede him in the command.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 77.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 257. 5.

It were highly desirable to elicit all possible light from the narrative of Plutarch, far more copious than any other extant, of the circumstances of the transactions of this time, which were among the most critical of the age; but he has so painted his hero Phocion in glaring colors without comprehensible form, and so thrown Philip into smoke and darkness, also without distinguishable lines, and altogether so wants support from the historian, the orators, the Roman biographer, and probability, that, amid much obvious romance, it is difficult to say to what, among all his tales, reason should allow belief. The issue however was, that Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing any of the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a composition with his enemies. The historian, writing near three hundred years after, and willing that Greeks only should be believed the defenders of Grecian cities, imputes the principal effect to the interference of the Chians and Lesbians: but what Demosthenes indicates, in his speech at the time, on the king of Macedonia's letter, was then probably too notorious to be concealed, and in his opinion perhaps matter rather to boast of, as the advantageous result of his negotiation, that the wealth of Persia, paying and plentifully supplying Grecian troops, principally gave the strength from which Philip thought it prudent to withdraw. It is possible also, and not wholly improbable, that something of that credit may have been due to Phocion, which Plutarch gives, but of which Demosthenes would avoid an account. Phocion having the command of the Athenian armament on the Hellespontine station, Philip would respect him, and be ready for accommodation with him. But, in an oration of many years after, Demosthenes assumed
the

the merit for the Athenian people, tho more particularly for himself, as the director of their measures: and, altho so he flattered the Athenian people much, and may have omitted what was owing to Phocion and others, yet perhaps he arrogated little more to himself than he might justly claim: the combination and direction of force, and the success insuing, may have been principally owing to his able management.

The triumph thus might appear great for Demosthenes, as the disappointment certainly must have been great for Philip; who since his defeat by Onomarchus, and insuing distress and danger in Thessaly, soon repaired by a splendid victory, had been accustomed to see all the measures of his enemies turned to their own confusion and his advantage; and, having earned the estimation of being the most fortunate, formidable, and glorious potentate of the age¹⁶, was now completely foiled in enterprize, successively against three little commercial states, which had before solicited his protection. But the success of Demosthenes, tho much had been done, was yet so far from complete, that he and his whole party remained as on the verge of a precipice. He had been, in his public speeches, continually and vehemently urging the republic to war against Macedonia, procuring measures of positive hostility to be taken, and after great forbearance and repeated remonstrances from Philip, contemptuously asserting the falsehood of his pretence to desire peace, and the actual existence of war. In these circumstances he and his party could not undertake conciliation with Macedonia. If conciliation were proper or necessary, they must yield the lead to their opponents of the party of Phocion, who had always desired peace, and with whom, it was well known, Philip was disposed to friendship. Nothing therefore remained for them, if they would even hold the lead in Athens, but still more, if they would prosecute still those ambitious purposes of extensive empire, which we have seen Demosthenes so frequently avowing, but to persevere in urging war against Macedonia, and in effort to form a confederacy able to support it. Of the terms of the treaty concluded, when the Macedonian arms

¹⁶ Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλῶν κύριος γίγοντι. Demosth. Philipp. 4. p. 143. and again, p. 149. Εὐδαίμων καὶ μέγας καὶ φοβερός ἐστὶ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ Βασιλεύει.

were withdrawn from Byzantium, we have no information : but the pressure upon Macedonia was relieved ; the hope of farther coöperation from the Chians and Rhodians, in the views of the war-party, was ended ; and active hostility, even from the Persian satraps, perhaps in necessary consequence, ceased.

Such appear to have been the disadvantageous and discouraging circumstances remaining for Demosthenes, after his success in procuring so important a check to the Macedonian arms, the first given since his acquisition of any share in the administration. He had however yet before him advantages, which talents like his might use, and ambition like his would not abandon. He retained still the agency for the Persian court, the means afforded by which are not to be calculated. In Eubœa, his new system of liberality had been highly successful. The able conduct of the brothers, Callias and Taurosthenes, his agents, had made their party preponderant in all the towns of the island. In western Greece the Acarnanians were much disposed to connection with the war-party of Athens, through enmity to the Epirots on their northern, and the Ætolians on their southern border, favored against them by Macedonia. In Peloponnesus the Achaïans, instigated like the Acarnanians, by enmity to the Ætolians, desired Athenian patronage for their support against those who enjoyed Macedonian patronage. Corinth also remained under the lead of those who held friendly connection with the war-party in Athens. But the important speculation was in Thebes ; and the interest there, adverse to Macedonia, not only maintained itself, but was advancing in weight.

Beyond Greece the Chersonese was now the only dominion of Athens ; but the neighboring cities of Byzantium, Selymbria and Perinthus, commanding the coast nearly from the Chersonese to the Euxine, were restored to her alliance. Among arrangements, made there by Phocion, would be a restoration of some liberal participation in civil power to the party adverse to war with Macedonia. It would then be an object for Demosthenes, on the first opportunity, to reverse this, and restore complete preponderance to the other party ; whose leaders, formerly connected with him, would not fail in zealous concurrence.

currence. How successful he was in this pursuit, following circumstances show.

In Byzantium, as in Athens, political measures were, in regular course, proposed in a select council, and, after discussion there, brought before the assembled people. A bill, regularly carried through the council, was transmitted to the general assembly, and there passed into a law, declaring the gratitude of the Byzantine to the Athenian people, for their support in the recent war with Macedonia. It moreover directed that, in perpetual memory of the benefit, three statues, each sixteen cubits high, representing the Byzantine people and the Perinthian crowning the Athenian, should be placed in a public part of Byzantium. The decree for this purpose has been preserved by Demosthenes, in its original Doric dialect. The temper and the policy, of those who led in the business, are clearly marked by the preamble; which contains a direct libel upon those Byzantine patriots who, through the Confederate war, had emancipated their commonwealth from its former oppressive and degrading subjection under the sovereignty of the Athenian people. It states, as the ground of the decree, ‘that
 ‘ the Athenian people, in former times, had been always friendly to
 ‘ the Byzantines and their allies and kinsmen the Perinthians; and
 ‘ that recently, when Philip the Macedonian made war with the
 ‘ purpose of exterminating them, they had done many and great
 ‘ services, assisting them with a hundred and twenty vessels, bringing
 ‘ corn and arms and heavy-armed troops, and thus delivered them
 ‘ from great dangers, and restored their antient form of government,
 ‘ their laws, and the tombs of their forefathers.’ An extensive purpose is indicated in what follows: to the whole Athenian people are given freedom of both cities, right of marriage with citizens, right of holding lands and houses in the Byzantine and Perinthian territories, and with these common rights of citizens, the extraordinary privileges of precedence at religious ceremonies and public spectacles, and immunity from those burdensome offices which were, in all the republics, connected with the rights of citizens. After this the statues are directed, and then follows the concluding clause, which is not the least remarkable

Demosth. de
cor. p. 255.

remarkable, inacting that embassies shall be sent to all the great national meetings, the Isthmian, Nemean, Olympic, and Pythian, to make there solemn proclamation of the crowns, 'with which,' says the decree, 'the Athenian people are crowned by us; that all the 'Greeks may be informed of the merit of the Athenians, and of the 'gratitude of the Byzantines and Perinthians.'

The tenor of this decree fully shows that the highspirited and successful assertors of independency, who had directed the measures of Byzantium and Perinthus in the Confederate war, no longer held the lead, and that the connection, of those who had superseded them in power, was not with the party of Phocion, to whom their cities owed recent relief from a ruinous war, but with the Athenian war-party, whose instruments they submitted to be, in offering such grossly false flattery to the Athenian people, and in promoting a new breach with Macedonia. The influence then of that party thus prevailing there, their authority would not be likely to fail among the subjects of Athens in the neighboring territory of the Chersonese. Accordingly,

Demosth. de
cor. p. 256.

from that country, a decree was procured in these remarkable terms: 'The Chersonesites inhabiting Sestus, Eleus, Madytus, and Alopeconnesus, crown the council and people of Athens with a golden crown of sixty talents; and they erect an altar to gratitude, and to the Athenian people, who have done the greatest of all benefits to the Chersonesites, rescuing them from Philip, and restoring their country, their laws, their freedom, and their religious rites: wherefore they will not cease henceforth forever to be grateful, and to return the greatest good in their power. So it is in common council decreed.' This extortion of sixty talents from the Chersonesites, gratifying to the Athenian Many, and therefore what Demosthenes would boast of before them, was not what would gain favor to the war-party cause among the other Greeks, and so was not proclaimed at the national meetings, like the decree of the Byzantines¹⁷.

¹⁷ Sixty talents, if talent was taken in its ordinary sense, denoting a sum of money, would be between eleven and twelve thousand pounds sterling; if meaning weight of gold, it would be many times more; but the former probably has been intended.

The restoration of the war-party interest in Byzantium was an important step toward the completion of the political system of Demosthenes, which had two great points, to surround Attica with allies, and Macedonia with enemies. To prosecute this he devoted himself, according to his own boast, to every kind of business. He was elected an Amphictyon, or representative of Athens in the office of pylagore in the Amphictyonic assembly, and he went to Delphi. It seems to have been a principal advantage of that situation and office, that they concurred to give great opportunity for communication with Thebes. He used moreover the opportunity of residence in Phocis for taking the duty of ambassador to the neighboring people of Acarnania, and he went in the same capacity into Peloponnesus. But he would not allow himself long absence from the debates and intrigues of Athens. The prosecution therefore of negotiation, begun in Peloponnesus and Acarnania, he committed to Callias of Chalcis, whose abilities had been so advantageously proved in Eubœa.

Demosth.
de cor.Æsch. de
cor.

Callias, returning to Athens, was introduced by Demosthenes to the assembled people, to report matters of important public concern. He had succeeded, he said, in negotiating a confederacy for war against Macedonia: the Achæians and Megareans had engaged for sixty talents annually; the Eubœans would furnish forty, and many other Grecian republics would concur. He must however desire to be excused for withholding report of some very advantageous circumstances procured by his mission, as they required secrecy; but they were known to some Athenians, who would vouch for them, and he named Demosthenes. To this Demosthenes assented, adding that, of his own knowledge, the force engaged for, by the Peloponnesians and Acarnanians together, was a hundred ships of war and ten thousand mercenary troops, beside native forces, two thousand from each country: that the command in chief, it was agreed, should be conceded to the Athenians, and that a congress of deputies from all the confederacy should meet, at Athens, on a day not distant, which he named ¹³.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 486.

p. 488.

Possibly Callias was deceived by those he trusted as leading men

¹³ For all these particulars Æschines refers to a decree of the Athenian people, passed on the occasion, which, on his motion, was read before the assembly.

of the democratical party, in the governments with which he communicated; or possibly, deceiving themselves, they undertook for what they were unable to accomplish. There was however a general failure of the promises: neither fleet nor army was assembled, no congress met, and, whatever may have been agreed in secret, no confederacy for war with Macedonia was acknowledged. To prosecute war then, as Demosthenes had proposed, was impossible, and to maintain peace was what he least of anybody could undertake. Thence evidently arose the necessity for what, it appears, followed; he conceded the lead in public business to those who could consistently propose to maintain friendly connection with Macedonia, and with whom the Macedonian government might be not indisposed to friendly communication. Under such circumstances, that he could quietly withdraw himself from the leading situation, and still hold the weight that enabled him to interfere as a speaker in the general assembly, marks either very extraordinary influence, which he possessed among the Many, or very extraordinary moderation in the opposite party, or rather both. The tranquillity insuing from his retirement, during the year following that of the Hellespontine war, is marked by the historian by a complete omission of notice of both Grecian affairs and Macedonian.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275.
Aesch. de cor.

B. C. 359.
Ol. 110. 2.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 82, 83.

SECTION V.

New Importance of the Office of Amphictyon. Sacrilege of the Amphissians. Opposition of Æschines to the Measures of Demosthenes. New Sacred War. Second Epistle of Isocrates to Philip. Election of Philip to the Office of General of the Amphictyons.

IN this season of comparative tranquillity, when nothing occurred strikingly affecting the principal republics, a political leaven was working in a corner of the country, which quickly produced a fermentation deeply interesting the whole. Formerly the office of Amphictyon was of so little importance, that hardly, among all ex-

tant memorials, is to be found the name of any who held it, as representative of any Amphictyonic state, before Demosthenes. But the acceptance of it by one of his eminence, his character, and actually holding the power of first minister of the Athenian republic, not lightly indicates that it was become an office affording, in existing circumstances, great opportunities. Accordingly, when his opponents acquired the administration, Æschines was elected to the office. Athens, it appears, now sent four representatives to the Amphictyonic council; three pylagores, among whom was Æschines, but still only one hieromnemon. What had been foreseen, of importance enough to detach a man of the powers of Æschines from the controversies of oratory at Athens, does not appear, but matter requiring his talents and experience in business soon showed itself.

In the Sacred war, lately concluded, the Ozolian Locrians, the most zealous and active allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers; and the final success of their friends had merely relieved them from injury and danger, without bringing any compensation. Their principal town, Amphissa, hardly seven miles from Delphi, overlooked, nearly as Delphi, the rich Cirrhæan plain; and its territory bordered on the devoted land, forbidden to the use of man. The Thebans, powerful among the Amphictyons, would be likely to desire gratification for the Locrians, if it might be had without expence to themselves: but allowance for what was coveted could be only by connivance. The Amphissians however not only used the devoted land, both for pasture and tillage, but ventured to occupy and even fortify the accursed port; and, encouraged by permission of so much, they advanced in assurance, so far as to exact duties for goods and persons passing to and from Delphi.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 305.

Æschines, from whom we have the account, in a speech of many years after, asserted, before the Athenian people, that the Amphissians tampered with the Amphictyons, and especially Demosthenes; who took from them a present of between sixty and seventy pounds sterling, as a fee for his interest immediately in the Amphictyonic council, with a promise of a yearly sum nearly equal, for his regular support to their cause at Athens: and Demosthenes seems to have confirmed this, by avoiding,

in his reply, to contradict it. Indeed it appears unquestionable that the Athenian orators generally, not less than the naval commanders, to whom we have seen Demosthenes himself imputing it, were in the habit of taking such fees or benevolences. It was so they made their fortunes; as afterward the orators in the Roman republic; so the great Cicero acquired his immense fortune. But the purpose of Æschines, in that speech, was not to explain freely and fully the politics of the times, but merely to inculcate Demosthenes. What he said of his rival might be true; but the purpose of that extraordinary statesman certainly went far beyond a little private lucre. Nor will it appear wonderful, all the little that is laid open to us considered, that, from Demosthenes, in his reply, scarcely any facts can be gathered: the splendid coloring, which he could give to anything, he has given with almost only vapor: the tangible matter, that has reached us, we owe mostly to Æschines.

Soon after Æschines had taken his seat in the Amphictyonic council (for so Demosthenes has shown) he noticed the profanation of the Amphisians. Why this was not immediately followed by proceedings against them, does not appear. The crisis at length arose thus. There was a temple newly built, probably to supply one destroyed in the late troubles; and, before it was regularly consecrated, some golden shields, which had been dedicated by the Athenian people, after the battle of Plataea, were placed in it, as if it was duly prepared to receive such oblations. The shields bore an inscription reproachful to Thebes, in these words: 'The Athenians, from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought ' against the Greeks.' This seems to have been done imprudently, rather than with any purpose of offence; for had there been any view to disturb by it the intrigue of Demosthenes, for a connection between the Athenian and Theban governments, which following circumstances show to have been at this time prosecuting at Thebes, more care would probably have been taken to avoid objectionable irregularity¹⁹. Not the Thebans then, but the Amphisian members of the council came

¹⁹ Æschines has avoided to say whether the Athenian accusation against the Amphisians, or the Amphisian accusation against the Athenians was first instituted, and of course credit will be due to the asser-

tion of Demosthenes, in his reply, that no accusation had been brought against Athens, by the Locrians, when Æschines first brought their profanation into question.

forward to notice the irregularity. They said it was impious; and they claimed damages against the Athenian people, for the fault of their representatives, to the amount of fifty talents, near ten thousand pounds sterling. Æschines rose to speak in defence of himself, and his colleagues, and his constituents. An Amphissian member interrupted him, and went to the length of insisting, that the Athenian people, as implicated in all the guilt of the Phocians, by alliance with them in the Sacred war, ought to be excluded from the temple, and deprived of Amphictyonic rights. Æschines however, obtaining at last a hearing, defended the suspension of the shields, and then proceeded to urge against the Amphissians their sacrilegious profanation, in using the devoted land and the accursed port.

Probably enough the Amphissian member, as Æschines says of him, and perhaps others of the Amphictyons, representatives of the smaller states, were men of no advantageous education. It is however evident that, for the new or revived importance, to which the council was raised, there was a great deficiency of established and suitable forms of proceeding; necessary, in every assembly, for insuring just deliberation, and dignified conduct. The arguments of Æschines, or the weight of the Athenian interest, prevailing, the council came so rapidly to a decisive decree, on so difficult and delicate a subject, that, on the same evening, proclamation was made by the herald, for ‘all Delphians, of Æsch. de
cor. p. 514.
‘two years and upward above boyhood, free and slaves, to meet on
‘the morrow at daybreak, at a place named, with hooks and spades;
‘the hieromnemons and pylagores to attend; every state, whose re-
‘presentatives failed, to be excluded from the temple, as implicated in
‘the profanation.’

This hasty communication produced its effect, so far that all met as the decree required. Under command of the Amphictyons the crowd descended into the plain, destroyed the port, burned the houses, and returned. But the Amphissians, admonished of course by their members in the council, had assembled in arms; and whether urged more by inconsiderate passion, or encouraged by promise of powerful support, tho too late to prevent, would revenge the injury to their possessions

Æsch. de
cor. p. 515.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 277.
& 279.

possessions. The unarmed Delphians fled from their menacing approach, but many were wounded, and some, even of the hieromnemons, were seized and stripped.

Such disgraceful irregularities abundantly mark the deficiency and weakness of this national assembly. Nor were the following measures at all becoming the dignity which it ought to have maintained. Next day the president, Cottyphus²⁰, summoned what was called a general assembly of the Amphictyons. In such a general assembly custom had established that all Greeks, at the time at Delphi, intitled to admission to the common sacrifices, and to consultation of the god, should have votes with the hieromnemons and pylagores. The very resource of summoning such an assembly seems to mark deficiency in the Amphictyons; and the result of its deliberations enough indicates that they felt their dignity committed by their former hasty measures. The necessary forms of justice, apparently, not less than a just consideration of their own means, would have required notice to the Amphissians, with a formal requisition to quit the lands they had improperly occupied, before violence was used for ejection. Now measures were taken, which should rather have preceded those through which their dignity and authority had been subjected to insult. It was decreed, that the hieromnemons should meet, on a day named, before the regular time for the next session of the Amphictyons (which in course was to be held not at Delphi, but at Thermopylæ) prepared with a bill for bringing the Amphissians to justice, for their offences against the god, the consecrated land, and the Amphictyons.

With this decree the Amphictyons concluded their session. The Athenian members, returning home, prepared a bill, as the decree required; which, whether as a matter of duty, or only of supposed prudence and expediency, they offered for the approbation of their own government; presenting it first to the council of Fivehundred, and then, warranted by their sanction, to the assembled people. Demosthenes opposed in vain, and the decree of the people gave it the force of a law.

²⁰ Κάττιφος, ὁ τὰς γνώμας ἐψηφίζων. Æsch.

But Demosthenes, superior to his opponents in diligence, not less than in acuteness, talking over the members of the council of Five-hundred, procured a decree there, commanding, that the hieromnemou and pylagores of Athens should go to Thermopyke and to Delphi at the times appointed by their forefathers; thus virtually forbidding their going at the previous time appointed by the Amphictyons. Chusing then dexterously his moment, in an assembly of the people, when the business appointed for the day was over, and Æschines, with the other principal men of his party were gone away, he brought this decree forward there; and uncontrouled by the salutary forms, which check insidious party-measures in the British parliament, he procured at once the complete ratification of it. Nor did he stop thus. Finding the sovereign assembly at his devotion, he added a clause, commanding ‘that the hieromnemou and pylagores of Athens should ‘not communicate with those of the other Grecian states, in words, ‘or deeds, or votes, or act of any kind’²¹.’ The account of Æschines, imputing sinister management to Demosthenes in this business, does no credit to himself or his party for diligence or vigilance.

The decree, thus carried, seems to have been effectual for its purpose; which evidently was to render any attendance of the Athenian members in the council either nugatory, or embarrassing. Had the Athenian Amphictyons been of the war-party they would probably

Æsch. de
cor. p. 518.

²¹ Τὸν ἱερομνήμονα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ πύλαγον, ὡς τοὺς αἰεὶ πύλαγον οὐσίτας, μὴ μετεκεῖν τῆς ἐκεί συλλεγεμένης, μὴ λόγων, μήτε ἔργων, μήτε θυμάτων, μήτε πράξεως μηδεμίας. Æsch. de cor. p. 518.

‘Sycophantice prætermittit quarum rerum ‘non debeant esse participes, belli Phocensis scilicet.’ There is something extremely curious in the disposition to democratical barking, so extensively shown among the critics of the continent, from the revival of letters onward to the French revolution; and more especially when compared with the greater moderation of those of our own country, where real freedom, and the con-

stitution that should insure it, was so much better understood. Taylor, accordingly, says indignantly to this: ‘Nihil prætermittitur.’ In what he adds I cannot equally agree with him: ‘Decrevit Demosthenes eòs non participare cum consiliis vel actis senatus ‘Amphictyonici, qui *extra ordinem cogebatur*.’ The additional clause of Demosthenes had surely a further purview; for the use of an inactment forbidding to the Athenian members concurrence in counsels and deeds with the previous meeting, which they were, by the former part of the decree, forbidden to attend, is not obvious.

have

Æsch. de
cor. p. 519.

have attended purposely to embarrass. But they avoided to go. The Theban members also staid away. All the others however were present, when the resolution was taken, that war be made against the Amphissians, and the command committed to Cottyphus. An army accordingly was collected; the Amphissians were brought to submission; and, as Æschines seems truly to say, all things considered, they were not severely treated. A fine was imposed on the Amphissian state, to be paid in a limited time, to the god. Some of those who had taken a leading part, in the late violence against the Amphictyons, were banished, and some Amphissian citizens, who had been condemned to exile for opposition to the little politics of their state, were restored. Thus, what had been very irregular and highly disgraceful, was put into as regular course as, according to all appearance could be, and in a manner as little objectionable.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 519.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 277.

But no sooner was the force which had compelled submission withdrawn, than the Amphissians returned to their former temper, and proceeded to corresponding measures. They refused payment of the fine, they recalled those whom the Amphictyons had banished, and drove into banishment again those whom they had recalled. Upon this war was again decreed against them. But troops were not duly furnished by the states called upon, and the measures taken were of little effect.

Such successful resistance of the people of the little town of Amphissa to the Amphictyons, the general council of the Greek nation, would appear strange indeed, if it was not fully indicated in remaining accounts, that their resistance was encouraged, and supported, by the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens, in concert with a powerful party in Thebes. Nor was the matter of light moment. It involved the question, whether the party of Demosthenes and Chares at Athens should command the Greek nation. In the fourth Philippic oration of Demosthenes we have seen Corinth, Arcadia, Argos, Thebes, and even Lacedæmon, threatened to be reduced under Athenian empire. Perhaps this boldness, which may appear improvident, was necessary for instigation to the Athenian people. Could Demos-
thenes

thenes have carried his purposes more secretly, he might have succeeded in them.

At the next meeting of the Amphictyons, held at Thermopyke, and thence called the Pylæan meeting, the circumstances of Greece were taken into serious consideration. How the people of the little town of Amphissa should be reduced to order, would have been even a ridiculous question for such a body, if the Amphissians were not already notoriously secure of that support, which soon after was openly given them. It was evidently the notoriety of the divided state of Greece (which Demosthenes himself has described as so inviting for Athens) and the apprehension of being brought under the rule of the conqueror of Sestus and his party, that induced a majority of the members to turn their view to the king of Macedonia.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 279.

Demosthenes, in a speech many years after, told the Athenian people that the whole business of this little Amphissian war arose from the intrigue of Æschines; the ultimate object being to procure the election of Philip to the command. Philip was all the time making war against that powerful Scythian hord, occupying the coast of the Euxine sea, from the Borysthenes to the Danube or beyond it, and he was actually in their country. Agents indeed might nevertheless be busy for him in Greece. But, on the contrary, if Isocrates is to be credited, Philip was as backward to interfere among the republics, even on their invitation, as Demosthenes desired to have him believed eager, indefatigable and profuse. That however the little people of Amphissa would venture first to attack the Amphictyons, and afterward to resume and persevere in war against them, without assurance of support from some more powerful state, is evidently improbable; and the disposition of a powerful party in Thebes and of the war-party in Athens to favor them is abundantly testified by Demosthenes himself. Toward an estimate of Philip's politics, then this may deserve consideration. At the conclusion of the Sacred war, a partnership in the presidency of the Pythian festival had been committed to him and his successors forever. When that great politician, Jason of Thessaly, proposed to make himself sovereign of Greece, it was with him a
great

p. 276.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 519.

great point to preside in person at the Pythian festival; insomuch that he proposed to assume the situation by force, should it not quietly be conceded to him. But Philip avoided the invidious honor, when already his own, and sent his deputy. The ingenuity of Demosthenes converted this into matter of reproach for him. Philip would not condescend, the orator told the Many of Athens, to attend himself, but sent his servant. Had Philip, on the contrary, used the opportunity open to him, as he was well capable of using it; had he displayed at Delphi the elegant magnificence which had been so admired at his Olympic festival in Macedonia; had he there, with advantageous opportunity for communicating personally with principal men, especially young men, from every city of Greece, exerted his singular talent for conviviality and pleasant conversation, to extend personal attachment to him in all parts, the ingenuity of Demosthenes, tho he might have feared the consequences, would not have wanted ground of invective to oppose them, or diligence in making the utmost use of it.

B. C. 339.
Ol. 110, 2.

A'sch. de
cor.

The second of the extant epistles of Isocrates to Philip shows itself to have been written about this time; for it mentions Philip as recently returned from the war with the northern people, in whose country he yet was when the Amphictyons were deliberating about his election to the command in the Amphiſſian war. It marks a strong feeling in the old patriot for Philip's safety; it reproves him for risking his person improvidently in battle, exhorts him to friendship with the Athenians, admonishes him not to regard those who, informing him of all the invectives and calumnies vented against him by a party in Athens, would persuade him that the people generally were ill disposed toward him, and concludes with urging him 'to connect his kingdom and his good fortune with the happiness and concord of the Greek nation'. The Amphictyons then, concurring in senti-
ment

"Επὶ τῇ βασιλείᾳ καὶ τῇ ἰσχυρίᾳ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡμετέρας πόλεως καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἡμετέρας ἡμετέρας καὶ ἡμετέρας."

It seems to have been in mere idleness that the editor, A'sch, has assigned the same date

to the oration to Philip and all the three letters of Isocrates: probably desiring not to be understood to mean the same day, but only time within which was no material change of circumstances. We have seen the ora-
tion

Isocrates and the party of Phocion, how far communicating with them we know not, the Amphietyons came to the resolution of inviting the king of Macedonia to take upon himself the office of their general, and they decreed that Cottyphus, their president, should go to him, as their ambassador, to request his acceptance of the appointment.

Demosth. de Cor. p. 279.

tion marks its own date very exactly. There seems little hazard in affirming that the first epistle was sent before it, because it would have been absurdly nugatory after it. The second and third epistles clearly mark them-

selves for dates very considerably differing, to those who will take the trouble, which Auger has desired to avoid, of adverting duly to the matter stated in them.

CHAPTER XLII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Election of PHILIP King of MACEDONIA to be General of the AMPHICTYONS, till his Death.

SECTION I.

Extraordinary Policy of Demosthenes. Confederacy of Grecian States under the Influence of the Athenian War-party. Hostilities against Macedonia, without declared War. Requisition of Forces for the new Sacred, or Amphissian War. Conclusion of the new Sacred War.

THE election of the king of Macedonia to the office of general of the Amphictyons, making him the constitutional head of a great confederacy of Grecian republics, almost in the moment of failure of the avowed project of the Athenian war-party for a great confederacy against him and his Grecian allies, again placed that party in circumstances most discouraging. Opportunity thus was so opened for establishing the prevalence of the peaceful, and for consolidating that friendly connection, of Athens especially, but of all Greece, with Macedonia, which the peaceful party, as the writings of Isocrates show, earnestly desired, that ground of hope for the war-party again to obtain the lead might seem hardly discernible. But as quicksightedness, dexterity, and boldness were never yet so wanted in the cause, so never before were they equally shown. The very conception of the ideä, which Demosthenes next carried into practice, appears extraordinary. Having reached his actual eminence by vehement and persevering assertion of the most unlimited democratical despotism, yet, unable, in the moment, to command by the democratical, he applied himself to cultivate, not an aristocratical party, but a depressed relic of the aristocratical branch of the constitution. A few years ago, Isocrates had proposed restoration of authority to the once powerful and venerable court of Areiopagus, but he proposed in vain. Demosthenes now formed an interest
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in that court, such that he might use it as his instrument for controuling the sovereign Many; and, under his direction, it assumed power to be an efficacious instrument.

In the way which appears to have been, of late at least, usual, and esteemed regular, Æschines had been elected, by the people, to the office of syndic of the temple of Delos; an office of high honor, and apparently lucrative. The court of Areiopagus, perhaps reviving some old claim to interfere in the appointment to offices connected with the religion of the state, not only annulled the election, but took upon itself to substitute Hyperides, an orator of eminence, zealous in the party of Chares and Demosthenes. Whether Phocion and his friends thought this might be a salutary precedent for checking popular despotism, or why otherwise they did not or could not excite the sovereign assembly, generally so jealous of its authority, to support its own act, we have no information. Demosth. de cor. p. 271.

The appointment to the syndicship, however, was, by itself, of small consideration: its importance arose from its connection with other matters. A man of eminence, Antiphon, respected for his quality, formidable by his talents, adverse to the war-party, and, as far as appears, without other crime, had been banished by a decree of the people. Whether hoping for protection, and a reversal of the decree, from the recovered influence of his friends, or under whatever of the various inducements that might present themselves, he returned illegally, and Ibid. was living in concealment in Peiræus. The vigilance of Demosthenes obtaining notice of this, he judged that, at any hazard, the utmost should be made of the opportunity. Unable to gain such information of Antiphon's residence that the officers of justice might be directed in regular course to apprehend him, he assumed to himself authority, with sufficient attendants, to search private houses; and, having at length discovered the delinquent, took him into custody and carried him to the city.

The people then being assembled, the prisoner was brought before them. The notorious fact of his illegal return from banishment, tho subjecting him to capital punishment, would not warrant the violation of private rights in apprehending him. It behoved Demosthenes

therefore

therefore to be prepared with means to obviate accusation against himself, or his own ruin might take place of Antiphon's. The mention of a plot to overthrow the democracy would at any time fire the multitude. Of such a plot Demosthenes accused Antiphon; with the addition that it was concerted with the king of Macedonia. The first measure, he affirmed, was to have been to burn the naval arsenal, with all the shipping there, and for this purpose it was that the prisoner was lurking in Peiraus. The peace-party came forward, anxious to defend Antiphon; but, aware of the inflammable temper of the despotic sovereign, they seem to have rested less on the total deficiency of evidence to the charge, than on the opportunity open for directing the popular passion to the notorious violation of the constitution and the rights of citizens, in the act of apprehending the prisoner. Whether however argument or influence or passion availed most, the charge was voted groundless, and, as illegally arrested, Antiphon was set at liberty.

Defeat, in such a measure, could not but involve in great danger those engaged in it. Demosthenes therefore, as little averse to aristocratical despotism, if it might serve his purpose, as to democratical, proceeded again to make the court of Areiopagus his weapon, for defence and offence. The security of an Englishman, in the immemorial rule of the common law, that no man shall be tried twice on the same charge, was given neither by the principles of democracy, nor of aristocracy at Athens. Antiphon, dismissed in pursuance of the sentence of the sovereign people, was arrested again, at the instigation of Demosthenes, by order of the court of Areiopagus; and, not convicted by evidence, but, under the pressure of torture, confessing, or uttering what his tormentors asserted to amount to confession, of the purpose of burning the arsenal, he was, by that court, so renowned of old for the equity of its decisions, sent to the executioner. It might be difficult to give credit to these facts, if they came reported on less unassuming authority than that of the great orator, the principal agent. It may however, it should seem, be presumed, that the proceedings, so disgusting, even as he has related them, were not warranted by the celebrated constitution of Solon, nor would have been allowed under that court of Areiopagus which Isocrates desired to restore;

restore; for it were difficult to say what just freedom, what security for individuals, could exist under a constitution that would tolerate the practice of Demosthenes¹.

But a measure of such violence, tho carried by the authority of the court of Areiopagus, against the declared will of the sovereign multitude, could be supported only by a recovery of prevalence among that multitude; and this was evidently never out of the view of Demosthenes. The ebb and flow of command, among the assembled Athenian people, was not always produced by any change of popular favor. At this very time, when the war-party failed of the votes wanted to carry one important purpose, the maritime department appears to have been decidedly under their influence: the fleets were actively, and probably lucratively, employed in preying on the Macedonian commerce, while the orators at home, and especially Demosthenes, were asserting, in the assembly, that Athens maintained faithfully the peace, which Philip, they exclaimed, had broken. While the nautic multitude were so employed, the strength of the party might sometimes fail in the general assembly, for want of their voices; and yet, to hold their favor, it would be necessary to allow them so to be employed. The inconvenience then of a temporary defeat, resulting from their absence in an unforeseen crisis, would be to be repaired by their zeal for the patrons of their vocation, when they returned; and it was apparently in reasonable confidence that he could call in sufficient support, that Demosthenes ventured, in the absence of a large proportion of his friends, to use the authority of the court of Areiopagus against the authority of the general assembly, and proceeded to that extravagance of despotism and cruelty, in the case of Antiphon, which surprized even Plutarch.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275,
276.
Demosth.
Philipp.

Thus, under the conduct of Demosthenes, most ably adapted to his own purposes and those of his party, that party recovered the ascendancy in the general assembly, and the administration of the affairs of the commonwealth. Their views then were directed, with not less ability or

¹ Even Plutarch has observed, of this affair, that it was *ερωδία ἀριστοκρατικὴ πολιτεία* (v. Demosth. p. 852.) It is obvious that he used the word *ἀριστοκρατικὴ* widely otherwise than with the very creditable meaning which it bore in the age of Plato and Isocrates.

diligence, nor without large success, to establish and extend its influence in other parts of Greece. In Eubœa, divided through all its towns, between factions long vehemently hostile to one another, yet with the war-party generally overborne, the business must have been of great nicety and difficulty. Nevertheless Demosthenes, attaching able agents to his interest by their interest, and favored by the scrupulous moderation of the party of Phocion, succeeded so, that nearly the whole island was brought under his command. In Megara he had equally procured prevalence for the party there under his patronage. Corinth, formerly the steady friend of Lacedæmon, the vehement enemy of Athens, was fallen much from her antient importance among the Grecian states; her constitution altered, and the people oppressed, after a long series of good administration, through that growth of violent faction, of which an account has been formerly given after the authentic narrative of Xenophon. In the following age, Diodorus has noticed Corinth, only for her connection with Sicilian affairs, through the expedition of Timoleon. For her antient fame her political state now would be an object of curiosity; but Demosthenes has simply shown that, when he was the minister, she was the ally of Athens. From a late writer, the jocular Lucian, we have the character of her government and people ludicrously exhibited; yet, being in consonance with the other more serious testimonies, the picture is probably not wholly unfaithful. The famous cynic philosopher Diogenes, at this time, it is said, was inhabiting his tub at Corinth. There, as at Athens, to infuse apprehension of attack from Macedonia, and to excite, if possible, passion enough among the people to lead them to approve and be active in offensive war, was the object of the leaders. All therefore was set in motion: fortifications were repaired, arms fabricated, provisions collected. The whole city thus being in a bustle of military preparation, the philosopher began to roll about his tub in various directions. Being asked Why? he answered, ‘he would avoid, for once, the imputation of affecting singularity, and so would not be the only person in Corinth not absurdly employed.’ Corinth however was no unimportant addition to the Athenian confederacy. Not only her situation was commanding, but her alliance carried with

Lucian. de
conscrib.
hist.

it, or assisted much toward obtaining, that of Corcyra and Leucadia, which accordingly were among the allies of Athens. Achaia and Acarnania were also in the same interest; decided to it much by their hostility to neighboring states, allies of Macedonia. Lacedæmon, under treaty still subsisting, was an ally of the republic, ill disposed toward Macedonia, for the support which Macedonia gave to the Argians and Messenians; but there was no friendship between the Lacedæmonian government and the war-party in Athens; and the great speculation of Demosthenes, at this time, alliance with Thebes, was incompatible with any friendly connection with Lacedæmon. The effectual confederacy of Athens, under the administration of the war-party, consisted then of Megara, Corinth, with Leucadia and Corcyra, Achaia, and Acarnania.

The acquisition of Thebes, for which Demosthenes appears to have been perfectly willing to forego any advantage to be derived from the connection with Lacedæmon, might seem, on a transient view, so to abound with difficulty, and indeed so to be out of all ordinary course of policy, that the purpose might appear even preposterous; yet, as we proceed with the course of events, we find the keensighted politician had discovered no inconsiderable ground for it. A party once formed in Thebes, in direct opposition to the party desirous of maintaining the connection with Macedonia, however aversion to Athens generally might be a popular passion, was in the best manner prepared for connection with the war-party in Athens. According to the probable imputation of Æschines, Demosthenes held communication with this party in Thebes, when it might have subjected any man to the charge of high treason. Yet so ably the intrigue was managed, that a powerful party there was prepared with zeal for connection with Athens, while not only the two republics were in a state of actual war, but the general prejudices among the people of both were very hostile toward each other.

Meanwhile nominal peace and nominal alliance remaining between Athens and Macedonia, the war-party orators continued their complaints that Philip had broken the peace, and the Athenian navy was busy in maritime depredation, as if war had been declared. It is precisely

Æsch. de
cor. p. 532,
533.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 299.

Demosth. de
legat. p. 275,
276.

of this time Demosthenes is speaking, where he says, 'Philip was without prospect of relief from the hostilities he was suffering from Athens, unless he could excite the Thebans and Thessalians to be active in measures against us: for notwithstanding the diligent exertion of our military commanders, he was suffering a thousand evils from the depredations on the maritime trade of his country. Nothing could be exported, nothing imported for the activity of our cruizers².'

Such was the state of things, when Philip, invited by the embassy of the Amphictyons, came to their meeting at Thermopylae, where alone they appear to have held their sittings, since Delphi was become insecure, through the open hostility of the Locrians, on one side, and the uncertain disposition of Thebes, on the other. In pursuance then of the duties of the office to which he had been elected, he issued requisitions for the Amphictyonic states to send their contingents of troops, for war to be waged under his command. The form of the requisition, sent to the Peloponnesians, is given by Demosthenes, thus: 'The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the magistrates of the Peloponnesians of the confederacy, and to all the confederates, greeting': 'Whereas the Locrians, called Ozolian, inhabiting Amphissa, are acting offensively against the temple, and, coming with arms, have plundered the sacred land; it is my purpose, with your support, to assert the cause of the god, and oppose those who violate what is held sacred among men. I require you therefore to meet me, in Phocis, duly armed, and bringing provision for forty days, within the present month, called by us Loüs, by the Athenians Boëdromion, by the Corinthians Panemus. Those who attend will be intitled to communication in council; those who fail of conforming to the decrees of the confederacy will be fined. Farewell.'

It does not appear that any requisition was sent to Athens; where acknowledgement of the election of Philip, not only to be commander-

² Ληστῶν. This word appears to have been used by the Greeks equally to signify a pirate, and a ship of war regularly commissioned, whence it is often difficult to know which has been intended.

³ Πελοποννησίων τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τοῖς δημοιργῶσι καὶ τοῖς σιείδοις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμαχοῖς πᾶσι. What the distinctions were between these descriptions of people we seem to fail of means for ascertaining.

in-chief, but to be an Amphictyon, had been denied. To Thebes it was not omitted; but so the Athenian party had advanced in power there, that obedience to it was refused: Yet among those fluctuations, to which democratical government was so liable, the Macedonian party, afterward preponderating, at least for that question, the Theban contingent, under the command of Proxenus, joined the Amphictyonic army.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275.

Dinarch. or.
in Demosth.

Meanwhile, in Athens, between parties stimulated, one by ambition, the other by fear of oppression, and of strength nearly balancing, the contest of oratory was vehement. The war-party however prevailing, a measure was taken, of the most decided hostility toward all that part of the Greek nation, which acknowledged the Amphictyonic authority, and was disposed to abide by the peace, which had ended the Phocian war. The Athenian republic had now in its pay mercenary troops, to the amount, according to Æschines, of ten thousand men. All, including apparently those which had been serving in the Hellespont, were sent, by a decree of the people, to assist the Amphissians, in their rebellion against the authority of the Amphictyons. What states, or what party in those states, had encouraged the obnoxious conduct of the Amphissians, could then no longer be doubtful.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 275.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 536.

Of the war which followed, no particulars have been transmitted. The remaining information shows only the general result. The Amphictyonic army, directed by the talents of Philip, quickly rendered all the support furnished to the Amphissians vain, and reduced them to unconditional submission. The power then being more in Philip's hands, than when the Phocian war was concluded, severity against the vanquished, notwithstanding the imputation of sacrilege, was so avoided, that even the adverse orator has been at a loss for ground on which he could venture to specify any complaint.

SECTION II.

Critical Situation of the Athenian War-party: Political State of Thebes: Exertions of Demosthenes to gain the Alliance of Thebes: Contest of Parties at Athens: Hostile Decree against Macedonia: Letters of Philip to the Athenians and Thebans: Elateia garrisoned by Philip.

THIS new failure, in a cause so generally uncreditable, throughout Greece, as that of the Amphissians, brought the war-party, practised in critical situations, into a situation perhaps more critical than any wherein they had yet stood. Weakened by the double defeat, military and political, yet to retreat or retract would now, more than in any former circumstances, be to surrender all their importance, and give the government of the republic to their opponents. Nor could they hope to hold their ground without advancing: enterprize was, more than ever, necessary to them. Neither were means yet wrested from their hands, or opportunities, such as able and keen-sighted politicians might use, failing before them. On the contrary, the confederacy under their influence remained, apparently undiminished. To the party which, through the dexterous management of Demosthenes and his agents, prevailed throughout Eubœa, the patronage of his party in Athens was necessary, perhaps not less than the command of the island was, for them, desirable. Similar party interests and local interests continued to hold Megara, Achaia, and Acarnania in their connection; and Corinth, carrying with her Corcyra and Leucadia, adhered to it. Nowhere their cause appears to have felt the shock of the defeat in the Amphissian war so much as in Thebes. The Theban people indeed had never yet been of their confederacy; but the progress toward the acquisition had been large. Without Thebes, then, the support of all the rest would hardly enable them to maintain their ground; but could Thebes yet be gained, hope might again soar high. The very name of Thebes, added to the catalogue of their allies, for
the

the recent renown of that state, would be a great acquisition. But the military force of Bœotia for its numbers, as well as for its reputation, was very considerable in the scale of the Grecian republics. There was moreover another consideration of no small importance. Could Thebes be gained, the rampart of friendly states around Attica would be completed. The Athenian people would be relieved from apprehension of a powerful enemy on their border, under which they had been long uneasy. Attica would be no longer to be approached by hostile armies, but across the territories of allies, who must bear the first brunt of any war. This circumstance, blazoned by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, appears to have weighed much with a large portion of the Athenian people, little capable of estimating what might be, in the existing circumstances, the probable efficacy of such a rampart. But perhaps the orator himself depended more on another view, which would have been disappointed by a premature declaration of it. Were Thebes gained, the force of the confederacy at hand would be such, that Philip might be blockaded in Phocis, or even attacked there with overbearing numbers, and compelled to seek personal safety, if so he could find it, by flight over the mountains.

The alliance of Thebes, thus a great object for the war-party at Athens to gain, was of course also a great object for Macedonia to preserve. In Thebes, meanwhile, with a weak government, the opposition of parties was violent. The party generally ruling was that which, in pursuit of empire, had put forward the Phocian war. In distress, produced by that war, it had sought the Macedonian alliance. Relieved, through the advantages of that alliance, from immediate danger, it resumed its purposes of ambition: but upon these that alliance was a check. The same party then, which had been most forward to form that alliance, became most earnest to be relieved from the intanglement. But another party, less desiring empire than just government and domestic security, and fearing oppression to themselves from success in the ambitious purposes of their fellowcitizens, cherished the newly formed connection with Macedonia, as the best stay of the peace, and even of the constitution of the commonwealth.

Between these two parties the Theban Many floated. But there were

circumstances tending to turn the flood rather in favor of the leaders adverse to the Macedonian connection. The Many were very extensively disposed to participate in the ambition of that party, but especially in the ambition to command, as a sovereign people, the people of all the other towns of Bœotia. Indignation was thus ready among them, when the king of Macedonia, with a liberal policy at least, tho among the ancients he had extensive credit for a nobler motive, humanity, desired mercy for those whom the Thebans called their revolted subjects, the Orchomenians and others, who had ingaged in confederacy with the Phocians. Even after he had consented to the expulsion of those unfortunate people from Bœotia, the charity he extended to them within his own dominions, where he provided many with settlements, was, in the eyes of the Thebans, suspicious and offensive. On the other hand that party in the Bœotian towns, consisting mostly of the wealthier, who desired emancipation from the sovereignty of the Theban people, or relief against its occasional pressure, looked, in common with most other Greeks in uneasy circumstances, to the king of Macedonia, as a general protector: and this was a second, and a stronger cause of jealousy for the Theban Many. But among the numerous states of Greece, where, for their smallness, alliances must be numerous, a kindness could hardly be done to one ally, such was the jealousy among them, without offence to some other. Had Philip's purpose been, like Jason's formerly, to hold Greece in subjection by force, Nicæa, placed in his hands by the Phocian general Phalæcus, would have been, for its commanding situation against the strait of Thermopylæ, a possession to be carefully held. Had he kept it by a Macedonian garrison, he would perhaps less have offended the Thebans; but he gave it to their old allies the Thessalians, and thus he excited much their envy and indignation.

Æsch. de
cor.

These were all circumstances of advantage for Demosthenes, in his purpose of detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance, and bringing it to close connection with Athens. Still, however, such was the inveterately hostile disposition of the Theban and Athenian people toward each other, and such the strength of the party in Thebes, not only in the highest degree adverse to such a connection, but earnest to

maintain the existing connection with Thessaly and Macedonia, that the project abounded with difficulty. The necessities of the war-party however being urgent, and the object great, they were willing to hazard much for it, and bid high. The liberality of a system resembling the Olynthian, which had succeeded as a lure with the Eubœans and Byzantines, would not suit the Thebans, who affected, not equality, but sovereignty. To engage to support the sovereignty of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, of whose freedom it had been formerly the boast of Athens to be the patroness, would be indispensable toward any hope of success. But, beyond this, Demosthenes flattered the ambition of the Thebans, leaders and people, with the intimation that Athens would promote their decayed hopes of extensive empire, and consent to hold a second place, at least in military command, under Theban leaders.

That it was the promising success of secret negotiation in Thebes, which encouraged the war-party to persevere in vehement opposition to any accommodation with Macedonia, the contest of rival orators afterward gave to public knowledge. Meanwhile the party of Phocion, perhaps suspecting the intrigue but little informed of it, and at any rate not desiring the Theban connection for the purposes proposed by their opponents, strenuously contended for abiding by existing treaties, and maintaining peace. A decree, first debated in the council and at the board of generals, and by them offered to the assembled people, appears to mark, by its inconsistent tenor, the struggle with which it was carried. It runs thus: ‘Whereas Philip has taken cities ‘in our near neighborhood, some of which he has laid waste, and now, ‘setting at nought the treaty, and proposing to violate faith, publicly ‘plighted, he is preparing to invade Attica; it is therefore resolved, by ‘the council and the people, that a herald be sent with an embassy to ‘confer with him, and especially exhort him to preserve the harmony ‘established between us, and abide by the treaty; or, at least, to allow ‘time for the state to deliberate, and, for that purpose, agree to a truce ‘till the month Thargelion.’

Æsch. de
cor.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 285.

We owe the preservation of this curious document to Demosthenes; but Philip's answer, to so strange a mixture of invective and solici-
tion,

tion, the orator has evidently thought it not for his purpose to bring forward. What however might be, at least in part, the answer, may even now be gathered. He had taken no cities of their neighborhood, and laid waste none. The Phocians had surrendered their cities to him rather than to Grecian republics, under whose power they would otherwise have fallen; and some had been laid waste, not by him, but by the oldest and most venerable judicature known to the Greek nation. He was not preparing to invade Attica, nor had any such purpose; but he was already prepared, and well resolved, to defend himself and his allies, against a party in Athens, adverse to the peace and freedom of Greece.

But whether this decree passed with or against the consent of the war-party, or rather partly with and partly against their wishes, their negotiation with Thebes, as the concurring testimonies of the rival orators show, did not cease, but was rather prosecuted with increased sedulity. This being not to be intirely concealed from Philip, and communication with Thebes being yet open for him, as a state, however showing a disposition to change, still formally his ally, he endeavored to obviate the mischief by counter-negotiation. Nor was his success, it appears, inconsiderable; for the Thebans, by a solemn act, renewed their former peace and friendship with him.

Ep. Phil. ad
Theb. ap.
Demosth. de
cor. p. 283.

Such proof of the prevalence of the party in Thebes, adverse to connection with Athens, alarmed Demosthenes and his friends; and, five weeks after the former decree for the embassy to Philip, another was brought forward, for a second embassy, in these terms: 'Whereas
' Philip endeavors to excite the Thebans against us, and is preparing to
' come with his whole army to the places nearest Attica, in breach of
' the treaty subsisting between us, it is resolved, by the council and
' people, that a herald and an embassy be sent to him, to propose and
' solicit a truce, that the people may duly deliberate on the existing
' circumstances, not having yet taken, on their part, any hostile
' measure.'

End of June.

To this decree, and the representations of the embassy, Philip returned a written answer, which remains reported by Demosthenes, thus; 'Philip, king of the Macedonians, to the Athenian council
' and

‘ and people, greeting : What your disposition toward us has been, ‘ from the beginning, I am not ignorant, nor with what earnestness ‘ you have endeavored to gain the Thessalians, the Thebans, and the ‘ rest of the Bæotians to your party. But now you find them too ‘ wise to submit their interests to your direction, you change your ‘ course and send ministers with a herald to me to admonish me of ‘ the treaty, and demand a truce ; having in truth been injured by us ‘ in nothing. Nevertheless I have heard your ambassadors, and I ‘ consent to all your desires, nor shall I take any step against you, if, ‘ dismissing those who advise you ill, you consign them to their ‘ deserved ignominy. So may you prosper⁴.’

At the same time he judged it expedient to address the Thebans, in a letter reported also by Demosthenes, thus : ‘ The king of the Macedonians, Philip, to the Theban council and people, greeting : I received your letter, by which you renew your friendship and peace with me. I understand however that the Athenians are urging ‘ everything that could induce you to concur in their purposes ; and ‘ indeed I did apprehend that you had some disposition to yield to ‘ their hopes, and follow their lead ; but now I am assured that you ‘ prefer the preservation of peace ; with me, to such submission of yourselves to the guidance of strangers, and I rejoice in it. I commend ‘ your conduct on many accounts ; but, especially, as it places you in ‘ security, and as it evinces goodwill toward me. I trust the advantage ‘ to you will be not small, if you persevere in it. May you prosper.’

Demosthenes, in the whole tenor of his orations of this period shows, and all that has been transmitted by Isocrates, Æschines, and the historian confirms it, that he had no view to peace : his purpose, and that of his principal associates in politics, was only to gain time for establishing the superiority of their party in Thebes. Were that accom-

⁴ “Αν πρὸς τοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς συμβουλευόντας ἡμῖν παραπίμψαντες, τῆς προσηκούσης ἀτιμίας ἀξιώσῃτε. Ἐγγασθε. This passage and another similar to it, in a former communication, seem the foundation on which has been built the story of Philip’s demanding ten orators ; the ingenious authors of which would surely have us believe Demosthenes either so uninformed or so modest that he either did not know, or among his numerous published orations, would not tell such a fact ; which certainly would have been often to his purpose, could he have obtained credit for it.

plished, Philip's situation in Phocis might be highly critical. The force of Bœotia might blockade him among the mountains there. The Athenian navy commanded the sea; and his return into Macedonia might be precluded. In Phocis the critical situation of a principal town, Elateia, has been already noticed: it commanded the pass, almost the only way practicable for an army, between Delphi and Bœotia, and also between Delphi and that part of Phocis itself which stretched toward Thermopylæ. These interesting circumstances of the place, not likely to escape so able a soldier and politician as Philip, had certainly not escaped the war-party in Athens, nor even public notice. Demosthenes, so long ago as when he delivered the oration called the Second Philippic, told the Athenian people that, the disposition of the Thebans toward the Macedonian alliance being already become doubtful, public rumor went that Philip had in view to fortify Elateia. The orator added that he did not think the pressure then such that the measure would be immediately taken. But things were now altered. Phocis and the whole Amphictyonic confederacy were in danger from the growing connection of Thebes with Athens. Philip therefore occupied Elateia with a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, and set about restoring the fortifications, which had been demolished at the conclusion of the Phocian war. That this was at all beyond his constitutional power, or even his duty, as general of the Amphictyonic army, bound by many obligations, to protect Phocis and give security to the Amphictyonic confederacy, seems no way to appear; yet whether he was more then just in time to prevent the Athenian party in Thebes from seizing, beyond all limit of any legal claim of theirs the same important place, following events make utterly doubtful.

Demosth.
Phil. 2.
p. 69.

SECTION. III.

Singular Decree of the Athenian People: Embassy to Thebes: Alliance of Thebes with Athens. Power of Demosthenes: Operations against the King of Macedonia and the Amphictyonic Army.

LITTLE as the occupying of Elateia with a garrison could be a surprise upon the war-party at Athens, who had so long not only foreseen but publicly spoken of it, and evidently as it appears to have been a measure of just precaution, injurious to none, they nevertheless found means to use it, in argument among the Athenian people, as if it was an actual beginning of hostilities, and to found public measures on it accordingly. The curious detail remains to us from Demosthenes himself.

‘It was evening,’ he says, ‘when intelligence came to the prytanes, then at supper, that Elateia was occupied. Instantly rising from table, some of them went to the agora, dismissed the waresellers, and burned their stalls: others sent to the generals and called the trumpet: the whole city was filled with tumult.’ To what purpose these hasty and violent measures were, but to excite the tumult, is not in any degree indicated by the orator; and as Elateia, a Phocian town, within the proper district of the Amphictyonic general’s command, was separated by the width of all Bœotia, from the Attic border, by the whole of the orator’s brazen wall untouched, no other seems within the bounds of reasonable conjecture.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 281.

The following steps then were consonant to this outset. Next morning the prytanes convened the council at daybreak. Meanwhile the people, alarmed by the proceedings of the past evening, and uncertain of the cause, so hastened to their usual place of assembly, that the council had not had time to come to any resolution, when much im-

p. 255.

patience was expressed for communication from it. Whatever then might be the impossibility of making regular and proper communication, the sovereign, it appears, was not to be irritated. The council, unprepared with propositions attended the assembly. The herald proclaimed, in the usual form, that any who would advise the people might

speak. Nobody offered himself, tho all the generals and all the orators (such is the phrase of Demosthenes) were present. Phocion and his friends, of course, would wait to learn, from those who could tell, what all the disturbance meant; while Chares and his friends left the field open for Demosthenes, who at length gratified the universal impatience by mounting the speaker's stand.

The theatrical effect, as it remains described by the orator himself, must have been great. His speech, of which we have only a short abstract, appears to have been full of art, directed chiefly to reconcile the multitude to the hazardous proposal of a close political union with the Thebans, long feared and hated as their hereditary and most determined and injurious enemies. Invective against the king of Macedonia was a principal instrument. 'Slavery,' he told the people, 'was the best lot they could hope for, if Philip succeeded in his ambitious purposes. But if they would form alliance with Thebes, there would no longer be anything to fear from Macedonia; and the Thebans, notwithstanding past differences, had now every disposition to meet them, as in a common cause. To obtain so great an advantage, however, it was absolutely necessary that their ministers should be unfettered by limitations and instructions: they must have free scope for making such conditions with the Thebans, as, under the actual urgency of circumstances, they might see most beneficial for the commonwealth.'

The speech being concluded, there was a pause. Councillors, generals, archons, all whose official situations most intitled and required them to offer propositions for public measures, were unprepared. Information and time had been totally wanting, unless for those in the secret with Demosthenes, who came himself every way ready. He presently offered a decree, very remarkable both for tenor and style, and preserved to us by himself, as follows: 'Whereas it appears that Philip king of Macedonia has, in past time, transgressed the treaty of peace, concluded with the Athenian people, disregarding the oaths, and whatever else, among all Grecian people, is esteemed just, and has possessed himself of towns of no right belonging to him, and has, even by force of arms, taken some belonging to the Athenian people,

Demosth. de
cor. p. 288.

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' without

‘ without any provocation of prior injury from them ; and whereas he
‘ has recently proceeded to greater extremes in violence and cruelty,
‘ placing garrisons in some Grecian cities, overthrowing the constitu-
‘ tions of some, even destroying some to the foundation, and reducing
‘ their inhabitants to the condition of slaves, in some establishing bar-
‘ barians in the room of Greeks, introducing them into the temples and
‘ among the tombs, thus doing nothing contrary to the character of his
‘ country and his own manners, but using extravagantly his present
‘ fortune, and forgetful that, from a small and low beginning, he has
‘ risen to an unhopèd for greatness : And whereas, while the Athenian
‘ people saw him possessing himself of towns belonging to them
‘ in the barbarian country, they judged it less necessary to proceed to
‘ extremities against him, but now they see states in Greece itself, some
‘ grossly injured, some annihilated, they think it unjustifiable, and
‘ unworthy of the glory of their forefathers to look on while Greece is
‘ enslaved.

‘ Therefore it is decreed by the Athenian council and people, pray-
‘ ing and sacrificing to the gods and heroes, protectors of the city
‘ and country, and bearing in mind the virtue of their forefathers, who
‘ were more earnest for the defence of the freedom of Greece than for
‘ the separate welfare of their own state, that two hundred ships shall
‘ put to sea, and that the admiral’s station shall extend to Thermopylæ ;
‘ that the commander-in-chief, and the commander of the cavalry
‘ shall lead the forces, foot and horse, to Eleusis ; that ambassadors be
‘ sent to the other Greeks, and first of all to the Thebans, because
‘ Philip’s present position is on the verge of their country, to exhort
‘ them not to be dismayed by Philip, but to defend their own and the
‘ common liberty of the Greeks ; to assure them that the Athenian
‘ people, dismissing all consideration of past differences, will assist them
‘ with their strength, their wealth, and their weapons, esteeming it
‘ honorable for Greeks to contend for military and political supremacy
‘ among one another ; but to be commanded by a man of alien blood,
‘ and allow the supremacy to pass wholly away from themselves,
‘ would be unworthy of the glory of the Greeks and the virtue of their
‘ ancestors ; that they do not esteem the Thebans alien either in blood

‘ or race; that they bear in mind the good deeds of their forefathers
 ‘ to the forefathers of the Thebans, who restored the descendants of
 ‘ Hercules to their paternal dominion, of which the Peloponnesians
 ‘ had deprived them, and, conquering in the field those who opposed
 ‘ them, gave refuge to Œdipus and those expelled with him; and
 ‘ in many other instances, enough known to name, have shown their
 ‘ friendship toward the Thebans: Wherefore the Athenian people will
 ‘ not now be wanting toward the Thebans and other Greeks, but
 ‘ will form connection with them, by alliance of the states, by allow-
 ‘ ance for intermarriage among individuals, and by the full admission
 ‘ of reciprocity of oaths for all purposes ⁵.’

The decree concludes with naming five ambassadors, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Mnesitheides, Democrates, and Callæschrus ⁶.

The proposal of such a Philippic, to be adopted as a decree of the sovereign assembly, seems to have been very contrary to the practice of former times, when simplicity and precision characterized their language, and argumentative and extraneous matter were utterly rejected. But the purpose, being to overthrow the former system of Athenian policy, and in a great degree new-model the government, associating the Theban people with the Athenian, however carrying, to the modern eye, the appearance of liberality, was so adverse to established and hereditary prejudices among the Athenian people, that it would be likely to need the machinery with which it was introduced, to excite popular passion suited to the occasion, the impatience especially, which

⁵ In translating always I have adhered to my original plan, of being as close to the letter as might be; and especially in this curious piece, in his version of which Leland has outranted the original far more than Auger, whose translation is perhaps generally as close as his language, and its critics, would readily allow. He has however here, as elsewhere, unwarrantably rendered *ἀλλόφρων*; *barbaric*, which Leland has translated, as nearly perhaps as any modern language can, *foriner*. Lohan Greeks and Ionian were to each other, in ordinary Grecian speech *ἀλλόφρων*, and hence evi-

dently the anxiety of Demosthenes to assure the Thebans that they were not considered by the Athenians as such.

⁶ The French, who, in their late revolutions have been quick and ingenious imitators, but original scarcely in anything, have set an example, which, it is to be hoped, will not be followed, of depraving the simplicity and decency and dignity, formerly characterizing European state writing, by adopting, and pushing to greater extravagance, the manner of this libellous decree of Demosthenes.

had prevented the usual previous discussion in the council. The reference to fabulous antiquity, times before a republic was heard of, and the introduction of Hercules and Œdipus, might appear to the modern reader even ridiculous; yet the frequent occurrence of such references among the orators, and especially Isocrates, show that they were found suiting the public taste of the age. The management of Demosthenes accordingly was successful: Phocion and Alcibiades opposed in vain: the offered decree was carried, and the embassy hastened to Thebes.

Plut. v. Phoc.
Æsch. de
cor. p. 536.

Meanwhile Philip, having provided some security for himself and his allies, by fortifying Elateia, neither took any hostile measures, nor made any preparation for offensive war. Informed of what had passed at Athens, he resolved to send also his embassy to Thebes, to obviate the effect of the Athenian negotiation; and he employed again the ministry of the eloquent Byzantine, Python⁷. The Theban people then were the sovereign to be courted; and, in the agora of Thebes, Python on one side, Demosthenes on the other (Python, for his talents, as Demosthenes himself has indicated, a rival worthy of Demosthenes) exerted their utmost powers. The ready topics for Python were the advantages of peace, generally, and the especial inducements to preserve peace and alliance with a prince of the king of Macedonia's character, such as it stood proved by his conduct, from the beginning of his reign; the respect he had shown for the religion and the general constitution of Greece; his deference for the particular constitution of every state, among the many in which he had an interest; the fidelity and honor with which he had always observed his engagements; and the proof of all this in the zealous attachment of so many republics, his actual allies. On the other hand Demosthenes, flattering the Theban war-party, and reproaching the peaceful, inveighed against the king of Macedonia, and all who adhered to him, with his usual fire and his usual art. His speech appears to have been celebrated in its day,

⁷ The narrative of Diodorus (b. 16. c. 85) already advanced as far as Chæroneia, within implies that, before the meeting of the embassies at Thebes, the Athenian army had a few miles of Elateia; but the orators show completely that it was otherwise.

even among the speeches of Demosthenes; perhaps for its effect; for it seems not to have been extant in the time of Dionysius of Halicarnassus; and very likely it had passages adapted to the time and place, but not adapted to answer the orator's purpose in a more extensive publication, so that it never was edited.

But eloquence was not a weapon to which alone Demosthenes trusted; he came provided with authority from the Athenian people to offer, at his discretion, whatever Athens could give; and he was bold in his prodigal use of their confidence. If promises and treaties could bind states, Athens was bound to continue its old patronage and protection to the Bœotians generally, but especially to the Plateans and Thespians, against the sovereignty over them, claimed by the Theban people. If democracy, of which Athens boasted to be the patroness, and Demosthenes the most zealous advocate, meant equal rule for all under its influence, and not a most real tyranny in the hands of one set of people over another set of people, and if the recent liberality to the Eubœans and Hellespontines was not a meer time-serving policy, Athens, even unbound by treaties and special promises, should have contended for the equal freedom of all the Bœotians against the claimed sovereignty of the Thebans, and Demosthenes should have exerted his eloquence and his interest in support of it. But Demosthenes, as if a preliminary step in his continually pretended assertion of the freedom of Greece, now ingaged that the Athenian people, not only should allow the subjection of the Plateans and Thespians, together with all other Bœotians, to the Thebans, but that they should exert their utmost strength to assist the Thebans in establishing that subjection. This carried with it to Athens loss of honor only. But Demosthenes ventured upon concessions likely to be more felt. Allowing to Thebes an equal vote in directing, not the military alone, but the naval measures of the confederacy, he ingaged that Athens should furnish the whole expence of the fleet, and two thirds of that of the army, and yet that a Theban general should command in chief. Even for the political business he seemed to give a decisive advantage to Thebes; for he stipulated that all the measures

of

Æsch. de
cor. p. 503.

p. 534, 535.

of the confederacy should be concerted with the Bœotarchs in the Cadmeia⁸. In opposition to such liberality, recommended by the glowing eloquence of Demosthenes, the talents of Python were vain. The majority of votes of the Theban people was in favor of the proposed new alliance with Athens.

The importance which Demosthenes, in this negotiation, yielded for the state he represented, he gained, and even more, for himself. His success, gratifying at least his own party, promoted and confirmed his power in Athens. But what was perhaps still more, through the intimacy of the connection formed with the leading Thebans, and the constant need wherein they stood, of countenance from their new ally, to support them against the opposition at home, he became really prime minister of Thebes; and, through the greater irregularity of the democratical constitution there, he found scope for a bold and ingenious policy to exercise even a more despotic authority. Thenceforward, accordingly, measures in Thebes corresponded with, and were adapted to promote, his purposes in Athens; and through the means acquired for playing one state against the other, it was a wonderful authority he acquired in both.

The object of the moment was to lead both republics to open war with Macedonia, before the forces which Philip had about him, for the little war with Amphissa should be increased, or while he retained only those deemed requisite for securing the order established by his success against the Locrians. Thebes then was made to be the first mover in the business. Solicitation was addressed to the Athenian people, in the name of the Theban people, for an Athenian force to be sent into Bœotia, to support the Thebans in the war against the king of Macedonia; no war at that time having been acknowledged by either party. The Athenian citizens nevertheless were called to arms; the desired support was voted, and a body of horse and foot marched. Meanwhile, zeal in the cause was so excited among the Thebans, that, on the approach of the Athenian forces, a large body, horse and foot,

Demosth. de
cor. p. 299.

⁸ These matters, asserted by Æschines, being uncontradicted by Demosthenes in his reply, must be considered as admitted by him.

marched

marched out of the town, and incamped, to leave commodious quarters in their houses for their new allies.

B. C. 338.
Ol. 110. 3.

It was already late in autumn. No troops were yet collected from Eubœa, Corinth, or other more distant members of the Athenian confederacy; but the force of Bœotia alone, added to that of Athens, would probably be much beyond what Philip had about him in Phocis. Moreover on account of the strength and earnestness of the peace-parties, both in Thebes and Athens, and the weight of their leading characters, at least in the latter city, and the necessary prevalence of their arguments with the sober part of both communities, it was much an object to have measures taken that should make war unavoidable. The united forces therefore of Athens and Thebes marched to the frontier of Bœotia, against Phocis, and took their station at Charoneia, a few miles only from Elateia.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 309.

Of what followed we have information only from the orator's cursory notice of it. By his very silence however it is enough indicated that offensive measures were not begun by the king of Macedonia. Nevertheless two battles were fought; the latter not till winter was already set in. Neither had any important consequences, or however none favorable to Athens: yet Demosthenes, unable to boast of a trophy, did not fail of the utmost use that united eloquence and policy could make of the incidents. The Bœotian troops held still considerable reputation in Greece, and were considered as formidable for their discipline as well as their valor: but Athenian citizens, accustomed, for generations now, to avoid actual service, and usually finding from party-leaders, or commanding for themselves, indulgence for neglect of discipline and practice of arms, had lost much of their antient estimation. To infuse therefore among them a confidence in themselves, and restore, if possible, somewhat of former opinion of them among others, he assured the assembled people, anxious for information, that their troops had gained high credit among their allies, both for discipline and valor. The people were gratified with the flattery; and, so the influence of the party prevailed, the meritorious deeds, which apparently would not bear a detailed report, were celebrated by public processions, and thanksgiving sacrifices. Of this prostitution

of

of honors the party of Phocion showed their opinion by avoiding to attend the ceremonies. The war-party revenged themselves by imputing such conduct to disaffection toward the commonwealth, and especially, where possibly the imputation might not be wholly ungrounded, toward the democracy.

SECTION IV.

Repetition of Proposal from the King of Macedonia for Peace. Authority of Demosthenes at Athens and at Thebes: Final Determination for War. Preparations during Winter: Battle of Cheronia.

IT does not appear that Demosthenes himself could state any preparation made, even now, by Philip, for that offensive war against Athens, on which he had been so long declaiming as that prince's purpose. On the contrary, considering the open violence of the war-party, there may seem to have been forbearance even beyond prudence; unless Philip, really desirous of maintaining the peace of Greece, hoped to succeed through recovered prevalence of the party of Phocion and Isocrates at Athens. Had Isocrates been his adviser and principal minister, his conduct could scarcely more have corresponded with that venerable patriot's published admonition. As general of the Amphictyonic confederacy, it was his especial business, in the spirit of the Amphictyonic institution, to be the peace-maker of Greece. Accordingly, notwithstanding all provocations received, he did not let the season of military rest pass without renewing assurances, to the Athenian and Theban people, of his desire still to avoid extremities. Nor did his proposals fail of exciting much interest among both. The contest of oratory, ensuing at Athens, was vehement. The principal opponent of Demosthenes, according to Plutarch, was Phocion. But every popular passion, desire of gain, desire of power, love of adventure, all was in favor of the war-party cause, except fear. To obviate fear, therefore, and to excite desire, Demosthenes exerted all his powers. 'Apprehension,' he told the people, 'on their part was groundless; for all

Plut. v. Phoc.
p. 748.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 397.

‘ Philip’s peaceful professions only proved his fears. On the contrary, with them hope might reasonably soar high; for, while provision had been made for the security of Attica, such that any apprehension was even absurd, a combination of force had been prepared, sufficient to give promise of success the most beneficial and glorious.’

The superiority obtained by Demosthenes, in this contest, placed him in a situation very flattering for an ambitious mind. With the eyes of all Greece upon him, he was at the head of one of the causes which divided that unhappy country; the cause (whether properly of democracy, the sanction given to the bondage of the Bœotians under the Theban people, should perhaps make doubtful but) of democratical empire. In Athens, through the circumstances in which he had involved his party, his abilities were so necessary to the other chiefs, that they hardly dared refuse him their support for anything. Æschines seems, not unaptly, to have called it ‘ a dynasty that he had formed for himself.’ ‘ Such was his power,’ said that orator, speaking, some years after, to the Athenian people, ‘ that here, upon the bema, he ventured to tell even you, that he would go whither he pleased on embassy, tho you should not appoint him; and he threatened the generals, that, if any of them opposed his measures, he would move a decree for giving rank and authority to the orators on the bema above the board of generals.’ Demosthenes, in his reply, rather gloried in these imputations than denied them.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 556.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 501.

Æsch. de
cor.

The Athenian Many, then, bold behind the brazen rampart of allies which Demosthenes boasted of having raised around Attica, refused all treaty with the king of Macedonia. But the Thebans, exposed to the first attack, and sore still from the evils of the Sacred war, so shrunk from a renewal of similar sufferings, that a decree passed their assembly for taking the proposals into consideration. Demosthenes was alarmed: if the Thebans yielded, all was lost; and he was reduced to the condition of a simple orator of Athens; probably in opposition to those who would hold the government. He hastened therefore to Thebes. The recent compact authorizing him to use his eloquence there, nearly as at Athens, the Theban people were summoned, and he addressed them. Flattering the war-party, he did not scruple violently

to

to threaten the pacific, swearing ‘by Minerva, that if any should dare
 ‘to say peace ought to be made with Philip, he would himself seize
 ‘him by the hair, and drag him for a traitor to prison.’ Little as we
 know of the Theban constitution, the small addition to former information, which may be gathered from the implication of its government, in this crisis, with the Athenian, will certainly not tell in its favor. The violent arrogance of Demosthenes forbidding freedom of speech to the Thebans in their own assembly, was successful: the Theban people voted as he required.

This was a great triumph, but not a decisive victory. To complete the immediate purpose of the party, in addition to the refusal of negotiation for peace, measures must be taken for actual war. It was already the season for military action, and the energy of Demosthenes had provided that a body of Athenian troops was at Thebes or in the neighborhood. Orders for its farther movements, while within Bœotia, should regularly come from the Bœotares, heads of the executive government of Bœotia, especially chiefs of the military department, and by the compact with Athens, managed under the direction of Demosthenes himself, to be consulted on all measures of the confederacy. Nevertheless Demosthenes, whether against their consent, or without communication with them, procured that the Athenians should march for the Phocian border. The Bœotares, surprised and offended, countermanded them. Consulting then at their own board, where neither popular eloquence could dazzle, nor popular passion interrupt them, they concurred, or at least a majority of them concurred, in dissatisfaction with the present state of things. Whether indeed comparing the immediate evils, and the final hazard, of the war they were provoking, with the advantages of the proposals for peace, to which the people had been persuaded to refuse consideration; whether the breach with their antient allies of Thessaly, with any advantages reasonably to be expected from their new alliance with their old enemies of Athens; whether the general moderation of the king of Macedonia, and the respect he had shown for the constitution and for the people of every state within his sphere of communication, with the arrogance of the Athenian orator, who assumed

*Æsch. de
cor. p. 358.*

to himself to controul their assemblies and supersede their own authority as first magistrates, there would appear much reason at least to pause, and look about them. Accordingly they came to a resolution, that the people should be again assembled, and the king of Macedonia's proposals again submitted to their consideration.

A very extraordinary contest ensued between the proper supreme magistrates of Thebes and the foreign orator. It was evidently apprehended that a majority among the Theban Many, brought to a juster sense of their interest, and of what was due to the dignity of their government, would support their own first magistrates. Demosthenes was driven to extremity. Venturing so far as to call the Bœotares traitors to Greece, he concluded a most violent speech with declaring, that, 'if the Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk from the common cause, he would return immediately to Athens, and move for an embassy to Thebes, to demand a passage through Bœotia for the Athenian army, which would go alone against the common enemy.' Whether the Bœotares were, as Æschines says, frightened with the charge, or in whatever way induced or overborne, they yielded, and the resolution was decidedly and finally taken for war?

The war, thus now impending, was not properly of Macedonia against Greece, but of Greece divided within itself; nearly as in the Peloponnesian and Theban wars formerly, and recently the Phocian. The proper contingent of troops from Macedonia, as a Grecian state of the Amphietyonic league, it may be supposed had joined the Amphietyonic army; tho so much is not said by any antient writer. But it is strongly implied, among the orations of Demosthenes himself, that, beyond this, no Macedonian force had passed Thermopylæ. It was not Philip's way, the orator says, to bring his phalanx: he came attended with an escort of horse, and perhaps some light-armed foot, and he found other troops as he wanted them. The greater part of Greece, averse to the dominion of the Athenian and Theban people, or of Demosthenes, ruling in their name, had ingaged in that alliance with Macedonia, of which the Thessalians had given the first example;

Demosth.
Phil. 3.
p. 123.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 84.

*The conduct of Demosthenes, as here related, having been stated by Æschines, in his presence, before the Athenian people, and not denied by him in his reply, stands on evidence far more certain than is often found for such matters in antient history.

and

and Philip was chosen general-autocrator of the confederacy¹⁰. It was his business then, during the winter, to assemble, from the confederated states, a force sufficient for the support of their common cause. Demosth. de cor. p. 295.

Meanwhile the exertions of Demosthenes, as prime minister of Athens and of Thebes, and principal director of the measures of their confederacy, appear to have been very great and very able. From the Eubœans, Megareans, Corinthians, Achaïans, Coreyreans, Leucædians, and Acarnanians, he collected a mercenary force of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, exclusively of their civic troops, whose number is not stated. From the same people he obtained subsidies, the amount unknown but probably not great, toward the expences of the war. In addition to these were the Bœotian civic heavy-armed, commonly reckoned about fourteen thousand, and the Athenian. In what numbers the Athenians were prepared for the field, or whether, since the defeat of their mercenaries in the Amphissian war, they had maintained any force of that description, is not said. Gathering however as we best may from the cotemporary writers (for the round statements of those of later ages are little to be trusted) the force at the disposal of Demosthenes, in the great contest for the empire of Greece, was of hardly less than fifty thousand men. According to Æschines, there was besides a large force of Arcadians ready, under willing leaders, if only nine talents, less than eighteen hundred pounds, which they either demanded as a bounty, or wanted to enable them to take the field, might have been advanced to them out of the Persian subsidy. This Demosthenes refused, while he appropriated to himself not less than seventy talents. Possibly however Demosthenes doubted the influence of the Arcadian leaders to secure the services of the Many, whom he might believe disposed rather to the Amphictyonic cause; and if the troops under Philip were only,

Demosth. de cor. p. 306.
Æsch. de cor. p. 633.

¹⁰ Ἀκούετε δὲ Φιλίππου ἡγετῆς τῷ φάλαγγι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἄραις, καθίζοντ' ἐκπαιδεύεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ φιλίππῳ, ἵπποις, τοξοῖς, ξινοῖς, τοιοῦτον ἐξοπλισθαι στρατοπέδον. Demosth. Phil. 3. p. 125. Ἠγχι μὲν δὲ καὶ ξινοὶ ἤδη Φιλίππου ἀπάειον. Demosth. de cor. p. 295. Philip was elected commander-in-chief of the Greeks, but no men-

tion is made of a Macedonian force. It seems to have sufficed him that he had, according to the historian, married the friendship of so large a proportion of the Greek nation: Φιλίππος ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν φιλίᾳ προσηγμένος. Diod. l. 16. c. 81.

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 81.

as the historian says, thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, he might think the forces, of surer fidelity, so ample for the occasion, that an addition of troops of less certain disposition, at any expence, might not be desirable".

Diod. 1. 16.
c. 85.

Demosthenes appears to have failed most in the choice of generals, to command the great army he had assembled. But very probably, with all the extravagance of power he sometimes assumed, he could not wholly put aside Chares, the patron who had principally opened the way for him to his actual eminence, and the beneficial patron also of so many others, that, with all his vices and failings, he was perhaps yet the most popular man in Athens. It was however provided that the command in chief should not rest wholly with one, whose unfitness had already produced so many misfortunes. In the preceding autumnal campaign, Stratocles had commanded the Athenian troops. Lysicles now was joined in the command with Chares. But there was likely to be, among the Theban officers, who had served through the long war with Phocis, far more experience of the warfare of heavy-armed in the field, than among the Athenian; and it seems not improbable that a juster consideration of the great interests of the cause of his party, than Æschines would suggest, a view of the general deficiency of the principal Athenian officers, and of the par-

" Æschines attributes the loss of another advantage also to the parcimony or corruption of Demosthenes: 'Οτι δὲ ἰδὲσαν μὲν χροιάται, ἔπειτα πικρὰ τελευτήσαν, ἐκ ξένου τῶν Θεβανῶν τὴν ἄρσεν ἐκ παροδοῦσαν. De cor. p. 633. The learned annotator Wolf says to this, τὴν Καδμείαν, ὡς ὕμνηται, ἐπὶ Μακεδονίας κατεχούσαν. (Note on Æsch. de cor. p. 633.) The learned annotator seems to have forgotten what he must have read in a preceding passage of this very oration, that the Cadmeia, so far from being held by the Macedonians, was the very place in which Demosthenes himself principally held council with the Thebans, the place to which, in the phrase of his adversary, he had transferred the powers of the democracy of Athens,

καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἄρσεν ἐλάβεν ἰφιδόμενος, καὶ μετέβηκεν εἰς Θώκας εἰς τὴν Καδμείαν, καὶ αὖτις τὴν πρᾶξιν τοῖς Βουστάρχοις σιδήμενος. Æsch. de cor. p. 525. To such mistakes the most learned may be liable, if they will undertake historical explanation without the previous trouble of historical investigation. For myself, I can hardly venture to say what ἄρσεν may not have been intended by the orator, except the Cadmeia; but circumstances, as far as they have been transmitted to us, would rather lead conjecture to some fortified height of the Phocian border, the possession of which might have led to better success in the autumnal campaign under Stratocles.

ticular

ticular impossibility of denying high command to Chares, assisted at least to induce Demosthenes to desire that, if a Theban did not actually hold the situation of commander-in-chief, yet in the council of war the Theban scale should preponderate. The nine talents also, saved by the denial of them to the Arcadians, might not be unwanted for the purposes of the campaign.

Such a force, as Demosthenes had now assembled, the scanty funds of the Grecian republics could not long maintain: it must proceed to quick decision. Meanwhile Philip, persevering in his purpose of avoiding aggression, remained within Phocis, till the Athenians and Thebans were already marching toward him. Then he advanced into the Boeotian plain, and took a station near the hostile garrison of Chæroneia ¹².

Of the great and decisive battle that ensued, no account remains that can give any satisfaction to the military reader. If any was extant even in the time of Diodorus, it unfortunately escaped that writer. Equally the king of Macedonia, and his son Alexander, then a youth of eighteen, whom neither any cotemporary, nor his own historian Arrian, has mentioned to have been present, are described by Diodorus and Plutarch like heroes of the Trojan times, whose personal prowess, rather than the mind of the consummate general, directing the great machine under his command, produced the complete victory which followed. We have formerly observed Thucydides and Xenophon cautious of answering for personal actions in the tumult of battle, and rarely undertaking to report words spoken among individuals. Even how one, about whom universal curiosity would be

7 July.
Roald. vit.
Plutarch.
c. 1.

¹² The narrative of Diodorus seems to imply that, before the contention of oratory between Python and Demosthenes at Thebes, the army of the Athenian confederacy had taken that station, near Chæroneia, which it occupied to the time of the decisive battle. But Diodorus, abridging greatly, and perhaps often writing from memory, not unfrequently manages narration so that it is difficult to guess whether he intends the reader should take what precedes or what follows as prior in time; and he still oftener omits, as here, to

notice intervening transactions, necessary to connect the parts of his story. It is clearly indicated, by both Æschines and Demosthenes, that, in the autumnal campaign, the Athenian and Theban forces were at Chæroneia, and as clearly that they were withdrawn before the meeting of Python and Demosthenes at Thebes. The Latin translator of Diodorus seems to have been aware of this, venturing to correct his author by giving, for *ἐπὶ πύλῃσι*, the preterpluperfect *miserat*.

so interested as Epameinondas, received his mortal wound, or what was his behavior and conversation in the awful interval till his death, Xenophon, tho he must have conversed with many present in the field of Mantinea, has not presumed to say. But public orders, marches previous to a battle, ground occupied, what part of a line was first engaged, what broken, what pursued, and what protected a retreat, we find them frequently reporting. On the contrary, concerning the battle of Charoneia, writers of centuries after have undertaken to give, of the former sort much; of the latter, almost nothing. It is only generally said, and seems probable, that the contest was sharp. But of the result we have full assurance so far, that the victory of the Amphictyonic army was most complete. The Athenians acknowledged to have lost more than a thousand slain, and two thousand taken. Nevertheless the principal brunt of the action is said, and not improbably, to have been maintained by the Thebans. If then these, and the other allies, suffered only in equal proportion with the Athenians, the total loss must have been very great. What was not destroyed or taken was so dispersed, that nothing remained to obstruct the conquerors, whichever way they might direct their march.

Demad. or.
fragm.
Diod. l. 16.
c. 53.

SECTION V.

Consternation at Athens: Flight of Demosthenes: Condemnation of Lysicles: Generosity of Philip. Arrangement for Boeotia. Liberality to Athens.

INFORMATION of the total defeat of the allied forces at Charoneia produced, at Athens, consternation and tumult, such as might be expected where sovereignty rested with the multitude, and the uninformed and improvident were not to take but to give orders; and this in a moment when great hope among them was suddenly disappointed, security, which they had been taught to believe complete, through the brazen wall of alliances of which Demosthenes had boasted, was wholly

wholly overthrown, and dangers in kind and amount incalculable, were, as by the shifting of a scene, substituted in their view. Waste of Attica, siege of Athens, all the dreadful evils of ordinary Grecian warfare, would be, in their apprehension, but preludes of those unheard-of horrors, which the speeches of the war-party orators had represented as to be expected from Macedonian barbarism and cruelty. This agitation of the popular mind was, for those who had been leading the public measures, far more dreadful than the approach of the victorious enemy. Demosthenes had born arms at Chæroncia; whether, in confidence of success, smitten with ambition to claim military merit, or, after all his exhortations to others, ill able to excuse himself from that common duty of all citizens. Escaping in the general flight, he did not scruple, for safer haste, to disgrace himself by abandoning his shield. Under all circumstances he would not venture to show himself in Athens: he went to Peiræus, got aboard a trireme, and, with the authority which he could assume, or, from his friends in office, obtain, he put to sea, under pretence of going on duty, necessary in the urgency of the republic's affairs, to collect, among the islands, tribute or loans for the treasury.

*Æsch. de
cor. p. 545.*

Chares remained, apparently the most obvious object for popular indignation. But the whole party were in danger; and, had the party of Phocion come forward with the common temper and common views of Grecian party, or of party in general, Chares and his associates could hardly have avoided ruin. But Phocion and his friends, with their usual regard for the general good, and perhaps over-scrupulous fear of appearing to press any separate interest, gave their attention rather to remedy the evil situation of public affairs, than to punish the authors. Yet that the popular anguish would be assuaged, and the resulting anger appeased, without some signal sacrifice, was hardly to be hoped. With admirable policy then, the party of Chares resolved to profit from the apparently extravagant liberality of their adversaries, by hastening to take the invidious business of crimination into their own hands. Thus they gained at once two great points: they could chuse the victim; and they preserved the advantage, which otherwise, for a time at least, they must have wholly forgone, of appearing still to hold a lead in public measures, and even in popular measures.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 88.
Plat. v. orat.

Lycurgus, an orator of celebrated talents, was famed, according to Diodorus and Plutarch, for virtue generally, but especially for the integrity, with which, during twelve years, he administered the business of the treasury. Possibly however it was only some branch of the treasury-business; or otherwise his fame must have rested upon his party; for every older testimony shows the general business of the treasury to have been most scandalously mismanaged. Lycurgus however was certainly, as an oration remaining from him assists to prove, a most zealous advocate for the high democratical cause¹¹.

Ch. 9. s. 2.
of this Hist.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 88.

Of Lysicles, the colleague of Chares in the momentous command at Chæroneia, mention is found, among antient writers, only in regard to that command and his fate which followed. Probably he had earned reputation as an officer, but was little important to the party, as a man versed in politics, or of any popular interest. It was resolved that Lysicles should be the victim, to be sacrificed for the safety of the rest of the party, and that Lycurgus should conduct the prosecution. Athenian justice, we have seen, was commonly quick, and not always very formal; of which the death of Lycidas, in what are called the virtuous times of the republic, and the massacre of his family, will, among other things, be remembered in proof. No crime appears to have been alledged against Lysicles, but that he had commanded unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, being told by the prosecutor, that 'he ought to be ashamed to live,' (tho why more than Chares, unless as far the less practised sinner, is not at all indicated,) the people condemned him to die, and he was executed. Whatever may be thought of the morality of the party of Chares and Demosthenes, whatever may be thought of their patriotism, their policy must be admired. The death of Lysicles had evidently all the effect proposed from it. The popular

¹¹ Wesseling, after the usual temper of the lettered of the continent, warm in zeal for the honor of so keen an asserter of democratical principles, would correct Diodorus from Plutarch; who, in the lives of the orators, gives fifteen years to the ministry of Lycurgus; and he would reckon a decree of the Athenian people, there

quoted, 'complete proof of Lycurgus's high merit. Such a decree, the reader who has followed Grecian history will be well aware, proves the prevalence of the party with which Lycurgus was connected when the decree passed, and his eminence in that party, but nothing more.

rage was quieted, and the way was kept open for the party to come forward still in the general assembly on public business, as they might see convenient.

Meanwhile the king of Macedonia's conduct, after his great victory, was consonant to that high spirit of generosity and humanity, which had shone in him from the beginning of his reign. No pretence was taken, as by the Thebans, when they were at the head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, to mix the cause of religion with that of policy, for extending the purposes of either vengeance or ambition. Even that severity, constantly observed in the practice of the republics, to compel the defeated to the humiliation of a formal acknowledgement of their defeat, by a herald soliciting the bodies of the slain, was studiously avoided. Information, that the bodies were at the disposal of their friends, was forwarded before heralds could arrive. Demades, an orator of the first eminence, was among the Athenian prisoners. Fragments of orations only remain from him; so that the style, as well as the estimation of his eloquence may best be gathered from what we are told was said in his day, that Demosthenes was the orator made for the actual state of the Athenian republic; Demades was above it. The Athenian people, amid the severest anxiety and apprehension, deputed Æschines, as a person likely to be acceptable to the conqueror, to learn his purposes, and obviate as far as might be, his just resentment. But, before Æschines could arrive, Demades had not only received his own freedom, but was authorized to assure the Athenian people that the king of Macedonia had all friendly disposition toward them. As soon after then as conveniently might be, all the Athenian prisoners were released. Some, perhaps most, were deficient in common clothing; for which the panoply would be an awkward substitute, and prisoners of war would be of course to be deprived of this, as appertaining to their arms, and a portion of them. Philip generously directed a supply of clothing to all.

Demad. or.
fragm.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 319,
320.

From the field of battle the victorious army proceeded to Thebes. Bœotia was so powerful among the divisions of the Grecian people, and so critically situated for giving either protection or annoyance, readily and extensively, among other states, that to establish there a sure pre-

ponderance of the party friendly to the Amphictyonic confederacy and the peace of Greece, was most especially necessary to the welfare of the whole alliance. The modern reader, especially the English reader, may have difficulty to imagine a worse constitution than that of Athens, in this age, with all its advantage of Solon's laws, has been described; yet it seems probable that the constitution of Thebes was greatly worse. The government of Thebes had been changed, not gradually, as that of Athens, but by a rapid and violent revolution, and without any such intervening advantage as that of the legislation of Solon, from a mixed aristocracy, to nearly a pure democracy. Under this ill-defined government of their own, the people of Thebes claimed a democratical dominion over the people of the other towns of Bœotia, to which their aristocratical government had allowed a more equal participation of rights. Moreover many Theban citizens were in exile. Probably many had found it adviseable to fly in consequence of the victory of Demosthenes, in the contest of eloquence with Python. Yet many less eminent men, friendly, with more or less zeal, to their cause, remained, and many always adverse to the alliance with Athens, and many rendered so by the ill success of the measure. These were ready to receive the refugees, who would be not unprepared to profit from the event of the battle of Charoneia. Altogether the Athenian party in Thebes found themselves so weakened, and their opponents so strong, that no opposition to the reception of Philip was attempted. The government of course passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. Bœotia then was emancipated. The subjection of its people to the dominion of the Theban people, confirmed by the treaty of alliance with Athens, managed by Demosthenes, was abolished, and the more liberal system of the Bœotian confederacy was restored. All the Theban, as well as all other prisoners, made in the battle of Chæroneia, were released without ransom. The common expedient of the Grecian republics to provide tranquility and safety for the victorious party, driving the disaffected into banishment, sometimes to the amount of nearly half the population, was avoided. That it might not be necessary, the Cadmeia was occupied by a garrison from the Amphictyonic army, probably mercenary, or standing, forces. That any Thebans
were

were banished, that a single individual suffered in person or property, is not said by any writer of better authority than Justin: Plutarch evidently knew nothing of it; nor is anything found to the purpose, among all that remains concerning this critical period, from the hostile pen of Demosthenes.

Beotia being thus assured to the Amphictyonic confederacy, liberality might be more safely extended to Athens; and Philip proceeded to show a liberality, which, in its day, excited the admiration of Greece, and became, apparently with the greatest reason, a lasting theme of eulogy. Few princes have ever had the opportunity to exhibit magnanimity and generosity like that now before Philip, and none known to history ever did equally show it. Punishment against his illiberal revilers, authors of so much trouble and so many dangers to himself, and of so many evils to others his friends, being at his command, he not only demonstrated to the world the falsehood of their continual assertions to his disadvantage, but disappointed even their own expectation, after all their experience, of his forbearance. When they were in power, he had recommended to the Athenian people to dismiss them, and commit the direction of public affairs to better men; that the awful crisis, now so alarming, might be prevented. Fallen as they were, he did not even mention them. As soon as it was known at Athens, from the report of Demades, that favor, beyond hope, might be expected, an embassy was appointed to wait upon him. Meanwhile he had caused the bodies of their slain to be burned, with the accustomed ceremonies of respect for deceased friends, and the bones to be placed on carriages, to be transported to Athens; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister Antipater, whom he also appointed his ambassador to the Athenian people. So far then from proposing any harsh conditions, he freely offered renewal of peace and alliance upon the former terms: but, farther, in manifestation of his disposition, as general of the Amphictyons, while he favored Athens, to maintain the antient order of things, and, as far as depended upon him, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration to the Athenian republic of its town and territory of Oropus, which in spite

spite of the solicitude, and in contempt of the power of the Athenian people, had been so long held by the Thebans.

SECTION VI.

Persevering Scrupulousness of the Party of Phocion. Return of Demosthenes. Funeral Oration for the Slain at Chaeroneia. Third Letter of Isocrates to Philip.

To suppose Philip without a political object, in this liberal conduct, were to suppose him unworthy to be king of Macedonia, and still more unworthy to be general-autocrator, supreme head of the Amphictyonic confederacy, or to have the illustrious Athenian patriots, Phocion and Isocrates, for his friends. What his expectations may have been, is not at all indicated in remaining accounts. Among them, however, no doubt, was to increase his popularity in Greece, and in this he did not fail: but if he hoped in any degree to gain the adverse party in Athens, who owed everything to his liberality, certainly he was most completely disappointed.

We are without information of any particulars of the conduct of Phocion and his friends; but it appears that their moderation and scrupulousness, emulating the king of Macedonia's liberality, were excessive. The party of Chares, in consequence, began presently to look about them with renewed hope. Their defeat at Chaeroneia, they saw, was not followed up, as they expected, to the utter extinction of their former prospects: they were not compelled, as so many of their betters had been, in better times of the commonwealth, to seek their safety in flight: they were not reduced to a condition, ordinary in the contentions of party among the republics, below that of any other citizens; none of their former legal rights were denied them. Meanwhile the power of the republic not only remained unimpaired, except for the loss of a few lives, which the course of a year or two, bringing boys to manhood, would recruit, but, beyond all hope, increased with the

the restoration of the town and territory of Oropus. Its comparative importance, among the Grecian states, was even greatly increased, by the depression of the power of Thebes, through the emancipation of the Bœotian towns. But, what was to them far more important, the constitution stood untouched, with all its convenient vices, by which they had risen to power; and nothing seemed to deny them hope, with diligent use of opportunities, again to rise.

A fortunate occurrence (so, without more explanation, *Æschines* has described it) afforded opportunity for Demosthenes to return to Athens without meeting popular indignation. It is evident that the large party with which he had been connected, tho there were able and celebrated orators among them, felt now not less, but perhaps even more than before, the want of his various superior talents, to direct their measures, and restore their fallen cause. Shortly after his return he was put forward as candidate, to be elected one of the commissioners of a board, for carrying into execution the terms of the peace. In this he failed. But neither himself nor his party were so discouraged. They presently resolved upon a bold measure, singularly calculated to distress their opponents, and give some new life to their own faded popularity. They proposed, in the general assembly, that those slain at Chæroneia should be honored with a public funeral, as antient custom prescribed for citizens falling in battle for their country. The rigid scrupulousness of Phocion and his friends seems to have afforded such opportunity for incouragement to the multitude, formerly at the heels of Chares, and desiring still his profitable patronage, that they were obliged, or thought themselves obliged, to let this motion pass without opposition. An orator was then to be appointed to speak the funeral panegyric. It was not an office for Phocion or his friends, who had totally disapproved the war. Thus Demosthenes was left to be chosen, according to his own boast, in preference to *Æschines*, *Demades*, *Hegemon*, *Pythocles*, and all others of their party.

Æsch. de cor.

Demosth. de cor. p. 320.

An oration has been transmitted among his works, as that which he spoke on the occasion. Some doubts about it have been entertained by some eminent critics, not however agreeing in their objections; and whatever partial injuries it may have sustained, in publication and transcription, the admirable ingenuity with which it has been adapted

to the difficulties of the orator's actual situation, and to the necessities and purposes of his party, in their depression and difficulties, speak strongly and perhaps unanswerably to its general authenticity. In the outset he soars into fabulous antiquity; with the same view, apparently, as Isocrates has often resorted to the same artifice, to lead away the minds of his hearers from party-distinctions, which now it was as much his business to blend, as formerly to widen. Winding then, rapidly down, through the Persian wars, to the immediate objects of his speech, he connects his subject, by observing how those, whose fall he was to celebrate, resembled the heroes, so universally admired, of whom he had before been speaking. He then checks his course to remark, that he was aware of difference of political sentiments among his auditory; and he would offend none; for, no discourse, he observes, could have the desired effect, without some harmonizing disposition in the hearer's mind. Nevertheless he affected to consider the numerous citizens, not of antient Attic blood, as those who alone could differ from him. Rushing then again into the midst of his subject, he proceeds, 'It will be said we were defeated: but in defeat these departed heroes had no share. Those who fall, on either side, are conquerors: the honors of victory are equally due to both. But look to the effect of these men's deeds. We owe to them that our country was not invaded. The very circumstances of the peace prove this. The lord of our adversaries was aware that the kindred of such men would be like themselves; and he chose rather to become their friend, than put all to hazard by farther contest.' Having thus boldly asserted, to the Athenian Many, that they owed nothing to his political opponents for procuring such advantageous terms of peace, and nothing to the conquering prince for granting them, he was aware that some softening was necessary. Eulogy of Philip, which he had not scrupled in some of his most adverse speeches, he would not scruple now; but he managed to put it rather into the mouths of others; and, while he gave praise due to the Macedonian king, he combined with it flattery and instigation to the Athenian people. 'Let those who fought against us,' he says, 'be asked, and there is not one but will avow, that not their superior military merit produced our defeat, but our incalculable hard fortune,

Demosth. or.
Fanebr.
1. 747. ed.
Lutet. Morel.

p. 748.

'and the skill, the daring courage, the superior mind of their commander'. And this must be evident to all, that the liberty of Greece 'existed in the souls of these men: they preferred a glorious death to 'a life of shame; and with them the dignity of the country has 'perished.' What next follows, with extraordinary ingenuity imagined and wrought, to win the attention and interest the fancy of the actual auditory, will be felt by the reader of aftertimes, only in proportion as his imagination may place him in the circumstances of the lower classes of Athenian citizens. It is a catalogue of the wards of Attica, and the heroes, their supposed founders, Erechtheus, Cecrops, Ajax, and others; each name accompanied with a panegyric apostrophe on their merits, most ingeniously varied through the long roll; with a reference to the congenial virtues and merits of those, their successors, in whose honor the actual ceremony was instituted. Hence is drawn, with great advantage, a consolatory exhortation to the parents and other relations of the deceased, with which the speech concludes¹⁴.

This funeral ceremony, under all its circumstances, appears to have been a triumphant measure for the party, and especially for Demosthenes. He no longer feared now to put himself forward again upon the bema. He proposed decrees to provide for the security of the city, by repairs of the fortifications and arrangements for the garrison, and those decrees were passed. He offered himself for an office, which seems to have been important, that of providitor of the victualling of the city, and he was elected. The effects of the victory of Charoneia were, as far as the Athenian republic, standing by itself, was concerned, almost done away: the principal powers of government returned into the hands of the party of Demosthenes and Chares.

Demosth. de
cor. p. 309,
310.

The disappointment and disturbance insuing to the peace-party, from this reviviscency of the party of war and troubles, are indicated in the third and last of the extant letters of Isocrates to Philip. In that letter Isocrates says, he had had much satisfaction in conversing with Antipater, who had been sent as minister to Athens

¹³ — Τοῦ προσκενέτους αὐτῶν ἐμπειρία καὶ τόλμη καὶ ψυχὴ.

¹⁴ Some remarks on this oration are, for more convenience, placed at the end of the section.

after the battle of Chæroncia; but he proceeds to indicate that he thought the king had afterward rather neglected his friends in Greece. He reminds him that, through the event of that battle, all was in his power: he might, at his pleasure, carry into effect the great purposes of the Amphictyonic institution, compel any refractory republics to the maintenance of peace, and put an effectual check upon that mad ambition, which had produced such destructive contentions among them. He professes to consider Philip still as the only person capable of saving the country; and he urges the expedition to Asia, in which the restless might find employment to their mind, as necessary toward providing for the peace of Greece. So bent was he upon this, his favorite project, now, he observes, for a great number of years, that if extreme age did not absolutely disable him, he would not content himself with writing, but would wait on the king, to exhort him to the measure. The execution, he proceeds to observe, and justly, as events afterward showed, would be far easier, with Philip's present means, than the acquisition of his actual power and glory, with the strength of the distressed kingdom inherited from his ancestors. He concludes with an observation, which will appear extravagant to the modern reader, unless much observant of the ways of antiquity, that nothing greater could then remain for Philip, unless to be made a god. But for those of his age, even for one of the general wisdom and moral rectitude of Isocrates, such a sentiment must not be estimated by the measure of the juster notions which Christianity, giving them to Mahometanism, has made the common feeling of men, now, so widely over the earth. The popular belief, among the Greeks, that Hercules, and perhaps others, from mortal men, had actually become immortal gods, may warrant the expression of Isocrates; which is modest in comparison of the vanity and flattery, not less absurd than immoral and impious, soon after beginning to prevail among the Greeks, and, after them, carried by the Romans even to greater extravagance¹⁵.

¹⁵ I have had occasion formerly to observe that some critics, of very respectable learning, have taken the liberty to slight Xenophon's indication of his own age, and

to prefer testimony to it, very indirect and every way questionable, from writers living not till some centuries after him. It seems indispensable here to advert to the fancy of some

some other critics, also of respectable learning, to set aside the testimony of Isocrates to his own existence, and to reckon him certainly dead, at the time to which his letter, commonly intitled his third to Philip, is in the text attributed. In that epistle the name, Chæroneia, indeed does not occur; but the battle of Chæroneia seems as clearly indicated, as if the name had been added. Referring to his oration, formerly sent to Philip, and professing adherence still to the opinions there professed, the writer adds that, what he then proposed and recommended, was now in large proportion accomplished, *through the recent battle, by which the state of Greece was greatly altered.* This could apply to no battle but that of Chæroneia. After that battle then Philip sent Antipater (so Polybius assures us) as his minister to Athens. Isocrates accordingly, in his third epistle, expresses satisfaction at the large opportunity he had had for conferring with Antipater. It may then be added that, before that battle, the hyperbole, with which the epistle concludes, must have appeared extravagant, even to minds tinctured as those of the Greeks mostly were; but, after the battle, it would harmonize with popular notions.

But in the zeal of the schools, in following times, for the cause of Demosthenes and democracy, a story was propagated that Isocrates, oppressed with anguish at the view of the ruin brought upon the liberty of Athens and of Greece, by Philip's victory at Chæroneia, destroyed himself by a voluntary abstinence from nourishment: Dionysius of Halicarnassus has noticed the story, as if he desired it should have credit; but in way-faring phrase only, so little circumstantial, that it might be difficult to report it after him, without help from the more explicit account in Plutarch's lives of the orators. It was however impossible to establish the credit of Demosthenes as a patriot, without invalidating either the character of Isocrates, or the authority of his written opinions, and

especially of this letter. Against his character for honesty and true patriotism nothing has been ventured. His character for wisdom Rollin and some other moderns have questioned, on the modest supposition that they understood the interest of Athens and of Greece better than Isocrates and Phocion. But whatever may be thought of the judgement of Isocrates, nothing, among the politics of all antiquity, is clearer than the evidence in his extant writings that, for himself, his friends, his republic and all Greece, what he most dreaded was the success of the party of Chares and Demosthenes in the battle of Chæroneia. The story therefore of his destroying himself on account of the victory of his friend, the king of Macedonia, is evidently an absurd fable; and yet it must be allowed, seeing the success it has met with, its propagators calculated well, what might seem not easy to calculate, the reception it would obtain from the understandings of some and the disposition of others, altogether a large portion of what has been called the republic of letters, through many generations, to late posterity.

The learned translator and editor Auger, in a note on the third epistle of Isocrates, makes this remarkable observation: 'De quo prælio hic agatur, non satis liquet: non de illo certe quod ad Chæroneiam fuit commissum, et post quod Isocrates statim e vita excessit. Forte loquitur orator de pugna illa per quam bellum Phocicum confectum est.' Where the learned critic found an account of any battle by which the Phocian war was ended, he has not said, and I must own I cannot tell.

Concerning the death of Isocrates there remains notice from writers of high authority. The oldest that has fallen within the scope of my observation, is that of Cicero. That very eminent Roman lived near three hundred years after the illustrious Athenian. Writing a treatise upon old age, he mentions the death of Isocrates among in-

stances of placid elderhood, quietly and deservably completed, in his ninety-ninth year: 'Isocrates quidem et pure et eleganter actus ætatis placida ac lenis senectus: — qualem Isocrates, qui eum librum, qui Panathenæus inscribitur, quarto et nonagesimo anno scripisse dicitur, vivitque quinquennium postea.' Cicero evidently either was uninformed of the story of the fatal anguish of Isocrates, or thought it unworthy of attention.

Next is Dionysius of Halicarnassus, about half a century later, but within which half century a prodigious change had taken place in the situation of the civilized world, through the establishment of the Roman empire on the ruin of the Roman republic. Dionysius says that Isocrates died a few days after the battle of Chæroneia, at the age of full ninety-eight, 'having resolved that his life should end with the good days of the republic, while it was yet uncertain how Philip would use the fortune which placed him at the head of the Greeks.' *Γνώμη χρυσάμιτος ἄμα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τῆς πόλεως συγκαταλίται τὸν ἐαυτοῦ βίον, ἀλλήλου ἴτι ὄλες πῶς χρήσεται τῇ τύχῃ Φιλίππος, παραλαβὴν τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀρχὴν.* The expression of Dionysius here may seem to imply a violent death. How far it necessarily implies so much I leave to the learned to determine.

Philostratus wrote about a century after Dionysius, and he gives an account of the death of Isocrates thus: 'Ἀπέθανε μὲν ἐν Ἀθήναις, ἑμὲ τὸ ἐκατὸν ἔτη. "Εἷς δὲ αὐτὸν ἡγάγη τῶν ἐπιπόλεμον ἀποθανόντων ἐπιπνὴ μετὰ τα κατὰ Χαιρωνίαν τελευτᾶ, μὴ καρτερήσας τὴν ἀκροατὴν τοῦ Ἀθηναίου πείσματος.' Philostratus seems to have heard of no violence beyond the meer shock from intelligence of the event.

In the Life of Isocrates, attributed to Plutarch, but rather supposed of some other, not earlier, but rather later author, we find, at length, the story of the death of Isocrates grown into fuller size; the very words he spoke, of which there is no appearance that the earlier writers knew anything, being now

reported; tho the whole bears still but an incongruous and uncertain shape. 'Isocrates died,' says that author, in consequence of intelligence of the battle of Chæroneia, which was communicated to him in the palestra of Hippocrates. Exclaiming, in the words of three verses from three detached passages of Euripides,

Δαιαίς ὁ περικλοῖα θυγατὶραν πατὴρ,
Πελοψ ὁ Ταυτάλειος εἰς Πισσὴν μολών,
Σίδαριν ποτ' ἄστυ Κάδμος ἐκλιπών.

'He abstained from food four days, and then expired; not bearing to see Greece a fourth time subjugated.' Proceeding through various other matters then the author comes again to his death: 'Some say he died on the ninth day of his abstinence from food, others on the fourth, the day of the public funeral of those who fell at Chæroneia.'

On a view of this account, the questions occur, Did the learned writer mean to compare the aged orator's case to those of Danaus, Pelops, and Cadmus, as if he was to expect banishment from the tyranny of the conqueror? or did he mean to compare Philip himself to those antient heroes, who came from afar and acquired honor with dominion in Greece? Has the expression, 'Greece the fourth time subjugated,' been intended to imply that, under the prior empire, successively of Lacedæmon, Athens and Thebes, Greece was as effectually subjugated as now under Macedonia? Or what should we take to be the value of that expression?

After all these four writers comes Suidas, who, following some author differing from all, reports that Isocrates reached his hundred and sixth year.

With the revival of learning, in Leo the tenth's age, was revived, and with new violence, the passion of its cultivators for the political principles of Demosthenes, which involved a desire to represent the great orator himself as a model of the purest patriotism, and to scandalize his great opponent:

opponent, the king of Macedonia. But among denials to these purposes, two were glaring, and might seem insuperable; the constant connection of Demosthenes with a person of character so universally reprobated as Chares; and the opposition to Demosthenes, and connection with Philip, of two persons of characters so universally allowed excellent, as Isocrates and Phocion. Men of learning and ingenuity however had their resources; and among favoring circumstances may be reckoned, what has always been a great hindrance to the extension of Grecian literature, its inaccessibility but through the medium of another dead language. In treating of the circumstances where the connection of Demosthenes with Chares would come in view, antient authority has been shoved aside or veiled; in treating of those where the opposition of Isocrates and Phocion to Demosthenes is most manifested, a step farther has been ventured, and antient authority has been boldly superseded by modern fancy. The probity and patriotism of Isocrates and Phocion, have, indeed, not been questioned; but, as before observed, it has not been scrupled to impute to them ignorance of the interest of their country, the modern sages modestly undertaking to know it better than they.

Such extravagances, whether resulting from misjudgement or artifice, have not equally obtained among our own fellowcountrymen. A note of Taylor's on a proposed correction of Æschines, by H. Stephens, both for the explanation it affords and the presumption it reproves, has so much merit, that I would not risk injury to it by giving it otherwise than in his own words. 'The passage speaks of generals *συνεργούτες*, 'acting in concert' with, some of the orators. On the word *συνεργούτες* Taylor says, '*Συνεργούτες* habes, 'mi lector, ex divinatione H. Stephani: 'quod nollem. Facilius enim fuisset et 'expeditius, immo levissimo clinamine a 'receptis deflexisset, proponendo *συνεργήτες*.

*'Sed ille genium et statim i. his reipublice
'parum intellexit, cum ista scripsit. In
'civitate administranda Atheniensium. Par
'hominum, rhetor scilicet et imperator,
'quorum hic auctoritate et rebus gestis,
'ille lingua et ore, præcelluit, sibi invicem
'mutuas semper operas præstabant:*

*'Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν ἄρ' αἰδοῦσιν, ὃ δ' ἔχει πολλὸν ἔντα.
'Huic rei abunde favet, & receptam Æschinis
'lectionem tuetur, insignissimus Plutarchi
'locus, de fraterno amore, quem exscribo: '
'Οἱ μὲν ἐν κατ' ἐτέρᾳ ὁδοῖς βαδίζοντες οὐδὲν ἀλλήλοις
'ἀφελόσιν· οἱ δὲ βίῃς χρήματαί διαφοροῖς, τὸν τε
'φθονὸν ἐντρέπονται, καὶ συνεργῶσιν ἀλλήλοις μᾶλλον,
'ὡς Δημοσθένης καὶ Χάρης, καὶ Ἀισχίνης καὶ
'Εἰσωλὸς, καὶ Ἰππικρὸς καὶ Λεωθρένης, οἱ μὲν
'λέγοντες ἐν τῇ δῆμῳ καὶ γραφόντες, οἱ δὲ τρατηγούνης
'καὶ πράττοντες.*

Leland has shown that, when he would venture to think for himself, he could sometimes think well; but he has given himself up far too much to his French predecessor in the history of Philip, Olivier, whose authority, quoted in his margin, appears even ridiculous, in company with the names of Thucydides, Xenophon and the orators; and for the politics of Isocrates and Phocion, he does not risk any opinion of his own, but bows to Rollin, whom he has quoted at great length. It should however be observed, for the credit of the fellowcountryman of Rollin, the learned translator and editor, Auger, that, with his very abundant negligence and wildness, he has sometimes shown great fairness. With the earnest zeal of the continental lettered of his day for democratical principles, he will have Demosthenes a perfect patriot; yet at the same moment, with the spirit of a French gentleman of the old school, he admits tho, with professed regret, in a phrase, quoted in a former note, that the deficient probity of Demosthenes, in his private character, remained too clearly proved.

To return for a moment to Isocrates then, I will own myself satisfied with the testimony in his third epistle, that he outlived

some

some time the battle of Charoneia, and also with the testimony there, consonant to the whole tenor of his writings, that he rejoined in the event, as favorable to what had been, for a long course of years, his views for the good of Athens and of Greece. For that then of which he could leave no account, I would give most credit to Cicero, and believe that, after a fortunate, and, as Cicero calls it, a placid elderhood (not without anxiety, the lot of all, but without great misfortune); he died in the course of nature.

SOME REMARKS ON THE FUNERAL ORATION of Demosthenes, too long for convenient insertion where the subject occurs in the text, may perhaps best find a place here.

In the epistle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to Ammaus, the funeral oration of Demosthenes is twice mentioned; in one place, without any doubt expressed of its authenticity; but, in the other place, as what he desired to consider as spurious. On this the questions occur, Did Dionysius mean to speak of the oration, which has been transmitted to us as the funeral oration of Demosthenes, on the first occasion, or on the second, or on both, or on neither? I will venture to own my opinion that he meant it on both. On the first occasion he is considering the kinds, or genera of orations, among which he reckons the funeral a distinct kind. Giving the names then of illustrious orators who had left examples of such, he mentions Demosthenes among them. It sufficed him, on that occasion, that a funeral oration was extant among the generally allowed works of that orator. But on the second occasion he is discussing the various merits of the extant works of Demosthenes. His particular opinion of the funeral oration would be then of course to be given. There then he says, not possibly that the funeral oration is spurious, but that he was unwilling to believe it genuine; adding his reason in three epithets; he could not bring himself to think a composition so *φειδωλὴ*, *καλὴ*, *παράλογος*,

as the funeral oration, could be the work of Demosthenes.

To appreciate this kind of criticism of such a work, so connected with, and necessarily to be influenced by, the politics of the moment, it may be expedient to consider what Demosthenes was, and in what times he lived. Dionysius himself, and all other Greeks, and their fathers and grandfathers, had been living under Roman despotism. Possibly his youth might see the last convulsions of the Roman republic, when it most despotically commanded the civilized world; but no free government was ever within the scope of his conversation. Hence apparently that very limited direction of his mind to politics, which is seen in his judgement on Thucydides, and, still more remarkably, on Polybius. A learned, discerning and elegant literary critic, he looked on the funeral oration with the eye of a literary critic only, except as he shared in that theoretical zeal for liberty, and partiality for democracy, which were almost universal among the lettered under the Roman empire. Little allowing therefore for the extraordinarily difficult situation of Demosthenes, when he spoke the funeral oration, he was disappointed not to find the orator's usual torrent of eloquence, for which the subject might seem peculiarly to call. Hence his epithet *καρὸς*, the torrent's channel appeared to him, comparatively at least, empty. Equally he would allow little consideration for the arts necessary to obviate jealousy, while the orator endeavored to conciliate the attention, not of his distressed party only, but of his audience as widely as might be, and convey, as by a fable, the meaning which could not prudently be delivered in plainer terms. Thus that large portion of the composition, which runs into fabulous antiquity, might accord with Demosthenes, though called *παράλογος*. It is true that in no other of the extant orations of Demosthenes, episodical matter of that kind is found; tho with his contemporary Isocrates

Isocrates it is very ordinary. But it may deserve observation that in a decree, formerly noticed in the text, a decree on a most momentous occasion, that which immediately led to the battle of Chæroneia, this very artifice has been resorted to by Demosthenes himself. Such references to remote and fabulous times would be surely less generally congruous in a decree than in an oration. But the orator has evidently thought it for his purpose to give to that decree the style and effect of an oration; and with that view has introduced what would be more truly *παράλογον*. If it was not suited, through the circumstances of the times, to produce an important effect. One part of the oration thus appearing, to the critic of the court of Augustus, childish, and the rest empty, the whole would of course become, with him, intitled to the remaining epithet *ψεφισμός*.

Having ventured so far to declare my opinion of the criticism of Dionysius, on the supposition, which I think probable, that he had in view the oration in question, it will be the less necessary to add anything upon the far less authoritative opinions of Libanius and Photius, because they seem to have had little consideration among modern critics, who have generally avoided notice of any doubt about the authenticity of this oration. The learned John Taylor however is an exception to require some attention. And yet I must own the greater part of his objections, stated in his *Lectiones Lysiacæ*, appear to me futile. For why was an orator, proposing, with a political purpose, to amuse the Athenian people with a panegyric catalogue of the several wards of Attica, to confine himself exactly to the order of the crier's roll? His intention evidently required a kind of poetical freedom. What then is that 'authority of history,' which denies to the daughters of a prince of the fabulous ages, Erechtheus, the title, which the oration has given them, of Hyacinthids? And what is that other unqualified authority, on which the

critic would contest, with Homer, the name of the mother of one, whose own name is not very familiar in Grecian history, Acamas? Any sophist between the times of Demosthenes and Dionysius, or even between Dionysius and Photius again, probably might have learnt the order observed by the crier in calling over the Attic wards, and the titles of the daughters of Erechtheus, and the name of the mother of Acamas, as well perhaps as Demosthenes himself, but surely as well as any modern critic; and a sophist, fabricating an oration, with the purpose of passing it for the work of Demosthenes, would be the more scrupulously attentive to such insignificant matters, clearly within his reach, as he must be conscious of his deficiency for many of more importance clearly beyond it. A sophist, also, of aftertimes, would be likely to be less heedful of the art and caution, so remarkable in the oration, and he would be especially desirous to give the torrent all the impetuosity, the failure of which so disappointed Dionysius. But hardly any sophist, of times when republics were no more, hardly Demosthenes himself, in a later age, could have so adapted his choice and arrangement of matter, or even his choice and turn of phrase, to those very critical circumstances of the moment, which Demosthenes himself, with Æschines, and Isocrates, and others, have laid open to us.

But Taylor has stated objections of another kind, in which I have found concurrence from some whose opinions on such subjects, as well as Taylor's, I respect highly. 'Multa præterea,' says Taylor, 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta, multa invenuste opposita,' *Lect. Lysiac. p. 236. ed. Reiske*. The first thing that strikes, in regard to these objections, is that they are not found among those of Dionysius: they are described by none of his three epithets. Nevertheless, not desiring that they should not carry all the authority that ought to be allowed to modern criticism on antient language, I will venture to offer some suggestions.

Considering the extraordinary circumstances

stances under which Demosthenes undertook to speak the funeral oration, which he certainly did speak, it seems likely that he would think it not prudent for himself to publish in writing what he did so venture to speak. But an oration on such a subject, delivered under such circumstances, by Demosthenes, would be, in its day, an object of the most extensive curiosity: it would hardly fail to be published by some person, more or less perfectly; nor could such a publication be indifferent to Demosthenes. He would desire that the matter and arrangement should be such as might produce all the effect of his spoken oration; but he might rather chuse that the diction should be what he might deny. The Alexandrine library became afterward the great depository of the literature of antiquity. Possibly the learned

men who superintended that library, in collecting the works of Demosthenes, finding the diction of the funeral oration less perfect than could be satisfactory to them, yet thinking it otherwise fit to be received as a work of the great orator, may have ventured to polish some parts, leaving others untouched; whence might arise ground for Taylor's two objections, the 'contra puritatem Atticam dicta,' and the 'invenuste opposita.' Nevertheless, let some phrases be less graceful, and some less purely Attic, and even none from the pen of Demosthenes, yet the whole oration may have come from the age of Demosthenes, differing scarcely in substance, scarcely in arrangement, and perhaps little even in diction, from what he spoke.

SECTION VII.

Congress of Grecian States at Corinth. The King of Macedonia elected Autocrator-general of Greece for War against Persia. Preparations for War against Persia. Assassination of the King of Macedonia.

WHILE things were in this disturbed state at Athens, what was passing elsewhere in Greece we have scarcely any information. Some contention of parties however there would be everywhere. Among those republics, which had begun their connection with Macedonia by voting golden crowns and brazen statues to Philip and inviting him to hospitality in their cities, and throughout the numerous states in whose forces he had trusted for opposing the armies of the confederacy managed by Demosthenes, there would still exist an anti-Macedonian party. But that party was so depressed by the result of the battle of Chæroneia, and so wanted a head capable of showing itself and openly offering patronage, that the winter passed without any event for the historian's notice.

In the next spring, Philip, whether more stimulated by the instances of his Athenian friends, or by the ambition within his own mind, by views coinciding with those of Isocrates, for the good of Greece, or of any interests of the Macedonian kingdom, or principally of his own power and fame, resolved to give up the glorious ease which, by his able and successful, but laborious and hazardous exertions, during near four and twenty years, he had at length brought apparently within his command, and to postpone the improvement of the kingdom which he had already so advanced in extent and power, to the purpose of conquest in Asia. From the orators, beyond what has been already stated from Isocrates, hardly anything remains to indicate either his purposes or his measures. The historian's account then, resting as we must upon it, will perhaps best be given as nearly as may be in his own words. 'Philip the king,' says Diodorus, 'encouraged by his victory at Chæroneia, by which the most renowned of the Grecian states had been checked and confounded, was ambitious of becoming military commander and head of the Greek nation. He declared therefore his intention of carrying war, in the common cause of the Greeks, against the Persians. A disposition to concur in his purpose, and to attach themselves to him as their chief, pervaded the Grecian people. Communicating then with all, individuals as well as communities, in a manner to conciliate favor, he expressed his desire of meeting the nation in congress, to concert measures for the great object in view. A congress accordingly was assembled at Corinth. His explanation of his intentions excited great hopes, and so produced the desired concurrence, that, at length, the Greeks elected him general-autocrator of Greece. Great preparations for the Persian war were put forward, and the proportion of troops for every state to furnish was settled.'

B. C. 338.
Ol. 110. 4.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 89.

Successful as Philip thus was, in engaging the Grecian republics to his purpose, it is nevertheless shown, by the same historian, that his power, acquired by the victory of Chæroneia, if really sufficient, was not used to prevent free debate in the congress. The measures were not carried without opposition; in which some of the Arcadian mem-

Diod. l. 17.
c. 2.

Diod. l. 16.
c. 91.

bers distinguished themselves by their warmth¹⁶. But the majority of the Macedonian party appears to have been great. All was finally settled to Philip's satisfaction, so far that, presently after his return into Macedonia, he took preliminary measures, which were a decisive beginning of war with Persia. He sent his generals Attalus and Parmenio into Asia, in the historian's phrase, 'to give liberty to the 'Greeks;' the obvious meaning of which is that the force was sent to incourage and support revolt against the Persian dominion.

Plut. v. Alex.
p. 609.

Scarcely anything remains to us on the very interesting subject of Philip's administration within his own kingdom. Numerous anecdotes of his private and domestic life have been transmitted; but mostly by writers ignorant, or careless of public transactions, which, in their day, were open to the knowledge of all who would observe and inquire, yet bold to relate secret affairs, of which whether they were real or not few could tell, and rarely even the few who knew would tell any truth.

Plut. ut ant.

It seems however too well ascertained that he was not fortunate in his nuptial connection. Tales of private vices, whether of the wife or of the husband, are less objects for the historian than for the anecdote-writer; a description of men beginning to abound in Philip's age, and long continuing under the Roman empire, who, in proportion to the grossness of their imputations against exalted characters, and the confidence with which they asserted what, if none could confirm, few could refute, excited extensive curiosity, and made their business lucrative. It may suffice here that the temper of the queen, Olympias, is, with probability, said to have been irascible, suspicious and vindictive. After long disagreement, Philip repudiated her, and married Cleopatra, daughter of one of the most eminent men of his court and kingdom.

¹⁶ Diodorus says the Arcadians alone opposed the king of Macedonia's purposes. We learn however from much higher authority, that the Arcadians were much divided, and that a large proportion of them was most zealous in the Macedonian party. Diodorus seems to have followed, in this

part of his narrative, an anti-Macedonian writer, who, according to what we have before noticed to have been the common practice of Grecian party-writers, would call the Arcadians of his party 'the Arcadians,' as eminently, and, in his politics, almost exclusively such.

Olympias,

Olympias, beside one son, Alexander, had borne him one daughter, also named Cleopatra. After his return from Corinth his new queen brought him another son, and soon after that event he gave his daughter in marriage to her uncle, Alexander, king of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was usual, as we have formerly observed, among the northern principalities, tho not peculiar to them among the Greeks, wherever means were not wanting, to be splendid in festive ceremony on such occasions. Philip seems to have proposed to use the opportunity for advancing his already great popularity among the Grecian republics, by uncommon splendor and a magnificent hospitality. He invited from every city some eminent men, omitting none who were personally known to him or to any principal persons of his court. Among the entertainments the theatrical, so especially the delight of the Greeks, were provided with care; the most celebrated actors and musicians being engaged from all parts. For the ceremony, not Pella, but Edessa, or *Ægæ*, the antient capital of the kingdom, was chosen. The festivity was very numerously and most respectably attended; not only eminent individuals coming from all parts of Greece, but deputations from the principal cities, even from Athens, bringing congratulations in the name of their communities, accompanied with the present, which was become common on great occasions, of a golden crown. In the midst of this joyful solemnity, as Philip was entering the theater, Pausanias, a young Macedonian of high rank and great connections, stabbed him, and he fell dead. The assassin, flying toward a horse prepared for him, was overtaken while mounting; and by a stroke, whether necessary to prevent his escape, or urged by the ill-judging vengeance of the pursuers, his life was instantly ended.

Diod. L. 16.
 c. 91.

The possibility of gathering anything from him who best could tell, being thus precluded, various stories were circulated of the provocation to this atrocious deed; some most disgusting in their tenor, all improbable in many of the asserted circumstances, and altogether confuting one another by their disagreement. In one improbable assertion only they mostly concurred, that it was simply the private revenge of the

individual; but this was contradicted by the only account of any known authority, which ascribed it to the base policy of the Persian court. In uncertainty thus of the reality, public suspicion of course was busy, and several exalted characters were involved; the divorced queen Olympias especially; and the prince Alexander did not escape the horrid imputation; which he endeavored to repel, by asserting he had proof against the agents of the king of Persia.

Plut. v. Alex.
p. 669, 670.
2 Curt. l. 4.
Arrian. l. 2.
c. 14.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 468.

Plut. v.
Demosth.
p. 855.

Plut. v.
Demosth.
p. 855, &
v. Phoc.
p. 749.

Æsch. de
cor. p. 468.

The always avowed principles of Demosthenes, combined with his political relations, and his public conduct, seem to have afforded no light ground for supposing that he was, in some degree, privy to the plot. Persia was still the ally of Athens, and Demosthenes was the orator principally employed, as agent of the Persian court for public communication with the sovereign people, and for the management also, it is said, of the distribution of money. He had, at the Macedonian court, apparently among the visitors at the celebrity, a confidential friend, Charidemus. From this man, by a special messenger, he received information of Philip's death sometime before any others in Athens. The people being assembled, he ventured upon a measure adapted to raise his importance among that numerous description of men on whose favor his power rested; he told them that Jupiter and Minerva, appearing to him in a dream, had given him assurance that Philip was dead; and this assertion he corroborated by an oath. When information of acknowledged authenticity afterward arrived, the people were again assembled. Demosthenes and the orators of his party then did not scruple to propose honor for the memory of the deceased assassin, such as formerly, by a decree of the Athenian people, had rewarded the living assassin of the king of Thrace; and they added a motion for performing the evangelian sacrifice, which, in better times of the republic, was the ceremony of thanksgiving, on receiving news of a great victory. The people decreed both the measures; and Demosthenes, tho he had recently lost his daughter, his only child, and custom, among the Athenians esteemed not only decent but sacred, forbad persons under such circumstances to show themselves but in

mourning,

mourning, put on a festal robe of white, and, with a crown of flowers on his head, made himself conspicuous at the ceremony ¹⁷.

SECTION VIII.

Anecdotes illustrating the moral and political Character of Philip King of Macedonia.

IF ever, after the early age of Agamemnon, there was any fair prospect that the Greeks might become a united and happy nation, secure in person and property against oppression and disturbance from one-another, and powerful to resist assault from foreign nations, it seems to have been when Philip, the popular king of a free people, was, by the apparently free and even zealous choice of a large majority among the republics, vested with that supreme military command, and with that superintending civil patronage, which had formerly been conceded to those who had shown themselves abundantly unfit to hold it, the Lacedæmonian, successively, the Athenian, and the Theban people. What was his plan for managing the intricate business, (for such a mind as his would not be without a plan,) and equally, in the great undertaking, imposed with it, of war with Persia, what were his views, his premature death, and the deficiency of history, have deprived us even of foundation for conjecture.

But the very silence of ancient writers, on some topics, is not wholly without indication of the spirit of his government. It is remarkable that, among all the abundant remaining invective against him, injury to the civil rights of the Macedonian people, or the purpose of it, is never imputed. In the few instances then in which we find it asserted that he interfered, with a strong hand, in the government of Grecian

¹⁷ This story of the conduct of Demosthenes altogether might seem extravagant, but that, in his reply to Eschine, he has avoided in any degree to contradict it. Even Plutarch's zeal for democracy and admiration of tyrannicide could not carry him so far as to give his more approbation

to the public measures. An idea of gratitude due from the Athenian people to Philip, for his generosity after the battle of Chæroneia, has struck him. Otherwise he appears to have reckoned all as it should have been.

states, as, according to the imputation of Demosthenes, among some of the Thessalian cities, on inquiry it becomes evident that the violence has been that of one party of the Thessalians against another, rather than of Philip against any; for, to his lasting popularity, among a large majority of the Thessalians, testimony is ample. In Macedonia, the frequent contentions for the crown, necessarily disturbing individual security at the time, and preventive of public prosperity, nevertheless probably contributed to the preservation and improvement of general freedom. For policy would require competitors to vie in ostentation of regard for the constitution. To Philip, on his accession, such policy would be especially necessary. His three opponents were supported each by a foreign power. His own cause rested wholly on the Macedonian people; and their attachment, which finally secured him the throne against a confederacy, otherwise apparently overbearing, appears to have attended him through life. Demosthenes has evidently been aware that it would be too much, even for his ingenious policy, to separate the interest of the Macedonian people from that of their king. Despairing of means to set them against him, he has reviled all together. Once we find him telling the Athenian people that the Macedonians were not really so attached to their king as was generally supposed. By this very expression he conveys the most unsuspecting assurance that Philip's general reputation for popularity among his subjects was high. Nor could he, even on this occasion, assign a ground for the dissatisfaction of which he was desirous of impressing a belief, but the frequent calls of Philip upon his people for military service, which would interrupt their domestic enjoyments.

Violent as the spirit of party was among the Greeks, it was but in the course of things that a prince highly, and perhaps in some instances extravagantly, the favorite of one party, was the object of the most rancorous libelling for its opponents. Demosthenes, in one of his early speeches, has endeavored to obviate the extensively prevailing favorable opinions of Philip, by describing him as even contemptible; a daily drunkard, abandoning himself to amusements, the most frivolous at the same time and vicious, among companions the lowest and most unworthy; envious of superior merit, and driving it equally from his
armies,

Demosth.
or. in ejist.
Philipp.

Demosth.
Oyath 2.
p. 23.

armies, from his councils, and from his society. But the orator seems to have found this bold experiment fail; for we find no instance of his repeating it. He would afterward call Philip faithless, cruel, a barbarian; but never more a drunkard, or the companion of fools: he would represent him as an object of fear and hatred, but never again of contempt. Sometimes he would even propose him as an example for the Athenians to emulate, and sometimes, for his united advantages of regal rank and universal talent, an example beyond their reach. His abilities he acknowledges were extraordinary and his activity wonderful. He alone could unite in his own person the offices of king and minister, of treasurer and secretary, of general and soldier. Even in that very oration where he ventured to represent him as an object of contempt, he had before been holding him out to admiration. ‘The love of glory,’ he said, ‘is Philip’s ruling passion. For this he yields to no fatigue; for this he will face any danger; preferring a great reputation to all the gratifications of pleasure, in quiet and security.’ What led the orator to such contradiction seems not readily imaginable. Whether then any occasional excess in the pleasures of the table, any less decorous amusements of the court, or any kind of extravagances of youth in power, may have afforded any degree of just ground for the scandal, already noticed, following in the same speech, all remaining information is too doubtful and imperfect to give foundation even for any fair conjecture.

Demosth.
Olynth. p. 22.

Athen. l. 6.
c. 17. & l. 14.
c. 1.

Among the extant obloquy of Philip, after that of Demosthenes, a story related by Diodorus may principally deserve notice, and perhaps not the less because the honest historian speaks of it as of doubtful authority; for so it marks the fame and popularity, in his time, of tales at which even his judgement revolted; and the probability is the greater that he gives it, as appears to have been sometimes his way, much in the very words of some earlier author. After the battle of Charoneia, he says, Philip gave a feast, as was usual on occasion of a victory. Not rising from table till he had drunk to inebriety, his fancy led him then to go out among the prisoners, and joke with them insultingly on their misfortune. Among them was the Athenian orator Demades, who did not fear to reprove the victorious king, even while he

Diod. l. 16.
c. 87.

he

he was drunk. 'The story goes,' says the historian, 'that he said to him, "O king! fortune has put it in your power to be an Agamemnon: are you not then ashamed to act the part of a Thersites?" Philip, struck with the justness and elegance of the reprimand, immediately changed his whole conduct. Throwing from his head the 'chaplet' (usually worn by the antients at their feasts) 'he put an end to the revel, applauded the man who had used such freedom, and received him ever after among the companions he most honored. Becoming then, through communication with Demades, familiarized with Attic graces, he dismissed all the prisoners without ransom, and, wholly laying aside the pride of victory, sent ambassadors to Athens, to make peace and alliance.' It would hardly be supposed it could be a prince, who, according to accredited report, was bred under Epameinondas, Pelopidas and Plato, who certainly corresponded with Isocrates, entertained Leosthenes in his court, and Aristotle in his family, and having already attained the mature age of forty-six, was acknowledged the man of the most informed understanding and the politest manners of his time, whose acquisition of the Attic graces, and of the humanity which produced (what does not appear to have been an Athenian practice) the free discharge of prisoners of war, is thus attributed to the accidental meeting with an Athenian orator. Had the historian himself been of less remarkable simplicity, it might seem with the purpose of exposing the preposterous vanity of the Attic schoolmen, under the Roman empire, from whom the story apparently originated, that he proceeds immediately from this tale to a more authentic exemplification of the Attic graces, by reporting the speech of the orator Lycurgus, in accusation of Lysicles, and the condemnation and execution of that unfortunate general. But Demades, as we have formerly observed, was of the most eminent orators of the party of Phocion and Isocrates, and most decided in opposition to the political principles and projects of the party of Demosthenes and Chares. The same spirit then which led to the fable making the victory of Charoneia produce the death of Isocrates, seems to have led also to that which put reproof of Philip into the mouth of Demades; the purpose being to gain credit to the cause of Demosthenes and democracy,

by

by infusing the opinion that men of the high characters of Isocrates and Demades were friendly to it.

A story is told on the other hand, exemplifying the arrogance and levity of the character of the Athenian many in that age. When it was announced to the prisoners, made at Chæroneia, that they were all free without ransom, presuming upon Philip's celebrated generosity, they accompanied their thanks with a petition that he would give them clothes to go home in. Philip said to those about him, 'These people seem to think we have been fighting for joke:' but he nevertheless gave what they asked for. And whether the account of their presumption be strictly true or no, his generous supply of their wants is satisfactorily confirmed. Plut. vit. or. Pol. b. l. 9. p. 593.

Testimony is ample that, under Philip, the Macedonian court became the greatest resort of the polite equally and of the learned, in that age probably in the world. Aristotle did not refuse his invitation, as it is said Socrates did that of his great predecessor Archelaus. His letter to that celebrated philosopher, has been preserved, in all appearance with fidelity, by Aulus Gellius, whose remarks on the occasion may also deserve notice. 'Philip,' says that writer, tho almost continually engaged in the business of wars and victories, yet never was inattentive to polite learning, and the studies that adorn human nature. Aul. Gel. l. 9. c. 3. Ælian. l. 8. c. 15. Many of his letters have been published, replete with elegance, pleasantry and sound sense. That which, on the birth of his son, he wrote to Aristotle, I think worth transcribing, because it is so adapted to excite parents to care and diligence in the education of their children.' Reporting then the letter first in his own language, the Latin, he proceeds to say, 'Philip's own words are these,' and he adds the original Greek, which may be rendered in English thus: 'Philip to Aristotle, greeting: I desire you should know I have a son born. Greatly I thank the gods for it; and yet less for the meer circumstance that I have a son, than because it happens in the age wherein you are living. I trust that, being put under your care and instruction, he will become worthy of his birth, and of the inheritance awaiting him.' It is here fully indicated that the king had not then to make his first acquaintance with the philosopher: they were already

in habits of communication, and it seems that Aristotle had already engaged himself to undertake the office proposed for him, of superintending the education of the child, who became afterward the great Alexander. Collateral evidence also is here afforded, tending to confirm the reports transmitted, of Philip's correspondence with Plato, Theophrastus and others, eminent in the philosophical schools of Athens. With Aristotle, as a native of Stageira, a Grecian colony on the Macedonian shore, he is likely to have had previous personal acquaintance. Aristotle however, it is certain, passed many years at the Macedonian court, in the office of tutor to the prince, Alexander.

The admiration which we find Cicero expressing of Philip's published letters, must assist to increase the regret that, excepting the one preserved by Gellius, all have been lost¹⁹. But, in an age when anecdote was in vogue, the words of a prince of such singular talents, and singular fortune, and so especially celebrated for quickness and pleasantry in conversation, would be likely to be observed and recorded. Numerous sayings, ascribed to him, have accordingly been transmitted. From Plutarch we have a collection of them, among those intitled his morals; where fortunately instigation to go beyond authentic documents did not equally press as in his lives. Words spoken, however, must always be liable to be incorrectly reported, and to receive different coloring from the interest, the feeling, the fancy or the recollection of different reporters. But, of those attributed to Philip, it is observable that liberality, generosity, gratitude, benignity, good temper, in extraordinary amount, are prominent features. Some are too good and too strongly indicate their origin from the occasion, to be, in any probability, wholly fictitious. Such are his celebrated compliments to his minister, Antipater, and his general, Parmenio. Having made his council wait one day for his coming, he apologized on entering: 'I have overslept myself,' he said, 'this morning. But it is no matter;

¹⁹ Extant epistolæ Philippi ad Alexandrum, Antipatri ad Cassandrum, et Antigoni ad Philippum filium, trium prudentissimorum (sic enim accepimus) quibus præcipiunt ut oratione benigna multitudinis

animos ad benevolentiam, militesque blande appellando, deliniant.

Præclare, epistola quadam, Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione benevolentiam Macedonum consecetur, &c. M. T. Cic. de Off. l. 2.

‘for Antipater was awake.’ At another time, conversation turning upon the election of generals at Athens, ‘The Athenians,’ said Philip, ‘are a fortunate people, who can find ten generals every year. For myself, in all my life, I could never find but one, Parmenio there.’

Plutarch, from whom we have these anecdotes, has shown himself so inclined to the reverse of flattery to Philip, that it can hardly be supposed he meant to report them favorably beyond the truth. But Athenæus, who has preserved some good and many curious things, among much ineptitude and much profligacy, wanting to swell a list of royal and noble drunkards, was fortunate enough, it seems, to find, in the historical memorials published by Carystius, one of Plutarch’s anecdotes of Philip otherwise told, and in a way exactly to his purpose. We have already observed it asserted by Demosthenes, to the Athenian people, that Philip was daily drunk. When the hour of revelling came, according to Athenæus, he used to say, ‘Come, let us drink: it is enough that Antipater is sober.’

Among the frequent calls of military business, and the increased variety and magnitude of the political affairs of the Macedonian kingdom, during Philip’s reign, it would almost as little be possible, as, according to the better civil theory of modern times, it were little desirable, that the monarch should preside in the principal court of justice. Nevertheless, throughout antiquity, prejudice seems to have obtained in favor of the early system, and the execution of the judicial office by the prince in person. An old woman of Macedonia, it is said, having a cause in the king’s court, urged Philip’s personal attention to it; which he did not refuse, but excused delay, by alledging want of leisure. The woman, who may have been of high rank and large fortune, for antient language does not always distinguish such by title nor antient writers by description, provoked at length, replied, ‘If you cannot find leisure to do justice cease to be king!’ Again, it is said, an old woman pleading her own cause before him, he, with a mind always full, annoyed by the inanity of her lengthened narrative or inept arguments, engaged in conversation with some one near him; upon which the woman indignantly exclaimed, ‘I appeal!’ Philip, surprized, said, ‘Appeal! to whom?’ ‘From the king inattentive,’

she answered, 'to the king giving just attention.' But this story also has been otherwise told, after the taste of Athenæus. Philip, it is said, went to preside in his court of justice after hard drinking; and, obviously affected by it, decided the cause. The old woman, against whom the judgement was given, in such case more justly indignant, tho in circumstances less likely to profit from her remonstrance, being asked to whom she would appeal? 'From Philip drunk,' she replied, 'to Philip sober.' But it is not said that the united stimulation of reproach and wine at all deranged Philip's temper; nor does there seem to be anywhere imputed to him the purpose of denying justice or stopping the course of law.

Among Plutarch's anecdotes, Philip's expression of gratitude to the memory of Hipparchus of Eubœa, is of a kind not likely to have been invented. Discourse turning upon the death of Hipparchus, some one observed that he died at a mature age. 'Mature for himself,' said Philip, 'but too early for me; for it was before I could make him a just return for the kindnesses he had done me.' Of similar character is the speech reported of him to Philon of Thebes, to whom he had had obligations in his early youth, for which, with the large means afterward within his power, he desired to make grateful recompense. Philon perseveringly refused everything. Philip, vexed at his pertinacity, yet giving him credit for his generosity, exclaimed, 'Why will you so mar my reputation for superiority in beneficence, by keeping me so much your inferior?' At the great Olympian meeting, it seems, amid the amusements, party would show itself; and, whether Philip had horses running, or whatever furnished the opportunity, aversion toward him, in some part of the numerous assembly, was expressed by hisses. The matter being afterward mentioned in his presence, some one observed, 'that it was extraordinary behavior for the Peloponnesians, who were beholden to him for important kindnesses.' 'Oh,' said Philip, 'we must not mind such things; for what would their behavior have been if I had done them ill turns?' The malignant calumnies of the Athenian orators being mentioned before him, 'I reckon,' said Philip, 'that I have great obligation to the Athenian orators, for so compelling me to be careful of all I do and say. It must be my business,

' by

‘by my whole conduct, to prove them scandalous liars.’ After the battle of Charoncia, when measures were to be taken for profiting from the victory, and giving secure repose to Greece, some of the more violent party-men suggested, that garrisons might be put into the citadels of the adverse states, and so their quiet obedience would be insured. ‘Such harsh measures,’ said Philip, ‘might perhaps be most certainly effectual, but I prefer the reputation of being beneficent to that of being powerful.’

Consonant to these from Plutarch, is an anecdote related by Seneca, Seneca de ira, c. 23. in his treatise on Anger. In the distress of Athens, after the battle of Charonacia, occasion requiring a mission to the king of Macedonia, Demochares, one of the coarse popular orators, was appointed, with Demades and some others of a different character. What they were instructed to desire was readily granted; and when they were taking leave, Philip politely asked, ‘If there was anything more he could do for the Athenian people?’ Demochares abruptly answered, ‘Yes: hang thyself.’ Indignation broke out among those around, and among his colleagues mixed with alarm. But Philip calmed them, saying, ‘Let him alone; and only assure your fellowcountrymen that those who use such petulance are far less disposed to peace and moderation than he who forgives it.’

The extreme profligacy, among the Grecian republics of his age, to which we have observed Demosthenes himself giving the most direct testimony, is very likely to have furnished occasion for a saying attributed to Philip, which seems to have been a favorite among antient and modern writers: some fortress being spoken of as impregnable, ‘Could not an ass,’ said Philip, ‘laden with gold, get into it?’

What he may himself have done by force of gold, must ever remain, as formerly has been observed, utterly uncertain. On the other hand, that Demosthenes was the agent of Persia for the distribution of gold among the Grecian republics, in the cause adverse to that of which Philip became the patron, seems fully ascertained, by his own omission to answer Æschines on that subject; and it may seem likely that he would be occasionally met with his own weapons. But his assertion simply, obvious as the interest is which would urge him to it, cannot reasonably

reasonably be allowed more weight than the denial of Philip himself, with expressions of magnanimous scorn, in his celebrated letter to the Athenian people. As far indeed as may be gathered from documents bearing any appearance of impartiality and authenticity, Philip's passions and his policy would both be rather adverse to such a mode of succeeding in his projects. He who, with all his military power, all his military talents, all his personal courage, all his military successes, and all his desire of glory, still professed to prefer conquering by his talent for popularity and persuasion, could surely have no equal gratification in conquering by secret corruption. Nor does it seem easy to discover his want of it. On the contrary, if we should trust his own declaration of his sentiments, as they were expressed and urged, not only in his public letter to the Athenian people, where his own testimony in his own favor will of course be liable to exception, but in written advice to his son Alexander, (and it is to Cicero's approving admiration of them we owe the account) they were very adverse to such a policy.

M.T. Cic. de
Off. l. 2.

Some modern writers, admitting, not only the liberal words, but also the generous deeds ascribed to Philip, have not simply followed the adverse orator, but outgone him, in imputing all to sinister purposes. The policy, for the orator, is obvious; the fairness, or the reasonableness, for his followers, not so; unless they would avow themselves careless of the praise of good, and the reproach of evil deeds, the credit of which such practice goes directly to confound, and indeed to make all virtue among men suspicious and doubtful. Its evil tendency, both in morality, and in politics, is glaring.

It has been liberally observed, by some French writers, to the credit of the English character, that, tho nowhere party contentions have been more continual, or civil wars more frequent than in England, yet nowhere has the violence of such contest been equally kept within the bounds of reason and humanity. Nevertheless, even in England, the violence of party divisions led the excellent Addison, not writing with party but with moral and philanthropical purposes, to some observations which, as applicable wherever party rages, and not least to Greece in Philip's age, may well deserve notice here. 'A furious party
' spirit,'

‘ spirit,’ he says, ‘ even when under its greatest restraint, breaks out in falsehood, detraction, and calumny: it fills a nation with spleen and rancor, and extinguishes all seeds of goodnature, compassion and humanity.—A man of merit, holding different political principles, is like an object seen in two different mediums, that appears crooked or broken, however strait and intire it may be in itself. For this reason there is scarce a person of any figure in England, who does not go by two contrary characters, as opposite to oneanother as light and darkness.—There is one piece of sophistry practised on both sides; and that is the taking any scandalous story, that has ever been whispered or invented, for a known undoubted truth, and raising suitable speculations upon it. Calumnies, that have been never proved or often refuted, are the ordinary postulatus of these infamous scriblers, upon which they proceed as upon first principles, granted by all men; though in their hearts they know they are false, or at best very doubtful.’

Spectator,
n. 125.

An exemplification occurs in a debate before a congress in Greece, reported by Polybius, in which the character of Philip king of Macedonia is introduced. One orator begins with stating, as a manifest truth, on which he might safely found his reasoning without danger of contradiction, that Philip, beginning with the Thessalians, reduced Greece to servile subjection. His opponent replies, as confidently, that Philip was notoriously the vindicator of the liberties, of Thessaly especially, but of all Greece. The former, in proceeding with his argument, unable to deny Philip’s magnanimous liberality to Athens, after the battle of Chæroneia, nevertheless, with the malignity of party-spirit, so justly reprobated by Addison, denies him all credit for virtuous purposes: the will, he asserts, was bad, tho the deeds were all beneficent and praiseworthy. For better foundation, however, for invective, he hastens from Athens, to seek evil deeds elsewhere; and in Laconia, he says, lands were wasted, houses demolished, and even towns and territories taken from Lacedæmon, under Philip’s direction. But even here the admission follows, that those towns and territories were not taken by Philip for himself, but given, (or, perhaps, rather restored,) to the Argians, Tegcans, Megalopolitans, and Messenians;

Polyb. l. 9.
p. 561.

and toward all these, it seems allowed, Philip's purposes, as well as his deeds, were beneficent. The other orator then replies triumphantly thus: 'Granted; Philip did send an army into Laconia²⁰. But it is ' enough known, the Lacedæmonians here present know²¹, that it was ' not his desire to interfere: on the contrary, invited, and repeatedly ' urged, by his friends and allies in Peloponnesus, he with difficulty ' yielded in any degree to their solicitations and remonstrances. Nor, ' when at length he did take up the business, was it to use his power, ' tho ample, to subdue or to injure any; but, as a beneficent mediator, to ' repress the violence of his friends, while he struck awe into their ' enemies, and so brought both to submit their controversies to a ' peaceful arbitration. Even then he did not assume to himself the ' decision, but he referred it to a congress of all Greece; and such ' was the conduct which it has been proposed to stigmatize, as matter ' for complaint and reproach among the Greeks!'

There is a remarkable passage of Cicero, not in the torrent of an oration to the Roman people, but in the sober course of his great moral work, where wanting, for illustration of his argument, a character alike illustrious and worthy, he has chosen the prince who has been now so long here the subject of discourse. 'Philip, king of ' Macedonia, he says, in magnitude of exploits, and splendor of glory, ' was excelled by his son; in affability and humanity he was far ' superior. Hence Alexander's conduct was often most shameful, but ' Philip was always great.' By this splendid eulogy, of few words, Cicero certainly meant to refer the recollection of his own son, whom he was addressing, to historical memorials, then extant, tho now unknown.

But the judgement of Polybius, for his double advantage, of having lived among the dying republics of Greece, and conversed afterward in friendship with the greatest men of Rome, may be reckoned even above Cicero's. That, in his report of the controversy about Philip's

M. T. Cic.
de Off. l. 1.

²⁰ Παρίητο μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. p. 566.
The import of this phrase has been considered in a note at the end of the fourth section of the thirty-eighth chapter of this history.

²¹ ἡμῖς ἴσμεν. The speech was especially addressed to the Lacedæmonian members of the congress.

conduct, his own sentiments went with the argument of the replying orator, seems sufficiently evident; but, might there be doubt, it is obviated in another passage of his history, where, like Cicero, wanting the example of a great and worthy character, he speaks, in his own person, of Philip, thus: ‘The victory over the Athenians, at Charoneia, promoted Philip’s greatness, and the power and splendor of his kingdom, less through the deed of arms, than through the humanity and generosity which he displayed after it. By the former he overcame those arranged in the field against him. By the latter he conquered all the Athenians, so that their republic became in a manner his own. Not allowing resentment to influence his measures, he carried the work of war so far only as to command opportunity for using clemency and goodness. He released all his prisoners without ransom; he clothed most of them; he did honor to the slain, sending their bones in procession to Athens, with Antipater commanding. Altogether he so astonished and captivated the minds of the Athenians by his generous magnanimity, that, from enemies, they became allies, devoted to his service. The experienced statesman-historian, it is evident, here uses the term ‘the Athenians’ in the common manner of Grecian writers, calling those ‘the Athenians,’ and even ‘all the Athenians,’ whom he thought most deserving the title, without notice of the powerful opposition, under the lead of Chares, Lysurgus and Demosthenes.

Polyb. l. 5.
p. 559.

Under the shadow then of these splendid testimonies, of such high authority, the humbler word of the annalist, whose assistance, in failure of others, it has been so often necessary to use, not always judicious, but always apparently to the best of his judgement just, may not ill conclude this part of the history. Having related the death of Philip, he proceeds, ‘Thus fell the greatest potentate of his time in Europe. With very small resources in his outset, he acquired the most powerful monarchy that had ever existed among the Greeks. His great success arose, less from the force of his arms and the greatness of his victories, than from the studious exercise of his extraordinary talent for communication among men, and his obliging disposition and conduct. He is said to have reckoned the valor of the fighting soldier, often as he had made it conspicuous in himself, not matter for

Diod. l. 16.
c. 95.

' the superior officer to glory in. Military science and the power of
' discourse, the general's skill and the talent of discussion, persuasion
' and conciliation, he esteemed together princely. Upon the latter he
' chiefly valued himself; for he used to say, "the merit of success in
" battles he could only share with those who fought under him, but his
" victories by argument, affability and beneficence, were all his own."

END OF THE FOURTH VOLUME.

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
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
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 128. l. 4. *for* he *read* Dionysius.
 132. l. 27. *after* he *had* been *a* sort *made*.
 133. in the note, *for* enim *ne* read *enim ne e*.
 135. l. 26. *quæ* the *wilds* death of the *wilds* of Dion and of the *elder* Dionysius.
 159. l. 7. *after* single *chefs* *insert* death of the *wilds* of Dion and of the *elder* Dionysius.
 167. l. 25. *for* Metapontium *read* Metapontum.
 181. in the note, *for* ἀχαριστία *read* ἀχαριστοσύνη.
 185. last line, *for* affords *read* afford.
 186. in the note, *for* obstineret *read* obtineret.
 195. in the note, *for* Διονυσίη *read* Διονυσία.
 216. in the note, *for* questio *able* *read* questionable.
 240. l. 24. *for* interprize *read* enterprize.
 288. l. 4. *for* Perinthus *read* Alopecconesus.
 292. l. 16. *for* reddily *read* readily; and l. 19. *for* Amodocus *read* Amadocus.
 293. l. 12. *for* redliness *read* readiness.
 294. l. 22. *for* redly *read* ready.
 300. l. 13. *for* reddily *read* readily.
 303. l. 12. *for* redly *read* ready.
 310. l. 6. *for* these *read* those.
 317. l. 8. *for* habiliments *read* habiliments.
 333. in the note, *for* accusaverunt prorsus *read* accusaverunt: prorsus.
 346. in the note, *for* ephor *read* ephors; and *for* succession *read* successors.
 398. l. 23. *after* But *read* the.
 413. l. 26. *for* governments *read* government.
 422. in the note, *for* *.* *read* Note 5, referred to this place from p. 420.
 423. l. 17. of the first column, *for* n'u *read* n'a.
 433. in the quotation from Horace, in the note, *for* numeribus *read* muneribus.
 439. l. 27. *for* Peiræus *read* Peiræus.
 454. in the note, *for* μισθός *read* μισθοῦς.
 457. l. 4. *for* to Macedonia *read* from Macedonia.
 511. l. 4. *for* Amyntus *read* Amyntas.
 515. in the note, *for* etrincele *read* etincelle.
 516. l. 20. *for* pursuing of their own *read* pursuing their own.
 518. l. 18. *for* Orcus *read* Oreus.
 519. l. 15. *for* ocured *read* occurred.
 528. l. 9. *for* Phocian's *read* Phocion's.
 565. in the note, *for* δογματῶν *read* δογματων.
 568 & 569. *for* concurring in sentiment Isocrates *read* concurring in sentiment with Isocrates.
 584. l. 3. from the bottom, *for* then *read* than.
 612. l. 7. of the first column, *for* quinquennium *read* quinquennium.
 613. l. 1. of the second column, *for* reipublicæ *read* reipublicæ.
 — l. 3. *after* the word Athenensium, *for* a full stop a comma.
 614. l. 23. of the second column, *for* theoretical *read* theoretical.
 619. l. 25. *for* assassin, *read* assassin.





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